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Human nature Is doubly ampfiibious, and politics, consequently,
has a doubly "transcenden Lai " function to perform. On the one hand,
man is both "agentic" and "communal," ot once the "socicl individual"
and the " soci a 1 Individual." But sociality, even a "tensional'' social-
ity, does not exhaust human nature; man bears at the core of his human
being a relationship to Be I ng-i)S-such , transcendental reality, a rea 1 -
i ss i mum "beyond" the being of the created universe. Politics, in the
widest sense the perennial effort to sustain and promote meaningful
order in history for concrete societies, involves, therefore, ^irst
of all the pragmatic imperative to mediate the relationship of the
individual citizen to the order of the v/hole political community; and
secondly, the larger task of representing In history a transcendental
order of "truth," via the primary constitutive symbolisms in which the
life of society moves, for the members of that comniunity.
This thesis, expounded explicitly in a central (fourth) chapter,
is the framework from which the other Four chapters of the disserta-
tion draw their sense. The first chapter attempts an Interpretation
of the current "crisis of legitimacy" in American politics as a
spiritual crisis brouglu on by a failed attempt at "secular transcend-
ence" manifesting in the forms of an ant i -pol I t i cal individualism and
the spiritually perverted concup i scent i al urge to realize a material
millennium. Chapter Two is a critique of Marx's political thought;
Marx, I argue, is also ant i -pol i t i cal insofar as the ideal of "commu-
nist man" eliminates the two "tensions" essential to human being--
the necessarily incomplete integration of the individual agent into
the social totality, and the inherently anxious relationship of man
to God. The tliird chapter sympathetically analyzes Hegel's theory
of state and citizenship; sympathetically because among modern political
thinkers Hegel most self-consciously addresses, albeit in the typically
synthetic fashion of the identity philosophy, the douby dualistic
nature of human being. A fiftfi and final chapter affirmatively ex-
plores the thesis that Western civilization as a whole is, a? N'ietzsche
said, in the grip of a nihilistic dialectic engendered by the disin-
tegration of Christian culture. An Appendix, related to the analysis
of Chapter 1, addresses certain dimensions of the individualist legacy
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INTRODUCTION
Only one star still shines, the inner star of Spirit. ...It
is natural that, thus alone. Spirit is assa i 1 ed . . . by dread;
it is as yet unknown where everything leads, where one will
end. Among the things vanished are many which one would
not surrender at any price. But in this solitude they
have not yet been reconstituted. And it is uncertain
whether they will be found again and given back.
--Hegel
Our beginnings do not know our ends. I undertook the p.'esent
work with a single guiding conception: that the "essence" of the poli-
tical, and the nature of c i t i Z3nsii i p , uas best grasped in terms of
the unity in tension of "particularity" and "universality," or, as I
translated the terms for my own purposes, "agency" and "commun ' on ."
The preeminent task of politics was to i ntegrat(j/.-ned i ate the two poles,
in the process neither repressing nor denigrating either. For man, I
thought, simply _i5_ amphibious, at once the social individual and tiie
social individual. Via the mode of citizenship, the (ideally) mediates
his own dual nature, participating in the se 1 f-co,^scious , "rational"
sphere of commonality that is the proper aim of the genuine political
commun i ty
.
Hardly a shattering or original insight. I was nonetheless
sure that the reaffirmation of this hoary truth was not only "the"
critical interpretative key to politics, both theoretical and practi-
cal, but would moreover go a long way in the work of reconstructing an
ideal of meaningful citizenship in an American political culture
devastated by the effects of liberal individualist Ideology. The
1
2proof would be an expositional pudding proceeding from a sympathetic
rendering of Hegel's Phi losophy of Right
;
through a critique of American
liberalism (an "individualist derailment" from ambiverse human being
that demeaned the political community to the greater glory of an ab-
stracted, "autonomous" individual) and Marxian communism (a "derailment"
that went in precisely the other direction, absorbing the individual in
e tens i on- 1 ess , undifferentiated Utopian concept of "social man") as
anti -pol i ti cal theories of policies and citizenship; to, finally, a
speculative account of a properly differentiated, mediatory political
orde r.
The reader will discover that I remain far from abandoning these
iientiments and ambitions. As tlie work progressed, however, it became
increasingly apparent that I war not in fact encompassing the intended
field of inquiry. SDmething fundamental was lacking. Indeed, how to
account for the most fundamental of facts: that politics, that is,
politics in its full breadth, is the concern for col lecti ve meaning?
Political order is rot limited to keeping the peace. Rather it repre-
sents, articulates, sustains, and promotes mean i ng- i n- h i s tory , the
"value of" and "reason foi" existence for the members of the political
community. V/ithout the substantial substructure of "meaning," state,
politics and c i t i zensh i p -- the whole task of mediating agency and
communion--would be a hollow superstructure, devoid of significance.
That this is so seemed clear enough in Hegel, for whom the state
is above all else the representative of the "Idea" in history:
the
citizen self of the individual is his link not only to the
state qua
3mundane organizational entity, but to the ultimate reality of Reason,
the Truth in all its fullness and plenitude of metaphysical Being. The
same truth could be found in Marx and liberalism, if in perhaps an in-
verted form and less obviously so. For the state Marx of course self-
consciously substitutes the "universal" proletarian class, which will
in fact establish ultimate historical truth through the cre£it i ve/destuc-
tive disestablishment of the "alienated" state. The specifically
political is thus supplanted by ant i -pol i t i cal socio-economic forces;
but in all essentials the "human condition," in the sense of the strug-
gle for fundamental meaning in history, persists. For liberalism too:
though here the sentiment is prominently conservative, at least in the
early phases of liberalism, and altogether unsel f-conscious . The
consciousness of principles has been lost, as 1 iberal ism assumes a
structure of secularized Christian meaning, i.e. Christianity subjected
to the Renaissance and Reformation mediation, which it loyally repre-
sents in its political practice. In each case, then, it seemed clear
that constitutive theoretical symbols were suffused with an "ultimate"
s i gn i f i cance
.
A further aspect of the question of meaning now emerged: that is,
the original religious, or more generally, "transcendental," source
of
primary meaning symbolisms, identifiable even after centuries of
secular/
ontological overlay. Thus for Hegel the spiritual irruption of
Christi-
anity is the most critical event for modern Western
culture. !t is
an essential determination of an a 1
1
-encompass i ng Reason in which
nothing is lost; hence even post-Enlightenment culture,
he believes,
an
will and must remain essentially, if secularly, "Christian." For
Marx Christiani.ty, like all religion, is reduced to a species of "alien-
ation"; but the selfsame Feuerbachian "transformation" that underlies
this reductionist interpretation guarantees that the primary Marxian
symbolisms will remain Judaeo-Chr i st i an analogues: in place of the Gar-
den of Eden/Fa 1 1 /Redempt i on symbolism, one finds the surrogate "primi-
tive communism"/"al ienation"/"communism" qua fully "human history,"
etc. For the Christian drama of salvation through "conversion," the
soul's opening to God, Marx substitutes, in Henri de Lubac's phrase,
the "drama of atheistic humanism," sel f-sal v£t i on through self-trans-
formation: in short, the totalistic (as against Hegel's more limited
and ambiguous) immanentization of the Christian eschaton. With early
liberalism the substitution is not nearly sc drastic; indeed, it need
only go so far as the replacement of one kind or Christianity with
another: individualized, "subjective" Christian'ty for the objective,
institutionalized Christianity of the universal Church; "liberal" and
"protestant" are not commonly conjoined adjectives for no good reason.
V/ith the increasing secularization of liberalism che situation of course
becomes more complicated. But despite the complexity, a strand of
continuity (certainly not noticed for the first time by me) seemed clear
enough. Secular, "enlightened" liberal categories, such as "Progress"
(transmogrified Christian Providence) and autonomous "Reason" (the
Augustinian coqnitio fidea with "'faith" now either lopped off or swing-
ing freely), are fundamental not only to the Hegelian synthesis of
religious substance and secular advance, but to the forthright Marxian
5immanent i zat ion : Comte's "Religion of Humanity" for example was first
articulated by America's own enlightened Tom Paine; and without some-
thing like it Marxian socialist humanism is unimaginable. in sum: the
fact of fifteen hundred years of uninterrupted Christian culture, in
which the meaning of the full scope of human existence was symbolically
articulated, and the subsequent secularization of that culture, in which
originally transcendental sentiments and symbols assume various intra-
mundane guises, emerge as the central empirical facts to be addressed
by modern political analysis.
Man himself now emerges as 'lot only an amphibious being in the
"social" sense suggested above; he must further be conceived as a
"metaxic" being, as Plato first said, and Eric Voegelin has much more
recently affirmed. V.'hether or not he realizes it consciously, man's
fate is to live in and address himself to the anxiety of the " I n-Between
,"
the area of being in which transcendence and immanence make contact, but
never fuse, where the human consciousness serves as the vehicle for the
process of reality becomeing luminous to itself, but where that same
consciousness can n?.ver "know" fully that same process. As Voegelin
has it, man's constant effort is to apprehend the "ground" of his being
and to express his understanding of his relationship to the ground in




politics in the broadest, and yet most fundamental, sense. The history
of politics is, thus, at once the history of meaning and the meaning
of
history insofar as it may be descried by the inquiring eye of the
philosophical consciousness.
6The five studies presented here all revolve around this revised
notion of human, nature and the human condition, if not exactly equi-
distantly. Chapter Four, in this sense the central chapter, expounds
the thesis explicitly, in terms of two interrelated "dualities" that
comprise the structure of human belng--the old "agent i c/communal" dual-
ity now coupled with the idea of the " i n-betv/eenness" of man in the ten-
sion of "transcendence" and "existence." Chapter Five occupies the or-
bit nearest these twin interpretative stars; there 1 argue, accepting
much of the Nietzschean analysis but not its conclusions, that the
breakup of Christian culture has plunged Western political order into a
nihilistic crisis which only a reaffirmation of our humanity under God
can "solve." Chapter One is perhaps the next closest, in which I at-
tempt to analyze the current "crisis of legitimacy" in American politics
as the result of "individualism" on the one hand, and "secularism" on
the other. The chapter on Marx's political theory, Chapter Two, in-
cludes the observations made above; the central thrust, however, falls
on the earlier interpretation of Marx's political thought as "anti-
political" because of its "communal derailment." Chapter Three, on
Hegel's theory of the state and citizenship, paradoxically puts the
least direct emphasis on the "transcendental/existential" tension. This
is partly because the chapter, like the chapter on Marx, was drafted
when the "agent i c/communa 1 " tension was foremost in my mind. Primarily,
however, it is because I have yet to work sufficiently through the
many
corrplex issues involved In Hegel's metaphysical sublimation
of religion
to commit myself to any but the most general of suggestions.
7The issue of man's real or imagined relationship to "Being" is
one on which it is extremely difficult, if not ultimately impossible,
not to "take sides." The more or less precise nature of the side I
have taken v/ill be evident upon a reading of the text. But it would
be dishonest of me to claim certainty as to the "metaxic" condition of
man as I develop it. As it stands, the argument goes at least two steps
(one small and one rather large) beyond the demands of available evi-
dence. This is to say that at least three distinct positions seem to me
to be logically compatible with the fact that man has heretofore sought
to secure mean ing- in-hi story through contact with a transcendental real -
I ss I mum:
1) It is a fact , it might be argued, that man has, and does, imag-
ine his existence to have transcendental significance; and that he has
and does, therefore, attempt to secure the meaning of existence through
exploration of the so-called "tension to the ground." It may, further,
even be true that we, heirs to the symbol i zat i ons of Christian culture
whether we like it or not, would not recognize o mankind that did not
attempt to articulate his meaning in this "transcendental" mode. But,
and this is the important point, we can imagine a future mankind that
did not so concern itself; a mankind simply not worried about the "mean-
ing of life," "ultimate destiny," "salvation," etc,
2) There is indeed "something," It might again be said, about the
human condition as such that compels man to invest life with a unifying
purpose and overarching meaning. What H. G. Wells once called the
"synthetic motive" is indeed basic; a mankind without this motive would
8not be manki nd--not only not a mankind vie_ cound not recognize, but not
"mankind" at all. However, that this is so says nothing in itself about
the truth value of the various symbolisms that claim to derive from the
experience of Being and so supposedly express the meaning of existence.
Man requires the solace of tran5cendental meaning; but perhaps the solace
he finds is always a f al
s
e solace. He needs the "truth" of various "hori-
zons" of meaning; but perhaps there quite simply are no ultimate truths,
no final horizons. Afte'' all, it is man himself who creates these
"truths" and erects these horizons; (though this is not to deny that
there are limits to, inellminable conditions of, his creativity). it
is at least possible, if not extremely likely, that he deceives himself
whenever he allows the anxiety of existence to push him into embracing
one or another "religion," whether it be a genuinely transcendent reli-
gion, as for example Christianity, or a "secular religion," as, e.g.,
the ideology of Progress, or Nationalism, etc. The mangod and the God-
man are--perhaps sadly, but, alas, perhaps truly--equal ly fantastic
imag i n i ngs
.
3) "God exists."
The first position is of little interest in the present context,
•
Though logically tenable in the abstract, it Is exper i en t i a 1 1 y vacuous,
and positively non-rational insofar as it cuts off any further
dis-
cussion of human nature by denying any and all content to the
category
of "essence." Political science falls into impotent
silence before
the assertion of man's radical freedom.
9onThe second position is far from vacuous, however. Indeed,
rational grounds that it would admit, I believe it unanswerable; any
answer must ultimately rely on some version of the cognitio fidea--one
must bel i eve first in order to "know," experience the "conversion" that
is at once conviction. 1 in fact attempt (in a rudimentary way) such
an argument, based on the analysis of Plato's Gorgias and Protagoras ,
at the conclusion of the last chapter. But I am certain, or near cer-
tain, that the skeptical attitude of position (2) will remain uncon-
vinced by it; for it is on the disputed ground itself that one is forced
to take a stand.
This is probably as it must be: that faith, never at peace with
the rambunctious reason, is the i nd i spens i bl e foundation for all primary
values. "Hope that is seen is not hope, for who hopeth for that which
he seeth?" (Romans S:2k) Ontol og i ca 1 1 y , the substance of meaning is to
be found nowhere but in faith. Ep i s temol og i call y , there is no
"proof"
for the "unseen things" of value but this selfsame faith.
Along this
single thread moves the meaning of human life.
C H A P T E R I
THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP
You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satis-
fied their desires, and people say that they have made
the city great, not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated
condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder
statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbors
and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have
left no room for justice and temperance.
--Plate, Gorg i .3s
A "crisis" of the American citizenship is no new phenomenon. In
the sense of a widespread want of meaningful membership in a democratic
political order, this crisis has long been a well established faCt.
Comparing the American membership to a "classical" ideal of active parti-
cipation in an order of meaning and being t ranscemJ i ng the particularity
of non-public life, such otherwise diverse theorists as Michael Walzer,
Sheldon V/olin, Hannah Arendt, Robert Pranger, Theodore Lowi
,
Joseph
Tussman, Carole Pateman, Dennis Thompson, Frank Coleman, and Darryl Bas-
kin ^ (among others) have all, in one way or another, established beyond
doubt two points: (l) that "participation" in the American polity is at
a shamefully low level; and (2) that the gual i ty of available partici-
pation is in any case quite poor. The charges are familiar: Too many
are shut out of the system; more are apathetic. Most significantly,
prevailing political perspectives are narrow, short-sighted and self-
regarding. In the crucible of the bargaining culture, where the bottom
line seems always to be the buck, the genuinely "common"--the noble will
to things public--has seldom failed to run a poor second to the "private"
10
11
--the insatiable and altogether inglorious thirst for individualistic
satisfaction.
It is, of course, hardly a stunning revelation to be told once
more that American culture in general, and political culture in parti-
cular, remains strongly "liberal," "individualistic," "capitalistic"
ideolog ical ly--even as the fact of contemporary existence (organiza-
tion, socialization, corporat i srn, mass i f i ca t i on
,
etc.) unceasingly con-
tinue to strip away the truth value of what is essentially a Renais-
sance-Refomat i on-En n ghten.nent wel tanshauung . But history is a harsh
mistress. If by ignoring it in our analyses we are not doomed to repeat
it, we shall certainly have to settle for being wrong--for, at the very
least, missing important dimensions of the reality we address with our
already feeble enougn conceptual resources. Thus the so often embar-
rassing compulsion to repeat the obv i ous-- that , for example, "indivi-
dualism" has devalued the American citizenship to the point where it is
appropriate to speak, with only a slight hint of hyperbole, of a "crisis"
of citizenship.
There is now, however, a "new" crisis afoot. The "old" crisis of
citizenship remains intact, to be sure; in fact it is painfully exacer-
bated by the "new." But something has changed. In the old days of
revealing, reviling, and resisting the ills and corruptions of the re-
glme--the privatism, the conformism and authoritarianism, the crass
materialism, the elitism and inequality, the "p 1 u ra 1 i sm"-- i t was seldom,
if ever, doubted that the regime was, at least in the eyes of the citi-
zenry as a whole, "legitimate." True: "virtue" might be slack, politi-
12
cal consciousness low, political education little more than paper thin,
"patriotic" propaganda, participation beyond casting the occasional
ballot the exception rather than the rule. An isolated left could rail
till hoarse against politically promoted ruling class rip-offs and the
repression of dissidence and the underclasses; a feverish right might
rampage against the liberal engineered perversion of traditional values,
and stockpile weapons for the last stand against the international com-
rrunist conspiracy. But who could doubt seriously that "the system
worked?" "Free Enterprise," faults and all, was firmly in the saddle.
Pragmatic, Lockean liberal democracy, as Louis Hartz told us, was the
only "tradition" America knew. (Daniel Boorstin denied even Locke; but
claimed the lack of theoretical tradition as America's strength, its
"genius.") Perhaps short on promoting justice and the public interest,
the Republic was long (long enough at least) on legitimacy. Its pur-
chase on the identities and loyalties of the citizenry was unquestion-
able.
.No longer. Now it is widely evident that American society exists
in a state of permanent "crisis," which the population is not at all
confident its political representatives can solve. A panoply of mina-
tory ills plague the social body, comprising a pernicious pattern of
lethal autointoxication: at the most pragmatic level, pollution, crime,
unemployment, inflation, waste, etc.; and gnawing at the very vitals of
the culture, the deterioration of values, a disintegration of communal
forms, the frightening eschalation of "alienation" and nihilistic ten-
dencies, etc. Yet even where the diagnosis is clear, the prognosis
is
13
poor. The Republic appears to have lost its rudder. Problems that are
everywhere recognized as in dire need of solution go unsolved; many go
untackled in even the most inadequate way. Not only does the pragmatic
political effectiveness of leadership appear lacking; worse, its spirit-
ual and moral strength approaches nil. "Whither do we move? Away from
all suns?" The unspoken question is everywhere on unformed lips. The
most evident phenomenon is the hard but simple truth: the ruling class
cannot rule. There results a crisis of credibility, a crisis of confi-
dence, a crisis of "legitimacy," as disaffection from 'z^e hapless state
emerges as a rational response, and cynicism supplants the slim vestiges
of civic virtue surviving the onslaught of individualism.
My aim here will be to address the crisis of American citizenship
and politics, in both the "old" and "new" dimensions, from a standpoint
that recognizes as fundamental a widescale, long-term disintegration of
Western c i v i 1 i zat i ona 1 (specifically political) "meaning", end which at-
tempts to situate the uniqueness of the American experience against the
backdrop of this general disintegration. We can initiate this effort in
no better way than by considering in some detail the sensitive and cogent
analysis of Professor William Connolly's recent paper, "The State and
2
the Public Interest." An appreciation of the values and faults of this
analysis will hopefully provide a sound starting point for our own in-
vestigation.
14
Connol ly's Analysis of the "Legitimacy Crisis"
Professor Connol ly' s argument owes its power to the interrelation
of its three component dimensions: (l) a specifically political per-
spective that affirms the reality of the "public interest" and the auto-
nomy of the political will which strives to realize that interest; (2) a
political economic perspective sensitive to the structurally constrain-
ing impact of the corporate capitalist system on welfare state policy
formation; (3) a perception of social reality as interrelated structures
of conventional social neanings, intersubjecti vely shared by participants
in that reality. Neither the state nor the economic institutions are
considered as "objective" entities completely "other" to the conscious-
ness of the participants.
The three dimensions are presented as nicely integrated and mutually
supportive. Connolly wishes to promote a version of the socialist "idea"
as the proper response to the legitimacy crisis. But against some
strains of less reflective radical theorizing, he knows that the idea
of the public interest, at once promoted by the law-making power of the
state and supported by th'i "virtuous" behavior of a citizenry whose
very identity is in part shaped l)y this idea, is basic to purposive,
meaning-sustaining politics.
The authority of the state, its legitimate use of coercion,
its war making powers, its accountab i 1 i ty . . . to citizens,
even the question of citizen rights against it, all these
prerogatives and concerns take on particular importance
cause state institutions are supposed to promote the public
i nterest , not by accident (as the market was thought to do)




On the other hand, the public Interest is far from the product of sheer
will. In the first place, the relationship of state and public interest
is mediated by structural Imperatives of the productive organization;
any realistic analysis of the political regime's legitimacy must consid-
er the rationality of what is in fact a t r i ad i c--s tate
,
public interest,
economy— relationship: that Is to say, the ability of the state to ef-
fectively promote the public Interest given the prevailing terms of re-
lationship between state and economy. Moreover, both the state and the
economic structure, as well as the specific content of the public inter-
est itself, are "permeated" by a complex range of i ntersubj ect i ve mean-
ings constitutive of the broadly social Identities of the citizenry.
The range of meanings relevant to the analysis is that which has for a
long time constituted the American "culture of work"— among these, "the
interdependent structures of instrumental work, material incentives,
labor mobility and bargaining."
This close fitting analytic structure provides the foundation for
elucidating and explaining the crisis of legitimacy, and thereby the
standard for criticizing less adequate accounts. Immediately, the
state/economy relationship looms large In the foreground. For the cri-
sis of legitimacy is in the first place a crisis of the modern welfare
state. The dilemma of the v;elfare state may be stated thus:
The welfare state looks in two directions at tha same time.
First, dependent upon the privately Incorporated economy for
tax revenues, the welfare state must provide it with directly
expensive subsidies and indirectly expensive permissions to
fuel economic growth. Meanwhile, the corporate system, un-
accountable to any public constituency, generates a prolifer-
ating set of social costs and burdens ("side effects") in the
pursuit of private profit. Second, the welfare state, formally
16
accountable to a public constituency, is thereby expected to
relieve the most onerous burdens imposed upon citizens by
that growth. The strain on its resources in responding to
each -imperat i ve is accentuated by: l) the economic effects of
its own growth in size; 2) the proliferation within this
framework of opposing demands pressed upon it first by em-
ployers in the state, corporate, and market sectors and second
by employees in each sector; 3) the narrow range of policy
options available to it within the established order in res-
ponding to these pressures (pp. 56-57).
The "private" economy unceasingly generates needs and problems which the
state is then expected to meet. it is a rational expectation in so far
as the state is, abstractly, responsible for the welfare of the polity
as a whole, but quite irrational in so far as the state is not allowed
--prevailing ideology and power arragements being what tney are--to tam-
per fundamentally and concretely with the cause oF the "burdens and
social cost," the structure of the corporate system itself.
There results what we may call a "performance" crisis of the first
magnitude. The state must finance Its many welfare functions. Prohib-
ited from developing its own profit making enterprises, however, its only
financial options are deficit spending and taxation. Deficit spending
is limited by the inflation it generates; and so the state must tax
ever more. But a point is reached (obviously reacned and surpassed some
time ago in fact) at which the burden becomes inordinate in comparison
to the benefit the taxpayer receives, and as problems continue to pro-
liferate while the public interest is neglected and the quality of life
declines, the willing support of the citizenry for state policies Is
withdrawn.
Unfortunately, both liberals and radicals are, in different ways,
apt to misinterpret the real nature of this crisis. Liberals
erroneously
17
accept the various aspects of corporate structure "as brute facts, as
facts that are natural, unchangeable and outside the purview of politi-
3
cal theory," Thus, even where certain liberal analyses, such as Lowi's
The End of Liberal Ism
,
are able to comprehend certain dimensions of the
crisis, they miss the critical causa.l significance of the economic
structure; they are "struck at the level of appearance" (p. 57). Radi-
cals, though well versed In economic analysis, for their part fail to
comprehend the intrinsic connection between the state and the public In-
terest, and therefore the way In which civic vlrtue--the support of the
cit'zenry for state policies general ly-- Is being progressively under-
mined and diminished by the state's failure to uphold the public inter-
est against the irretlonal exig'^ncles of the productive system. Radical
analyses (the specific e>;a,Tiple Is O'Connor's The Fiscal Crisis of the
State ) are thus ten^pted to adopt an uncritical belief that "the deepen-
ing crisis of the welfare state provides a boon to socialist thought and
practice" (p. 68). A socialist himself, Professor Connolly stresses
this point strenuously: wliat leftists miss (along with most liberals) is
the "inner rationality In the citizen's loyalty to the state, in the
patriotism of the citizen" (p. 69). As a result of this theoretical
myopia, which overlooks the oower of the "idea" of the state, radicals
may be surp'-ised to find that patriotism "might become more tenacious
just when a particular set of state officials, policies, and long range
programs are subject to the most intense repudiation." Though paradoxi-
cal, such a development would be rational. "If the state is the only
institution that can consciously pursue justice and the public interest.
18
if it is the repository of common meanings and aspirations, the people
identify themselves in part through their ties to the state. Their
collective freedom, their ability to exert control over their common
lives, is embodied in the state" (p. 69). In a crunch, the citizenry
might well rally to defend the state against the apparent threat (the
left) to their collective "freedom." On the othei' hand, should the
progressive erosion of civic virtue continue unchecked, a left in power
V/ould find itself incapable of marshalling the civic energies neces-
sary to carry through the sweeping social changes it envisions. The
very cynicism regarding state purposes it had helped to promote would
then have damaged in advance its own legitimacy. (We can only tremor
£t the thought of the scapegoat i ng-- the frantic efforts to root out the
class enemies--that would then be all too likely to follow.)
Clearly, the crisis of "performance" is more than a pragmatic cri-
sis in a strict and narrow sense. More is involved, however, than even
the state-public interest connection, abstractly considered. For the
public interest, though it has a non-specific, "universal" or "ideal,"
dimension, is no mere abstract entity. In historical practice it de-
rives its content from the structures of value and meaning that com-
prise the social substance in general. And so we penetrate to the deep-
est level of the legitimacy crisis. Professor Connolly suggests, only
when we grasp the essential fact that the United States ;s today ex-
periencing major changes in prevailing "patterns of social meaning, as-
piration and motivation."^ The constitutive structures of "instrumental
work, material incentives, labor stratification, bureaucratic rationality.
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economic growth, and private profit" (p. 59), the incentives "to work,
consume, bargain, and politic" (p. 6l) have themselves entered a state
of decomposition. This is a profound development of enormous conse-
quence. As the structures collapse, so do the mainstays of collective
values, aspirations, identifications; for these
institutional relations were partly constituted by the inter-
subjective understandings required to sustain them; they were
energized by the collective aspirations of those whose iden-
tities were interwoven with the purposes they serve. They
shaped us and we shaped them in our pursuit of a corr.mon good
or a common dream: an affluent society with leisure and free
time for all. The daily activities and public policies of each
generation were infused with the aspiration to bring the fruits
of this dream closer to the r.ext (pp. 55"6l).
Now, however, these "operat i ve .i ns t i tut I ons" have "become drained of
normative significance for those who must continue to work, ccrsume,
bargain, and politic within them." In short, the spirit is gone. Be-
hind the "performance" crisis, then, even more bas'c, Is a "spiritual"
crisis.
And here once again, both liberals and radicals have failed tc
penetrate to root issues: "the old liberal and radical interpreters of
'possessive individualism' never quite grasped the collectiv e aspirations
inside the way of life they celebrated or criticized" (p. 62). As a
result both liberalism and radicalism find themselves impotent In the
face of the extensive decline of civic virtue that accompanies the wide-
spread "disaffection" from the old ethic, for both "underestimated the
connection between this inner disaffection and the impaired performance
of the entire system."
We may summarize Professor Connol 1
y
' s thesis regarding the legitl-
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macy crisis as follows: (l) The irrational terms of relation between
state and economy--the "bind" of the welfare state--is such that the
state is inherently unable to promote the public interest; the civic
virtue of the citizenry is thereby eroded. This aspect of the general
crisis we have called the "performance" crisis; (2) There is further-
more a growing disaffection from those normative structures necessary
to support both the political and economic "systems"-- i . e . the order as
a whole--undermin*ng virtue still more radically. This is the "spiri-
tual" dimension of the crisis; (3) The proper, rational response to the
crisis is support for socialist ideals themselves informed by Profes-
sor Connolly's ar.a I ys i s--- i .e . appreciative of the interrelationships of
state, economy, and public interest; cognizant of the rationale of
patriotism and civic virtue; aware of the i ntersubj ect i ve "ground" of
meaning and purpose, botn political and generally social.
The merits of this astute analysis are evident. The key presupposi-
tions of the a rgumept--the autonomy of the political and the public in-
terest, the economic context, and the i ntersubject i ve character of social
reality--are i nd i spens i b 1 e , both to the analysis of the crisis, and
certainly to any plausible reconstructed "ideal" of the legitimate
(socialist or non-socialist) state. The assertion of a close connection
between what 1 have called the "performance" and "spiritual" dimensions
of the crisis is in my judgement especially important and worthy of
close consideration. It is precisely here, hov/ever, that we detect a
definite deficiency, potentially a critical aporia, in Professor Con-
nolly's case.^ We will attempt to briefly explicate the difficulty.
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As I have said, the analysis culminates in support for a socialist
state. There is no difficulty in this result per se; indeed it follows
Inexorably from the analysis of the "bind" of the welfare state. Under
contemporary industrial conditions, only the socialist type of state
(there is of course much room for argument as to specifics) is 'rational'.
But the insightful illumination of the specifically 'spiritual' dimension
of the crisis--that the culture of work is itself col 1 aps i ng-
- i nv i tes an
important qualification of 'socialism' as an ideal. We are wont to
wonder--how can socialism in itself repair the gaping cultural rent
opened by the widescale collapse of meaning? Socialism will, it is
hoped, admirably meet the 'performance' crisis of the welfare state.
To that extent it will recover the right relationship of the state and
the public interest, and restore civic cirtue. But what of the 'deeper'
level: the c i v i 1 i zat i ona 1 disaffection from the p roduct i ve-ba rga i nn i ng
ideal that is progressively undercutting the very content of the public
interest and eroding civic virtue? Yet no qualification is fortlicom i ng
.
Our question is, why not?
The answer, I suggest, is that Professor Connolly has failed to
fully appreciate his own thesis--or at least the most relevant part of
that thesis. Despite the sensitive identification of a general civili-
zational crisis as the primary, depth dimension of the legitimacy crisis,
he winds up slighting the real scope of the crisis by conflating the
'performance' and 'spiritual' crises, implying thereby that the 'answer'
to Ihe crisis-as-such lies in the movement beyond the welfare state to
socialism. As this is not only a serious charge in itself, but moreover
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provides the departure point for the analysis constituting the remainder
of this chapter, it is important that I make my meaning clear.
The conflation I speak of may be best observed in Part iV of "The
State and the Public Interest." On the one hand, Connolly approvingly
quotes Charles Taylor as "succinctly" summarizing the thesis of the
radical deterioration of i nter subj ect i ve meanings. It is an important
quotation for both Professor Connolly's and our ov\n purposes, and so
worth reproducing in full:
We might think that the productive, bargaining culture
offered in the past common meanings a.nd hence a basis
for community, which were essentially linked with Its
(the culture) being in the process of building, tt
linked men who could see themselves as breaking with
the past to build a new happiness in America, for
instance. But in all essentials that future is built:
the notion of a horizon to be attained by future greater
production verges on the absurd in contemporary America.
Suddenly the hor I zon wh I ch was essent I a 1 to the s ense of
meaningful purpose has collapsed , v/hich would mean that
like so many other enlightenment based dreams, the free
productive, bargaining society can only sustain men as
a goal, not as a reality (p. 62, Connolly's emphasis),
Taylor makes it clear that the collapse of meaning is to be attributed
to the 'success' of the productive-bargaining ideal. ThB problem is
not that the "horizon" has been derailed by structural ' -on t rad I ct 1 ons
'
and/or 'constraints.' Rather the real problem is that the horizon it-
self is incapable of sustaining human purpose when It ceases to be a
"goal" and becomes a "real Icy." Taylor thus suggests that there is
something fundamentally false about the horlzon--it is an enlightenment
"dream." Extrapolating now, we can speculate that the dissipation of
this dream, the awakening of contemporary America from its influence,
amounts to a full scale existential crisis, the roots of which
are sunk
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deep in the experience of seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
century Europe,, as well as the whole cultural history of the American
Republic, which emerges from the European Enlightenment milieu. This
experience, what is left of it, no longer has the power to motivate,
to inspire, to sustain. Modern American man no longer knows what his
exi s tence- i n-h i s to;"y means ; he no longer knows, as a result, who he is.
Given his explicit e.ffirmetion of Taylor's sweeping historical
reading, Connolly's gloss on this quotation is surprising. Following
the already noted conclusion that civic virtue is declining because
of the dissolution of the system's intersubjecti ve supports, he argues
that
The social man • f es ta t i ons of this disaffection are found
to some extent in the productive system (a decline in
rates of growth) and (earlier) in the youth culture, but
they are concentrated, for reasons vie have already dis-
cussed, in a grov/ing disaffection from the welfare state.
The state today has more troubles to deal with and less
civic virtue to draw upon in coping vj'\th them. And its
resulting failure to respond to these troubles success-
fully enlarges the target it provides. Thus the crisis
of legitimacy underlying the failure of the welfare state
is a displaced crisis: the irrational terms of relation
between the state and the corporate economy provide the
source while the welfare state emerges as the target.^
The conflation of the 'performance' and 'spiritual' dimensions of the
overall crisis is apparent in tv;o places here: in the claim that
general disaffection concentrates in disaffection from the welfare
state "for reasons discussed above," but especially in the concluding
point that "the irrational terms of relation between the state and the
corporate economy provide the source" of the crisis. The "reasons"
Professor Connolly refers to all involve irrationalities internal to
2k
the 'productive-bargaining' society in its present state: victims of
inflation cannot attack the corporate economy itself, so they demand
cuts in welfare spending; the unemployed, also impotent before the'
corporate behemoth, press for public service jobs; blacks fight whites,
and men women, for the limited supply of dignified, well-paying work;
etc. Now, these problems may certainly contribute to widescale dis-
affection; but they are not the same crisis--in essence a crisis of
success
,
not f a i 1 u re-- that Taylor alerts us to. Only because he errs
In identifying Taylor's 'spiritual' crisis with the 'performance' cr'sis
of corporate capitalism/welfare statism, is Connol 1/ able to make his
concluding point. For certainly the irrational relationship between
the state and the economy is not the primary source of the crisis. It
is, to be sure, a^ source, and part of the 'deeper' source; and it may
well be the central target of disaffection; but it is not 'the' source.
Indeed, when situated against the backdrop of the post-Enlightenment
ci vi 1 i zat ional crisis as such, the welfare state is as much a mani-
festation of the crisis as it is a cause of it. In the same way,
socialism cannot be 'the' answer. Socialism is the form--the solution
of the performance crisis under the presumption of continued industrial
conditions. It is not, nor can it be, the content --the answer to the
searching questions: Who are we? What is the meaning of our existence?
What will now be the nature of our collective aspirations? The substance
of our order in history?^ These are the burning questions of the time.
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Individualism, Secularism and Crisis
Our own analysis shall purposely ignore the immediate, "performance"
dimension of the American crisis to give attention to two other "causes":
Individualism and secularism. The reason for enclosing the word 'causes'
in quotation marks is that individualism and secularism, though analyti-
cally distinguishable, are in fact interrelated "momenti" of a single
large-scale c i v i 1 i zat i onal d i a 1 ect i c--the breakup of universal Christian
cu 1 tu re--wh i ch unfolds its ultimately destructive potential gradually
over time. If anything is "the' cause of the current crisis, it is
this monumental event. (Though for this too, of course, we would iiave
to seek causes.) It i ? nonetheless highly useful, if not quite precise
and perhaps a little misleading, to speak of i nc i v i dual i sm and secu-
larism as relatively independent phenomena of causal s i gn i f i cance-- i
n
the same way that I have found it useful to divide the American crisis
into its "old" and "new" aspects. Thus I will maintain that individu-
alism, or the ideology of the autonomous person liberated from the
ethical substance of the community and standing a? the self-sustained
source of his own "values," is the basis of the "old" crisis: the
denigration of the political, the undermining o^ public life, the
alienation of the citizen (or at least large numbers of citizens) for
the state, etc. Secularism, then, is held essentially responsible for
the "new" crisis, the "sp i r i tual cr i s i s that is claimed to be the
ground for the legitimacy crisis as a whole., i do not mean, however,
a simple secularism, a flat denial of things divine and an affirmation
of things worldly. The secularism I have in mind, which 1 wi 11
suggest
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has helped to sustain American culture in the face of otherwise dis-
integrative Individualistic forces, has been one unsuccessful in fully
liberating itself from meaning-constitutive values drawn directly from
Christianity. It is in fact essentially grounded in inverted, immanent-
ized Christian symbol s--most notably the eschatolog i cal idea of indefinite
"Progress" (i.e. inverted, imma.nen t i zed Providence), especially as wedded
to America's persistent sel f -concept i on as the bearer of a millennial
"mi ss ion" in the world
.
The case is suitably divided into two parts: in brief, it is
argued that, (l) individualism, a mistaken ("derailed"), an t I -pol I t I ca
1
vision of man to begin with, has had a progressively destructive impact
on political culture as both existential conditions and unrecognized
ideological presuppositions have changed or been eroded; and that (2)
Eschatolog i cal secularism (also a "derailment") was able to sustain a
sense of meaning and purpose only so long as it allowed the American
people to indulge freely in the collective fantasy of self-salvation
through progress toward a terrestrial paradise. But now, as Taylor
puts it, the "horizon" is attained, further production (in the "pursuit
of happiness") is absurd, and yet paradise is not ours. All that has
materialized is a desp i r I tua 1 i zed materialism; and it fails to satisfy.
The Individualist Derailment
In the analysis of American individualism I shall attempt to move
from the abstract to the concrete: from, that Is, ahistorical analytic
argumentation, to comprehensive historical generalization, to particular
27




It is from the abstract point of view that we derive the
designation of individualism as a "derailment" from a formally correct
concept of man. On this view, a tensional relationship deriving from an
ambiverse (isolate and communal) human nature may be disguised, glossed
over, disfigured, submerged in a concept that disguises, glosses, sub-
merges, and finally disfigures human nature itself. it cannot, however,
be eliminated, any more than human nature can be abolished in the inter-
ests of theoretical or ideological tidiness. Truth does have a way oF
willing out, if only in so far as anomalous facts have a way of per-
sistently cropping up where they are needed, if not wanted. When truth
rams against the closed door of inaflequate concept, the inevitable
result is the derailment of the concept. This derailment may take one
of two forms: (l) Positively, the concept breaks down completely, being
swept aside by a new and more adequate notion of reality; (2) Negatively,
it will shut itself up against all penetration of truth's light, gather
up the shreds of limited truth at its command, and harden into ideo-
logical dogma. It perhaps never loses hold of its partial truth, but
the value of this truth is vitiated by its imperialistic compulsion to
stand for the whole, a compulsion fired by its megaloman i cal delusion
that it is in fact the whole.
Something like this latter sort of derailment has unfortunately
been the fate of the concept of American individualism, despite widely
variant permutations of specific content. From New England Puritanism
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on: through Jeffersonian tradition and natural rights philosophy,
Unitarianis.-n, Transcendentalism and evangelism; through the Northern
industrial ideological assault on Southern slave agrarianism, the
evolutionary and laissez-faire Ideas of Herbert Spencer and the growth
of social Darwinism; down to and past Wood row Wi 1 son ' s idealism, William
Jennings Bryan's populism, Herbert Hoover's rugged individualism, and
Ayn Rand's Enlightened ra'ly cry of "reason, individualism, and capi-
talism": "individualism" has served as the supreme symbolic catchword
in American social thought, with an i nv-a 1 cu 1 abl e ideological power and
significance. Such longevity suggests the persistence of a powerful
experiential core, which must be considered and given its due. Yet
from the "abstract" point of view, the concept of individualism is a
specific disfiguration of human nature in that it interprets the re-
lationship of the individual and his world in a pervertedly one-sided
way. Seizing upon the irreducible separateness of individual man from
his social being, it proposes this limited (insofar as it goes perfectly
legitimate) insight as truth itself. We are to believe that isolate
human being is human being as such (if not all Being): the ground of
all authority in social and especially political life, the source of
all meaning and value. Thus individualism negates the community, for-
gets the social character of human being, and denies the possibility of
objective meaning and value. But because reality refuses to simply
fade away at the behest of the inadequate understanding, because, that
is, the social character of human being persists despite the individu-
alist demand, individualism derails into setting the individual against
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the community, against his own social nature. Then, unable to abide
by the d i sma 1 , -empty purity of Its own abstraction, a derailed individu-
alism rushes to fill in the hollow shell of the asocial individual with
a specific set of social traits and culturally derived values. Pur-
porting to abstract from all social determinants of human being, it in
fact posits as necessary, external verities of nature certain psycho-
logical and behavioral traits sustained by a specific social order.
Thus Hoftstadter writes in regard to the U. S. political tradition:
"However much at odds on specific issues, the major political traditions
have shared a belief in the rights of property, the philosophy of eco-
g
nomic virtues of capitalist culture as necessary qualities of man.'
The individualist derailment, we see, exhibits transhistorical
and historical dimensions. it has an historical dimension, we might
say, because it is part of the structure of existence itself; that is
to say, the problem for man of relating his individual self to the
historical social order is a problem for man as such . "Generic man,"
no matter his social setting, be it ancient, medieval, modern, "primi-
tive" or "developed," lives in the tension generated by the need to
somehovy integrate, however imperfectly, the two fundamental modalities
of "agency" and "communion." At once, however, we must recognize the
significance of the derailment's historical dimension. The subject of
its error, the relationship of man to the soc I al /pol i t i ca 1 v/orld. Is
situated in history, in the concreteness and specificity of historical
time. As already suggested, we shall explore this concreteness by
stages--f i rst from the "grand" historical point of view, which sets
30
the fundamental American political thought, the though:: of the "Founding
Fathers," In developmental relation to the Greek, med i eva 1 -Chr i s t i an
,
and modern paradigms of political order; and then from the perspective
of the specific American context, both ideological and experiential.
The rise of the indi vidual and the decline of the political.
The Aristotelian paradigm
.
"Every art and every inquiry, and simi-
larly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for
this reason the good has been declared as that at v\;hich all things aim."^^
The art, the practice of politics is, in the critical paradigm of Aristo-
tle, the continuation of ethics; it is the science of the good and the
just life for man, of right order in human existence. The end of poli-
tics "is concerned with nothing so much as with producing a certain char-
acter in the citizens, or in other words, v/I th making them good,"^^
The fu 1 1
y
good life, argued the ancient Greek, is possible only within
the polls, the community as politically organized. The full develop-
ment. of human nature depends upon the political , for politics is nothing
short of the perfection of social life, and the political community the
mark of the fully flowered "society."
Man, for Aristotle, Is born for citizenship, the right to life In
that form of association which can complete his "nature." No less than
Plato is Aristotle concerned with the cultivation of the most sublime
character possible, the education of the loftier f acu 1 1 1 es— i .e . the
intellectual and moral--of the soul. There Is, he believes, no contra-
diction (though there may be, indeed. Important tensions) between law
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and custom, the ethos of the state and the ethos of civil life, nor
between nature (in the Greek sense of nature of "physics," or develop-
ment) and the state: "It is evident," says the philosopher, "that
the polls belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and
that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polls. He who
is without a polls, by reason of his own nature and not of some acci-
dent, is either a poor sort of being, or a being higher than man."
At the same time that there is an essential continuity between
civil and political life, however, there is a profound distinction to
be made between what we today call "society" and the "state." The
polls must be concerned with the highest good, the "virtue" of the
citizenry, argued Aristotle; otherwise it is a "mere association."




i.e. the most primitive of communities, whicn exists
primarily for the sake of sustaining life, meeting everyday needs and
wants, and which generally represents v^hat Is one's own rather than
what is truly common . The rule of the family household is autocratic
ru 1 e--monarch la , rooted in the relationship of master and slave. The
rule of the polls, that community that "may be said to have reached
1 k
the height of full self-sufficiency", is by contrast the rule of
full and equal c 1 1 1 zens-- po 1 i t ie , a sharing in the political acts of
deliberation, justice, legislation, administration.^^ The mere as-
sociation, surely, offers a measure of commonality to its members;
but that commonality bears the indelible birthmark of "necessity,"
and beyond the family is moreover infused with the spirit of the
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contract. The state is more than a contract, more too than the frame-
work in which a cont ractar i an existence is carried on. The "good life"
for which the state exists transcends both familiar necessity and
contractar ian consciousness. The good life is the life of virtuous
citizenship, the life of "freedom."
The Aristotelian paradigm has little use for scientific "technique"
in the mere maintenance of "order." Politics as ethical enterprise is
directed toward the cultivation of character and not the control of pre-
formed individual "characters." Thus law, and constitutions generally,
aim at providing the conditions for leading the good life. No authority
structure is legitimate in its own right, but only insofar as it con-
tributes to the "common interest," the virtue and freeaom of the
citizenry as a v;hole. The paradigm is thus uncompromising in the way
of ethical judgement. There are good constitutions and true states;
there are bad constitutions and states that are so in name only, not in
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fact. "Justice" (lawfulness and fairness) is coincident with right
order only--that is, an order of rule In the general interest that at
once deepens and gives free play to the virtue of the citizen body.
"Prudence" and "virtue" are, then, the linchpins of the pclitical
("It is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical
1
8
wisdom, or practically wise without moral virtue.)" The Ideal po-
litical actor must be able to grasp a situation in all its variation
and contingency, and respond to it out of the we 1
1
-sp r i ngs of finely
wrought character issuing in political will. Thus in the NIcomachean
Ethics Aristotle argues that moral virtue Is a "state of character
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concerned with choice" according to the rule followed by the morally
insightful man, the spoudaios
. Political order is not a matter of
20
mathematical exactitude. Nor is it like a table, which, when an
imbalance occurs, one can correct by replacing or reshaping a leg.
Politics is not "made," is not characterized by "making." It is
practiced. As practical wisdom it is distinguished from both the
scientific and contemplative faculty, and the cal cul at i ve disposition
9 1
"concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning." It
is, rather, "a true and reasoned capacity to act witii regard to things
22good and bad for men." The essential mediation between the agent
and the (political) community is inevitably ethics, the concern for
right values.
The medieval rrediation: Saint Thomas . The essential datum of
virtually all medieval political reflection is the perception of two
realms cohabiting the fold of the temporal: the Chruch (the keeper of
the Spirit) and the empire (the tender of the "body"). Saint Augustine
had conceived this duality of human being in terms of a dialectic of
good and evil. The state is, in a disparaging sense, "worldly." Its
most positive purpose lay in the resistance to and suppression of the
excesses of human evil; the state is necessary because man is fallen.
The Church, in the sense of the spiritual fellowship of all true
Christians, is the superior entity; its end is the true end of man-
kind, viz. eternal life in the bosom of God.
But Augustine's political "pessimism" cannot be regarded as a
direct fall from the Aristotelian paradigm, as Augustine did not know
Aristotle. Saint Thomas, on the other hand did, and here we discover
both important continuities and severe discontinuities with the classi-
cal paradigm. Against Augustine Thomas restated the Greek premise that
political society is "natural" to man, and plays a central role in the
cultivation of virtue and the sharing of right value. Even v/ere man
nsver to sin, he held, the need for central direction o'^ activities
toward the common good of the temporal order would remain. Importantly,
the state retains for Thomas the valuation of seeking the good life:
For were human beings to unite solely for the sake of
mere survival, then beasts and slaves would be part of
the c i V i tas
,
too; if, again, they were to unite only to
gain goods and wealth, then all v;ho are interested in
the same manner in economic commerce would have to be-
long to the c i V i tas . 23
Only the community organized such as to provide its citizens instruction
in virtue may be legitimately called a state.
But as Arendt and Habermas have alike pointed out, the civltas is
here less a pol i s than a soc i etas , a "mere association." From the
classical perspective, the Thomistic community is not genuinely po-
litical: "Significantly, in Thomas the d I st i net ion ... between the
economic controlling power of the master of the oi kos (household) and
the power of political rule in the public sphere is absent." For
Thomas the principle of the pater fami 1 ia s and the pr incip s is the
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same: the rule of each is. equally dominium , "mastery pure and simple."
An essential part of the substance of the state is not the political
will of the virtuous citizen acting in and for his freedom, but order
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in the modern sense— peace
,
the "domestic and family order as extended
to the state. "^^
Between Aristotle and Thomas the polis had disintegrated and Christ
had come. For Thomas the end of man, the summum bonum
,
must be ulti-
mately more radically transcendent, "otherworldly," than it ever was
for the Greeks. The state is not, in the classical sense, "self-
sufficient." It is part of the world, and the v/orld has been de-
divinized, despite the ultimate unity of cosmic order, the connection
between nature and supernature. Christian virtue is not loyalty and
reverence for the state, but for God alone. As he claimed, Thomas
never really (or, rather, total'ly) deserted the Aigustinian standpoint.
and could not. "Man is not ordained to the body politic," he insisted,
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"according to all that he is and has." Thus pol 1 1 i cal order is for
Thomas a "social" order encompassing the whole of terrestial (non-
spiritual) existence within its scope, an order in the final analysis
of instrumental value only in the deliverance of mankind.
The temper decidedly cuts across the more naturalistic grain of
the classical tradition. Indeed, Thomas sustains the essential con-
nection between politics and ethics, but on essentially un-Ar i stotel ian
grounds. Human (political) order is theo-on tol og i ca 1 1 y joined to the
divine (ethical) order via Natural Law. The mediation is Stoic, foreign
to the paradigm of the polis. In and through the varieties of the Law--
eternal, natural, divine, human--the coherence of the cosmos, and so
the destiny of man, is revealed, articulated and upheld. When the
ontological bond falls before the nominalist criticism of the incipient
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modern age, and the seeds of nascent nationalism begin to germinate,
the ethical dimension of the political sinks from sight. As the ideal
of a unified Christiandom wanes (an ideal upheld even by "imperialists"
such as, e.g. Dante), the prevailing sense of the division between
private and public life is radically altered. V/riters (e.g. William
of Ockham, John of Paris, Marsilius of Padua) took the view that the
state indeed had a "natural" justification of its own. But less and
less did this justification toucfi upon the perfection of the human
moral capacities. The 'good life" of this world more and more bears
the distinctive imprint of an exclusive i nt ramundane , non-moral focus.
Conflating Aristotelian and Christian elements, the new nation-
al isni proved itself true to neither the Aristotelian nor the Christian
political paradigms. First steps were taken toward relegating ethics
("value") to a strictly pr i vatc-- i .c . non-political concern (though
it would be a long way yet to tiie separation of church and state), and
"promoting" the public to the rank of the social "sovereign." The
stage was set for the assertion of the idea of the sovereign state,
whose defining mark is the monopoly of authority, law-making might
and "legitimate" violence. Not ethics or virtue but pov/e r--"rea 1 -




conception of the "iovcreign state" led him to define the citizen as
merely one who is subject to the sovereign power, a mere legal status.
Bodin logically excludes all etiiical cons i derat ions-- i ndecd social
relations in gene ral --f rom the notion of the state; thougli he held
that there is a vast difference between a state and a "band of robbers,"
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it is unclear what the d i f fe rence _i_s_: Sovereignty is legibus solutus,
the "supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law."^^
The modern paradigm of power politics: Machiavelli and Hob be s.
With the moderns public concerns are at once wrestled bodily down to
this world and subjected to the individualist solvent. The Renaissance
liberates the individual intellect from the unity of theolooy, queen
of sciences. Similarly, the Reformation frees the soul from the tutelage
of the Chruch qua public representative of the Spirit. A i<ind of tri-
partite division is now forged: legality, morality, and politics are
fragments of a splintered unity that is no more. The latter fragment,
politics, is largely now a matter of technical expertise in the main-
tenance of utilitarian order and the accumulation of power.
The new orientation is quite explicit in Machiavelli and Hobbes,
tl"(e two outstanding representatives of Renaissance and Reformation
thought, respectively, if to different degrees and in somewhat different
forms. The establishment and maintenance of political order is funda-
mentally a problem of knov-ying and employing a proper "technique."
Hobbes more so than Machiavelli, though Machiavelli too is out to
teach techniques of statecraft. Hobhes has full faith in a secure
knowledge grounded in a new science of politics:
Though nothing can be immortal 1, which mortals make; yet,
if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their
Common-weal ths. might be secured, at least, from perishing
by internal d i seases . . , .The refore when they come to be
dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine dis-
order, the fault is not in men, as they are the M.^ter:
but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them.JO
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Both Machiavelll and Hobbes fundamentally overthrow the historicity
and contingency of communal life, and assert eternally valid conditions
for the preservation of strictly intramundane order. It is true that
Machiavelli works from history, but no less than Hobbes does he assume
a rock-bottom human nature, unchanging not merely in regard to form but
specific content as well. All men, both these moderns agree, are most
powerfully driven by the baser instincts of egoism and fear. From the
Florentine:
men have less scruple in offending one who makes himself
loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is
held by a claim of obligation which, men being selfish,
is broken whenever it- serves their purpose; but fear is
maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails...
Men will always be false to you unless they are compelled
to be true. 31
There is but small space for moral development. This orientation is
indeed much the stronger in Hobbes. The classical requirement of
prudential, virtuous citizenship is obliterated there altogether, re-
placed by a calculated system of rules and institutions designed to
maintain the peace. Social relations are essentially inflexible, and
only tenuously tied to ethical norms: for Hobbes men are "good" when
they obey the commands of the sovereign power, the "Mortal 1 God,"
"bad" when they do not. Beyond this obedience, al. things are per-
mitted. The "common space" of the political community is driven from
the picture, as the moral dimension is amputated from the body politic.
With the moderns the substance and subject matter of political
science is thus drastically altered. For the classical ancients the
subject is right conduct, hence the substance pedagogy; for Machiavelli
39
and Hobbes the subject is social relations and the substance their
regulat ion
_.
The citizen as political actor in effect disappears. How
can the new science instruct hnm to act? It rather is preoccupied with
the proper arranging of institutions, the order-sustaining exercise of
power. The citizen qua individual becomes the raw material in the
calculus of political technique. In fact the virtue of the citizen
is supplanted by the vitality of the egoistic individual. Hobbes:
Continual 1 Successe in obtaining those things which a
man from time to time desireth, that is to say, con-
tinuall prospering, is that men call Felicity; I mean
the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing
as perpetiiall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here;
because Life itselfe is but motion, and can never be
without Desire, nor wi chout Feare, no more than with-
out Sense.
And Mach i ave 1 1 i ' s "virtu" only partly connects with virtue in the
classical sense. More significantly, it resembles more closely an
unambiguous manifestation of sheer energy, a youthful and audacious
ability to master "Fortune":
It is better to be impetuous than cautious, for fortune
is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master
her, to conquer her by force ; . . . 1 I ke a woman, she is
always friendly to the young, because they are less
cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity.
"States and republics" will continue to fluctuate until such time as
a ruler of virtu ar'ses "able to govern such states so that Fortune
may not have occasion, with every revolution of the sun, to display
her influence and power." Machiavelli shouts aloud the decisive
disjuncture of politics and ethnics: "Let a prince. ..aim at conquering
and maintaining the state, and the means will always be judged honorable
ko
and praised by everyone, for the vulgar is always taken by appearances
and the issue of events; and the world consists only of the vulgar "^^
The preoccupation with power quite naturally accompanies the pre-
occupation with warfare
. For Hobbes primarily the warfare of the ab-
stract "state of nature," with its solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short life; for Machiavelli the real - life warfare of the prince bent
on gaining and retaining power: a prince should have "no other aim or
thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but war and its
organization and discipline, for that is the only art that is necessary
to one who commands...."-^ Politics becomes the deadly serious art of
self-preservation ("raison d'etat") through power and domination
against the eve r- th reaten i ng destructive forces of chaos (Fortune
allowed free rein in human affairs) and anarchy (the state of nature).
The good life as the end of political effort has been replaced by mere
1 i fe--survi val
.
Fortunately the art of survival has the attributes of science; it
can be studied, learned, and as technique applied by any with the will
and skill to do so. V/ith the moderns the critical Aristotelian dis'^
tinction between theoretical and practical knowledge has once and for
all been superceded; moreover, and perhaps more importantly, practical
knov/ledge no longer constitutes the pedagogical path to virtue, but the
key to mastery of the mundane, the meaning of existence.
The Ameri can constitution makers . In the Republ I
c
Plato has
Ademantus address Socrates with the essential conditions of a theory
of justice:
I want you, in commending justice, to consider only how
justice, in itself, benefits a man who has it in him, and
how injustice harms him, leaving rewards and reputation out
of account. .You must not be content merely to prove that
justice is superior to injustice, but explain how one is
good, the other evil, in virtue of the intrinsic effect each
has on its possessor, whether gods or men see it or not, 37
No sentiment is more foreign to the motives of the early American con-
stitution makers. The bona interiora that was the primary object of the
great Greek (and also Christian) political philosophizing has been sur-
rendered v/holly to the apolitical province of religion and "conscience."
For the practical politlcos of the former colonies, enlightened bour-
3 O
goi s/Protestants all, the inner region of virtue is beyond the reach
of political action, outside the province of political order. "I he
connection of inner and outer truth, subjective and objective value, is
snapped. Government was, quite simply, a matter contract assuming a
fully formed moral personality; constitutions were in genera' considered
on the model of statements of principles securing men in their rights
against governmental encroachment.
As we shall see, the situation is already, however, far from sim-
ple: America's men of intellect had read not only Mach i ave 1 1 i ., Hobbes
and Locke, but Aristotle, Polybius and Cicero, Hooker and Harrington,
Milton and Montesquieu. Moreover, enlightened optimism vied with Cal-
vinist gloom over the precise nature of the individual and the human
prospect as a whole. Yet the spirit in its every form is intensely in-
dividualistic, and for the present it is safe to say that a political
psychology of negative "passions," in the temper of Mandeville, Pope,
Smith and Hume, for the most part holds sway. It is assumed that the
i»2
"natural" state of the human soul (psyche)--In so far at least as it
compels men to political action--is dark indeed: "sinful," a capitula-
tion to Christian perception divorced from the redemptive potential of
Christian metaphysics. Thus Ben Franklin, Newtonian, Deist, and propo-
nent of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, lamented the poor compar-
ison humans made to the "Musick of the Spheres" and the "Harmony of the
Stars." They viere "a sort of Beings very badly constructed, as they are
general 1 y more eas i ly provok'd than recondil'd, more disposed to do mis-
chief to each other than to make Reparation, much more easily deceiv'd
than undeceiv'd, and having more Pride and Pleasure in killing than in
begetting one another." And John Adams, author of the first draft of
the 1780 Massachusetts Cons t i tu c i on
,
spoke of "unlimited passions," and
especially the "Passion for Super ior i ty .... Every human being compares
himself in its Imagination, with every other around it, and will find
some Superority over every otfier real or imaginary or it vnll die of
ho
Grief and Vexation.'
Political artif.ans, practitioners of political "technique," are
left, as they themselves saw the situation, to contend with an irreduci-
bly "wicked" nature bent on the satisfaction of selfish "interests";
exactly the condition so graphical ly depicted by Machiavelli: "whoever
desires to Pound a scate and give it laws must start with assuming that
all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, when-
Ill ....
ever they may find occasion for it." The modern imprint is unmistak-
able. Statecraft as soulcraft is a dustbin relic of outdated political
philosophizing. The day of "interest" politics has dawned, and the
^3
denigration of politics and citizenship as "sav i ng"-- i . e . as mediating
the individual's relationship with the community and with the trans-
cendental order--is near complete. Politics is recognized for what it
can only be given the human condition: the control of a conflict-oriented,
interest-propelled social life.
Thus American politics appears as the individualist derailment in
full flower, taking to the modern medium like metal to magnet. In a
Western vyorld increasingly populated by Hobb i st/Mach I ave 1 1 i an "master-
less men," the makers of the American republic were perhaps the most
masterless of all--hence the most in need of an external, mechariical
political organization. As Frank Coleman has argued in a persuasive
effort to illustrate the continuity between Hobbes and the American
constitutional tradition, "The purpose of American politics, from the
origin of the republic to the present day, Is the management of conflict.
This purpose is operat ional Ized in a political process Involving exten-
sive bargaining and negotiation between Independently situated political
actors. Public order Is created and sustained so long as it Is able
to accomodate the diverse needs of Independently situated political
actors bargaining for short-term gains through the political process....
The legacy of the Federalist theory of politics In terms of these work-
ing arrangements is ruthless individualism, a merely policing sovereign,
transactional relations, and conflict-maintenance." A brief survey
of The Federal I st , written for the purpose of securing ratification of
the Federal Constitution, seems to more than adequately establish a basis
for Coleman's claim.
Madisontanism: the logic of mechanistic order
. Several varieties
of political thought, from monarchical nationalism to sovereign state
decentralization, were represented at the Constitutional Convention of
1787. Yet despite differences of nuance and emphasis the already noted
consensus on political psychology prevailed. Hamilton portrayed the
common temper in the first of the Federal i st papers, lamenting the
sad truth that a polity sustained by such noble sentiments as "philan-
thropy," "patriotism," or others "unperplexed and unbiased by consider-
ations not connected with the public good" is "more ardently tc be
wished for than seriously expected." The real stuff of politics, he
averred, includes "particular interests," "passions," "prejudice,"
"avarice, personal anif.iosity, party opposition, and many other motives
not more laudable." Any other drives men might have to subordinate
their particularity to higher, more universal a'ms, e.g. to honor, pub-
lic glory, "service" to the state, etc., may be considered of secondary
stature and largely, if not completely, discounted from public signi-
ficance. For practical purposes interest, ambition and power are build
ing blocks of political construction; the v/ise poMtical mason might
well take his bearings from the Machiavellian maxim that "All human be-
ings are ungrateful, fickle, hypocritical, cowardly and selfish."
The same assumptions underlie Madison's analysis of "faction" in
the famed Federalist #10 . For Madison as for the nominalist Hobbes, in
dividuals, because of d i f fe rences of temperament, biography, "faculties
etc., interpret the "good," and the means to securing it, in radically
diverse ways, thereby engendering conflict.
^5
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
government, and many other points, as well of speculation as
of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other
descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed
them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more dis-
posed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for
their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind
to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial
occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful dis-
tinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly pas-
sions and excite their most violent conflicts. ^5
.Most importantly, the "diversity in the faculties of men," and the
"liberty" to exercise these faculties, results in the unequal distribu-
tion of property, "the most common and durable source of fact i ons . "'^^
Government is bound to protect "liberty," and so inequality of property;
faction follows inexorably.
For the protection of different and unequal faculties of ac-
quiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds
of property immediately results; and from the influences of
these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors,
ensures a division of the society into different interests and
parties. ^7
A human condition of division and conflict is fated: "The latent
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man"; they "cannot be
removed." In general e<3cK man Insists on his own authority in deter-
mining what is his good in all things impinging on his conscience and _ .
Interest. The "common good" persists as a kind of "empty category,"
opposed to particular interests, and indeed here and there paid homage
as superior to these interests; but there is no apparent way that the
empty category might be supplied a content. The problem for government
cannot be to change the basic human propensities—wishful thinking at
best. The causes of "Instability, injustice, and confusion" are too
k6
deeply rooted in individual psychology to be extirpated. It is the
Hobbist pre-pol i tical and anarchic state of nature that underlies any
and all (realistic) political arrangements. Madison queries: "What is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary . "^^ And Hamilton
echos: "Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions
of iiien will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without
constraint. "^^ The task of government is to "rescue" society from "im-
pending anarchy."
It is precisely out of a fear of anarchy--put-. positively, the oesire
for secu r i ty--that men seek public order. Without order the hard wcr
fruits of struggle are not safe. Above all else, then, though they them-
selves are propelled by nature toward it, men fear the dangers and con-
sequences of constant and unmitigated civil strife: "The weaker indivi-
dual is not secured against the stronger," argues Madison; and "even the
stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition,
to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as them-
selves."^^ As Hobbes and Machiavelli had alike held, liberty counts for
little without security of possession; (indeed, the "immense majority,"
said Machiavelli, "desire liberty so a s to be able to live in greater
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security")- There is thus intensely experienced the very pr i vate
need for public order. Madison does not, unlike Hobbes, speak specifi-
cally the language of "covenants" and "social contracts," but it is the
language that fits, and is tacitly assumed: the Constitution represents
the act of "authorization" (Hobbes) by which an aggregate of otherwise
^7
discrete, hostile, and acquisitive individuals will bring an American
"sovereign" into being.
The Constitutional document appropriately expresses the deep-cut-
ting fears and anxieties of its Hobbist authors. As Norman Jacobson
observes: "For sustained sombreness of mood, the Constitution of the
United States is extraordinary. Its authors anticipated little good,
but mainly evil: war, universal corruption, public insolence and Insub-
ordination." The document frankly assumes that "venal i::y and recalci-
trance are as natural to men as the air they breathe. "^^ There are
constitutional provisions against embezzlement, for punishment of repre-
sentatives guilty of disorderly conduct, and for the expulsion of trou-
blemakers. A kind of peak of anxiety Is reached in Article I, Section
8, where the powers of Congress, minimal and strictly order-oriented,
are enumerated. The ref 1 ected assumpt i on is clearly that government is
grounded in vice; the preoccupation Is with preserving the peace. "Sec-
tion 8 takes on the aspect of a demonology of politics, foreign and
domestic." Similarly, Roelofs has noted "the negative, exclusionary
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slant of the Constitution's language," despite the document's commit-
ment to "Union," "Justice," and "General V/elfare." It is less con-
cerned with these "positive" ends than with dire forecasts of "domestic
Violence," "Insurrection," and "Cases of Rebellion." "The document as
a whole consistently carries forward and deepends the Impr-esslon that Its
composers were men preoccupied with, first, their sense of being on the
inside surrounded by threats from without, and second, the suspicion that
all kinds of disaster lurked within as well." It appears written for
"savage, violent men, men with little sense of social membership and
who could be impelled to do their duty only by fear of pun i shment . "^^
If this document of the fundamental law of the land be taken as the sole
evidence, the Founders, clearly, thought poorly of themselves, their
countrymen, and the new nation's common prospects.
Such pessimism, however, did nothing to detract from the clarity
of governmental purpose. To the contrary. It was abundantly, diapha-
nously evident to Madison that it was government's preeminent purpose
to control (not to stifle, but to regulate) conflict. The conclusion of
the analysis of faction in Federal ist ^10
,
"that the causes of faction
cannot be removed, and the relief is only to be sought in the means of
controlling its effects," had been presaged in the essay's opening line:
"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
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and control faction." The well constructed Union, and it alone, could
achiev/e a sure, if delicate, reconc i 1 at i on of order and "liberty." The
problem is distinctively Hobbist, as it must be, as the question was
exactly how to const i tut ional i ze a Hobbist society: that is, how to de-
ploy human passions in such a way as to preserve and not threaten order,
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thereby upholding "the great principle of self-preservation." Like •
Hobbes, Madison sought a system of objective, mechanistic (no less so
for being nan made) ru 1 es able to regulate the amoral behavior of mas-
terless men. That lie rejects the Hobbist conclusion that "nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain (men) from destroying and
CO
devouring one another," and seeks "a republican remedy for the dis-
eases most incident to republican government,"^*^ does not alter a jot
^9
the fundamental problem, i.e. the assurance of utilitarian order in
the face of rapacious, self-seeking ambition. Only the specific solu-
tion changes.
Madison's constitutionalism takes shape as a brand of political
physics, a la Newton, mechanics as organization. The aim is to produce
through organization a balance of interests, equivalent in Madison's
mind to a unity of "private right and public happ iness ."^^ The key is
the checking of power by power, drive by drive. Madison has no confi-
dence in either a mere "demarcation on parcfiment" or the virtuous In-
dustry of "enlightened statesmen."
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place.... In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You
must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence
upon the people is no doubt the primary control on the govern-
ment; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of aux-
iliary precaut i ons . ^3
Madison would through constitutional organization produce an auto-
matic balance and "integration" of interests. The will to balance and
integration, that is, a genuinely political will to the common good, is
rendered superfluous. The policy is to supply "by opposite and rival
interests, the defect of better motives." With Machiavelli and
Hobbes Madison shares faith in a manipulative, yet essentially non-
directive, political science as the anodyne for the pa i n f u 1 problem of
modern order. The sole general need is for the preservation of the sys-
tem as a whole; beyond this the system qua system knows no life other
than the life of private interests, no language but the language of
private satisfaction. As non-directive, the constitutional scheme, the
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state itself, has no goa
. s to prescribe, no common tasks to undertake.
And the members of political society--the c i t i zens--have no interests
qua members that they do not have already as private persons. The com-
munity per se has no interests. The "common" is an instrumental con-
trivance, no true common at all. It has nothing to impart to its mem-
bers, no virtue to promote, no higher purposes to serve. It is a tool
of antecedent individuals.
For this political society is, certainly, no less v i tal . With
Machiavelli Madison could agree that division and conflict, if properly
"maintained," can "contribute to the prosperity of republ i cs . "^'^ More
than this could not be expected. Politics, against the classical faith,
harbors no redemptive potential, serves no ennobling fuctions. Indeed:
The history of almost all the great councils and consultations
held among mankind for reconciling thei" discordant opinions,
assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their res-
pective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and
disappointments, and may be classed among the most dark and
degraded pictures which display the infirmities and depravi-
i tes of the human character. ^6
The prescribed constitutional setting is an engineered context in
which "the private interest of every individual may be sentinel over the
public right. "^'^ As such it is radical ly plural istic ; Madison is in-
deed the real father of American theoretical pluralism, the pluralism
of the "group." If men must fight, (relative) tranquillity can only
be achieved through a system that insures civil ize d (i.e. "political")
fighting. This achievement will be insured by providing all key poli-
tical actors (the biggest and the best of fighters) a "stake" in the
system by dispersing power sufficiently to allow all wortfiy competitors
the opportunity to employ multiple power bases in the defense--and ad-
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vance--of their interests. Liberalism's "independent centers of con-
sciousness" (R. P. Wolff) will be matcined by independently anchored
centers of power. Thus, for example, we find each governmental insti-
tution prescribed its own method of recruitm.ent (Presidential election
by electoral college, etc.). Each has to care for its own; no one can
helop an other directly, even should it wish to. By the same token,
each is protected from the others. When they come together to execute
the "public interest," therefore, it is by the clash and clang of "op-
posite and rival interests." The structure of the arrangement, that is,
the separate branches themselves, will "by their mutual relations, be
68the means of keeping each other in their place."
But the famed "separstion of powers" is more than a simple division
of function. Madison feared (quite logically within his scheme) dead-
locked and exacerDated strife if a strict separation of function were
combined with a reliance on distinct social bases. V/ith regard to the
Legislature, for example, he wrote: "The division of the State into tvjo
Classes, with distinct and independent organs of power, and without any
intermingle d Agency whatsoever, might lead to contests and antipathies
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not dissimilar to those between the Patricians and Plebians at Rome.
Men have always one foot anchored in the state of nature, and are for- .
ever in danger of falling backward.
The doctrine of "intermingled," or partial, agency is the real
keystone of Madisonian pluralism. Madison is, to be sure, concerned
with preventing a concentration of governmental power at any one point;
but he is not concerned with the dispersion of povyer per se. For that
alone the separation of functions would be sufficient. He is rather
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concerned to at once provide against a concentration of power, and to
provide for the availability of alternative power (transactional, bar-
gaining power) bases for ambition driven political actors. The latter
strategy is the essence of the republican manner of politicizing the
war of all against all. Thus, constitutional functions are mixed within
each governmental branch, so as to provioe each "a partial agency in...
(and) control over, the acts of the others. "'^^ The formula of separate
will/conflated function is perhaps most clearly expressed in a remark on
the legislative function:
In republican government, the legislative authority necessari-
ly predominates. The remedy for this i nconven i ency is to
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render
them, by different modes of election and different principles
of action, as little connected with each other as the nature
of their common functions and their common dependence on the
society will admit. 72
Thus by the structural devices of pluralistic republicanism does
Madison aspire to produce the automatic moderation of the strife pre-
supposed by an individualist politics ungrounded in an order of objective
value, meaning and purpose. Could it be otherwise? Where there is only
"interest," but no virtue, the mechanism is all. Where there is no uni-
ty but "order," no purposes but subject i v i zed needs and wants; where
"conscience" and "society" supplant directive community and objective
ethics; where the aim of salvation has given way to security and bar-
gained gain--there there is no true common, no meaningful order of truth
to infuse agency with a sense of common purpose. There is but organ i za -
tion: government by thrust and counterthrus t , the t r i v i a 1 i za t ion of
politics, politics bereft of spirit and genuine order.
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Concrete caveats: i ndlviduansm in early America
. A few qualifications
of the above, still somewhat "abstract" depiction are in order.
The Calvinist gloom so prominent in the Constitution, it should
be remembered, appeared in an Enlightenment permeated context that was
far from consistently gloomy. The ideas of objectively discernible
Natural Law and Natural Rights, "self-evident truths," and the power of
a universal human Reason uncori'upted by the "passions" were not merely
taken seriously, but were critically constitutive of the inte'. lectual
milieu. One could be int3nsely "individualistic," acutely aware of
the general displacement of the old su,"imum bontm by an impending summum
ma 1 um--what was this but realism?--, and yet quite confident of the pos-
sibility of "reasonable" men arriving at the objective values on which
a good society would be grounded. Was not the natural law, as Locke had
said, "writ in the hearts" of all men? (Indeed, had not Hobbes as well
insisted that the laws of nature obliged men, though inadequately, i
n
foro interno ?) Human society is supported by a framevjork of fixed
principles which are knowable, and hence the re'^e'-ence for right action,
it was only the "unreasonable" who would refuse to assert to the right
and natural order of things.
The split into what can be conceived, albeit Dve rs i mp I i f i ed 1 y
,
as "optimistic" and "pessimistic" strains of thought turned principally
on the judgement as to the proportion of reason and unreason in human
nature, and hence in society. Thus Jefferson, the "optimist," had no
difficulty voicing the view that man is "formed for society, and en-
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dowed by nature with those dispositions which fit him for society."
At least as long as society v/as composed principally of hamlets and
farm communities the spirit of individualism meshed nicely with the
requirements of political order and public virtue. But the "pessimist"
John Adams, too, who averred that "all Magistrates and all civil of-
ficers, and all civil Government (are) founded and maintained by the
sins of the People," could also conclude his Discourses wi th the ob-
servation that "the best republics will be virtuous and have been so."'^
And even Fede ral ist #10 qual ifies: "As there is a degree of depravity
in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and dis-
trust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence."
Few would despute the possibility of at least an enlightened few-
the "wise and good men"--p 1 ay i ng an educative role in political life.
Franl<lin in all likelihood expressed the prevalent sentiment when he
wrote in 1750 that "Wise and good men are... the strength of a state:
much more so than riches or arms, which, under the management of Ig-
norance and Wickedness, o^'ten draw a destruction, instead of providing
for the safety of the people. And though the culture bestowed on many
should be successfu'. only w*th a few
,
yet the influence of those few
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and the service in their power, may be very great."
Conveniently, "goodness and wisdom" concurred more or less pre-
cisely with yet prevailing Christian sensibilities. Again the Enlight-
enment imprint is evident: Deism, while dispensing with the divinity
of Christ and restricting God's role in the world to that of its origi-
nal "author," was nonetheless rather wholeheartedly affirmative of
Christian values. Not self-consciously so, to be sure. The Deist was
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convinced that "natural religion" was sufficient to sustain the funda-
mental virtues. "The only gospel one ought to read," Voltaire had said,
"is the great book of Nature It is as impossible that this pure and
eternal religion should produce evil as it is that the Christian fanati-
cism should not produce it."^^ Yet strangely enough the values of Deism
were the values of Christianity; one result v-^as the general faith that
even the most depraved of individuals was not totally unsusceptible to
the "rational" imperative to serve his brethern, if perhaps sparingly
and without a surplus of enthusiasm.
In brief, "individualism" in the early context is a great deal
closer to religious than to the much less attractive "bourgeois," "pos-
sassive" individualism: a fact not at all surprising considering Ameri-
ca's protestant origins. Consider how painlessly the political thought
of such religious leaders as Roger V/illiams and John Wise could merge
into strictly secular formulations: Williams, for example, asserting
that "The Sovereign power of all civil authority is founded in the con-
sent of the People that every Commonwealth hath radically and fundamental
ly. The very Commonwea 1 es , Bodies of People .. .have fundamentally In
themselves the Root of Power, to set up what Government and Governors
they shall agree upon."^^ And Wise:
Every man ought to be conceived to be perfectly in his own
pov;er and disposal, and not to be controlled by the authority
of any other. And thus every man just be acknowledged equal
to every man, since all subjection and all command are equal-
ly banished on both s I des ; . . . eve ry man has a prerogative to
judge for himself, namely what shall be most his behoof, hap-
piness, and we 1 1 -be I ng . 79
Such stridently "individualistic" arguments could be made without fear
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for the eruption of a war of all against all precisely because of an
unquestionable consensus on fundamental values. The Spirit has been
privatized, but its public Impact is yet far from nullified.
Nor was it pessimistic sentiments that prevailed, on the whole,
in regard to the general outlook for the young nation's prospects. Some
succor was derived from a fairly widespread physlocratic faith that the
pursuit of Individual interest, at least under conditions of agrarlanism
and excluding monopoly and other forms of economic privilege, would
"naturally" result in the advance of the general good. But more was
involved than economics, us we shall see in more detail in the next
section. The sense was on the land that Europe was decadent, sterile,
and in decline, while America was fresh, fecund, and fraught with prom-
ise for the future. What was not possible In the virgin forests and on
the fertile plains of the New World, a land unencumbered by the repres-
sive strictures of the erstwhile motherland, and inhabited by new men,
truly free men, ambitious, strong, self-reliant, self-disciplined and
vital individuals? Why need individualism have a negatl/e effect In
such a context, where headiness was of a piece with common sense? To
the contrary; as Hartz has It, "Amid the 'free air' of American life,...
men began to be held together, not by knowledge thet they were different
parts of a corporate whole, but by the knowledge that they were similar




But more important for the moment than the binding force of this
and related ideas which v;e will explore shortly, Is another factor--vIz.
the supportive social structure that provided the elemental existential
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context for a prosperous American individualism.
The conditions of the frontier from the seventeenth century
nearly to the end of the nineteenth century could not but give pro-
nounced importance to the individual. The ratio of few men to a seem-
ingly endless expanse of land was an outstanding feature in the form-
ative American experience. The individual had to clear the forest,
till the land, defend the settlement against the occasional Indian at-
tack, and so on. It is this early engendering experience, so stimula-
ting to the romantic imagination, which undoubtedly accounts in part
for the continued symbolic prowess of individualist ideology. But it
was no isolated, "abstract" individual who undertook the great task of
taming a wilderness nation. On the contrary, it was principally the
individual as member- of the close-knit family: the family as love-
relations, productive unit, child-rearing facility, primary educator,
8l
worshipping group;--the family as a "little society" unto itself.
The individual person was a 1 1 - importan t , but al 1 - important in the con-
text of the nearly se 1 f -s jf f I ci en t farm family group. He was "rooted"
--close to loved ones, to nature, and, usually, to God.
Beyond the family, if anything, vyas the hamlet, the village, the
small city. GeneraMy, the individual member participated in intensely
personal relations comprising a comprehensive pattern of life: the term
"neighbor" was more than a geographical designation; religious practice
was a generalized fact of life; the "free market" had a purchase on
reality and was not merely a legitimating myth. As the historian Ralph
Gabriel has written of early American society, the individual "knew
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his neighbor's habits as a provider for his household, as a citizen
dealing with public affairs, as a member or nonmember of a church. "^^
It is a time, so at least is it easy to believe, when life in many ways
was a great deal simpler: Identity, dignity, and a sense of place were
values that did not have to be struggled for so desperately, to be
gained and held; they came, as it were, with the territory.
One can see then how very different the sense, and the effect, of
the individualist ethic must have been: in general affirming the "indi-
vidual" much more than negating the "community." It is to a large degree
vast changes in the ideological and structural composition of American
society that transform a positive value into a destructive dogma: the
progressive decline in the public significance of Christian values; the
concomitant rapid and rather brutal transformation of the United States
from a sparsely populated, agrarian, largely wilderness nation into a
sprawling industrial giant, pockmarked by teeming metropolitan centers,
and thoroughly dominated by the manners and morals of a pervasive
"business creed" manifesting objectively In the corporate form of eco-
nomic organization and a "labor force" composed of the vast majority of
the American citizenry, and subjectively In a mentality at once conformist
and "consumerl St ," and competitive and rapacious. The self-sufficiency
of the family is undermined. Its functions parceled out among impersonal
social agencies; the local community quakes under the impact of urban
anomie and rampant mobility; the dignity of labor is a scarce commodity
within the factory walls. As Richard Hoftstadter once put it, America
was born in the country and moved to the city; the original "individual,"
we might say, passed away en route.
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These caveats against too easy abstraction cannot be gainsaid.
Their value notwithstanding, however, it must be admitted that the
seed of a destructive individualism was already, long before the advent
of industrialization and urbanization, well planted in American soil.
Even where men were considered preeminently "social" beings, the po-
litical was denigrated. Necer.sar i 1 y , perhaps: the reduction of the
state to an instrument of autonomous social forcer, is a principal
prejudice of the modern age. The rise of individualism and the cele-
brations of "society" are in the Western ci v i 1 i zat i onal dialectic not
contradictory but complementary developments. American sentiments re-
garding government have never been far from chose expressed by the
phamphleteer Paine: "Society is produced by our <vants and government
by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness pos i t i ve
1
y , by
uniting our affections, the latter negat ively by restraining our
vices." Society is. a "blessing," while "government, even in its best
state, is but a necessary evil." "Government, Mke dress, is the
O-j
badge of lost innocence." And what is society anyway, Americans
(but for the rare exception, as, e.g., Royce) have always been wont
8^
to argue, but collections of individuals?
And when the political community suffers, all community suffers,
if not immediately. The same American frontier that produced a self-
reliant individualism typically showed intense distaste for common
activity of any sort. As the social historian Richard Bartlett has
written of frontier society: "Many church organizations represented
the limits to which the members vyere willing to go in any kind of
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unified endeavor. Any manifestation of government larger than the
membership of a neighborhood church was anathema to them..." At
least partly for this reason did the frontier offer the extraordinary
opportunities for lawlessness that is yet a thematic staple of the
popular culture. America was already, had been since the first whitet;
made the first camp, in the gr'p of a disintegrative Reformation
dialectic which rendered the problem of public order in its most
elemental form--the guaranteed continued existence of the community--
increasingly central. There is no longer a public representative of
"truth"--the objective organization of values. The Vyestern-Chri st i an
ci vi 1 i zat ionai content is still active, to be sure; but given the
requirement of continual subjective mediation, its sustained power as
a social binding force is far from assured. The inevitable tendency
seems to be toward nihilism, in the sense of an absolute relativity
of all value. The only (theoretical) answer, in turn, is a "civil
theology" which excludes the truth of the Spirit, but which is itself
beyond debate-- i . e ., a mechanistic constitutional scheme which replaces
once and for all the idea of a summum bonum as ordering force with
the fear of the suninum malum , a total breakdown of order, a "v/ar of
all against all." This "freezing" of the problem of order through
political organization, the attempt to construct an artificial "good"
out of the inherent "wickedness," above all else places America in
the Hobbist canp,^^ and contributes an unmistakable "policing"
character to a government which at best hopes to contain and check
a liberated and thoroughly unvirtuous individualism.
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The Secular Derailment
And what shall we say of the future? Is one Church
all we can bu i Id?
Or shall the Visible Church go on to conquer the V/orld?
--T. S. El iot, The Rock
An entirely utilitarian culture cannot exist. Societies, if they
are not to collapse into utter nihilism, must sustain a sense of col-
lective meaning and purpose in their historical existences. Since
history is not a novel, because it has no obvious denouement, the sense
of purpose must be sustained by a public, shared belief in an "end,"
or destiny, one of another form of "salvation." That is to say,
societies must have f a i th . The Western experience suggests that if
the shared faith is not in a God (i.e. an experient ial ly based notion
of an ext ramundane , "transcendental" Being) who assures salvation, it
will instead be placed in one or another God-subs t i tute--Reason
,
Progress, the Nation, Humanity, the Leader, etc. --capable of at least
partially allaying the ineliminable anxiety of existence. If God is
not available to save man, in short, man must, or at least he will,
attempt to save himself.
We will remember that in Taylor's understanding, the "productive,
bargaining culture" bound together men "who could see themselves as
breaking with the past. to build a new happiness in America..." In
this section I shall take seriously Professor Taylor's idea of the
"dream"-like character of this Enlightenment based i ntersubject i ve
self-interpretation, to suggest (in a way, I recognize Taylor might
not admit) that it is at the most fundamental level a collective
62
fantasy of self-salvation based on the cultural transmogrification of
central Christian symbolisms: That is, symbolisms relating to the
Judaeo-Christian Beyond are "squeezed" in the press of an increasingly
secularized American culture to provide meanings evocative of a para-
disiacal, concupiscent Future, The eschaton, in brief, is progressively
Immanent i zed
,
placed within the intramundane reach of human realization.
The dream of self-salvation through this inversion of the original per-
ception of transcendental order is what I mean by the "secular derailment"
that underlies the current crisis of politics and citizenship.
"This American, this new man." From the first the New V/orld of the
Americans appeared to many as a "new world" indeed, the veritable har-
binger of a new age. The hype-bolic contrast of Nsw World virtue with
Old World decadence was inevitable. As the eighteenth century Frenchman
turned American farmer, St. John de Crevecoeur, had it, America had
accomplished a clean break with the past. It was a country
not composed, as in Europe, of great lords, who possess
everything, and of a herd of people who have nothing.
Here are no ar i stocrat i cal families, no counts, no kings,
no bishops, no ecclesiastical dominions, no invisible
power giving to a few a very visible one, no great
manufacturers employing thousands, no great refine-
ments of luxury, 0^
Crevecoeur, like a great many others, was convinced that "the American
89
is a new man who acts upon new principles." "We are the most perfect
society now existing in the world," he fervidly declared, with "new
laws, a new mode of living, a new social system. .. Here man is as free
,,90
as he ought to be . .
.
Yet if the sense of a new age dawning could most easily take root
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in a new world, the germ of the Idea had not originated there. Eighteenth
century Europe was ablaze with the sentiment that one age had come to an
end, and another begun. And so it had. An essential shift in the inter-
pretation of human existence had already been largely accomplished: The
spiritual substance and energies of the soul (psyche) were no longer
directed, as they had been for an unbroken fifteen centuries, towards
the Christian sanct i f i cat i on of life (the pursuit of the holy from within
the fold of the temporal)
,
but v;ere now diverted to the creation, solely
by the power of human agency, of a terrestial paradise sans need of
divine sanction.
The breaking point was of course not so sharp, nor the change too
sudden. The eruption of the Enlightenment only marked the nadir of an
atrophy of medieval sentiments long underway. By the eighteenth century
the world of imperial Christianity, the Western community's common
spiritual orientation in the Res Publica Christiana , was already in
ruins, its sense and power sapped by historical developments encompassing
the Renaissance, the Reformation, the breakup of feudalism and the
emergence of the sovereign national state. The public status of the
Church had suffered much long before Voltaire had issued his famous
call to "encrasser 1 ' infame"; the un I ve rsa 1 i s t i c Empire had already
lost its very reality; cap i ta 1 i sm was already the irresistible up-and-
coming economic system.
"Reason" of course remains the outstanding single symbolism as-
sociated with the Enlightenment. And indeed it is perhaps most illus-
trative of the universal inversion of the order of existence that then
eh
occurs. As Ernst Cassirer has written,
The basic idea underlying all the tendencies of
enlightenment and the conviction that human under-
standing is capable, by its own power and without
any recourse to supernatural assistance, of compre-
hending the system of the world and that this new
way of understanding the world will lead to a new
way of mastering it. Enlightenment sought to gain
universal recognition of this principle in the
natural and intellectual sciences, in physics and
ethics, in the philosophies of religion, history,
1 aw and pol i t i cs .9^
Reason so conceived, that is, a reason shorn of the limiting encumbrances
of the classical bios theoretikos and the Christian cogn i t io f i dea alike,
was taken to be the nev; way, the new life, and the levi truth--the intel-
lectual leading edge of the new secular order of existence. The French
Eicyclopedie put the point succinctly: "Reason is to the phi losophe
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what grace is to the Christian."
Still, Reason is but the polestar of a whole constellation of
transmogrified Christian conceptions. So, for example, for the per-
ception of the mystical body of Christ represented In the Church is
substituted faith in the secular destiny of a "Humanity" organized
(for the time being at least) In sovereign states; for the notion of
the spiritual personality formed by faith and grace, the concept of
the autonomous, passion-driven "individual"; for a Law of Nature
linking nature (including society) and Supernature in an ultimately
transcendental unity, a fully immanent Law implying a mechanistically
organized secular social order (on the model of a similarly organized
universe) preeminently protective of property rights and legitimized
by consent; for vicarious atonement through Christ, the
surrogate of
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self-perfectibility; for universal Providence, indefinite "Progress."
These last notions are especially significant for the analysis of
the American se 1 f-concept
. For long before the ideas of Progress and
Perfectibility received the specific determination of "productive,
bargaining society" were the ideas themselves extraordinarily popular.
To be sure, the cyclical interpretation of history alsc appealed strongly
to the eighteenth century American mind. History proved, did it not,
that every society (look at Rome!) had its stages of g-owth and develop-
ment, and then decline and death? The cyclical view, moreover, meshed
nicely with Protestant concerns for virtue and its preservation, against
the innumerable forces of evil 'ranged against it, in the life of society.
"Immorality has ever ruined the nations where it abounded, whether
they were civilized or barbarians," pontificated colonial historian
Cadwallader Colden, "as justice and strict discipline has made others
flourish and grow powerful. "^^ The perception of the inevitability
of depravity and immorality was, we have seen, at least in part re-
sponsible for the atmosphere of anciety permeating the Constitution
and the Human mechanical attempt to extract, via the alchemy of organi-
zation, "virtue" from irrepressible vice.
But the later eighteenth century was a period of transition; one
must expect the juxtaposition of opposing and mixed conceptions. As
the century passed, even the pessimistically Inclined were favorably
impressed with the record of evident human progress. John Adams con-
fessed to Jefferson, for example, that "The eighteenth century, not-
withstanding all Its errors and vices, has been, of all that are past.
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the most honorable to human nature. Knowledge and virtue are in-
creased and diffused; arts, sciences, useful to men, ameliorating
their condition, were improved more than in any former period. "^^ An
irrepressible optimism was in the air; the cyclical interpretation of
history gradually fell into American deseutude.
Certainly the "new man" of America was very much the progressive
man; precisely the sort of man to prove the visionary philosopher
Condorcet correct in his judgements that
nature has set no term to the perfection of human
faculties; that the perfectibility of man is truly
indefinite; and that progress of this perfectibility,
from now onwards independent of any power that might
wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration
of the globe on which nature has cast us. This progress
will doubtless vary ir speed, but it will never be re-
versed as long as the earth occupies its present place
in the system of the universe, and as long as the
general laws of this system produce neither a general
cataclysm nor such changes as will deprive the human
race of its present faculties and its present resources.
Thus we find in Jefferson an explicit agreement with Condorcet: "!
am among those who think /yell of the human character general 1 y ... I
believe also, with Condorce t . . . that his mind is perfectible to a degree
of which we cannot as yet form any conception .... (A) s long as we may
.
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think as we will, the condition of man will proceed in improvement.
And everywhere among the great men of America were there echos in
praise of Reason and Progress, Science and the Rights of Man. Thus
John Quincy Adams: "The spirit of improvement is abroad upon the
earth. It stimulates the heart and sharpens the faculties...";
Owen Biddle: "It is evident that all our valuable attainments depend
upon a diligent and close application in our pursuit after facts...,
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that discoveries have succeeded each other by a slow and gradual
advancement, and that one invention is linked in with and leads to
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many others that are remote and unforeseen"; John Dickinson: "(Our
natural rights) are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken
from us by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they
are founded in the immutable maxims of reason and justice." A
commission charged with formulating a curriculum for the University
of Virginia counselled Americans to look ever optimistically to the
future for the increasingly complete realization of those rights:
"Each generation succeeding to the knowledge acquin^d by all those
who preceded it, adding to it their own acquisitions and discoveries,
and handing the mass dov;n for successive and constant accumulation,
must advance the knowledge and well-being of mankind, not inf ini tely ,
as some have said, but indef ini tely , and to a term which no one can
fix and foresee.
"^^^
A catalogue of such testimonials to the Enlightenment impact on
America might become quite extensive. Again, however, there is upper-
most in every enlightened American mind the contrast, rather than the
continuity, with the Old World, America was special. The European might
"imagine" enlightenment, to adopt historian Henry Steele Commager's
formulation, but America would "realize" it. As Benjamin Rush de-
clared:
Europe in its present state of political turpor affords
no scope for the activity of a benevolent mind. Here
everything is In a plastic state. Here the benefactor
of mankind may realize all his schemes for promoting
human happiness. Human nature here (unsubdued by the
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tyranny of European habits and custons) yields to
reason, justice, and common sense. '^^
Europe had, perhaps, an idea. But America possessed the moral, intel-
lectual, and physical superiority to put it into practice. As such,
America had more than just the opportunity to "progress." It had,
first of all, a respons i b i 1 i ty to do so. President John Quincy Adams
reminded the young country in his first annual message, "While dwelling
with pleasing satisfaction upon the superior excellence of our political
institutions, let us not be unmindful that liberty is power; that the
nation blessed with the largest portion of liberty must in proportion
to its numbers be the most powerful nation upon earth, and that the
tenure of power by man is, in the moral purposes of the Creator, upon
condition that It shall be exercised to ends of benef icience, to improve
1 03
the condition of himself and his fellow men." And with the sense of
universal responsibility came easily enough, if not necessarily, the
sense of cause, of destiny, of mission. In Tom Paine's usually trenchant
and ringing formulations: "The cause of America is in great measure the
cause of all mankind." Before the new men of the new nation lay the
fate of a waiting world. "We have it in our power to begin the world
over again. A situation similar to the present has not happened since
the days of Noah until now.
The redeemer nation . Paine's biblical reference Is noteworthy. It was,
of course. Reason and not God that would "begin the world over
again."
(Paine insisted: "My own mind is my own church.") But it is a certainty
that the American sense of mission drew its greatest and most direct
inspiration not from the Enlightenment per se, but from its own Puritan
origins--specif ical ly from the Puritan notion of the "city on a hill,"
according to which political order was continuous with a church "covenant
of grace" saturated with apocalyptic sentiments.
Here we should recall that the discovery and settlement of America
coincided with the radical reversal of the traditional Augustinian view
of history, viz. the view that the City of Man and the City of God could
ne^er be reconciled on earth. -or Augustine the eschaton is indeed a
living reality; but it is seen only with the eye of faith, heard with
the ear of hope. I is irreconcilable with the mundane sensibilities.
History does indeed progress toward its end. But neither the end, nor
a succession of definite "stages" towards it, can be known by the power
of human reason; the date cannot be specified. The mystery of the
Incarnation is absolute, as is the mystery of v/ho and what man himself
is at the most fundamental level. Man is destined to live in the
tension of sacred and profane history; within the framework of the
world order of di\/ine dispensation this life remains ever a pilgrimage
toward salvation, not its realization, with only the power of faith
to draw upon for succor.
It is a view that was violently reacted against even before
Augustine's specific formulation of it. The anxiety produced by the
imperative to remain ever in the existential stance of faith towards
an inscrutable Providence can be great--so great that the imperative
may well be rejected in favor of a more reassuring interpretation which
at once retains many, if not all, of the original categories relating
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man to the Beyond. Thus the early variants of heretical Christian
gnosticism (from "gnosis" = knowledge), whose adherents believed they
had, in the formulation of Clement of Alexandria, "the knowledge of
who we were and what we became, of where we were and where into we have
been flung, of whereto we are hastening a.id wherefrom vie are redeemed,
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of what birth is and what rebirth." Through possession of an arcane
"knowledge" man could effect, or at least help to effect, his own
salvation. In this vein Joachim of Flora in the twelfth century worked
up the influential sequence of three grand historical periods based on
the symbolism of the Holy Trinity. The age of the father had lasted
from Creation to the brith of Christ; that of the Son, from Christ
until Joachim's own time. Now the last and greatest age, that of the
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Holy Soirit, was due for inauguration in the year 1/bO. Thus
Joachim first articulated a structure of "gnostic" speculation that
vjould reverberate throughout the centuries, and indeed is far from
exhausted even today.
Anticipations of apocalypse were rife in the later Middle Ages;
indeed they are inseparable from the eruption of the Reformation and
the lengthy period of bloody political sectarianism that emerges there-
from.^^'' American Protestants, integrally part of this milieu, held
that not only would the earthly millennium Indeed be fulfilled; they
believed it was_ being fulfilled through human efforts in America. The
New World had been chosen to redeem the world through a progressive
conquest of evil (an evil they imagined victorious over Europe), and
so realize God's divine plan for man. The specific vehicle was
of
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course the Puritan settlements themselves, fully motivated as they
were by the miVlennial Christian spirit. Literary historian Ernest
Lee Tuveson quotes a Puritan settler:
The Latter Erecting of Christ's Kingdom in whole
Societies (whereby Christ is seen Ruling All in a
Conspicuous and Open, in a prevailing and peaceable
manner)
, was OUR DESIGN and is OUR INTEREST in this
Country ... .And this also is CHRI ST '
S
Design in these
Latter days; To set up His Kingdom in a Public and
Openly prevailing manner, in all the Parts and Ways
thereof J08
Whereas Augustine insisted that the eschaton could not be politicized,
the Puritans conceived the political order in the Old Testament terms
of a chain of covenants linking men and God. Thus Richard Mather ex-
pounded the nature of the political bond:
When Jehojada (the high priest) made a Covenant between
the King and the peop 1 e . . . that Covenant was but a branch
of the Lord's covenant with them all, both King and
people: for the King promised but to Rule the people
them all, both King and people: for the King promised
but to Rule the people righteously, according to the
will of God: and the people to be subject to the King
so Ruling. Now these duties of the K^ng to them, and
of them to the King, were such as God requirea in his
Covenant of him and them. ^'^9
To this understanding of the political covenant the Puritans coupled
their self-conception of being in active partnersFiip with Christ in
the conquest of evil. "The first grand design of Christ Jesus is to
destroy and consume His mortal enemy, AntiChrist," argued Roger Williams
(specifically in favor of freedom of conscience as a civil norm).
This must be done by the breath of His mouth in His
Prophets and Witnesses: Now the Nations of the world
have impiously stopt this heavenly breath, stifled the
Lord Jesus in his servants. Now if it shall please
the civil state to remove the state bars, set up to
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resist the holy spirit of God in his servants....
humbly conceive that the civil state hath made a
fair progress in promoting the Gospel of Jesus
Christ. 1 10
The question which exercises fs here is this, How great is the
distance between these extraordinary seventeenth and eighteenth century
political sentiments and those, for example, of the "nationalistic
theology"^^^ of Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth, or Wood row Wi 1 son '
s
"idealisrr" ("America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her
destiny and saving tne world") in the twentieth?
In fact, religious, or primarily religious, formulations persist
side by side with mote strictly secular versions of the United States'
"mission" at least until the turn of the present century. Historian
and enthusiastic Andrew J.ackson supporter George Bancroft, for example,
considered the popular voice to be the voice of God; democracy he de-
fined as "Eternal Justice ruling through the people," the mystical-
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progressive embodimeit of a divine Providence immanent in the world.
Similarly Henry George, in his widely read Progress and Poverty (1879),
was explicit In his religious longing "for the promised Millennium,
when each will be free to follow his best and noblest Impulses,
un-
fettered by the restrictions and necessities which our present
state
of society impose upon him...."; George argued that "a very
Kingdom




^ The persistent, ex-
plicitly millennial aspiration was perhaps most stridently
expressed
in the- formulations of the late nineteenth century
"Social Gospel"
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movement: Josiah Strong, one of its founders, believed fervently that
it was the intention of Providence to "Ang 1 o-Saxon i ze" all mankind,
1 1 k
employing the United States as its instrument; his colleague
Washington Gladden declared in I89O that "...here, upon these plains,
the problems of history are to be solved; here, if anywhere, is to rise
the city of God, the New Jerusalem, whose glories are to fill the
earth."
The dominant formulations are of course secular, from the early
days cn . It is not difficult, however, to trace the continuity of
sentiment involved in the shift from religious to secular notions of
the American "mission," The form changes dramatically; but the sub-
stantial content--a collective faith in the redemptive role cf the
United States in the wor 1 d-- rema i ns fundamentally unaltered. Let us
compare the visions of two eighteenth century contemporaries, biblical
scholar and preacher David Austin, and enlightened Delaware lawyer and
Jeffersonian correspondent Caesar Rodney. The passages are neither
unique nor outstanding in themselves. To the contrary, they are repre-
sentative of widely shared sentiments; herein precisely lies their value
First, Austin's militant, exclamatory articulation (179'^):
Behold, then, this hero of America, wielding the standard
of civil and religious liberty over these United States!--
Follow him, in his strides, across the At 1 ant i c! --See
tyranny, civil and ecclesiastical, bleeding at every pore!
See the votaries of the tyrants; of the beasts; of the
false prophets, and serpents of the earth; ranged in battle
array, to withstand the progress and dominion of him, who
hath commission to break down the usurpations of tyranny--
to let the prisoner out of the prison-house ; and to set
the vassal in bondage free from his chains--to level the





The Revolution of America, by recognizing those rights
which every Man is Entitled to by the laws of God and
Nature, Seems to have broken off all those devious
Trammels of Ignorance, Prejudice, and Superstition
which have long depressed the Human Mind. Every door
is now Open to the Sons of genius and Science to in-
quire after Truth. Hence we may expect the darkening
clouds of error will vanish before the light of reason;
and that period is Fast arriving when the Truth will
enlighten the whole v;orld.^^7
Two related points may be abstracted from the continuity of sentiment
revealed in the juxtaposition of these two statements of missionary zeal.
Of first importance is the essential s tructure of the wor 1 d- i n-.nanent
"religious" experience. The evidence here suggests that once che
impulse to realize a terrestial paradise has been firmly established
in the collective consciousness of a people, the precise nature of the
"new world" (the Visible Church) that is expectsd to appear may, within
limits prescribed only by the experience itself, vary freely. Thus
Austin's paradise follows the orthodox Puritan expectation of the Lord's
arrival (via his prepared "highway") in the world; Rodney's, on the
other hand, is the enlightened paradise in which ignorance, superstition,
etc. have evaporated, and the "Sons of genius and Science" have pene-
trated (or at least are in the process pf penetrating) every dark recess
with the omnipotent searchlight of Reason. Second, then, is the vari-
ation itself, the gradual transition from one form of the "mission,"
the millennial exemplar, to another. Notice that Rodney yet speaks,
as the good Deist must, of the "laws of God and Nature"; but it is
of
course Newton's and not Noah's God that he has in mind. God has
been
put on "hold," as it were, while for the more traditional
embodiments
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of evil in the worl d--"beasts ," "false prophets," "serpents of the
earth" is substituted the single enemy--"er ror . " God is knowable
Nature; Satan is a great Mistake. At once we see that the Puritan
formulation itself presages the transition. In Austin's vision America
the hero's task is to everywhere establish civil as well as religious
liberty, to liberate the "vassal" from his bondage to the "tyrant,"
1 1
8
to "progress" and establish "dominion," etc.
This continual process of transmogrification, in which, however,
the psychic energies remain constant, is precisely the process of
secularization. The Deist inversion of the original Puritan vision
prepares the ground for further concupi scential differentiations of
the original impulse which will dispense with the notions of God and
"transcendence" once and for all. By 18^6, for example, J. Sullivan
Cox could declare in The United States Magazin e and Democratic Review
that "There is a moral sense--a soul in the state, which longs for
something more than the tariffs, the bank and the bankrupt bills of a
temporary present; which lOoks for some celestial beacon to direct
1 1
3
the course of popular movement through the eternal future!"
'' We
have already seen, in the quotations from Bancroft and George, some
intimations of the fully secu 1 ar democrat i c theology that develops in
the nineteenth century. Cox's statement is significant first as an
indication of the extent to which this "democratic faith," to use
historian Ralph Gabriel's phrase, had crystallized as an ideological
differentiation of the Progress-Mission sentiment which relies not on
God Himself, not even on the "laws of God and Nature," but
simply on
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vague "moral senses," mystical "state souls," and Indefinite, sybilline
"celestial beacons." In this regard it is interesting to note that
Cox's statement appeared only the year after the phrase "Manifest
1 2
1
Destiny" was first catapulted into the national consciousness. (All
that is new, of course, is the specifically democratic element ("the
course of popular movement"); fifty years earlier David Humphreys, aide
and protege of General Washington, later minister to Spain and Portugal,
had written that "America, after having been concealed for so many ages
from the rest of the world, v/as probably discovered in the matur^ity of
time, to become the theatre for displaying the illustrious designs of
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Providence, in its dispensation to the human race." And surely such
a large theater, in which was to be given the most sacred of "illus-
trations," would have to be under the command of only the greatest of
performers.) The statement is noteworthy also, however, for its
apprehensive presentiment of the next great stage of the future-
progress-mission consciousness. Already "tariff, bank and bills"--
i.e. the emerging symbols of the "productive society"--threaten to
usurp the crown and crozier of Destiny. When they are successful,
the distinctively transcendent, the "celestial beacon," however
amorphous and ambiguous its precise nature, will no longer point the
way toward the "eternal future." At that point "Progress" will be
wholly self-sustained, immanent to the capitalist productive dynamic.
Again, the direction of change is inexorably towards further
Immanent ization and secularization. And again the movement to the
next stage is presaged in the former one. A popular movement directed
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by a Newtonian Providence gives way easily enough to a self-directed
process of democratization, which in turn conditions the movement to
the ful 1 -fledged "bargaining" culture. In none of these transitions is
the religious impulse lost. Rather it Is immanentlzed. Specifically,
the notion of salvation is not dispensed v;ith; instead man commits him-
self more fully to the belief of sel f- salvation. Nor does the idea of
a terrestial paradise give wa>' to dour fatalism. To the contr^ry, now
man need not, must rot, wait for Christ to establish tne Kingdom; he
can, he must, establish it by the power of his own thought, his own
will, his own 1 abor
.
The "Bard of Democracy" Walt Whitman was perhaps the mos*: self-
conscious participant in the nineteenth century process of democratic
immanent i zation; his revealing interpretation of the movement Is worthy
of a brief examination. "The meaning of America," he wrote in his
working introduction to Leaves of Grass , "is Democracy." And
The meaning of democracy 'S to put in practice the idea
of the sovereignty, license, sacredness of the individual.
This idea gives identity and isolation to ever-y man and
woman--but the idea of Love fuses and combines all v/ith
irresistable pov/er....A third idea, also, is or shall
be put tiiere , --namely Re 1 i g i on , --the idea which swallows
up and purifies all other ideas and thlngs--and gives
endless meaning and destiny to a man and condenses him
in all things .^23
Whitman envisions Religion "swallowing" man. But in truth It Is man
who swallows religion, and becomes, as it were, God. Whitman approaches
a democratic Neltzsche as he Imagines the evolution of "a perfect race,,
grandly developed In body, emotions, heroism and Intellect." In the
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prophetic poetic vision, "Man comes forward inherent, superb, the soul,
the judge, the common average man advances, ascends to place. God dis-
appears--the whole idea of God, as hitherto presented in the religions
1 2h
of the world for the thousands of past years...." We are to under-
stand that the historical advance to democracy is not merely a progression
of political formr. not even "simply" a remarkable advance in the concept
of man. It is a transformation of history itself: from an ultimately
mysterious process that depends for its sense and substance on the will
and judgement of a transcendent Being, to a self-enclosed anthropocentric
system of self-given meaning and purpose. Can we wonder at the motivating
power of a "democratic faith" which promises no mere equality with one's
peers, but with Gdq Himself?
We may of course think the enthusiastic Whitman to occupy at best
an extreme position on the spectrum of American democratic sentiments.
Cannot the God-fearing as well as the mangods , and indeed the agnostic
pragmatists as much as the salvation seekers, be democrats? Certainly.
But Whitman's immanentized religious individualism is hardly bizarre
in the context of an American experience grounded in Reformation-En-
lightenment. It is certainly no more extreme than the prevalent
eighteenth and nineteenth century sentiment expressed here by en-
lightened extremist Paine: "I do not believe in the creed professed
by the Hewish Church, by the Roman Church, by the Greek Church, by
the Turkish Church, by the Protestant Church, nor by any church that
1 25
I know of. My ovvn mind is my own church." This is more than meta-
phor, as Whitman's vision is more than poetry. It is a quite
unexceptional
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expression of the essentially modern conviction that by his own hand
man has displaced God the Father, and assumed his powers and privileges.
Nor can Whitman's political universalism be finally depicted as any
more millennial than the hallowed Declaration of independence, whose
fervently un i versa! i st i c tone has made it the inspirational mainstay
of indigenous American radicalism, from the original colonial rebellion
to the Port Huron Statement and the Manifesto of the Black Panther Party.
It is precisely this inspired tone of immanent universalism moved
President-elect Lincoln, taking office when American millennial aspi-
rations were at fever pitch (I86I), to declare:
I have never had a feeling politically that did not
spring from the Declaration of I ndependence . . . . I have
often inquired of myself what great principle it was
that kept this confederacy so long together. It was
not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from
the motherland, but something in that declaration
giving liberty, not alone to the people of this
country, but hope for the world for all future time.
It was that which gave promise that In due time the
weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all
men, that all should have an equal chance. This v/as
the sentiment embodied in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence .... I would rather be assassinated on the
spot than surrender lf.^26
Lincoln knew the essence of the Declaration to be faith, not "reason"--
faith In a final realization of justi ce--"l 1 berty" and "equal I ty"--for
all mankind: not following an anxiety shrouded Judgement in the after-
life; but "in due time," In the approaching Future, In this world.
Like Cox, Whitman was appalled by the
fully commercialized, bargaining culture.
baleful apparition of the
His ideal democracy would
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brook no ph i ] i st i nes ; it was composed of "sound men, women and children,
of simpler want's, owners of their own homes, of natural talents, un-
1 27tainted with the sick madness which we see." Were it in his power,
he would surely balk the movement to the next version of the radically
immanentized eschaton. But the fantastic transmogrification of civil i-
zational values is no man's toy. The specific content of a coPective
hallucination is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to manipulate.
And in the Ajnerican war of dream with dream, if vje.s of course the night-
mare that won out over the pleasing fancy. Babbitt who triumphed over
Huckleberry Finn.
P roductive, bargaining society .. The eruption of America into a post-
Civil War "productive"-industrial society represents the development of
the enlightenment salvation fantasy to the point o-^ concrete materiali-
zation. In the Puritan fantasy it is still Christ who realizes the
Millennium (albeit only after the Puritans have prepared the proper
place). For the Deist it is Reason unaided by valth. For the ram-
bunctious democrat, the nat i onal i st i c wi 11 of the people ruling over
an extensive territory. The productive-bargainer, however, surpasses
all previous developments toward explicit externa 1 i zat i cn ; the Spirit
now resides in the factory . The machine Is the new mess i ah; Henry
Ford is the high priest: "To produce, produce; to get a system that
will reduce production to a fine art; to put production on such a
basis
as will provide means for expansion and the building of still
more





is the industrial idea.
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The bourgeois/materialist/sensationalist impulse had of course
always been strong in enlightened America. The powerful currents of
passion-psychology nearly compelled It. Was not Newtonian Reason, more-
over, one which embodies itself _m matter? Man progresses, at least in
part, through the increase of gratifications and the refinement of the
sensibilities. Thus Jefferson: "Life is of no value but as it brings
us gratifications." "Rational society" is to be sought because it Is
the greatest of grat i f I e rs--" I t reforms the mind, sweetens the temper,
1 29
cheers our spirits, and promotes health." John Adams, similarly, but
more radically, struck a distinctly Benthamite note, arguing that "the
form of government which communicates ease, comfort, securi ty . . . to the
1 30
greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best."
And Hamilton, who as Secretary of the Treasury in Washington's cabinet
perhaps affected more than any other statesman the course of the young
nation, grounded the national interest in the practical imperative to
make it "the immediate interest of the monied man to cooperate with
1 3
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government"; we might fay he thereby anticipates by more than a
century President Coolidge's notorious adage, "The business of the nation
i s bus i ness . "
The concept of labor, moreover, gradually underwent the same process
of imnanentization that vjorked its heady magic on the originally religious
sentiment of the new man and his mission. Central to the much celebrated,
much maligned "Puritan work ethic" was a notion of the sanctity of labor.
One v/orshipped God by diligent attention to one's vocation, as well as
by prayer, church participation, etc. "Success" in economic life was
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indeed central; less for its own sake, however, than on the adapted Old
Testament rationale that worldly success Is a sign of faithful keeping
of the covenant. Prosperity is the outward sign of inward grace. In
the same rationale the Puritan practice of self-denial finds its ground:
The worker is in but not of the v-jorld; the ultimate end of labor, like
that of all human effort, is not comfort, but the beatific vision,
communion with the Lord.
These sentiments have reverberated steadily throughout the American
experience; undoubtedly they continue to fuel a large measure of the
working man's resentment toward the welfare state. But if the con-
nection between work and "inward grace" has survived, we find that it
is not God who bestows the saving blessedness, but the intramundane
mangods Progress and Mankind. Consider this passage from Andrew
Carnegie's Gospe 1 of Wea 1 th :
It seems nowadays a matter of universal desire that
poverty should be abolished. We should be quite
willing to abolish luxury, but to abolish honest,
industrious, self-denying poverty would be to destroy
the soil upon which mankind produces the virtues which
enable our race to reach a still higher civilization
than It now possesses -^^
The statement is remarkable for two reasons beyond its obvious self-
serving ideological character. First is the continuity with the
tradition of the Puritan ethic; the more subtle irony of multi-million-
aire Carnegie forswearing "luxury" and extolling the virtues of "honest,
industrious, self-denying poverty" is lost if we fail to take account
of its Puritan ground. Second, however, is the radical break with the
central "transcendental" sense of that same tradition. Carnegie is a
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man of greed, not of God, more concerned for profit than for piety.
The justification of work is now cast not in terms of an explicitly
religious thirst for salvation, but rather in terms of the indefinite
progress of "civilization" qua producer of an ever-expanding quantity
of goods--and we expect at least a goodly few millionaires like Carnegie
himself. The apparent contradiction of sanctifying poverty in the
interests of producing wealth, not to mention the rather obvious tread-
mill quality of the conceotion (production for the sake of production),
is not obvious only to a man--or a nation--that holds fast and fervently
to a conviction that the process itself is of transcendent significance,
that it is somehow "divine."
The development of this totally immanent sanct i f i cat i on cf work was
long underway. At least as early as Franklin's Poor Richard's Almanac
Americans were introduced to the genre of "success for its own sake"
recipe/maxims. Advised the assiduous ph i 1 osopher-s tatesman- sc i ent i st
:
"Lose no time; be always employed in something useful; cut off all
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unnecessary actions." Similarly, that staple of nascent mass edu-
cation, the McGuffey Reade r, imperiously intoned: "Work, work, my boy,
be not afraid;/Look labor boldly in the face;/Take up the hammer or
the space, /And blush not for your humble place." The formulations are
straightforwardly secular. Yet quite clearly the Puritan sensibilities
motivate and inspire still. For Franklin industry is a key not only to
a merely mundane comfort, but to virtue; his is an attempt to articulate
a wholly immanent paradigm of right life in the secularized "new world."
And in the Reader we can almost hear the war against the devil sloth bel
8^*
waged, and won: "There's glory in the shuttle's song ;/There
' s triumph
In the anvi 1 's stroke;/There'5 merit in the brave and strong, /Who dig
1 35the mine or fell the oak." it is doubtful, though I shall make no
pretense at providing the point here, that without a nearly universal
conviction as to the immanent hallowness and sanctity of labor, the
culture of industry could so much as gotten off the ground, let alone
known the enormous success it has.
In the post-Civil Viar period the identification of the culture of
production and work with a developing pattern of vjor Id- immanent Progress
is explicit, universal and unchallenged. Who could dare deny that the
rising industrial colossus was not fulfilling the American mission, as
society was radically transfigured by the complementary forces of
technology, industrialism, corporate management, exploitation of
physical resources, scientific development, immigration (America need
not go to the world to sa\'e it; the world was pouring into America),
urbanization, expansive nationalism?
Economics was in the saddle, determined to ride mankind into the
promised land of the American dream. "Enterprise" was the first article
of this latest version of the I rrepress I bly millennial faith. A few
industrial "captains'' unabashedly averred the divine origins of their
immense secular authority. "The good Lord gave me my money," explained
1 36
good Baptist Rockefeller; likewise George Baer, president of the
Reading Railroad, pontificated on the v/orklng man's plight: "The rights
and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for--not
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by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his
infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the
country," Nor would one have to seek far for a clergyman willing
to perform a few theological contortions aimed at synthesizing Christian
categories and triumphantly frank materialism; said, for example. Bishop
Lawrence of Massachusetts in 1900: "In the long run, it is only to the
man of morality that wealth comes. V/e believe in the harmony of God's
Universe. We know that it is only by working along His laws natural
and spiritual that we can work with efficiency. Only b/ working along
the lines of right thinking and right living can the secrets and wealth
of nature be revea 1 ed . . . . God 1 i ness is In league with r i ches . . . . Mate r I a 1
prosperity is helping to make the national character sweeter, more
1 38joyous, more unselfish, more Christlike."
More, however, travelled the strictly worldly path blazed by
William Graham Sumner, the American "social Darwinist" disciple of the
Englishman Herbert Spencer. Sumner is an especially intriguing figure
insofar as his very biography may be viewed, without i think undue ex-
aggeration, as representative of the powerful forces of revolutionary
immanentization then underv/ay in American culture. Ordained a minister
in 1869, Sumner gradually became the most outstanding spokesman for
undiluted social evolutionist ideals. As he himself characterized the
transformation: "I never consciously gave up a religious belief. It
was as if I had put my beliefs Into a drawer, and when I opened it there
1 ^9
was nothing there at all." So, we might say, had the nation.
The posltivlst science of social Darwinism was doubly attractive
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to the prevailing spirit of bouyant materialism. It proffered both a
secular theodicy and the libertarian promise of a capitalist Utopia.
On the one hand, things must be (temporarily) as bad as they are; on
the other, they must steadi ly improve. Nature "grants her rewards to
the fittest," said the Yale professor of Political and Social Science,
"without regard to cons I derat • ons of any kind."
If, then, there be liberty, men get from her just in
proportion to their being and their doing. Such is
the system of nature. i f we do not like it, and if
we try to amend it, there Is only one way in which
we can do it. We can take from the better and give
to the worse. We can deflect the penalties of those
who have done ill and throw them on those who have
done better.... We shall then lessen the inequalities.
We shall favor the survival of the unfittest, and we
shall accomplish thir> by destroying liberty.^^^
To be sure, capitalist Utopians did not indulge in idle fantasies of
universal equality; the harsh law of nature wou^d not abide such flir-
tations with unreality. "The American beauty rose can be produced,"
mused Rockefeller in a tone of hard lyricism, "only by sacrificing the
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early buds which grow up around it." But that they were utcpian
there can be no doubt. Arch- cap I ta 1 I s t Carnegie looked beyond Babylon
to the bourgeois version of New Jerusalem: "We accept and welcome,
therefore, as conditions to which we must accomnodate ourselves, great
inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial
and commercial, in the hands of a few; and the law of competition be-
tween these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future
1 k2
progress of the race ." In the paradisiacal Future, the millionaires
will be "the bees that make the most honey, and contribute most to the
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hive even after they have gorged themselves full," ^ "the millionaire
will be but a trustee for the poor...."^^^
It was the Age of Enterprise, the Gilded Age, the Age of Spoilsmen,
coincident with breakneck industrialization, the amassing of monstrous
fortunes and the proletarianization of the majority of citizens, and
the utter degradation of the political. On the social Darwinist view,
government's laissez-faire role was restricted to removing Impediments
to the free and right working o^ the natural law of competition and the
principle of freedom of contract (thus even Hamilton's mercantilism was
considered too "pol i t I ca 1 ") --a theoretical fantasy that In fact led (or
helped heartily to lead) to the practical reality of commonplace public
venality at every level of political community: the Grant Administration
reeled under the impact of Credit Mobil ier while Boss Tweed transferred
$100 million from New York City's coffers to his own pockets.
But could this too not be seen as part of the grand pattern of
Progress that v;as realizing itself in American culture? Was it not
possible that the state itself--at least the state as it has hitherto
been known--is a passing phenomenon, in the final review incidental to
the ultimate destiny of a se 1 f- real i zed humanity? So said the first
great American cultural anthropologist, Lewis H. Morgan, whose Ancient
Society (1877) bore the revealing subtitle Researches in the Lines of
Human P rogress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization . The
historical evolution of tne forms of property and technology , argued
the enormously influential Morgan, is the real motor of all c i v i 1 I za 1 1 ona
advance.
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There is something grandly impressive in a principle
which has wrought out civilization by assiduous appli-
cation from small beginnings; from the arrow head,
which expresses the thought in the brain of a savage,
to the smelting of iron ore, which represents the
higher intelligence of the barbarian, and, finally,
to the railway train in motion, wh i ch may be cal led
the triumph of civilization . 1 '^5
A better illustration of tlie economic version of millennial immanenti-
zation would probably be hard to find. Morgan furthermore seized upon
the apparently i r ""es i s t i b' e triadic symbolism to express a pattern of
deterministic advance from primitive communism and elementary democracy,
through the property forms of goverriment--despot ism, imperialism,
monarchy, aristocratic pi-ivilege, and representative democracy--to,
finally, a still "higher plane of society" foreshadowed by "democracy
In government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges,
1
and universal education." Not too surprisingly, America appeared at
the very pinnacle of civilization, necessarily in the vanguard of all
future progress.
Some, it is true, were not so sure about the ultimate benevolence
of prevailing property forms, nor the likelihood of their giving way
necessarily to Utopia, capitalist or otherwise. But before the dogma
of the progressive faith, none were true heretics. Dissent erupted in
•
waves that washed across the nation from country to city, but none could
seriously challenge the hurricane advance of the industrial civilization.
Disputes arose about the wa^ to realize the American paradise, the right
method to employ In fulfilling the mission of world salvation. Yet in
no quarter flagged the faith that the material kingdom was at
hand,
the eschaton within "evolutionary" reach. Capitalist dominance
and
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political decadence were challenged not by un-prog ress i ve creeds, but
by sectarian splinters of the fundamental collective cult.
By the end of the nineteenth century even religion was explicitly
and self-consciously evolutionist. American Christendom now embraced
the working man, and v;ent at once "social" and "scientific." Walter
Rauschenbusch declared in Christianity and the Social Crisis (1907):
The higher spiritual insight of Jesus reverted to the
earlier and nobler prophetic view that the future vizs
to grow out of the present by divine help. .. .Jesus had
the scientific insight which comes to most men only by
training, but to the elect few by divine gift. He
grasped the substance of that law of organic develop-
ment in nature and history which our own day at last
has begun to elaborate systemat i ca 1
1
y . . . h i s end was
not the new soul, but the new society; not man, but
Man. 1^7
Thus Christ was really only a divinely inspired "scientist" of social
development; a nation (a world!) of veritable Christs could be created,
could they not, by the proper "training."
In a superficially contradictory but fundamentally complementary
vein, secular evangel Robert Ingersoll proffered a Religion of Humanity
(Tom Paine's phrase, originally) as a more consistent replacement for
a humanistic religion. "If abuses are destroyed," sermonized Ingersoll,
"man must destroy them."
If slaves are freed, men must free them. If new truths
are discovered, man must discover them. If the naked
are clothed; if the hungry are fed; if justice is done;
if labor is rewarded; if superstition is driven from
the mind; if the defenseless are protected, and if
the riqht finally triumphs, all must be the work of
man .
^
Ingersoll had in mind, however, not man alone, nor man even in community
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with other men, but man armed with "Reason, Observation, and Experience--
the Holy Trinity of Science." With Science as our teacher, Ingersoll
was convinced, "We are laying the foundations of the grand temple of
the future--not the temple of all the gods, but of all the people--
wherein, with appropriate rites, will be celebrated the religion of
l''i9
Humanity." Again, we err if we interpret the explicit expression
of millennial sentiment as mere metaphor. In Europe, August Comte had
already gone beyond envisioning to the attempt to inst i tut ional i ze the
new immanent and sociological Religion of la Grand-Etre (i.e. "Humanity"),
investing himself vn tii the powers of its ex cathedral high priest. If
anything, the Americans were somewhat behind the times.
In the culture of work, however, economic panaceas of necessity
received priority over ritualistic religiosity, positivistic or other-
wise. If laissez-faire capitalism v;as not the v;ay to heaven, then
perhaps some other, more "socialistic," form of economic order was.
Wendell Phillips, for example, running hot still on erstwhile abolition-
ist steam, held that "extinction of all monopol i es" wou 1 d result in
"the final obliteration of that foul stigma upon our so- called Christian
1 50
ci vi 1 i zat ion--the poverty of the masses." Still more ambitiously,
Henry George's Progress and Poverty proposed a single tax that v/ould
"raise wages, increase the earnings of capital, extirpate pauperism,
abolish poverty, lessen crime, elevate morals, and taste, and intelli-
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gence, purify government," and in general inaugurate the millennium.
Populist Bryan's silver solution of course anticipated the same results;
as did the American marxist Laurence Gronlund's vision of economic
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Revolution-through-Evolution of a "cooperative commonwealth." In the
socialist commonwealth there is a "perfect harmony" between "the interest
of each citizen and those of the citizen at large," morals are vastly
improved, perfect justice and equality prevail, etc. While wary of
sounding "over-marxi st" to American ears unaccustomed to the hard
language of class warfare, Gronlund was altogether unrestrained in
voicing his millennial expectation: "the society to be ushered in"
through the revolution/evolution of industrial relations, he said,
1 52
" i s , . . . i ndeed , the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth."
Increasingly the call now is for government to take up self-
consciously the banner of Progress v/ith the cudgel of economics. Thus
Edward Bellamy, in the highly popular Utopian novel, Looking Backward
(1886):
Let but the fan i ne-s t r i cken nation assume for the common
good the function It had neglected, and regulate for the
common good the course of the life-giving stream (the
production of goods flowing from the labor of men), and
the earth would bloom like one garden, and none of its
children lack any good thing. 153
"Progress ivi sm" now displaces social Darwinism as the dominant millennial
creed, largely in reaction to the obvious social des t ruct I veness of an
unbridled capitalism. The darwinian theodicy had worn thin In the face
of political bossism and graft, unremitting poverty and the worsening
of slums, the ruthless exploitation of child and female labor, the
extensive expropriation of middle class economic power by corporate
concentration, etc. --so many sacrifices to the specifically capitalist
vision of the concupiscent Future. But the very name of the new move-




Already the "scientific" dissenter from the Gospel of Wealth,
Lester Ward, had presaged the interventionist welfare statism of the
Progressives. In Dynamic Society (I883) he proposed an Immanent
critique of Spencerian evolutionism: "human soc I ety . . . wh I ch is the
highest product of evolution, naturally depends upon mind, \;hich Is the
highest of matter." Through exploiting the psychic factor, man can arti-
ficially engineer his own evol ut I on--"the fundamental principle of biology
is natural selection, that os sociology is artificial select ion .... I
f
nature progresses through the destruction of the weak, man progresses
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through the protection of the weak,"
From these formulations it Is but a short move to the early
tvvfentieth century science-worshipping, management mentality of the
pragmatic-progressives. Politics is rescued from the self-serving
"bosses" and "machine" politicians to become the scientific adminis-
trative agent of an antecedent society that is the bearer of the ever
continual Progress. As the prestigious and influential John Dewey
spoke of political ph i 1 osophy--" I t is not the business of political
philosophy and science to determine what the state In general should
or must be. What they may do is to aid in creation of methods such
that experimentation may go on less blindly.
"^^^ Politics Is to serve
social life, and the aim of social life, Dewey averred, is "the ever-
enduring process of perfecting, maturing, refining"; "growth Itself
is the only moral end."^^^ An immanentlzed eschaton was here relativized
and "instrumental Ized": Reality is process; intelligence is
pragmatic
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and functional; scientific method is the organon by which the mastery
of nature and society, the indefinite betterment of the human condition,
is to be achieved. Dewey came close to identifying, though there is
more assumption than demonstration in his arguments, science with
"democracy." An ideal democratic political order would fundamentally
be an "approximation to use of scientific method in investigation and
of the engineering mind in the invention and projection of far-reaching
,
,,158plans.
At once the Progressive Era produced yet another d i ^^fe ren t i at i on
of the American missionary consciousness, as the United States embarked
on a new imperial vocation. It was a period of a resurgent and strident
nationalism in which the passion for material paradise fused with the
Zeitgeist of the imperialist conqueror. The new nationalism perhaps
hit a peak in the righteous Teddy Roosevelt's conception of a v^orld
divided into the civilized and uncivilized, and among the former, the
weak and degenerate on the one hand and the virile and progressive on
the other. It was no mystery which camp the United States was in. Its
own expansionist ene rg I es , Rooseve 1 t insisted, followed the natural law
of all great nations: "In every instance the expansion has taken
place
because the race was a great race. I t was a sign and proof of greatness
In the expanding nation, and moreover bear in mind that In each
Instance
it was of Incalculable benefit to mank I nd . . . .When great
nations fear to
expand, shirk from expansion, it is because their greatness is
coming to
end."^^^ This is not arrogance, on Roosevelt's Interpretation,
but the
11 of destiny to responsibly shoulder the missionary
burden. "Our
ca
wealth and our power have given us a place of influence among the nations
of the world. But world-wide influence and power mean more than dollars
or social, intellectual, or industrial supremacy. They involve a re-
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sponsibility for the moral welfare of others which cannot be evaded."
Roosevelt might well have lifted his text directly from his predecesso-
of more than a century, John Quincy Adams.
Thus America met the twentieth century with much the same optimistic
fire, pa.-,sion and zeal with which it left the eighteenth. Periiaps a
little less innocent, its virtue was nonetheless intact. The nation's
face may now snow a few scars, but its heart yet beat true, its mil-
lennial will was like the steel that poured forth from its factories.
"We fight in honorable fashion for the good of mankind," a displaced
but still combative Roosevelt harangued in 1912, "fearless of the
future, unheeding of our individual fates, with unflinching hearts and
undimmed eyes; we stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord.
Peel
i
ne of fai th . The experience of the twentieth century wrecked havoc
on the cherished American se 1 f -concept . To be sure, it was, as it still
is, possible to poi-t to multiple avenues of "advance" opened
and
travelled in the last several decades. The Progressive movement
it-
self, of course, was the first victim of World War I.
But it was to
an America on crusade, an America, in Wilson's words, that
had the
great fortune to "fulfill her destiny and save the
world," that it was
sacrificed. And after the first Great War came the
exhilaration of
prosperity and still greater productivity, the twirling
twenties, the,
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In Presidont Harding'', expression, "sustalnment in triumphant nation-
ality." The new "normalcy" reeked of conservatism, it is true, hut
in America conservatism is quite compatible with a high frenzy of the
concup i seen t i a 1 urge, ttie undaunted will to a final i n te rpenc t rat ion
of the ci vitas Dei and the civitas terrena. In World War II America
drove tlio Fiiropeap Anllchi-ist from the field once more; and again was
rewarded vn t h an ch.illient prosperity, which now the new Keynes ian
expertise promised to make permanent. To those intent o\\ reading
history v/i ili a millennial eye, t hf tuliire looked its rosiest yet:
no more v/ar, no more; depression; at last a piece of tlie dream for
every American dreamer.
But cracks in the great progressive egg had already appeared, and
threatened to become irreparai)1e crevices. In a few scant decades the
American record of success woulo no longer be unsmudged. The nation
would have tfie dirty hands of empire, would become aware of its un-
justifiably privileged status in tfie world, would know the scope of
the ecological des t ruct i veness of its incessant drive to vyor 1 d- i inmanctU
progress. There is thus an irreducible element of "f a i 1 ure"-consc i ous-
ness in the experie/ice of declining faith in tlie American destiny.
The nevi consciousness is part and parcel (jf the general twentieth
century Western sense of renewed anxiety and despair; over the un-
flagging power of evil in the world, over tiie disintegration of values
and the frightful growth of nihilism, over the apparent impossibility
of reform. In the context of pervasive anxiety, the erslwliile prevalen
dream of Utopia, as Camus said, "retreated into the distance, gigantic
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wars have ravaged the oldest countries of Europe, the blood of rebels
has bespattered the walls, and total justice has approached not a step
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nearer." The experience of World VJar I was pivotal in the eruption
of a new fatalism. While America (better put, some Americans) could
still Imagine the nation in the role of world savior, there is more
generally felt a more or less total collapse of ci vi 1 i zat ional self-
confidence. The sense of human power is replaced by "a sense of weakness
and dereliction before the worldwind that man is able to unleash but not
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control." Following the war there is no respite from the sense of
continuous disaster; the uninterrupted stream of vjars, revolutions,
economic upheavals create the expectation of catastrophe; the evidence
of an apparently indomitable will to self-destruction (10 million lives
lost in the first world war; 50 million in the second; the anticipation
of total annihilation in the third, and last) is overwhelming. Against
the aggressive Saint Simonian optimism of a century before, according
to which "there will be continuity and acceleration of the progressions
among the whole of mankind, for people will teach one another and will
16^
sustain one another," the failure of twentieth century man was
total. "This throw-back to the most cruel Mach i ave 1 1 i sm," lamented
a disillusioned Trotsky, "seems incomprehensible to one who yesterday
abided in the comforting confidence that human history moves along a
rising line of material and cultural progress All of us, I think,
can now say: No epoch of the past was so cruel, so ruthless, so
cyn I ca I . . . .
Among Americans the influential theolog ian NIebuhr called the
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nation back to the Augustinian perception of the irreducible ambiguities
of history. "The antichrist stands at the end of history to indicate
that history cumulates, rather than solves the essential problems of
human ex i stence .... Both the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena grow
1 66
in history...." The naturalistic philosopher Santayana went much
further, to disdain the entire world as "contingency and absurdity
incarnate, the oddest of possibilities masquerading momentarily as a
fact."'^'^ And while there is anxiety over the apparently impenetrable
vicissitudes of history generally, there grows a new disenchantment
with politics and deirocracy specifically; an elitist, conservative
mood settles on political thought. Lippmann, among a rising chorus,
emphasized in a striking disaffection from the old democratic faith the
corruptive, disordering force of mass democracy: "executives become
highly susceptible to the encroachment and usurpation by elected as-
semblies; rhey are pressed and harassed by the higgling of parties,
by the agents of organized interests, and by spokesmen of sectarianism
and ideologues.
"'^^ This in the context of a widespread and dis-
quieting intellectual confusion in which there are at once attempts
to dispense with the notions of progress and mission altogether,
and
efforts to hold onto them in some form, to on the one hand establish
a truth-denying cultural relativism in a position of ep i
stemol og i ca
1
hegemony, and on the other to achieve a solid mooring fo-
threatened
American values once the faith in the objectivity of natural law has
collapsed. The latter concern, rooted in a widespread
anxiety over
both potential and actual value disintegration, at
least partly
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motivated the quest for "consensus" among such luminaries as Louis
Hartz (The Liberal Tradition in America
, 1955), Daniel Boorstein (The
Genius of American Politics
, 1953), Daniel Bell (The End of Ideology
,
i960), and cultural and political "pluralists" generally.
The decline of the American faith is only completely understood,
however, as the result of a very specific and paradoxical kind of
failure, viz. the failure of "success." At the strictly pragmatic
level, the immanent i zed eschato 1 og i ca 1 consciousness leads to devas-
tating consequences--to, e.g. the wholesale proletarianization of the
citizenry and the exploitrtion of its labor, the tragedy of ecological
autointoxication, the horror of \/ietnam. But at the spiritual level
the dream of i n tramundane Progress is even more destructive, as it
ultimately, inevitably underminjs the i ntersuoject i ve structures of
meaning that are the basis of existential order.
It cannot do otherwise. For the very process of progressive
secularization is a derailment from the fundamental structure of
human being. Man lives in truth in the "metaxy," as Plato said, in
the In-Between of Transcendence and intramundane Existence. His
spiritual life is exactly the effort to gain a right relationship to
the transcendental, the ground of his existence. The immanent! zat ion
of transcendence is in fact a transmogrified spiritual endeavor. But
transcendence cannot in reality be immanent i zed ; the idea of "secular
transcendence" is a contradiction; the distinction between heaven and
earth cannot be obliterated, the former absorbed into the
latter. The
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enlightened dream of the productive-bargaining culture is precisely the
dream of accomplishing this impossibility.
To be sure, an order of existence can be, and has been, builtupon
collective delusion, but it is an inverted order, and the spiritual
life of men sustained by this order is en inverted spirituality. As
Taylor puts it, it can sustain as a "goal" but not as a reality, indeed
only so long as it appears that the culture is progress-ng tovvards an
eschatol og i cal unity of transcendence and existence. The dream ceases
to motivate at that point at which it begins to become evident that
the real issue of Progress is the death of the Spirit, and not its
realization: that is, precisely at the point of the greatest "success"
of the immanentizing process, when it becomes all too clear (to the
world-ravaged soul, if not to the consciousness) that Paradise cannot
be produced in this world; that one cannot bargain one's way into the
terrestial millennium; that the intramundane pursuit of the immanent
eschaton is not a true quest for salvation, but an hallucinogenic
exodus from reality.
Concl us i on
The analysis given supra is an admitted invitation to despair.
If it is correct, if Indeed it Is only half correct, then the Western
civilization as a whole, including the United States, may expect no
lasting respite from its troubles. Our "v;orld" will continue to
come
apart, as our most cherished se 1 f- I n te rprel a t i ons continue to
crumble
about our ears. What appears at the most immediate level
as a political
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economic "performance" crisis encompasses, in a wider perspective,
dimensions of a disintegrative c i v i li zat i ona 1 dialectic that is already
perhaps over five hundred years old. It is impossible to read either
the full import, or the final resolution, of this "crisis." One
possibility which comes readily to mind, though I have not exv^mined
the problem sufficiently to offer any conclusions, is that the national
state itself, qua prototypical ^orm of political organization, profitting
as it were paras i t i ca 1 1 y , from sentiments that lose their sense when the
secular dialectic has proceeded far enough, is doomed: The "legitimacy
crisis" does not represent, in the long run, the de 1 i g i t i mat i on of
this or that state form, but of the nation-state as such. (As a result
it becomes one of the central tasks of a critical political sc'ence to
determine the extent to which the central categories of "public interest,
"community," "citizenship," etc., themselves so badly treated at the
hands of secular individualism, may be salvaged from the mass of debris
that will surround the decomposition of the "state.")
The root cause for despair, then, is the simple fact that meaning,
by which men sustain themselves in history, is not a "msde" thing. The
"new man" has grown old; the old totems of conviction will not be at-
tended any longer; yet there are no new ones obviously forthcoming,
and ours becomes an increasingly volatile situation, fraught with
danger, pregnant with the likelihood of a violent onrush of nihilism.
On the other hand, it remains the privilege of the human spirit to hope,
and to seek new principles of order through openness and attunenent to
the ground of Being. This is the other side of c i v i 1 i za t i ona 1
anxiety.
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the perennial promise of despair. In the awakening from dream there
comes a confrontation with reality, and the opportunity to begin, if
not innocently, at least anew.
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CHAPTER II
MARX'S POLITICAL THEORY: THE ANT ! -POL IT I CAL STRAIN
A current 'dialectical' interpretation commonly conceives the
problem regarding Marx's relation to Hegel's political thought as one
of a more or less straightforward (albeit involved and elaborate)
critical, "demystifying" appropriation. The political and generally
philosophical indebtedness of Karx to Hegel is beyond issue. At an early
stage in the course cf his political education Mar>: was heart =.nd soul
the "young Hegelian". In his own buoyant, brilliant style, he v;as the
"idealist" critic par excellence, demolishing with a trenchant, incisive
intellectual virtuosity every pretension of the "actual" to overtake the
"real".
But our beginnings do not know our ends. On tne dialectical vievj,
idealism, fruitful though it was, was finally only the womb for gestating
the new and more profound "materialism", to whose birth the revised ideal-
ism of the left Hegelians played the skillful, ir unwilling, midwife. The
formulations essayed to capture this process are so familiar that they
hardly bear repeating. The "mysticism" of the old idealist's categories
penetrated, their inadequacies were exposed as so many severed nerves of
a body about to expire. Like slag off a bad weld the elaborate Hegelian
edifice, the belabored system of political mediation came tumbling down
about idealist ears. The Hegelian theoretic was shown to be the ideo-
logical excuse for the alienated, spiritually diseased condition of a
badly splintered and abused mankind. Thus the critical appropriation
demonstrated that the philosophers had only "interpreted" (wrongly, at
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that) the world, while the point of course was to change it. In the end,
in short, Hegel served as the dialectical springboard for his own super-
cession: his philosophy in general, and his political philosophy in
particular, v;ere "aufgeheben" in the iconoclastic efforts of his greatest
philosophical offspring. In the aphoristic mnemonic phrase, Marx turneo
him "on his head".
I will not maintain here that this interpretation is "false". It
has, indeed, a good deal of truth to recommend it; hence its power of
appeal. Thus, for example, David Kettler is not wrong to aver the "con-
tinuity" between Hegel and the early (earliest) Marx, nor further to
observe tiiat the continuity/ lapses at that point where Marx "revises"
the Hegelian political approach 'so sharply that the focus shifts from
state to society".' The continuity is real, as is the revision. The
precise nature of the. "continuity", and the subsequent "revision", how-
ever, is easily given to misinterpretation on what I have dubbed here
the dialectical view. I believe Kettler for one, despite an obvious
and careful avoidance of a simplistic, formulistic perspective, con-
tributes to such a misinterpretation. Following the outline of the
delineated interpretation, h's discussion of Marx's political development
through 1 8'+A suggests, in sum, that Marx was initially inspired by es-
sentially Hegelian political motivations; that Marx only deserts Hegel's
categories when he realizes their inherent incapacity to measure up to
their own standards; and that Marx never in fact deserts a genuine
"political" standpoint but only supercedes it--i.e. essentially, unlike
Hegel,- he realizes that the state cannot be divorced from the existing
2
conditions of civil society.
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But whatever the truth regarding Hegel's misinterpretation of the
state-civil society relationship, and his inability to meet his own
standards, I think we must look elsewhere for the reason that powers
Marx's political thrust--that is to say, his apparently whole-hearted
adoption of Hegelian thematic concerns, his subsequent desertion of the
"republican" (Hegelian and democratic alike) standpoint, and the final,
unswerving commitment to a "stateless" communism. In what follows I
hope to show that Marx's political project, including the "revision" of
the Hegelian approach, is only properly interpreted in the context of
Marx's consistent and overwhelming will to an unmediated (herce quite un-
Hegelian) "universality"; that indeed, his own sel f- interpretat ion aside,
Marx in no vjay "supercedes" Hegelian categories through the recognition
of their inadequacies, but that rather, replacing the specific Hegelian
political problematic with a constant re i nterpretat I on of the content of
a notion of a "pure" universality, sidesteps that problematic altogether;
and that it is, paradoxically, precisely in the finest, most noble and
apparently unassailable of Marx's humanistic sentiments that we can dis-
cern the pernicious seed-kernel of ant i -pol i t i ca 1 (hence ant I ~c 1 1 1 zen)
soc i a 1 1st dogma
.
Early Humanism
In the earliest direct evidence available regarding Marx's political
education, he sounds the uncompromising universal note that, I believe,
echos from every corner of his av/esome corpus. In the Gymnasium exam
essay, "Reflections of a Youth on Choosing a Career", we find him committ
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to a broadly humanistic, religiously flavored perspective that is critical
of any but the purest and most general of intentions. The Deity has as-
signed to man, Marx there avers, "a general goal, to improve mankind and
himself". Unlike the animal that "acts calmly" within its circumscribed
sphere of activity, "not striving beyond, not even surmising that there
is another", the individual man bears the weighty responsibility "to
choose the position in society which is most appropriate and from which
L
he can elevate both himself and society".
The choice is difficult, fraught with potential error and the danger
of straying from the path of true vocation. Working within an essentially
Christian framework, Marx acknowledges man's capacity for "self-deceit",
his susceptibility to "ambition" and sel f -agg rand i z i ng "fantasy'. Yet
already Marx has abandoned the doctrine of origir.al, ineradicable sin.
The human challenge is to keep eyes fixed on the fue, universal human-
ity, so that he might overcome his particular limitations, his fallen
state. It is man's task to set aside all "meager, limited, egotistic
joy"^, and to strive for that station "which offers the largest field
to work for mankind and approach the universal goal for which every
position is only a means: perfection".^ The vision of a future state
of perfection unites at the most basic level individual "fulfillment"
and the "welfare of humanity": "Man's nature makes it possible for him
to reach his fulfillment onl/ by working for the perfection and welfare
of his society".'' Implicit is the distinction between the true self and
a false selfishness. It is true that "if a person works only for himself
he can perhaps be a famous scholar and a great wise man, a distinguished
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poet". Yet he cannot be "a complete, genuinely great man". Experience
and religion alike support his judgment, Marx believes, counselling us
to set aside the poverty of particularity for the abundant wealth of the
general good. And history too: "History calls tfiose the greatest men
o
who ennobled themselves by working for the universal".
Thus Marx entered university life i dea 1 i s t i cal
1 y infatuated with the
universal ity of "humanity" and "society", at least as conceived in the
purity of abstraction. He soon deserted the deistic standpoint. But his
ensuing rad i ca 1 i za t i on via Left Hegel ianism did nothing to dispel these
vibrant de i s t i c/human i s t i c sentiments. Indeed, it was apparently exactly
such, or similar, sentiments that guided the adoption of Hegelianism.
Already in the vocational essay Marx had noted, almost in passing, that
social reality is sometimes obstinately opposed to idealistic aspiration
("We cannot always choose the vocation to whicti we believe we are called.
Our social relations, to some extent, have already begun to form before
Q
we are in a position to determine them"). Two years later it had be-
come clear that the extent of societal intransigence was more severe.
In an 1837 letter to his father the already prolific Marx explains that
his recent study of jurisprudence and "wrestling" with philosophy had
inspired an "ill-starred opus" of nearly three h-ndred pages, in which,
he reports, fie v/as "greatly disturbed by the conflict between what is
and what ought to be".^^ This problem, as he notes "peculiar to idealism"
must have strongly prompted his attraction to the liberal ist side of the
struggle over the Hegelian legacy: Against the conservative view that
world history had permanently taken up residence in Prussian social and
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political institutions, the liberals held that a critical philosophy of
praxis was required to in fact make "actual" what was Indeed "rational"
(universal and historical) but as yet only "ideal", a non-existent "ought-
to be".
For Marx, Left Hegel lanism proffered critical praxis in the form of
an historical promise to subsume a deficient particular existence under
the all-embracing rubric of universal Idea, to transfigure the Individual
existent Into the general and genuinely real. In his "Notes to a Doctoral
Dissertation", in the context of some rather dense discussion, Marx docu-
ments his enlistment in the left ranks. "It is a psychological 'aw",
Marx writes, "that the theoretical mind, having become free in itself,
turns into practical energy. ..it turns against worldly actuality which
exists outside it... The practice (Praxis) of philosophy, however, is it-
self theoretical. It Is cri ticism which measures individual existence
against essence, particular actuality against the ldea".^\ Marx then
conceptualizes the split within Hegel ianism in terms of a "duality of
philosophical se 1 f -consc I ousness" manifesting In dramatically opposing
d i rect ions
:
The one, which we may generally call the 1 iberal party, ad-
heres to the Concept and the principle of philosophy as Its
main determinations; the other to Its Non-concept , the element
of reality. The second direction Is posmve philosophy . The
act of the former is criticism; hence, precisely the turning
outward of philosophy. The act of the latter is the attempt
to philosophize, thus the turning inward of philosophy.
It
grasps the deficiency as immanent to philosophy, while the
former conceives it as a deficiency of the world to be made
phi losophlcal J ^
Both parties are beset by "inner contradiction"; yet
Marx's affinity
is clearly for the liberal camp: "In content only
the liberal party makes
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real progress, because it Is the party of the Concept while positive
philosophy is capable of achieving merely demands and tendencies whose
1 3form contradicts its meaning". ^ For a time at least Hegelian categories
suggested themselves as the most effective vehicle for the realization
of the humanistic project. Initially even the monarchy was believed to
be in service to the universal good and the perfection of mankind; Hunt
reports that the "Doctor's Club" to which Marx belonged as a Berlin
student was, until 18A0, thoroughly devoted to enlightened constitutional
1 k
monarchy. But in 18^0 warm confidence turned to angry frustration with
the ascendence of the repressive Frederick William iV to the German throne.
Government intolerance for liberalism increased dramatically; faith in the
universal agency of existing state institutions concomitantly declined.
For Marx the confrontation of aspiration and ""eality was not merely
philosophical, but intensely personal as well. Doctorate in hand, Marx
initially hoped to acquire a teaching position at Bonn, but the acceler-
ating official campaign against the left turned a p-omising aspiration
into an impossible pipe-dream. As is well known, Marx then turned his
considerable critical talents to political journalism. His growing
hostility toward a political system itself obvioi'sly hostile to the
universal good of the citizenry is abundantly evidenced in Marx's first
published article, "Comments on the Latest Censorship Instruction".
(Well to the point of his criticism, the journal for whicii it was
originally written was itself killed, by censorship.) Wiiat is most
noteworthy here is Marx's identification of the source of the univer-
sality the state is enjoined to embody. Here we find the first indications
122
of a crystallizing conviction that the citizenry as such^, and here in
particular its truth-serving agency, the free press, is the bearer of
essential universal humanity. The state--the existing state, the legis-
lative, judicial, and executive apparatus--emerges as a better or worse
servant of the apparently pre-existing good. With vitriolic agility
Marx wields the adapted analytic distinction between the ideal and the
exi St ing state, between genuine and pseudo-law. He attacks with especial
vehemence the Instruction's makirig "the tendency of the criticism of
governmental measures" the main criterion for subjection to censorship.
Under suci^ censorship, Marx argues
the writer is subject to the most horrible terror i sm
,
to
jurisdiccion base d on suspicion . Tendentious laws, law
without objective nornr, are laws of terrorism, such as
those created by Robesp'erre because of emergencies in the
state and by Roman emperors because of the rottenness of
the state. Laws that make the sent iment of the acting
person the main criterion, and not the act as such , are
nothing but posi t ive sanctions of lawlessness ...
In a tendentious law the legal form contradicts the
government issuing it passionately denounces the very thing
it represents itself, a subversive attitude. Similarly
such a government constitutes, so to speak, an institution
opposed to its own laws, using two yardsticks. Lawfulness
on the one side is unlawfulness on the other. S uch laws
are the oppos i te of what they proclai m _to be 1 aw" . 1 5
The tendentious state deserts the standpoint of the true "ethical"
state, which is the standpoint of the citizenry: "It is an insult to th6
honor of the citizen, a mockery directed against my existence". While
true laws are "positive and lucid universal norms in which freedom has
attained an impersonal, theoretical existence independent of any arbitrary




a tendentious 1 aw . . . i s no^ a^ Jjiw of_ th£ £ta_t^
citizenry, but a law of a party against another party. The
tendentious law cancels the equality of the citizens before
123
the law. It divides rather than unites; and all dividing
laws are reactionary.
. . In an ethical state the view of the
sta_te_ is subordinated to its members even if they o'ppose"
an organ of the state or the government . 17
~
These themes are, to be sure, decidedly Hegelian. The point I wish
to stress here, however, is not the similarity, but the critical difference
in treatment of similar themes. Truly Marx wants to uphold the "spirit of
the state" in the experience of the citizenry: Because under censorship
only the illegal underground press is truly free, he is concerned that
"the people become accustomed to regard what Is lawless as free, freedom
as lawless, and what Is lawful as unfree. Thus censorship kills the very
1
8
spirit of the state". But Marx's "spirit of the state" is not here,
nor ever was, I think, Hegel's. The spirit of Hegel's state Is a brand
of universality complexly mediated by a differentiated socio-political
institutional structure. For Marx, however, universality lacks this
mediated character, because it is g i ven ; like Rousseau's general will it
seems to persist whether recognized or not. It is not achieved, but ex-
pressed. Marx agrees with the "Ideal and profound" view of the state
"as the great organism In which legal, ethical and political freedom has
to be actualized and In which the individual citizen simply obeys the
1
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natural laws of his ovm reason, human reason. In the lav/s of the state".
The state is "a free association of moral human beings .. .aiming at the
achievement of freedom". Most Hegelian, these formulations. Yet there
can be little doubt, I believe, that Marx already begins to consider
"human reason" and the "free association" that springs from It as primary,
and the laws of the state per sc as derived. With the assumption of the
inherently intact universality of humanity, the elaborate structure of
Mk
mediation that links the existing individual with his abstract universal
self (his citizen self) perforce appears "accidental" from the first.
Marx did not have to "shift" the Hegelian standpoint from state to
society; his was always the "social" standpoint. Thus he writes: "Where
law is genuine law, i.e. the embodiment of freedom, it is the real free
existence of man. Laws cannot restrict the actions of man, because they
are themselves the inner vital laws of his action, the conscious m i rror
images of his 1 i fe . Law then does not interfere with a human life which
20
is life of freedom...". Under ideal conditions the unity of man with
mankind is purely given expression in tne state; ur.der existing circum-
stances, however, an impure union can only be forced by the repressive
mechanisms of the polit'cal apparatus. Marx has not, to be sure, de-
serted a "political" standpoint,. But even at this early stage politics
for Marx is distinctively un-Hegelian in content, strikingiy Hegelian
in form. In place of the idealist preoccupation with the mediation of
public and private, what is m i ne and v/hat is common, we are given, on
the one hand, humanistic enthusiasm for an institutional expression of
unmediated universal human being, and, on the other, the liberalist-
tinged, much narrower concept of politics as principally concerned with
relations of existential social pov;er.
The vociferous defense of press freedom derives from precisely the
Young Hegelian faith in the inherently objective, universal character of
human critical reason. C r i t i c i sm--human critical reason man i fest i ng in
journalistic praxis--is above control because, unlike the existing state,
it is above faction and private interest. Once it is realized that the
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state itself has dirty hands, "There will always be two sides that we
must keep in mind: the private person and the state". "To resolve the
difficulty the administration and the administered both need a third
element, which is pol itical without being official and bureaucratic, an
element which at the same time represents the citizen without being
directly involved in private interests. This resolving element composed
^ pol i tical mind and a civic heart is a free press"
. But the press
is to play no permanent mediatory role; Marx has not come round to a new
view of the press corps performing the stabilizing role of Hegel's bu-
reaucracy. Rather press criticism, for Marx, has adopted the role of
advancing the perfection of man, the historical "ought-to-be": "The
critic... can start with any form of theoretical and practical conscious-
ness and develop the true actuality out of the forms i nherent in existing
22
actuality as its ought-to-be and goal".
The "spirit of the state" is thus most closely identified with human
reason, for reason, Marx believes at this stage, is closest to the heart
of universal human nature. In a glowing tribute to the universal character
of philosophy, he asks rhetorically:
Must philosophy £idopt different principles for every country
in accordance vyith the saying "different countries, different .
customs" so as not '.o contradict the ground truths of dogma?
Must it believe that in one country 3X1=1, in another that
women have no souls, in a third that beer is drunk in heaven?
Is there no universal human nature just as there is a universal
nature of plants and heavenly bodies? Philosophy asks what is
true not what is accepted as such, what is true for all men
not what is true for individuals: its metaphysical truths do
not recognize the boundaries of political geography; its
political truths know too well where the "boundaries" begin,
to confuse the illusory horizon of particular world and natural
outlooks with the true horizon of the human mind. 23
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At this stage Marx shows an unbending enlightened faith in the power
of the critical intellect to advance the universal course of history.
The problem of historical agency in the realization of universal humanity
had already begun to loom large in Marx's mind; for the time being, the
unaided efforts of the "theoretical mind" served as solution. In the
article, "On a Proposed Divorce Law" (1842), Marx agrees with Hegel that
"A true state, a true marriage, a true friendship is indissoluble". But
his emphasis fell on the other side of the relation of concept and reality;
"there is no state, no marriage, no friendship that completely corresponds
to its concept. Actual friendship even within the family is dissoluble
;
the actual state in world history is dissoluble; and so is actual marriage




least does not have to correspond to it". The Young Hegelian reduction
of the unfolding of the Hegelian Absolute Idea to specifically human_ con-
cepts had established freedom-through- reason as the core notion in the
project of historical (human) self-realization. Rational freedom so
conceived was autonomy, in the sense of Kantian self-determination; and
the goal of history took shape as the liberation of the universal human
will from every form of external constraint. So closely did he believe
this "freedom" to correspond to the universal project that Marx declared:
"Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents make it
real as they struggle against its rea 1 i zat i on . . . No man fights freedom; at
25
most he fights against the freedom of others". It was the sacred missi
of critical reason to discern the depth of the discrepancy between the
rational essence of freedom and the existing social world, and where
on
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necessary to reform real icy.
Because at this point he identifies autonomy-as- reason with "true"
law, Marx opposes all attempts to degrade the universality of rational
legal principles. Thus we find him inveighing against a provincial
"wood-scavenging" bill that would "degrade the state into an instrument
of private interest". Marx yet maintains a faith, yet I believe an in-
creasingly tenuous faith, in the power of pol i tical educat ion to raise
man to an awareness of his own true self:
The genuine "public" education pertaining to the state is
the rational and public exist.^,nce of the stats. The state
itself educates its members b/ transforming purposes of the
individual into public purposes, primitive drives into ethical
inclinations, natural j ndependence into spiritual freedom, by
the fact also that the individual fulfills himself in the life
of the whole and the whole fulfills itself in the loyel dispo-
sition of the i nd i V i due 1 . 2^
The perspective of the genuine state is uncorrupted by contact with
private interest. Thus Marx upholds the inherent universality of the
common wood-scavenger against the particular economic interests of those
who would have this activity outlawed:
The state must see more in a wood-scavenger than an enemy
of wood. Is not each citizen attached to the state by a
thousand live nerves and may not cut all those nerves simply
because the citizen has himself voluntarily severed one?
The state v/i 1 1 also see in the wood-scavenger a human being,
a living member in which its own blood flov;s, a soldier who
is to defend the^nation, a witness wliose testimony is to.
count in a court of law, a member of a local community, who
is to perform public tasks, a father of a ^amily whose ex-
istence is sacred, and above all a citizen--and the state
will not lightly exclude one of its members from these
attributes, for it amputates itself each tine that it makes
a criminal out of a citizen.
In this moving passage Marx is at his closest, I believe, to genuine
Hegelian sentiments. The citizen as "member of a local community" and as
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"father of a family" is a social being who participates in mediating
bodies organically tied to the state. Like Hegel Marx expressly does
not desire an homogen i zat i on of interest and opinion within the organized
community. At one point he suggests a formula distinctively saturated
with Hegelian sentiment: "differences within the unity, but not different
28
unities". Yet beyond affirming, as Hegel does, the distinctive uni-
versal character of the state Marx goes on to demand the disestablishment
of all those private interests that might oppose the universal "public"
interest As such I believe he remains true to his earliest commitment
to universal humanity, but at the same time undermines all bases (beyond
the family and the "community") for the mediation of particular and
un i versa 1 --the primary political project of the Hegelian state. In a
most striking passage opposing representation by estate, Marx voices
explicitly his contempt for the Hegelian contention that organized
private interest might through institutional mediation be oriented
toward the public good. In place of estate representation Marx demands
a conscious representation of the people's intelligence,
which does not advance special requirements against the
state, but whose highest requirement is to advance the
state as its own deed, as its own s ta te . . . Rep resentat i on
must not be the representation of any other than the people
itself, must be conceived only as a sel f- rep resentat ion , as
an action of the state ... Representat i on must not be viewed
as a concession to defenseless weakness, to impotence, but
as the self-confident vitality of the highest powers. _ln_
a true state there is no 1 anded property , no industry , no
g^ross matter wh i ch as _raw el ements that could make £ barga i n
with the statF m7 emphasis ; there are on! y powers of the
spi r i t. . .Not the unf ree th i'ng but free man domi natesTS
Against Hegel Marx has taken a distinctively democratic turn, dis-
cover i ng the rational essence of law in popular will; true law is "the
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conscious expression of the will of the people created with and through
it".^° The true state is the pure universality which is in turn to be
identified with the directly represented will of the "people". When
Marx recognizes the incapacity of the representative form of monarchy
to actualize human universality, he turns to democratic republicanism
for the promise of aid. The important point here, again, is not the
shift itself, but the natur e of the shift. If we are to believe, as
Kettler argues, that Marx's point is that "Hegel has identified the values
which ought to be subserved by a just or rational political order"^\ but
fails to embody those principles in the political order he recommends, we
must at once recognize that Marx does not interpret these "values" in an
Hegelian manner. Not the mediated universality of the differentiated
state, but universality as the "se 1 f- representat i on" of the "people it-
self", the "self-confident vitality of the highest powers" is Marx's
meaning.
|n the face of this radical interpretation of the universal as
"popular will", Marx remained a moderate prior to 18^3. In the article,
"Communism and the Augsburg 'Allgemeine Zeitung'", he is the serious
minded, non-communist non-revolutionary. He raises the question, "Who
talks about labor corporations ?" And ansvyers:
The reactionaries. The laboring class is to form a state
within a state. Do you find it striking that such ideas,
brought up to date, go as follows: "The state is to be
transformed into the laboring class"? If the laborer's
class is to be the state for him, but if the modern laborer,
like any other modern man, understands and can understand
the state only as a sphere shared by all his fellow citizens--
how can he synthesize both ideas in any other way except in a
labor state?32
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Marx writes that his own paper "cannot even concede the theoretical
'"^^^ ' to communistic ideas in their present form, and can even less
wish or consider possible their p ractical realization ...".^^ As they
are, their ideas are but "a rebellion of man's subjective wishes against
... 3Z|
an objective understand i ng ...". Similarly Marx in an 1842 letter criti-
cized the communist-anarchist Hegelian left, siding with the "liberal-
minded practical men who have undertaken the troublesome task of struggling
for freedom step by step within constitutional restraints".
But, probably as a result of his o.-vn losing battle with censorship,
moderation gave way bit by bit. Miirx came to doubt the likelihood that
even a reformed bureaucracy
—
government in genera 1 --cou 1 d ever embody
the sought for universality. In a passage echoing the above cited remark
on the "political" press, Marx writes that quite tne contrary to advancing
the common human interest, government appears as a part i cu 1 ar interest of
i ts own
:
If the official charges that the private individual is
elevating his private Interest into the interest of the
state, so the private Individual may charge that the official
debases the interest of the state Into his own private interest,
an interest from vjhich all others are excluded as laymen, so
that even the dearest reality appears Illusory to him as
against tfie reality presented In the offical repor ts , . . . so
that only the official spher-e of activity seems to him to
be the "state", against which the world lying beyond that
sphere seems the object of the state, in which all community
concern and insight are lacking. ^6
I do not mean to imply that Marx's "revision" of the Hegelian mode
of mediated universality is totally ungrounded. Certainly his experience
with the empirical modes of this presumed universality provided more than
adequate grounds for disenchantment. The crown was revealed to him as a
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symbol of repression rather than mediated unity; the supposedly dis-
interested civil service as a capricious, se 1 f -agg rand i i ng class that
presumed to "ov;n" the state; and the estate-based assemblies as lobbies
for advancing special interests.
But here vie do well to recall the distinction between philosophical
principles and historical forms. Marx's critical move is not to seek
alternative mediatory organs to replace the defective existing agencies,
hut to abolish the very need fo^ mediation. Thus the hopeful Marx and
the d i scrcljanted Rousseau share the same problem, viz. to recapture the
imag:^ of the undivided u'lity of the classical Greek polls. It is this
image, I liope to show, that especially under modern conditions is pre-
eminently unpolitical.
The C r i t i que of Hege
1
In this section we will briefly examine Marx's 18^3 Cr i t i que of
Hegel's Ph i losophy oP Righ t, the first major effort at demystifying the
master, both philosophically and politically. As I hope to make evident,
the thrust of thought here is exactly coincident with Marx's earlier
work. Now taken definite political shape as "popular sovereignty", the
preoccupation with manifesting an immediate human universality is, if
anything, greater than ever. Marx's position has, however, moved well
beyond a basically undeveloped humanism; his earliest formulations now
wear the sophisticated ph i I osoph i ca T gu i se of "generic man" ("species
being"), derived from Feuerbach, the young Hegelian atheist humanist.
Feuerbach's influence was clearly decisive in the development of
132
Marx's thought. Tucker goes so far as to claim that "Marxism might
perhaps be epitomized as Hegel ianism mediated by Feuerbach's critique
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of Hegel". V/e will have cause to consider the nature of this critique
later on; here we have only to state the basics.
The main line of Feuerbach's critique was religious, or, rather,
ant i -rel
i
g i ous , launched and sustained from the standpoint of a radical
anthropocentr i sm. In The Essence of Chr i st i an i ty (18^1) , he declared:
"God as the epitome of all realities or perfections is nothing other than
a compendious summary devised for the benefit of the limited individual,
an epicome of the generic human qualities among men, in the self-realization
of the species in the course of world history". "As God is, so man should
be and des i res to be". God is nothing more than the collective potential
of mankind, his "Gattungswesen" , or "species-being" (essence), which he
is in the process of becoming. At the completion of the historical pro-
cess, man will indeed be "God". Not individually, to be sure, but com-
munally: "The essence of man is only to be found in community, in the
unity of man with man--a unity which nevertheless rests on the reality
of the distinction between 1 and Thou".^^ Thus the individual person
will be a species-being when the existing tension between his
individual
and communal lives will have been abolished; that is, when he
acts in
full consciousness of his "species" relations, and contributes
his singular
efforts, communally undertaken, to the welfare of the
social whole.
Via his famous "transformational criticism", Feuerbach
applied the
critique of religion to Hegel's speculative philosophy.
For what was
Hegel's Absolute but a speculatively contrived God,
and what was this
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but "man's essence outside man, the essence of thinking outside the act
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of thinking"? In short, a disastrous confusion of "subject" (man)
and "predicate" (man's creations). Hence, "It suffices to put the
predicate in place of the subject everywhere, i.e. to turn speculative
ph i 1 osophy upside down
,
and vie arrive at the truth in its unconcealed,
2,0
pure, manifest form".
Marx was ecstatic over Fejerbach's discoveries. Nothing could have
better matched, and more importantly, fortified, his own profuse human-
istic sentiments. In an enthusiastic \Qhh epistle, he expressed to
Feuerbach his "great admiration" and "love" for him, and commended him
for having, whether he knew it or not, "given a philosophical foundation
to socialism". "The unity of men with men, which is founded on the real
differences among men, the concept of the human species brought back from
the heaven of abstraction to the real world, what is this but the concept
of society"!^^ In an only slightly more sober vein, Marx the following
year assessed Feuerbach's contribution as having "brought to a culmination
the critique of religion and at the same time masterfully drew the main
line of a critique of the Hegelian system and thereby of any metaphysic .
What Feuerbach had done to religion, and further to philosophy in general,
Marx in his Cri tigue would do to Hegel 's pol itical phi losophy.
First we will examine the more or less explicitly "political" aspects
of the Critique , returning after this to probe somewhat its
metaphysical
(or more properly, ant i -metaphys i cal ) presuppositions. These
will, I
believe, lead us in due course to the heart of Marx's
ant i -pol i t i ci sm,
viz. his contemptuous denial of the ambiverse
(agent i c/communa 1 ) human
13^
conditions, and the inherent tensionality thereby implied.
The politics of the Critique . The central theme to which Marx turned
the nev; philosophical tool was Hegel's own--the Rousseauist legacy re-
garding the relationship between socio-economic and political life,
private man and public citizen: 1 ' homme and le citoyen . Marx follows
riegel in his concern for the "species-forms" (Marx) of family, society
and state. With H-gel he believes that "In fact, the abstract person
brings h's personality to its real existence only in the artificial
person, society, family, etc.". That is to say, as a being of innate
social inclination, man is not wen outside his participation in such
moral entities: society, etc. are "precisely those species-forms in
which the actual person brings his actual content to existence, objecti-
fies himself, and leaves behind che abstraction of 'person quand meme '
".
But whereas Hegel had asserted the state ("sundering itself into the two
ideal spheres of its concept, family and civil society") as 'prior' to
civil society and the family, Marx countered that "they are the modes of
the state; family and civil society make themselves into the state. They
are the active force"; "the political state cannot exist without the
natural basis of the family and the artificial (moral) basis of civil
.
society; they are its conditio sine qua non". Hegel had committed
the
gross error of establishing "the conditions" as "the conditioned,
the
determining as the determined, the producing as the product of
its
product". In brief, he had got everything backward, had
reversed
subject and predicate ("Hegel proceeds from the state and makes
man into
the subjectified state"). This is the root error that
leads Hegel to
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offer a mere pseudo- resol ut i on to the bifurcation of society into the
dual spheres of public and private interest.
Marx charged Hegel with elevating this purely historical development
into a logical absolute: "He has presupposed the separation of civil
society and the political state..., and developed i t as a necessary moment
hi
of the Idea, as an absolute truth of Reason". In fact the distinction
between civil society and the state--and, hence, the very category of
"the state"--is a strictly modern development: "The abstraction of the
state as such belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the
political state is a modern product". The v;eight of history leans
heavily against this modern bifurcation of social life. In neither
ancient Greek democracy, Asiatic despotism, nor Middle Ages feudalism
was there such an opposition of private and public: "Either, as in
Greece, the res publ i ca was the real private concern, the real content
of the citizen, and the private man was slave. That is, the political
state as political was the true and sole content of the citizen's life
and will; or, as in Asiatic despotism, the political state was nothing
but the private will of a single individual, and the political state,
like the material state, was slave";^^ as for the Middle Ages, "the
classes of civil society and the political classes were Identical because
civil society was political society, because the organic principle of
civil society was the principle of the state": To the members of the
1. 50
medieval classes, "Their class was their state ,
Of the three alternatives to modern disunity, it Is the
Greek Ideal,
as we shall see, that Marx champions. Asiatic despotism
Is anathema
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because it negates the will of all but one. Feudalism, in which "every
private sphere had a political character", is objectionable because
it "separates man from his universal nature". The main point here,
however, is that the dichotomy of state and civil society is a strictly
modern phenomenon, based on the breaking free of egoistic Interest from
the constraints of general community concern. The absolute monarchy
took the first major step in transforming political into civil classes,
the modern bureaucracy asserting "the idea of unity over again'Jt the
various states within the state". Even here, however, social difference
spelled definite political difference, and only th(i French Revolution
transformed political classes wholly Into social classes, political
distinctions into mere civil distinctions. "With that, argues Marx,
"the separation of political life and civil society was completed".
Born were two separate spheres, civil society and the state, the "material"
and the "political". For Marx the opposition is exclusive: the "burgher"
has no universal concerns, and "the state likewise in fixed Individuals
opposes the 'burghers' ".^^ The state claims to embody ;he common
interest--a claim Hegel swallows whole; but the state Jjl fjJCj_ becomes
itself a self-interested party, because cut off, alienated, from the
people. The agents of the state (the executive civil servants) look
upon it as their private property. Hegel of course recognizes
the basic
problems; but he was thoroughly mistaken in his belief that the
separation
of state and society could in any way be mediated:
Hegel's keener insight lies in his sensing of the
separation
of civil and political society to be a contradiction.
But
his error is that he contents himself with the
appearance
of its dissolution, and passes it off as the real
thing...
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Actual extremes cannot be mediated with each other
precisely because they are actual extremes .. .5^
Thus Marx shows no sympathy for any of the Hegelian modes of
political mediation; his claim is categorical: "If civil classes as
such are political classes, then the mediation is not needed; and if
this mediation is needed, then the civil class is not political, and
57thus also not this mediation". Regarding the crown, the most vulnerabh
of Hegel's institutions, Marx cynically queries: "What kind of ideality
of the state would it have to be which, instead of being the actual self-
consciousness of the citizens and the communal soul of the state, were
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one person, one subject" (?) Amidst Hegel's tortured justifications
of the monarchy, Marx sarcastically reduces Hegel's doctrine of sover-
eignty to one of "L' etat c'cst moi":"
because subj ect i v' i ty is actual only as subject, and the
subject actual only as one, the personality of the state
is actual only as one person. A beautiful conclusion.
Hegel could just as well conclude that because the indi-
vidual man is one the human species is only a single man.
Marx then sets the matter straight:
If the sovereign is the actual sovereignty of the state
then the sovereign could necessarily be considered v i s -
a-vis others as a se 1 f -subs i stent state, even without the
"peo^l^e. But he is sovereign in so far as he represents
the unity of the people, and thus he is himself merely a
representative, a symbol of the sovereignty of the people.
The sovereignty of the people is not due to him but on the
contrary he is due to it.^^
Marx equally denounces the Estates: "The Estates arc the political
illusion of civil society". They are not mediators of public and
private, but pure representatives of private interest:
The sentiment of the Estates, their will, is suspect, for
they start from the private point of view and private
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interests. In truth, private interest is their public
affairs, not public affairs their private i nterests" . ^3
They are, moreover, superfluous to the execution of public business:
The officials can carry out this execution vjithout the
Estates; moreover they must, in spite of the Estates, do
what is best. Thus the Estates, with regard to their
content, are pure superfluity. Their existence, there-
fore, is pure formality in the most literal sense.
Marx denies outright the mediatory function that Hegel ascribes to the
Estates: "only for the sal<e of logic does Hegel want the luxury of the
Estates"; they in fact "mediate against the isolation of particular
interests" only "by presenting this isolation as s political act".^^
In sum: "The Estates are the sanctioned, legal lie of const i tJt i ona
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states, the lie that the state is the people's interest or the people
th3 interest of the state"; they are "the established contradiction of
the state and civil society within the state".
If the crov;n and the Estates are expressions of particularity
opposed to the pure universality of "the people", the bureaucracy is
the epitome of this opposition. Marx read Hegel's emphasis on the
"universal" character of the bureaucracy as evidence that he was
"thoroughly infected with the miserable arrogance of the world of
Prussian officialdom".^'' The heart of Marx's critique is that the
bureaucracy does not escape, let alone offset, the egoism of private
life. It succumbs fully, disastrously to that egoism, imagining the
public good (in truth inherent in "the people") to be its private pos-
session; as such, the "general good" is in fact an illusion.
The bureaucracy asserts itself to be the final end of the
state... The aims of the state are transformed into aims of
bureaus, or the aims of bureaus into the aims of the state...
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The bureaucracy is the imaginary state alongside the
real state; it is the sp 1 r 1 tua 1 i sm of the state. As a
result everything has a double meaning, one real and
one bureaucrat ic. . .The bureaucracy has the being of
the state, the spiritual being of society, in its pos-
session; it is its private property. The general spirit
of the bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery, preserved
inwardly by means of the hierarchy and externally as a
closed corporation...
As far as the individual bureaucrat is concerned, the
end of the state becomes his private end: a pursuit of
higher posts, the building of a career...
In the bureaucracy the identity of the state's interest
and the particular private aim is established such that
the state's interest becomes a particular private aim
opposed to the other private aims...
It is evident that the bureaucracy is a tissue of practi-
cal illusion, or the illusion of the state.
Marx draws into his critique of bureaucracy the criticism of Hegel's
"Corporations", the so-called "self-governing" bodies of civil society.
The bureaucracy and the corporations, Marx says, presuppose one another;
they are two sides of a shingle ("abstract" and unreal) coin: "The
Corporations are the mater i a I i sm of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy
is the Corporation of the state". They are opposed, but share a common
genesis: "The same mind that creates the Corporation in society creates
the bureaucracy in the state". The bureaucracy is "a particular,
closed society within the state", and the corporation is "like incom-
I. 71plete bureaucracy .
As with the Estates, Marx denies the Corporations any capacity for
mediating between private and public, particular and universal: "Politi-
cal right as the right of the Corporations, etc. completely contradicts
political right as pol i t i ca 1 — i . e . as the right of the state and citizen-
ship, for political right precisely should not be the right of this
existence as a political existence, not right as the particular
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existence". For Marx, the particular qua particular cannot be
mediated, but only extirpated.
The critique of the state heralds the turning away from the state
per _se to the contradictions of "society". The "real state"--"the state
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as the whole of a people's existence" --Marx has discovered, has only
jncldentally to do with institutional forms of the empirical, political
state, "hese exist only in contrast to "the present mode of private
life". The illusory Hsgelian hope of mediation abandoned, Marx is
driven to the conclusion that both private and public life must be
transcended. "Society", by its nature one , is split in two ; likewise
the individual social being:
Civil society and the state are separated. Consequently
the citizen of the state and the member of civil society
are also separated. The individual must thus undertake
an essential schism within himself. As actual citizen
he finds himself in a two-fold organization: (a) the
bureaucratic, which is an external formal determination
of the otherworldly state. ..(b) the social within which
he stands outside the state as a private man... In order
to behave as actual citizen of the state, to acquire
political significance and efficacy, he must abandon his
civil actual i ty, .. .his own actual, empirical reality;
for as a state- ideal i st he is a being who is completely
other, distinct, different from and opposed to his own
actual i ty .75
"Political life is the life in the air, the ethereal region of
civil society". Compared with "actual, empirical reality", the state
has for its citizens an "otherworldly existence"; it is "nothing but the
affirmation of their own a 1 i enat i on , . . . the religion of popular life, the
heaven, of its universality In opposition to the earthly existence
of its
actual i ty";^^ "the commonwealth (das Geme i nwesen)
, communal being das
kummuni stische Wesen
,
within which the individual exists, is reduced
to civil society separated from the state, or in other words, that- the
7R
political state is an abstraction of civil society". The critical in-
sight is that a1 1 forms of 'political' state must be abolished if popular
will is to be effectively realized. There are, surely, better and worse
forms of state. "Monarchy", Marx claims, "is the fullest expression" of
human alienation; whereas a republican state "is the negation of this
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alienation within its own sphere". But the republican sphere too,
because yet a form of state, is alienated from communal being:
In the republic as merely a particular form of the state,
political man has his particular and separate existence
beside the unpolitical, private man. Property, contract,
marriage, civil society appear here. ..as particular modes
of existence alongside the political state. ^'^
Any constitutional state "is the state in which the state- interest is
only formally the actual interest of the people, but is nevertheless
8
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present as a distinct form alongside of the actual state".
Thus the "political" state, as opposed to the "real state" of
popular sovereignty, must be transcended. For the author of tlie Cr i t igue
the goal of such transcendence was a "true democracy": "Democracy is
human existence" , Marx argues, "while in the other political forms man
has only legal existence"; democracy "is the first true unity of the
universal and particular". The motor of transcendence is the un-
restricted expression of popular sovereignty. In regard to sovereignty
Hegel has, as everywhere, inverted subject and pred i cate-- thus demanding
man's subjugation to an "alien" power. We saw above Marx's view of the
]h2
sovereign monarch; we arrive at a face-off: "sovereignty of the monarch
or sovereignty of the people, that is the question". Hegel further
perverts the issue when he asserts that the constitution ("essentially
a system of mediation") is not "made" by a people. The truth, Marx
insists, is the exact opposite: "it is not the constitution that creates
the people but the people which creates the cons t i tut i on . . . Man does not
exist because of the law but rather the law exists for the good of man...
Here is most forcefully asserted the contention that law~-the state
in general--is the better or worse expression of an immediate and un-
medlated universality, a popular will: "democracy starts with man and
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makes the state objectified man". Thus:
Democracy Is the resolved mystery of all constitutions.
Here the const i tut i on ... i s returned to its real ground,
actual man, the actual people, and established as its
own work. The constitution appears as what it is, the
free product of men...
In democracy the constitution itself appears only as one
determination, and indeed as the self-determination of
the people.
The constitution becomes a practical illusion the moment
it ceases to be a true expression of the people's will.^'
Marx's true democracy has a radical Rousseauist ring to it; it
betrays, as does Rousseau's paradigmatic political community, a con-
sumptive thirst for the perfect and unruffled unity of the classical
city-state, as imagined by the romantic mind. Likewise in the radical
Rousseauist vein, Marx believes that the transcendence of the state-civi
society oppos i t ion--hence for Marx the very exi.stence of these two op-
posing realms of being--will be accomp 1 i shed by the revolutionary
institutionalization of unrestricted universal suffrage :
1A3
In unrestricted suf f rage
. . . c i v i 1 society actually raises
Itself for the first time to an abstraction of itself, to
political existence as its true universal and essential
existence. But the full achievement of this abstraction
is at once also the transcendence (Aufhebung) of the
abstraction. In actually establishing its political
existence as its true existence civil society has simul-
taneously established its civil existence, in distinction
from its political existence, as Inessential. And with
the one separated, the other, its opposite, falls. Within
the abstract political state the reform of voting demands
the dissolution (Auflosung) of the political state, but
also the dissolution of civil society.
In democracy the separation between man and citizen is erased. Here is
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the "real revolution" that produces the "new constitution":
The fact... that civil society invades the sphere of legis-
lative power en masse , and where possible totally, that
actual civil society wishes to substitute itself for the
fictional civil societ/ of the legislature, is nothing but
the drive of civil society to give itself political ex-
istence, or to make political existence its actual existence.
The essence of the "real revolution": Civil society will "transform"
itself Into political soc'ety, "make political society into actual
society". V.'e behold the immediate identity of "society" and the "state":
"The very notion of member of the state implies their being... a part of
it, and the state having them as Its part. But if they are an Integral




already th^jj;^ ^ctuaj^ parti cipation in
The new order would be a "commonwealth",^^ something other than
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and superior to the "abstract state form" of a democratic
republic.
But what precisely would It be? Primarily, it appears, the
thorough
democratization of the executive. Marx intends, as does Rousseau,
nothing less than the abolution of government as
profession. Herein
lies the secret of the _l_rue unity of universal
and particular, the
particular manifestation of universal human essence: "The abolution
of the bureaucracy can consist only in the universal interest becoming
really--and not, as with Hegel, becoming purely in thought, in ab- .
straction--a particular interest; and this is possible only through
the particular interest really becoming universal". Against Hegel,
it is not enough, Marx believes, even if every citizen has the oppor-
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t un i ty to serve as administrator; in a "true state" every citizen
mus_^ serve:
In a true state it is not a question of the possibility
of every citizen to dedicate himself to the universal in
the form of a particular class, but of the capability of
the universal class to be really universal, i.e. to be
the class of every citizen.
Examinations, which Hegel proposed for admission to state service, will
be abol i shed
:
In a rational state, taking an examination belongs more
properly to becoming a shoemaker than an executive civil
servant, because shoemaking is a skill without which one
can be a good citizen of the state, a social man; but the
necessary state knowledge is a condition without which a
person in the state lives outside the state, is cut off
from himself, deprived of air. The examination Is nothing
other than a masonic rite, the legal recognition of the
privileged knowledge of state ci t i zensh i p . . . the bureau-
cratic baptism of knowl edge . . . 57
In this connection Marx makes an important allusion that clearly
suggests
classical antiquity as the model for his political paradigm: "No
one
ever heard", he says, "of a Greek or Roman statesman
taking an exami-
nation'.
Legislatively, we have already seen that Marx considered
"the vote"
as "the chief political interest of actual
civil society". Where "active",
voting will take the form of the referendum;
where "passive", in the form
U5
of directly elected representatives, these representatives will be
responsible not to a mediatory "estate", but to the people directly.
In a true democracy the legislature is "the representative of the peopie--
99i.e. of the species-will".
Marx does not discuss in the Cr i t igue the judiciary, though it is
reasonable to presume that he anticipated a similar democratization here,
in the form, e.g. of directly elected judges subject to recall.
More significant than these particular institutional reflections
is the now apparent commitment to soc i g' 1 i sm (i.e. the abolition of
private property) as the essence of "true democrac/". Private property
figures prominently into the constructions of the Cr i t i que ; Marx declares
that "at its highest point the political constitution is the constitution
of private property. The highest political inclination is the inclination
of private property".
The institution of primogeniture provides the paradigm case of
private property; as inalienable property "it is petrified private
property, private p roper ty ... i n the highest independence and sharpness
of the development. . .sovereign pr I vate proper ty" .
^
^ Hegel had defended
primogeniture on the grounds that the inalienability of property rendered
the class of independent landed property holders particularly suited
to
render selfless service to the state. Precisely because their property
rights were restricted, the benefactors of primogeniture
would remain,
unlike the average burgher, unaffected by the vicissitudes of
the market,
hence aloof from the marketplace mentality. But in
fact, Marx rejoins,
primogeniture is not, "as Hegel says, a chain on the freedom
of private
U6
right"; ratlier, precisely because it remains private property, but is
inal ienable private property, it is "the freedom of private right which
has freed itself from all social and ethical claims". Primogeniture is
thus "abstract" private property. And since Hegel's constitution, the
"highest" political constitution, presupposes the institution, "the
highest political constitution is the construction of abstract private
.
n 102p roper ty .
Obv'ous to the discerning eye, the fatal inversion of subject and
predicate is again at fault, the root cause of this perversion of politics.
"It is no longer the case that property is in so far as I put my will into
it, but rather my will is in so far as it is in property. Here my will
does not own but is owned... The subject is the thing and the predicate
is the man. The will becomes the property of property. . .Hegel makes
political citizenship, existence, and sentiment a quality of private
property .
It might seem here that Marx has waxed inconsistent. In what sense
can civil society and the state be separate , as he insists they absolutely
are, if private property, the essence of civil society, now is found also
to be the essence of the state? But the inconsistency is only apparent.
Marx has located v^hac amounts to a double alienation from the standpoint
of "the commonwealth": (1) private property as the alienation of will;
(2) private property as the obsession of the (a) political
burgher. Civil
society and the state are opposed, yet united in common alienation.
Private
property is at once the alienated bourgeois and the alienated
citoycn, each
of which nonetheless continues to look askance at the
motives and concerns
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of the other. Through the identification of primogeniture as only the
"highest development" of private property in general ("Private property
is the species-existence of pr i v 1 1 ege ..."), ^ Marx can conclude, via
the interpretive prism of double alienation, that "Independence, autonomy,
in tiie political state v;ho5e construction we have followed so far, is
private property ... Pol i t i ca 1 independence is an accident of private
pi'operty and not the substance of the political state. . . I ndependent
private prope r ty . . ._i_s_ the political independence of the state... not only
the support of the constitution but the constitution itself".
With the notion of the democratic commonv;eal th Marx has, as it were,
presupposed the socialist revolution, in the sense that he seems to as-
suiT,e that unrestricted suffrage (the universal/particular manifestation
of universal will) will perforce issue in the abolition of private property
Needless to say, this opinion does not remain a final resting place, but
only 0 temporary way station, in Marx's conception of the realization of
universal humanity.
The metaphysics of the Critique . As is probably already evident, Marx
never tires of hammering home the essential flaw of the Hegelian philo-
sophical/political project, as laid bare by fellow-traveller Feuerbach:
"The important thing is that Hegel at all times mal<es the Idea the subject
and makes the proper and actual subject, like 'political sentiment', the
predicate. But the development proceeds at all times on the
side of the
prcdicate";^°^ "Hegel make5 the predicates, the objects, independent,
but
independent as separated from their real independence,
their subject.
Subsequently, and because of this, the real subject appears to
be the
U8
result; whereas one has to start from the real subject and examine its
object i f i cat i on".
^
Categorical statements of this order pervade the whole of the
Cr i t i que
,
especially its early pages. The question is, can we make
philosophical sense of the inspirational basis of the C r i t i que , which
constitutes, as we have heard Karx sweepingly declare, "the main line of
a critique of the Hegelian system and thereby of ary metaphysic"? The
key, I think, is to be discovered in Marx's language; the reader of the
Critique is literally overwhelmed by the use of the adjectives "actual"
and "real" (as in such phrases as "real life", "actual man", "actual
civil society", etc.), and the opposition of the "empirical", "crdinary
existence", the "facts", the "obvious", the "simple", "common language",
etc. to Hegel's "imaginary", "logical" constructions of the "ideal", his
1 nR
"logical, pantheistic mysticism". Marx would drive us beyond all
possible doubt that he is talking brass tacks, and Hegel sheer mystical
goobledygoop. For example: In Hegel, "Actuality is not expressed as
itself but as another reality. Ordj_na ry emp i r i ca 1 ex i sjence does not
have its own mind ( Geist ) but rather an alien mind as its
law..."; "The
Idea is given the status of a subject, and the actual relationship of
family and civil society to the state is conceived to be
its inner,
imaginary activity"; family and civil society are "the
_r_e ajjy. ac tjve
things". When "the Idea is made subject, there the real
subjects -
civil society, family, circumstances, capr i ce ,
etc. become unreal...".
For Hegel "it is not a question of bringing
empirical existence to its





the obvious is developed to a real moment of the Idea";^^^ "It is
evident that the true method is turned upside down. What is most
s imple is made most complex and vice versa";^^^ "In order to behave
as actual citizen of the state, to acquire political significance and
efficacy, (the individual) must abandon his civil actual i ty, ., .hi s own
actua l
,
empirical reality ; for as a state- i dea 1 i st he is a being who Is
completely other, distinct, different from and opposed to h i s own actu-
1 12
ality". In Hegel, "the fact
,
which is the starting point, is not
conceived to be such but rather to be the mystical result. The actual
becomes phenomenon ...". ^ '
These assertions and others like them comprise the whole critical
thrust of the Cri tique . Yet we search in vain for their substantial
philosophical justification. Far from presenting a definitive refutation
of the Hegelian metrphysic, Marx projects a distinctive impression
(though the impression is not the truth) that he has thoroughly mi s -
understood that metaphysic. The strongest support for this impression
is Marx's undefended subversion of the Hegelian categories of the "real"
and the "actual". As a philosopher in the fullest and loftiest sense of
the vjord, Hegel is concerned to penetrate the mystery of the nature of
"reality". The "obvious", "empirical reality", common-sense experience,'
for Hegel has a discernible order, a structure open to investigation by
the philosophical eye. But that structure is not, precisely because it
is a philosophical probl em, evident to common-sense understanding;
it is
not a simple "fact" to be grasped directly. Hence the need
for reflection
and interpretation in terms of such categories as "real"
and "actual":
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Empirical reality--the undifferentiated aggregation of everyday "fact"--
is real only insofar as it manifests the fundamental structure of Being,
that is, in Hegelian shorthand, the "Idea". Marx, on the other hand,
explicitly interprets the "real" as exactly this empirical reality and
nothing more; everything beyond this rea'ity is relegated to the misty
realm of mystical, "unreal" reasoning. This, it might be claimed, is
precisely the point of the Feuerbachian "inversion": what Hegel claimed
to be the real is proved to be not so. But this is to get ahead of the
game. The crucial move has been made as it were before the inversion
proper; or perhaps more precisely, the inversion presupposes the evapo-
ration of the philosophical problem of reality as such ; this i take it
it Marx's meaning when he hails Feuerbachian criticism as offering a
"critique" of "any metaphysic".
But has a "critique" in fact been given? I think not. Marx does
not so much cri ticize Hegel 's position as he i gnores it. The critique
of any given metaphysic must, it seems to me, take place in the context
of another metaphysic; or, if the term "metaphysic" is offensive,
another
"interpretation of reality". But then that interpretation must be
critically justified. And it is just this justification that Marx fails
(refuses?) to provide. He is content to stage a confrontation of
"logic"
and "fact": "Hegel's true interest is not the philosophy
of right but
logic. The philosophical task is not the embodiment
of thought in deter-
minate political realities, but the evaporation of
these realities in
abstract thought. The philosophical moment is
not the logic of fact but
the fact of logic. Logic is not used to
prove the nature of the state,
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but the state is used to prove the Logic" With Hegel, "thought is
not conformed to the nature of the state, but the state to a ready made
system of thought" J But of course the question is precisely the
"nature" of the state.
Marx wants (demands!) Hegel to prove "empirical ly" what cannot be
"proved"-- i . e. the union in difference of the ideal and the "real".
Hegel, for example, claims that the Idea differentiates itself "organi-
cally", and that the development is objectified in the organic consti-
tution of the state. Marx objects as I'ollows: "by defining the organism
as the development of the idea, then by interpolating tiic concrete data
of the various pov/ers (of the state) the development assumes the appear-
ance of having arrived at a determinate content". '^^ Quite simply, Marx
bluntly rejects Hegel's metaphysical premises because they are not what
they cannot be--viz. empirical "facts", "What Hegel really wants to
achieve is the determination of the organism as the constitution of the
state. But there is no bridge by which one can pass from the universal
idea of the organism to the particular idea of the organism of the state
1 1
7
or the constitution of the state, nor will there ever be". In place
of a detailed philosophical criticism we are treated to the rather
dogmatic affirmation of an apparently translucent, immediate empirical
reality. Thus, Hegel "does not develop his thought out of what is ob-
jective, but what is objective in accordance with a ready-made thought
which has its origin in the abstract sphere of . log i c . . .Th i s is an
obvious (!) mystification". The mystification is
"obvious", pre-
sumably, because Hegel does not make his point of
departure everyday.
152
common-sense reality. For this refusal to recognize "the facts", he
is castigated as a "mystic". Marx has been widely and lavishly praised
for this purportedly brilliant rebuttal of the Hegelian metaphysic.
But it seems to me that Marx here, in the Cr i t i que
,
wears the rather
unbrilliant mantle of the indignant positivlst (something he decidedly
is not; as we shall see, liis own theory of alienation is hardly trans-
parent to the naked, unph i ] osoph i ca 1 eye. But then neither is the
positivist posture in truth non-metaphysical). What else can we make
of an argument of the form: 'This is the v;ay things really are' (no
further grounding or explanation offered, presumably none necessary);
'Hegel does not see :hings this way, the way they are, but rather meta-
physically; therefoi"e Hegel is a hopeless mystic...'?
Not su rpr ; s i ng 1 V , Manx's critical gaze is especially drawn to the
philosophical category of mediation, i.e. the notion that universality
is a "substance" not Immediately one vyith human particular being. For
example, he says, "q_ij£ ci rcumstances , caprice, and personal choice they
(ci rcumstances
,
)etc. are lot declared to be rational. Yet on the other
hand they again are, but only so as to be presented for the phenomena of
mediation, to be left as they are while at the same time acquiring the
meaning of a determination of the Idea, a result and product of the
Idea".^^^ Marx will countenance neither the notion of a transcendent
force, i.e. God, "outside" (generic) m.an , determining his nature and
condition, nor the idea of a "universal" social entity, i.e. the state,
beyond the immediate will of (particular) man. He rightly perceives that
the two notions, in Hegel at least, are complexly
connected, and will
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have nothing of either. But again, the critical point is not the
rejection of Hegelian metaphysics per se, but of metaphysics as such ;
this is the manifestly (ant i
-) ph i 1 osoph i cal counterpart to the rejection
of mediatory political modes as such, and not simply the Hegelian forms.
Either man already ]j_ un i versal --• i n a double sense: he already is God
on the one hand, and "society", the totality of coinmunal being, on the
Other (this is Marx's position, as we shall see in the next section);
or he is not , and can never become so via the mysticism of mediation,
either transcendent or political: "actual extremes cannot be mediated
with each other precisely because they are actual ext renies" .
^
What is the upshot of Marx's ant i -metaphys i cal posturing? As I
have said, and will demonstrate in some detail in the next section
(though the detail will be more important for our purposes than the
demonstration itself), Marx is not so ant i -ph I 1 osoph i cal as he would
in the Cri t ique have us believe. Yet even in the hardly self-evident
theory of al ienation--the genuine foundation of the critical power of
the whole Marxian corpus--Marx never turns loose the idea that the
truth he presents is immed iate truth. The human universality from which
mani<ind becomes "alienated" in the course of history, and in which he is
to be ultimately redeemed, remains always (so it is presented) an im-
mediate, unmediated fact of existence: a posture I think abundantly
evidenced by the Marxian embodiment of the task of realizing universal
humanity in the mundane activity of the "universal" class, the
proletariat.
Marx as it were has his cake and eats it. He would
philosophize without
philosophizing. He does not in truth dispense with the Hegelian
Idea, as
Lukacs has abundantly demonstrated, but i ncorporates it into the stream
of intramundane history. In this way he is able to keep the dialectic,
while throwing over the unwieldy ballast of Hegel's "system". Where it
would certainly seem that by the rejection of Hegel's metaphysics Marx
is logicaPy obliged to reject the very notion that history "unfolds"
according to discernible plan, he instead substitutes for a "metaphysical"
unfolding an "empirical", "factual" revelation. Out of this apparent
contradiction emerges the "materialist" dialectic, a "method" which Marx
always insisted rested on the same inversion that inspired the C r i t i que .
In the 1873 Afterword to the Second German Edition of Cc?pi tal , Marx says:
"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain... is the
demiurges of the real world and the real vyorld is only the external,
phenomenal form of the 'Idea'. V/ith me, on the contrary, the ideal is
nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and
translated into forms of thought". His is the "rational", and Hegel's
the "mystified" form of the dialectic. As mystification, it glorifies
"the existing state of things"; as rational, "it is a scandal and
abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors . . . i t lets
nothing impose on it and is in its essence critical and revolutionary".
With Hegel the dialectic "is standing on its head. It must be turned
right side up again, If you would discover the rational kernel
within
the mystical shell". If we wi 1 1 but see clearly, we
can slough off
the heavy shroud of misunderstanding. It is. not surprising
that Marx
should adopt this quasi-positivist and arbitrary posture.
At the most
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fundamental level he is engaged in the revolutionary task of transposing
the sense of a transcendent reality (in Vv'hich, for the most part, men
participate only by virtue of one or another form of symbolic mediation)
into a strictly "factual" key of intramundane experience. There is no
"soft", "easy" way to do this. The method is always violent in a philo-
sophical sense, necessarily taking shape as the flat denial of the
validity of metaphysical questioning and reasoning. As we will see,
tiie process of human se 1 f -"perfect i on" , the task Marx had already long
before laid on the shoulders of the laboring species, brooks no inter-
ference from forces beyond the "real, sensual" nature of collective
mankind, la masse totale (Turgot).
Marx's Philosophic al Anthropology: The Communa 1 i st i c Derailment
|f the "real, objective" world is without metaphysics, it is not,
however, without grace. The very idea of universal humani ty- -the
collective stream of countless generat i ons--makes no sense without a
demonstration of historical structure. History indeed has a meaning
for Marx, or rather, not _a meaning, but (as it must be) _the meaning, the
real, factual meaning of universal humanity. And because the fulfillment
of this meaning, though obvious in form, is in content not yet
an "is"
but only a promised "ought to be", the "actual" world is a world
perme-




The German situation and the outlook for universal emancipation
. In the
I ntroduct ion to the Cr i t ique
,
published in 18A^, Marx explicitly identi-
fies the critique of religion as the "prerequisite of every critique".
Why? Because religion is, "in fact, the self-consciousness and self-
esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself
again. ..the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against
1 23that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma". It is "man
himself" that Marx burns to bring to sel f-avjareness , and call to the
universal mission of self-realization. Toward this end the critique of
religion is so much (necessary) clearing away of cobwebs, the dissipation
of a mental fog. Pursued to a logical conclusion, it ends "in the doctrine
that man is the supreme being for man; thus it ends with the categorical
id.perative to overthrov/ all conditions in which man is a debased, en-
12^
slaved, neglected, contemptible being...".
State and society, as they are, produce religion as "an inverted
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world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world". The de-
struction of religion is thus the opening salvo in the coming revolution
of state and society: "The critique of heaven is transformed into the
critique of earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law,
the critique of theology into the critique of pol i t i cs"
.
^ Marx writes
in universal istic terms; but it is the German situation that preoccupies
him specifically. The connection between religious and political criti-
cism is not strictly logical in the usual sense. Rather Marx seems
acutely aware of an historical connection between his thought
and the
radical iconoclasm of Luther's Reformation. He believes he
has penetrated
the special character of a coming German revolution
when he remarks:
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"Germany's revolutionary pasl is precisely theoretical; it is the
Reformation. At that time it was a monk, so now it is the philosopher
127
in whose brain the revolution begins". Luther initiated the first
stage of the struggle of layman against priest; vn th him the priest
outside was abolished: he "overcame servitude based on devotion". But
he did so only "by replacing it with servitude based on conviction";
"He transformed the priests into laymen by changing the laymen into
128
priests... He freed the body of chains by putting the heart in chains".
The next stage, that of Feucrbach's criticism, had eliminated the priest
within, by showing religion to be a mere product of the religious "con-
sciousness". Finally, it was up to Marx to carry the struggle to its
ultimate issue, that is, to the critique of the social need for the
priest, any priest, within or without. Thus Marx would, paradoxically,
fulfill the religloui mission, begun by Luther, by destroying the roots
of religion: "the philosophical transformation of the priestly Germans
into men will emancipate the people". (Later, the people emancipated,
philosophy too could be discarded.)
This self-interpretation leads directly to the critique of politics.
The special character of the critique ought not escape us; it too has a
paradoxical quality. Marx does not turn his enlightened pen against
actually existing institutions straightaway; instead he attacks
Hegel_.
What is the justification for this procedure? Marx recognizes the
German political situation as strikingly (and painfully)
unique. France
and England had had their revolutions; Germany had
not. In Germany the
ancien regime was yet in place, while her rivals
were busy consolidating
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their bourgeois accomplishments. Marx is distressed: "V/e have shared
In the restorations of modern nations without ever having shared in
1 30their revolutions". It was essential to discern the why and the
wherefore of the nation's political niggardliness. The answer pre-
supposed the analysis of the revolutionary process. In Marx's view,
every "merely political" revolution is the result of a single class
successfully i den t i f y i ng--br i ef 1 y , at least--j_ts_ interests with the
Interests of the whole: "a section of civil society emancipates itself
and achieves universal dominance; a determinate class undertakes from
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its particular situation the universal emancipation of society".
The single class thus appears legitimately representative of the entire
society. And so it j_s for a time; its revolution would certainly fall
if it did not evoke "a momiint in which its demands and rights are truly
those of society itself, of which It is the social head and heart".
Thus the first rule of revolution: "No class of civil society can play
this role unless it .arouses in Itself and in the masses a moment of
enthusiasm, a moment In which It associates, fuses, and identifies It-
self with society in general, and Is felt and recognized to be society's
general representat 1 /e"
.
^ There is another, equally critical require-
ment, viz. an opposition class symbolizing in the general consciousness'
evil incarnate: "For one class to be the class par excellence of liber-
ation, another class must, on the other hand, be openly the subjugating
class"; "A particular social sphere must stand for the notorious
crime
of the v/hole society, so that liberation from this
sphere appears to be
universal 1 1 berat 1 on"
.
^ The obvious illustrative example is France.
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In that particular revolutionary drama, the French nobility and clergy
wore the black hats, the bourgeoisie the white.
Germany suffers on all accounts. Its political state is, from the
modern standpoint, a massive confusion. No clear line of development
seems discernible, the preconditions for revolution apparently, painfully
lacking. There is no class of such "consistency", "keenness", "courage"
13^
and "ru th 1 essness" that it can be saddled with the onerous role of
society's sole oppressor; no class either of adequate "bread:h of soul"
and "revolutionary boldness" that it can accomplish the identification
with tne whole people that will ignite the revolutionary torch. Absent
from the German scene is "that genius vjhich animates material force into
political power"; unlike France, "the relationship of the different
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spheres of German society is... not dramatic, but epic". In a sense,
there is too much struggle: "the princes are in conflict with the king,
the bureaucracy with the nobility, the bourgeoisie with all of them,
while the proletariat is already beginning its struggle against the
. . n 136bou rgeo i s i e .
On his own analysis Marx has ample right to be pessimistic about
the prospects for his nation's progress. Yet he is not; he has dis-
covered a rose in the German political cross. Germany is behind the
times ("The struggle against the political present in Germany is the
1 37
struggle against the past of the modern nations"). But as a result
Germany has the benefit of . anal yz i ng not only the
accomplishments, but
the limitations, of the Western revolutions. The
modern state, it finds,
has achieved a critical, yet critically circumscribed,
liberation: in
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the modern state, political status is no longer the direct concomitant of
religious and property differences. This is the positive side of the
liberation. The negative side is that political and "material" life
have fallen out of common orbit. in the essay "On the Jewish Question",
written contemporaneously with the completion of the Cri tique , Ma''x
reiterates and develops the main lines of this analysis. "By its nature
the perfected political state is man's spec i es - 1 i f e in op pos i t i on to his
1 "^R
material life". The flaw of the modern state is that it retains the
whole structure of "egoistic life" outside the political sphere. In the
"perfected" political life man is compelled to leao a double life; his
public and private selves are severed: "in the pol i tical communi ty he
regards himself as a communal being; but in civil society he is active
,,
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as a pr i vate individua l . ...
Given this diagnosis, the prescription is evident. Only a new,
radical, complete socialization of man can put his sundered self back
together. Only then will man be whol ly liberated, and can quit straddling
the political wall that partitions his generic beirg. Here perhaps more
clearly than anywhere we see Marx emphatically make the point that
poli-
tics and citizenship are not (not even potentially) the mediation of
private and public interest, but rather the expression of their
mutual
hostility: "The state is the mediator between man and the
freedom of
man. As Christ is the mediator on whom man unburdens
all his divinity
and all his religious tie_s, so is the state the
mediator to which man
transfers all his unholiness and all his human free^^^
"the state
permits private property, education, and occupation
to ac^ and manifest
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thei r part icu 1 ar nature... Only thus above the particular elements is
1 ko
the state a universality". Marx would bring universality down to
the earth, and back to its original resting place--the undifferentiated
heart of homogeneous "humanity". Hence the judgement: "Political
emancipation is a great progress" but "it is not... the final form of
universal human emancipation". It is only "the final form within the
prevailing order of things"; " political emancipation by itself is not
human emancipation"; "the limits of political emancipation are seen at
once in the fact that the state can free itself from a limitation without
nan actual ly being free of it, in the fact that a state can be a free
1^2
state without men becoming free men". Universal citizenship is but
cne stage in the progress of human freedom, destined to be superceded.
The principle of analysis here is clear enough, and can be ex-
pressed by the term 'emancipatory reduct i on i sm ' . "Emancipation" for
Marx is man's advance in history tov/ard absolute freedom. In the
"Jewish Question" we read: "All emancipation is restoration of the
1 ^3
human world and the relationships of men themselves" . Feuerbach had
accomplished a rel igious emancipation by reducing religion to the re-
ligious-making consciousness of man. "Political emancipation", says
Marx, is also a form of reduction, that is, "the reduction of man
to
a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent
individual on
the one hand and to a citizen , a moral person on the
other". Just
as Marx perceived that the religious emancipation by
itself only went so
far. leaving man divided between himself and his
religious "consciousness",
he saw that man remains, as political man, as
citizen, in opposition to
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his true self, for he is yet a divided personality. The final step must
be the reduction to "man himself": Only when "the actual, individual
man has taken back into himself the abstract citizen" that is. When
he becomes truly a generic, "species" being "in his everyday life, his
individual work, and his individual relationships"; only when man "has
recognized and organized his own powers as social powers"; only when, as
a consequence, tiiese powers are "no longer separated from him as pol i t i -
cal power_" is the process of human emancipation fulfilled.
The structure of overcoming politics is thus identical to that of
overcoming religion. Both are equally manifestations of human alienation
from immediate universal being. "The political constitution was until now
the religious sphere, the religion of popular life, the heaven of its
universality in opposition to the earthly existence or its actuality ;
"The political state is as spiritual in relation to civil society as
1 hi
heaven is in relation to earth". Al I of past history expresses for
Marx human alienation; the future, however, constitutes the progress of
ever-expanding freedom, or more precisely, emancipation from the multiple
structures of alienation. The latter is the direct reversal of the former.
In the process of alienation, man objectifies his essence as, e.g. re-
ligious and political institutions, which he does not recognize to be his
own creations. (The creation of the objects and the "forgetting" of their
authorship merge under social conditions of alienation into a single pro-
cess.) In the process of emancipation, proceeding through religious,
political, to finally total social emancipation, man takes
back into ex-
istence the lost essence. One by one he rejects the illusory suns
"about
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which man revolves so long as he does not revolve around himself"
Germany, in its own inverted philosophical way, has seen al 1 this,
though it has done none of it. Precisely because of this severe meta-
physical myopia, "we Germans have lived our future history in thought"
Germany thus holds a peculiar advantage. Just because it is anachronistic
politically, Germany has been forced to speculate abstractly, that is,
philosophically. Here is the justification for the critique of Hegel,
For Hegel develops "the idea of the modern state" to perfection. "In
politics the Germans have thought v^hat other nations have done. Germany
was their theoretical consc I ence"
.
^ He, Marx, exponent of a new kind
of critical German thinking, could through the cr'tique of Hegel raise
to consciousness the inadequacy of merely political emancipation. En-
lightened by the new insight ("material force must be overthrown by
material force; but theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes
1 5
1
the masses") the German people could seize the banner of full human
emancipation. But for this to be the case, the revolution cannot be
carried like all previous revolutions by a simply particular class--the
"partial, merely political revolution" is for Germany a "utopian dream".
But for this reason exactly is the "general human emancipation" a
possibility within reach. Enter the proletariat: this class, Marx
believes, fills the bill of a non-particular class. It is "a class that
is the dissolution of all classes", a "sphere of society having a uni-
versal character because of its universal suffering". It suffers not
particular injustice, but injustice as such , "no particular wrong but
unqualified wrong". As the quintessence of humanity's alienation from
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its own true universality, it "cannot emancipate itself without emanci-
pating itself from all the other spheres of society, thereby emancipating "
them"; the proletariat is "the complete loss of humanity and can only
redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity"; it is the
"dissolution of society existing as a particular class"J^^ Thus to
the combined force of a new philosophy and the universal proletarian
class falls the task of executing the mission of history, i.e. the
revelation of German man as generic man, and thus his emancipation: "The
head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat.
Philosophy cannot be actualized v/ithout the abolition of the proletariat;
the proletariat camot be abolished without the actualization of philoso-
1 53
phy". Together, philosophy and the proletariat will realize Marx's
single hope and dream; universal human being.
The genesis and structure of alienation . "The premises from which we
start are not arbitrary; they are no dogmas but rather actual premises
from which abstraction can be made only in imagination". In the
German Ideology
,
beginning from real premises that "can be substantiated
in a purely empirical way", Marx proposes to render a "real, positive,
scientific" "description of reality", one in which philosophy "loses its-
medium of ex i s tence"
.
^ Here we wi 1 1 discover both the factual nature
of human being and man's alienation from it. All without the aid of
philosophy; for, "when we conceive things as they really are and happened,
any profound philosophical problem is resolved quite simply into an
em-
pirical fact".^^^ But Marx must do more than trot out a long
train of
facts; he must demonstrate an overall structure of historical
meaning .
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Toward this end he employs an analytic device at least as old as
Vol tai re--i .e. the arrangement of a selected set of historical ma-
terials according to a partial structure of meaning, itself a far cry
from being "purely empirical". For Marx, the structure of meaning is,
of course, "economic" organization, in the broad sense of his conception.
The ground for this conception is the basic relationship of man to nature.
The development of history--its subject matter and the revelation of its
meaning--is to be found in and deciphered through the analysis of the
changing content of the basic relationship. Thus, history is humanity's
emergence from an animal state in which it is submerged in nature, through
the long period of travail in which humanity gradually i ncrea5es--v i a
,
however, alienated systems of product ion-- i ts powers of domination over
nature, to, finally, humanity's complete mastery of nature, by which
and in such a way that the whole structure of alienation is overthrown.
"Labor", then, is the core notion of the (correct) "empirical" con-
ception of human being; in the language of the l8A^+ Economic and Phi lo-
sophicel Manuscripts , "the entire so-called world history is only the
creation of man through human labor and the development of nature for
man". The analysis of history provides "evident and incontrovertible
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proof of his sel f -creat ion , his own formative process .
Before proceeding further in the explication of this conception,
we note that implicit to it is the most pronounced aspect of Marx's
anti-religiosity. He is a genuine, if errant, offspring of the En-
lightenment. In the Manuscripts Marx drav;s out the premise/implication
of his earlier rejection of all re 1 i g i o-ph i 1 osoph i ca 1 speculation
based
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on the experience of a "transcendent" ground of being. Emancipation,
he argues, cannot be complete until man eliminates the notion that he
owes his creation to a power outside himself:
A being only regards himself as independent when he stands
on his own feet, and he stands on his own feet only when
l"e owes his exi stence to himself. A man who lives by the
favor of another considers himself dependent. But if I
live entirely by the favor of another I owe him not only
the maintenance of my life but also its creation, its
source . My life necessarily has such an external ground
if it is not my own creation. ^^8
To the supreme metaphys i ca I /rel i g ious question, "who created tne first
man and nature as a whole?", Marx replies curtly, "Your question is it-
self a product of abstraction"; and continues, taking to the offensive:
Ask yourself how you arrive at that question, wiether it
does not arise from a standpoint to which I cannot reply
because it is twisted. Ask yourself whether that pro-
gression exists as such for rational thought. If you ask
about the creation of nature and man, you thus abstract
from man and nature. You assert them as non-exi stent and
yet want me to prove them to you as ex ' s t i ng . I say to
you: Give up your abstraction and you will give up your
quest i on . ^ ^9
As the reader of the Cr i t ique was compelled to choose between the
sovereignty of the king or the sovereignty of the people, the reader
of the Manuscripts is faced with the unambiguous choice: God or man.
The world has room for only one creator, a single supreme being. And,
since history is revealed as "only the creation of man through human
labor", it is evident that "the question about an al ien being beyond
man and nature (a question which implies the unreality of nature
and
man) has become impossible in pract i ce"
.
^ It is this truth (among
others) that the condition of alienation veils from human
eyes, making
the "notion of creation" of man by God "very difficult
to expel from
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popular consciousness", but f a 1 se-- i tse 1 f a prominent feature of
al ienation--nonetheless.
What is the genesis of this condition? If the man/nature relation-
ship constitutes the fundamental, irreducible structure of history, it
cannot be the relationship itse'f, but the specific content of this
relationship that is prob 1 einat i c . So much Marx tells us in the German
Ideology : "The first premise of all human history... Is the existence of
living human individuals"; and the "first fact to be establ I shed . . . I
s
the physical organization of the individuals and their consequent re-
1 6
1
latlonship to the rest of nature". By this fact of productive
organization (not, as so many have believed, by "the fact that they
think") men distinguish themselves from animals, and determine, under
conditions of necessity, their being: "As Individuals express their
life, so they are. V^hat they are, therefore, coincides with vyhat they
1 62
produce, with v/hat they produce and how they produce". So much is
basic. The basic condition becomes al i enated by virtue of the historical
differentiation of tie process of production, the "division of labor".
The development of the division of labor parallels the division of forms
of human association, Incljding sexual, familial, tribal, municipal and
national differentiations. The historical compulsion is always toward
increasingly complex differentiations, and Increasingly developed "pro-
ductive forces'": "How far the productive forces of a nation are developed
is shown most evidently by the -degree to which the division of labor has
been devel oped"
.
^ The coherence of historical development "consists
of the- fact that in the place of an earlier form of interaction,
which
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has become a fetter, is put a new one corresponding to the more developed
productive forces and thus to an advanced mode of the self-activity of
individuals, a form which in turn becomes a fetter to be replaced by
16A
another". i-lence, "modes of material production" = "modes of life" =
substance of history = man.
Through differentiation man develops his powcs; but through the
same process he is alienated from his essential, undifferentiated
(generic) being. Necessity exacts a fearful price in return for the
favor of existence: "Man's own act becomes an alien power opposed to
him and enslaving him instead of being controlled by him... For as soon
as labor is distributed, each person has a particular, exclusive area
of activity which is imposed on him and from which he cannot escape. He
is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and he must
1 65
remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood".
Through spec i a 1 i zat i on--the "fixation of social act i vi ty"--the indi-
vidual laborer is cut off from the communal substance; the latter,
significantly, then takes shape not as "reality, as a mutual inter-
dependence of those individuals among whom the labor is divided", but
as, like a vagrant of the spirit world, "an illusory communal life".
That is, as the state. Neither the "real" community nor the "real"
individual (for Marx, one and the same "reality") appears real as the
division of labor compels the "consolidation of our own products into
an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our





an iron cage of his own forging, man subjugates nature only at the cost
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of his self-subjugation.
This general alienation of productivity is mul t i -d imens ional in
its dehuman i zat I on of the worker and his world. It is in the first
place alienation from the products of labor, turning labor and the
laborers themselves into products: "The increase in value of the human
world. Labor not only produces commodities. It also produces itself
and the worker as a commod I ty , and indeed in the same proportion as it
produces commodities in general"; "the worker is related to the product
of his labor as to an alien object... The more the worker exerts himself,
the more powerful becomes the alien objective world ^^/hich he fashions
1 ( 7
against himself". Secondly,- there is alienation frcm the proces s of
labor, that is, the alienation of labor from labor: "the worker does
not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, feels miserable and
unhappy, develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies his
flesh and ruins his mind. The worker, therefore feels at ease only
outside work, and during work he is outside himself"; "His work... is
not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy other needs .
Moreover, man is alienated from his natural humanness: "man (the worker)
feels that he is acting freely only In his animal f unct ions--eat I ng
,
drinking, and procreating, or at most In his shelter and f inery--whl le
in his human functions he feels only like an animal.. .To be
sure, eating,
drinking, and procreation are genuine human functions. In
abstraction,
however, and separated from the remaining sphere of
human activities
1 69
and turned Into final ends, they are animal
functions". Finally,
there is alienation from the "species", and thus
the alienation of man
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both from other men and from himself: "alienated labor also alienates
the spec i es from (man); it makes species-l i fe the means to individual
life... Life itself appears only as a means to 1 i fe" ; "the statement
that man is alienated from his species-existence means that one man is
alienated from another just as each man is alienated from human nature.
The alienation of man, the relationship of man to himself, is realized
and expressed in the relationship between man and other men".^^^
In a sense the individual v;orker faces the alienated system of
product i on--the division dt 1 abor--d i rect 1 y . In another sense he does
not: "in the relation of alienated labor every man sees the other
according to the standard and the relation in which he finds himself
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es a worker". Tne system of alienated labor takes shape as a par-
ticular determination of class structure . The individual does not
relate to the world qua individual, but as a rr.ember of a class. The
division of labor is systematized as class structure, that is, as
organized exploitation. in capitalist society, the class structure
is pel lucidly simple: One class owns the products of labor and the
means of producing them; the other class owns nothing but its alienated
labor: "the external nature of work for the v/orker appears in the fact
that it is not his cwn but another person's, that in work he does net
belong to himself but to someone else... That the product of labor does
not belong to the worker and an alien power confronts him is possible
only because this product belongs to a man^ other th^
11"
his activity is torment for him, it must be a pleasure and
the life
enjoyment for another". History thus prepares for Armageddon by
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producing the "antithesis between property lessness and property ... the
antithesis of 1 abor and capi tal" .
The class structure is, then, identical with the system of private
property : "The relation of the worker to labor produces the relation
of the capitalist to labor, or whatever one wishes to call the lord of
labor. Private property is then product, result, and necessary con-
sequence of externalized labor
,
of the external relationship of the
wcrker to nature and to himself". Private property, as the quint-
essence of alienation overflowing the stuffed pockets of the capitalists
to pollute the whole productive organization, is the Satanic demiurge of
perverted existence, the soulless lord of all the evil shocks that flesh
is heir to. 'Objectively', it "produces marvels for the wealthy but it
produces deprivation for the worker. It produces palaces, but hovels
for the worker. It produces beauty, but mutilation for the worker";
'subjectively', it produces not only for the propertied but for the un-
fortunate propertyless as well as the personality type whose dominant
passion is greedy possess i veness : "Private property has made us so
stupid and one-sided that an object is ours only if we have it, if it
exists for us as a capital or is immediately possessed by us, eaten,
drunk, worn, lived in, etc., in short, used. ..all the physical and
spiritual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of them
all, the sense of having" . Thus, with the revelation that private
property inhabits the heart of a 1 i ena t i on , Marx concludes that it is a
"necessity" "that the whole revolutionary movement finds both its em-
pirical as well as theoretical bases in the development of private
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property-
-in the economy, to be exact"
In the course of this study we have witnessed the rapid evolution
of what I have called Marx's 'will to universality'. We have followed
the determinations of this will from the original deistic humanism,
through notions of Rousseauist popular will and Feuerbachian species-
life, until here we arrive at the final and most comprehensive con-
ceptual i zat i on- - i . e . species-life as a "process of production", the
totalistic self-creation of man through "social" interaction with, and
domination of, nature. As we read in the Manuscr i p i:s :
In the treatment of the objective world, therefore, man
proves himself to be genuinely a spec i es-be i ng . This
production is his active spec i es- 1 i f e . Through it
nature appears as his work and his actuality. The object
of labor is thus the object if ication of man's species -
life : he produces himself not only intellectually, as
in consciousness, but also actively in a real sense and
sees himself in a world he made.^^
The problem of course has always been the stubborn fact that the
experience of universality, by which "as present and living species
(man) considers himself to be a universal and consequently free
being", '^^ is somehow denied man. The catalogue of "barriers" to
the experience has grown to include human selfishness, the unpopular
state (i.e. the mediatory state as such), speculative philosophy, re-
ligion, and, finally, capitalist class society. To a large extent the
evolution of both the conceptions of universality and the barriers to
the experience of it is a process of "aufgehoben" : further determinations
do not merely negate, but carry forward the sense of their
forbears in a
redefined form. This is preeminently true of Marx's concept of
capitalist
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private property. Marx has here arrived at the point of ultimate
comprehensiveness and ultimate reduct ion--for him one point. In
private property everything comes to a head. As the structure of
history is constituted by evolving modes of productive organization,
capitalist private property, as the pinnacle of that development, repre-
sents the cresting point of a long-building historical crescendo. But
because history has heretofore been alienated hiitory, private property
is capitalist class society is more than another entry in a ledger that
extends infinitely forward in historical time. Standing in relation to
the multiple modes of alienation as genus to species, private property
forms, as it were, the etlier that separates, yet unites, earth and sky.
It is the breaking point of two ages, the witidow througli which man,
even now because still alienated, sees the future £S "th'"ough a glass
darkly". But if the species are vague, the prominent features are un-
mistakable. The transcendence of private property is the door that
opens onto the wonder and exaltation of the heretofore inexperienced:
universal humanity. The transcendence of private property is the last
act in the drawn drama of human emancipation, the climatic poetic
flourish in a lengthy prose epic, that allows the "positive overcoming
of all alienation and the return of man from religion, family, state,
etc., to his human, that is, social existence. Religious alienation
as such occurs only in the sphere of the inner human consciousness ,
but
economic alienation belongs to'actual life-its overcoming thus includes
both aspects". Marx does not specifically mention the political
"consciousness", but it is clear, that its transcendence too is implied:
17A
"state" and "law", Marx insists, are "only particular forms of pro-
duction", falling under the "general law" of product ion J ^ ^ With the
"positive overcoming of all alienation", the sense of political con-
sciousness, the consciousness of citizenship, reaches the vanishing
point. Or, perhaps more precisely, the "citizen" becomes just another
synonym for "social man". From the political standpoint, the dis-
tinction, I think, "s relatively unimportant.
Communist man
.
The abolition or private property must be rightly under-
stood. As "communism", Marx writes at the end of the Manuscr i pts section,
"Private Property and Communism", it is "the necessary form and dynamic
principle of the immsdiate future but not as such the goal of human
1 82development--tlie form of human society". Against mere form, the
goal itself is of course the realization of human universality. Marx
uses, confusingly, various terms to depict this state: "society",
"the social situation", "socialist man", "socialism", "communism" in
some senses but not in others (dooming beforehand, it seems, all at-
tempts to determine the developmental relationship of "socialism" to
"communism"). But it is quite clear that Marx i s not del i neat i ng
institutional forms, but rather heralding a revolutionary change in
the human condition as such. He is talking about the world-historical
appearance of a new tvpe of ("restored") man. Hence the introduction
of critical distinctions regarding the senses/stages of "communism".
In tfie first p 1 ace--" immed i ate 1 y"--commun i sm is "crude" and "unthinking",
taking the form of a generalization of capitalist society. "The con-
dition of the laborer is not overcome but extended to all men". The
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crudity of communism at this stage is evident in the manifestation of
its "envious" and "levelling" passion. "The community is only a com-
munity of labor and an equality of wages which the communal capital-, the
1 83
community as universal, pays out". Communism at this point raises
society not to a true but only a "supposed" universality; hence there
exists only an "apparent" community: Crude communism is in truth the
"vileness of private property trying to set itself up as the pos i t i ve
.
18^
commun i ty .
Intermediate to the crude form of communism and what we might call
its "true" form is a second stage. In this stage society moves from a
communist form "still of a political nature, democratic or despotic" to
one in which politics and the state have been "overcome", but which is
1 Or
Still "influenced" by "the alienation of man". At this point, "commu-
nism already knows itself as the reintegration or return of man to him-
self, as the overcoming of human se 1 f -a 1 i enat i on , but since it has not
yet understood the positive essence of private property and just as
little the human nature of needs, it still remains captive to and
infecteo by private property. It has indeed grasped its concept but
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still not I ts essence .
Finally, after long exile in the wilderness of alienation, post-
revolutionary society comes at last home to itself. In the
final form
of communism, communism as
positive overcOTinq of private property as human self-
TlTeT^iTion, and thus as the actual appropriation of
the
human essence through and for man; therefore
as the
T^ete and conscious restoration of man to himself
within the total wealth of previous development,
the
restoration of man as a social , that is, human
being.
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This communism and this communism alone is the end of history, the
fulfillment of all historical striving, the "perfection" of mankind,
unlimited in content either by particular ideas or particular insti-
tutional forms. It is at once "naturalism", "humanism", the "resolution"
of all man/nature and man/man antagonisms, and also the "true resolution"
of the age-old conflicts between "existence and essence, object i f i cat i on
and self-affirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species".
In short, it is the point at which the need for any and all modes of
med iat ion--rel ig ious
,
philosophical, pol i t i cal --has been "positively"
surpassed: In the "social situation", Marx says, "it is apparent how
subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity
1 88
and passivity lose their opposition". But these accomplishments are
but aspects of the greatest victory, the victory of man over history:
Communism "is the riddle of history solved and knows itself as this
solution .
In communist society the noxious historical tension between the
individual and his "generic life" dissolves, replaced by an all-
encompassing, unmediated unity. The individual mirrors society and
society the individual in a self-absorbed dance of narcissistic en-
chantment: the individual is only "a more particular or more general
mode of generic life"; and generic life "a more particul_a_r or universal
mode of individual life".^^^ Everywhere the individual looks
he sees
his own self, because for the first time he has become
fully a "communal
being". He is everywhere at home; for in his particularity
he is
"equally the totality, the ideal total i ty , the subjective existence
of
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society explicitly thought and exper ienced. , . a totality of human ex-
1 9
1
pression of life". The totality is a "manifold essence" that the
individual will appropriate in an "all-sided way", "as a whole man".
His very senses are transformed: "hearing, smelling, tasting", etc. are
now his "human relations to the world", they are "immediately communal
1 92
in form". The individual has no "needs" which society cannot satisfy,
because all his needs are communal needs: "Need or satisfaction have
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thus lost their egoi st i c nature". Through the human mastery of
nature, nature too has been appropriated by the unbounded human essence,
has become genuinel/ "hunan nature": "Nature has lost its mere uti 1 i ty
by use becoming hunxan use"; for "social man", "nature (is) a 1 ink wi th
man, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the
life-element of human actuality"; "the natural existence of man becomes
his human existence and natJre becomes human. Thus society is the
completed, essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection
19^^
of nature, and fulfilled naturalism of man and humanism of nature".
In communism all is one: man, society, nature. "History itself is an
actual part of natura l h_i story, of nature's development into man.
Natural science will in t i Tie include the science of man as the
science
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of man will include natural science: There will be
one science".
In addition to the always dynamic will to universality,
Marx here dis-
plays a transparent inclination toward the Saint S
imon i an/Comtean
conception of historical advance- th rough religious/mythical,
meta-
physical, and, finally positive-scientific thinking.




institutional arrangements. The revolution introduces not a particular
politico-socio-economic solution to a specific set of historical probli
Rather it portends a wholly transfigured human being, the un i versal . man
who knows "that the nature of the particular person is... his social
quality, and that the activities of the state, etc., are nothing but
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the modes of existence and operation of the social qualities of men".
It solves the "riddle of history" as such.
But the problem of concrete arrangements remains despite the
sweeping visionary character of Marx's reflections on communism. It
looms large not only for the doubtful reader, but on Marx's own account,
indeed precisely because of the awesomeness of the vision. The un-
paralleled universality of communism is not to result from, or issue
in, the abolition of industrial society, even though industrialism
presupposes an intensely developed division of labor, and therefore
presumably a multiplicity of alienated ills--the alienation of the
worker from his tools, specialization, job dependence coupled with
massive productive interdependence, etc. It was quite unthinkable to
consider a wholesale break with the empirical stream of economic de-
velopment. "Communism is not", Marx insists, " a s_tate of af^aij:s_
s t i 1
1
to be established, not an ideal to which reality (will)
have to adjust.
We call communism the real movement which abolishes the
present state
of affairs. The conditions of this movement
results from premises now
in existence". Marx of course links the
division of labor to social
ownership, suggesting communal expropriation of
the exploiting capitalist
class as the obviation of these ills. But it
is exactly this expropriation
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that Marx calls "crude communism", still within the gr
i
p--s 1 acken i ng
yet firm--of alienation, not yet the genuine un i versa 1 i zat i on of man.
Marx presents no solution to the problem, because, I believe, none is
possible within his framework. He simply asserts, because he apparently
believed it to be so, the non-contradictory coalescence of a highly
differentiated industrial productive apparatus and the unspec i a 1 i zed
all-round development of "the whole man". "In communist society...
nobody has an exclusive area of activity and each can train himself in
any branch he wishes"; "society regulates the general production, making
it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt
in the morning, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner,
just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman,
or a critic". Only by positing as historical resul
t
the assumption
of an unmediated identification of the individual with the social
totality, is Marx ab le (but not without his readers being struck by
a sense of glaring incompatibility) to merge the necessitarian division
of productive forces with the revolutionary leap into absolute individual
freedom. Just because the productive forces have "developed to a to-
tality", "the appropriation of the forces is itself nothing more than
the development of individual capacities corresponding to tne material
instruments of production. For this very reason, the appropriation
of
a totality of instruments of production is the development
of a totality
of capabilities in the individuals themse I ves" J Thus is a
theoretical
disjuncture presented as the "practical" resolution of the "riddle" of
history. Labor is somehow at once divided and not
divided. Nor does it
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appear that Marx ever deserts (or at least strays very far from) this
vision of resolution, even in his most mature reflections. In the
famous discussion, "The Fetishism Of Commodities And The Secret Thereof"
(Cap i ta 1 I), it is reformulated, though vaguely, as a comparison of "a
community of free individuals" witli the all-sided Robinson Crusoe. V/hen
we "picture to ourselves" such a community of individuals, says Marx,
"carrying on their work wich the means of production in common, in which
the labor-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied
as the combined labor-power of the community", vte find "repeated" there
all the characteristics of Robinson's labor--!. e. "useful work of various
sorts, such as making tools and furniture, taming goats, fishing and
hunting"--"wi tfi the difference, that they are social, instead of indi-
vidual". Marx's vision continues to bear the unmistakable imprint
of conviction as to the coincidence of historical necessity and absolute
freedom, and the unmediated unity of particular men and general societal
will: "The life-process of society, which is based on the process of
material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is
treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously
regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however,
demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of
conditions
of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous
product of a long
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and painful process of development .
The presumption of immediate unity I call the
"communal derailment"
of the fundamental duality of human exi
stence- i .e . the theoretical
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elimination of the irreducible tens i onal i ty inherent to an ambiverse--
agentic and communa 1 - -human nature (see ch. 't) . Let us go a little
into the precise nature of this derailment. In the first place, we-
must note that though emphasis falls on the agent i c/communal tension,
the still more comprehensive "transcendent/existential" tension (the
relationship of finite man to infinite being as such) is integrally
involved as well, as it alv/ays is, however tangent i a 1 1 y . That this
should be less than obvious today is due only to the prevalent atheism
(and atheism's weak sister, agnosticism) of our age. (More on this
later.) With Marx the interrelationship of the agent i c/communa 1 and
trcnscendent/existential components of human being is especially clear.
We have observed already the centrality of his ant i - rel i g I os I ty to his
passionate vision of universal mankind's historical mission. It is
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clear enough too, as many observers have noted, that the critical
Marxian category of "al ienation^' is an obvious analogue to the Christian
eschatological vision. The origin of alienation in the division of
labor marks the "fall" of man from the true order of being into dis-
order and darkness, the socialist revolution, the Redemption, etc. We
have seen how, whereas his philosophical antagonist Hegel had taken
over and reinterpreted in terms of his metaphysics the Christian
distinction between "sacred" and "profane" history, Marx at once
abolishes the distinction (the rejection of metaphysics) and preserves
it in a radically transfigured form. "Sacred" history
is no longer
sacred, but rather the "factual" line of d i al ect i
cal -mater i al i st
"progress" of the world toward freedom- I n-communi
sm. For Marx the
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corpus mysticum Christ! has been, as It were, supplanted by the corpus
myst i cum human i tas .
The results are staggering in scope for the whole of human ex-
istence, and especially for the notion of human political existence,
our primary concern. By no means did Marx overstate the significance
of his notion of communism. The Fathers of the American Republic, we
will remember, wholeheartedly accepted the privatization of the spirit
(in both the religious and secular sense), and the consequent degradation
of public existence. This I called the "individualist derailment" of
the basic agent i c/communa 1 , tremscendent/existent ial tensions of human
being, arguing that its upshot is, at best, the tr i vi al i zat ion of the
mediatory/integrationist task of the political. Marx takes the opposite
tack. He rejects privatization in any_ form and sets out to rssp i r i tual i ze
the "public", or more properly, the "communal", via his activist uni-
versal ist humanism (in the form, finally, of the "economic", corresponding
appropriately to the identification of "real" man as homo fabcr) . For
the American Fathers the secularized individual "soul" was all, the
community nothing. For Marx the soul, and the transcendent experiential
reality it designates, is gone, a mist evaporated, and the "community"
is all. He would break the i nd i v i dua 1 i s t amor sui of man
not with the
amor Dei_, for the latter is but an illusion of the
alienated conscious-
ness, but with a collective amor su_^. Marx realizes,
rightly, that a
spiritual integration of personality is altogether
impossible under
conditions of capitalist exploitative individualism.
He moreover per-
ceives, again quite correctly, that man wants,
and needs, to comprehend
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his c i V i 1 i zat I ona 1 existence as meaningful, to see, as it were, the
hand of God in his historical works. But instead of projecting a vision
of personality integration proper (that is, an integration that focuses
on the individual as spiritual center) Marx adopts the aim of soc i a1
integration, the identification of the individual with what Turgot
called la masse totale, "humanity". This identification is precisely
v;hat I mean by the communal derailment. The spiritual formation of
personality has given wav to social integration. Ev i
1
is not a terror
that each must reckon with in the depths of the soul (which is not to
say that civilizations, too, must not reckon with evil), but a faulty
form of social organization (which is not to say that social forms
cannot be evilj. The coming world of communism will be a world wi thout
evil. (The Marxian prayer of the proletariat is precisely this: "deliver
us from evil".) The realization of a universal mankind exorcised of evil
is the final fruit of the long chain of economic cause and effect that
binds together the intramundane history of all the generations of man.
But the question arises: what of me? That is, what of the
solitary individual who seeks the spiritual integration of his strife-
weary soul? The march of history has no meaning for me, the
"alienated"
agent. The progress of history is no "experience" that
I might have
(and perhaps not care to have). The communal ist historian
has no choice:
he must interpret the individual's internal anguish
as a species of
alienation 'caused' by a disordered "oroductive
organization". The
individual's experience is only the perception of
diseased ^li^iory.
We have already noted how Marx, in exasperated
tones, counsels us to
"give up" our "abstract" questions about the "beyond" of being. Notice
further what he. says of death (precious little it is, too), the antici-
pation of which is probably the greatest single spur to individual •
'transcendence': "Death seems to be a harsh victory of the species
over the particular individual and to contradict the species' unity,
but the particular individual is only a part i cu 1 ar generic be. i ng and as
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such mortal". So! The individual is doomed to perish, but--saving
grace--the species persists, and, after all, we only exist as members
of the species. C'est tout. No individual openness to perception of
the transcendent is permitted, because, quite simply, none is possible.
"Religion" is illusion, not merely in its soc i o-h I s tor i ca 1 manifestations,
but in essence.
Similarly, the purely "secular" tension of agent and community is
abolished In favor of the concrete totality of "society". In Feuer-
bachian argot, we might say it is the new "subject" and Individual man
the "predicate". But such a description Is precluded by the presumption
of the immediate unity of Individual and society. The category of
"citizen", which in its richest meaning Is a secularly 'transcendent'
category of mediation between particular and general in society. Is
reduced to a synonym for "social man". Appropriately, Marx
invokes
constantly the concept of the "species". Appropriately,
because here
the language of "citizen" has no sense: a species has,
certainly,
member s, but it has no citizens . A species is not P_ontlcal.
Understand: the "communal derailment" of human being
does not
signify the collective extirpation of Lhe
Individual personality. (I
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have pointedly avoided use of the term "collective" because of its
obvious ideological taint.) We must not misinterpret the dream of
communism, misconstrue the sense of the distinction between "true" and
"crude" communism. Communism for Marx will express a t ransformed
,
not
an eliminated person.! 1 i ty . The question is the nature of the transfor-
mation. Harx is an adamant advocate of a certain brand of "individualism"
But there can be little doubt that it is the "community"' that holds the
power, that is "prior", in the sense that the individual qua "soc i al i st
man" is consubstant i u 1 with tlic power of the community he is truly an
"individual" man, he realizes the properly ordered, universal person-
ality, only when fiis life is identified with the open field of "social
relations". The metanoia of the individual person consists not in a
reordering of a disordered "soul", but is constituted by the historical
breakthrough to communist society. With the tension between self and
Self, the tension between the agent and the community, the animating
chord of the political, has been dissolved.
Re vo
1
ut i on an d Pol i t i cs
The si gnificance of revolut ionary actjvj^tx- For Marx it is the escha-
tological notion of human "essence"-un i versa 1 humen i ty-- that
drives
the revolutionary engine of history toward its final
destination/
realization in communist society. We have seen how Marx
identifies
this essence with labor , the self-creation of man by
man. His self-
activity has put man in chains; but sel
f
-act i v i ty will likewise
emancipate him from his self-made historical
encumbrances. Through
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"conscious", "revolutionary" se 1 f -act i v i ty man will achieve an un-
paralleled, ineretofore impossible, se 1 f -sal vat i on
.
That this is
possible is assured by the revelation that for homo faber reality has
no structure beyond that "produced" by human pract i ca 1 -product i ve
activity. This is the meaning cf Marx's "materialism" as expressed
in the famed Theses on Feuerbach (18^5) . "The chief defect of all
previous material ism. .. is that the object, actuality, sensuousness , Is
conceived only in the form of the object or perception , but not as
sensuous human activity , as pract i ce". No thinker before Marx
has fully grasped the fact that reality--the totality of man, nature,
society-is a seamless web. woven solely and in full by human practical
energy: "All social life is essential ly pract ica l", he writes. "All
mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution
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in human practice and the comprehension of this practice". Post-
Marx, the problem of "truth" is to be recognized for what it is--a
"practical" rather than "theoretical" question: "The question whether
human thinking can reach objective truth--is not a question of theory
but a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that
is, actuality and power, the th i s-s i dedness of his thinking .
this
insight, Marx believes, instills a necessarily revolutionary
attitude.
Theory j^. P'actice, and practice _i_s
transformation. Since religion,
for example, is to be explained "by the cleavage
and sel f-cont rad I cto-




be understood in its contradiction and revolutionized
in practice .
And as human being is "the ensemble of social
relationships", change of
187
circumstance equals self-change. In practical activity, subject is
immediately object, and object, subject. This "coincidence" "can be
comprehended and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice".
Thus the "rational" confrontation v/ith the world is at once the com-
pulsion to change it, in the words of the German I deol ogy , to get "rid
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of all the traditional muck" and to establish society "anew".
In the Commun i st Man i festo (I8A8), the bourgeoisie comes in for
profuse praise for 1 ts revolutionary accompl i sliments : "It has been the
first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished
wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic
cathedrals: it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all
former Exoduses of nations and crusades"; "the bourgeoisie cannot exist
without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and
thereby, the relations of productions, and with them the vyhole relations
of society"; "In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-
sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-
dependence of nations"; "National one-s i dedness and narrow-mindedness
becomes more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and
local literatures, there arises a world literature"; "The bourgeoisie,
by the rapid Improvement of all instruments of production, by the
im-
mediately facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most
barbarian, nations into civilization"; "It has created enormous
cities,
has greatly increased the urban population as compared
with the rural,
and has thus rescued a considerable part of the
population from the
idiocy of rural life"; "The bourgeoisie, during
its rule of scarce one
188
hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive
forces than have all preceding generations together .. .v/hat earlier
century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered
2 1 0
in the lap of social labour"?
Indeed, Marx had no reason to be chary of praise for capitalist
accomplishments; the proletarian successors to the bourgeoisie will not
negate the revolutionary spirit, but intensi f
y
1 1 . Yet if communism
promises continuity, it also portends cataclysm: It will carry forward
the admirable capitalist performances, but only by transforming alienated
revolutionary activity into "free, conscious" activity. Communism differs
from all previous movements not "in its display of r 2Vol u t i ona ry zeal, but
in the precise character and quality of that zeal--that is, insofar as
it "overturns the basis of all previous relations of production and
interaction, and for the first time consciously treats all natural
premises as creations of men, strips them of their natlona' character
2 1 1
and subjects them to the power of united individuals". As the
capitalist class inevitably produces its "graved i ggers" in tPie form
of the proletariat, the eschatolog i cal drive reaches fever pitch, as
it must; for the proletariat does not challenge a conservative, tra-
dition-mired class, but the most revolutionary class in history. Its
own consciousness, therefore, must signify a qualitative revelation,
2 I 2
it must involve "the alteration of men on a mass scale". The prole-
tarian revolution is the revolution to top all revolutions, the initiation
of the most productive of all phases of human act i v i ty
.
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That man's fate lies in revolution is clear; further, that the
revolution will result in the "abolition", or "transcendence" of the
state, and its replacement by, in the words of the Mani festo
,
"an
association, in which the free development of each is a condition for
2 1 3the free development of all". in doubt yet, however, is the specific
oolitical upshot of this revolutionary act. We have already established
the fundamentals o^ Marx's political theory. But our analysis might only
be consicered complete when v;e fiave considered the remaining textual
evidence on this score, especially that drav;n from the "late" (post-
1850) Marx. The position taken up here will be that Marx remains less
than clear on the matter; he articulates in various contexts as many as
three different "strains" of thought regarding the "political" organi-
zation of future society. We will examine each in turn. I will argue,
however, that these a i f ferences-- i nsof ar as they are real d i fferences--
are of small consequence in regard to the fundamental judgement already
expressed-- i .e. that Marx's communal derailment renders a genuine
(mediatory, citizen) politics superfluous, and more, impossible. "Uni-
versal man" remains tlie base, and political forms the superstructure,
of all Marx's ref 1 ect i ons- -ea r 1 y and late--on the "stateless" society.
The dominant "strain" is an ant i - pol i t i ca 1 strain.
The "withering away" of the stat^. In addition to what might easily
be
taken as the general thrust of his philosophical anthropology,
there are
numerous textual indications that Marx expected (true)
communism to result
finally in a kind of communal "anarchism". The notion
of the eventual
"withering away" of the state (admittedly Engels', not Marx's
phrase)
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would appear to be consistent with Marx's many castigations of (pre-
sumably) the state-as-such as the "abstract" product of alienated social
circumstances, and moreover with the specific judgement that in capitalist
society "the state is nothing more than the form of organization which the
bourgeoisie necessarily adopts for both internal and external purposes
as a mutual guarantee of their property and i nterests" .^^
^
Such anti-statist suggestions are bolstered by the pronounced eco-
nomic "deterni i n I st" dimension of Marx's historicism. In the "Preface"
to A_ Cont r i but i on to the Cr i t ique of Pol i t i cal Economy ( 1859) , for
example, Marx formulates the "guiding thread" of his studies as follows:
In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are i nd i spens i b 1 e and independent
of their will, relations of production which correspond
to a definite stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society,
the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consci ousness . 2 1
5
Revolution occurs, as we have already noted, when "forces" and "relations'
of production (that is, the two aspects of the "economic structure") come
into Irreconcilable conflict. On this analysis, political forms would
appear to be of purely incidental significance: dependent political
changes of necessity follow independent economic changes. Indeed, Marx
insists that in considering such revolutionary transformations, "a dis-
tinction should always be made between the material transformation of
the economic conditions of . product i on , which can be determined
with the
precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious,





become conscious of this conflict and fight it out". Culture as a
whole here is quite explicitly reduced to the ideological reflection of
fundamental, economic conflict. On this premise it would follow that
when economic conflict comes to a close, as it will in socialist society,
so too will history have shut the book on politics, religion, philosophy,
etc. The state indeed would "v/ither away".
The analysis of the class dimension of revolutionary historical
development invites the same conclusion. In the pithy pronouncement of
the Man i festo : "The history of all hitherto existing society is the
2 1 7
history of class struggle". With the demise of class struggle, what
need of a state? As Marx had remarked in ]Skk,
Revol ution in general --the overthrow of toe existing
ruling power and the dissolution of the old conditions--
is a pol i tical act so far as it needs ove rthrow and
dissolution . But where its organizing activity begins,
where i ts own aim and spirit emerge, there socialism
throws the pol i t ical hull away. 21°
To be sure, the proletariat must itself become a ruling power, at least
for a time. In his "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875), Marx was
emphatic: "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period
of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other.
There
corresponds to this also a political transition period in which
the
state can be nothing but the revolutionary d icta_torshj£ of the
prole-
tariat".^^^ The working class must achieve political
supremacy and
exploit it "to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the
bourgeoisie, to
centralise all instruments of production in the
hands oF the State--i.e.
of the proletariat organized as a ruling
class; and to increase the total
of productive forces as rapidly as poss i b 1
e"
. Yet the Manifesto, from
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which the last passage is taken, seems to imply that the proletariat
only employs political power so long as i t is "compelled" to do so in
its "contest with the bourgeoisie", that is, only so long as it is a
"class":
if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling
class, and as such, sweeps away by force the old con-
ditions of production, then it will, along with these
conditions, have swept away the conditions for the ex-
istence of class antagonisms and of classes generally,
and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a
cl ass .
^
The "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat", it would appear,
would know only a brief, and strictly transitional, existence; it would
go to its grave even before the capitalists had grown cold in theirs.
For "Political power, properly so-called, is merely the organized power
of one class for oppressing anotner". ' Similarly, Marx pointedly
raised the question of proletarian power in The Poverty of Philosophy
(18^7), and gave much the same answer as might be gleaned from the
Man i festo :
Does this incan that after the fall of the old society
there will be a new class somination culminating in a
new political power? Mo.
The condit'on for the emancipation of the working class
is the abolition of every class, just as the condition
for the liberation of the third estate, of the bourgeois
order, was the abolition of all estates, and all orders.
The working class, in the course of its development, will
substitute for the old civil society an association which
will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there
will
be no more political power properly so-called, since
political power is precisely the official expression of
antagonism in civil society. ^23
The matter is not, however, so easily settled.
What, we are in-
clined to wonder, is implied by such a phrase
(repeated word for word.
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we will not ice, in both the Han I festo and The Poverty of Phi losophy) as
"political power, properly so-called" ? Marx is ambiguous. Does he have
in mind another form of "state" power, not "political" in character (and
hence not a state in the usual sense), perhaps a "state" form that does
not exercise power ("properly so-called"?), but which would persist past
the purely "transitional" period? There is persuasive evidence that he
does indeed. (if so, the idea would not be entirely new: recall the
frequent contrast in the 18^43 Cri tique of the "political" and the "real:
but only highly confusing.) Furthermore, there seems to be sufficient
variety and latitude in Marx's observations and pronouncements to allow
for two (apparently) distinct interpretations of the surviving communist
state form: On the one hand, a severely circumscribed, but highly
centralized state whose primary function would be to efficiently "ad-
minister" the economy; on the other, a radically decentralized, partici-
patory democratic state, a revival it seems of the earlier concept of
"true democracy", inspired by the experience of the Paris Commune of
1871. We will examine each of these possible "states" in turn, then
move to assess the significance of the various "strains" taken together.
The instrumental state . The emergence under communism of a new
type of
state is forthrightly implied by Marx in his "Critique of the
Gotha
Program". There he criticizes the German Workers' Party
(paradoxically,
in light of his own reluctance to consider "recipes
for the restaurants
of the future") for its failure to deal not only with
the "dictatorship
of the proletariat", but further with "the
future state of communist
society"-^^^ That Marx means more by the term
"state" here than
"condition" is indicated by the question he raises two paragraphs prior:
"What transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In
other words, what social functions will remain in existence there that
are analogous to present functions of the state"?^^^ Unfortunately,
Marx does not essay an answer to this critical query, but says only,
characteristically, that it can only be answered "scientifically". Yet
the implication of the question itself is uncontestable: Some form of
"state"-- in the language of the Man i fes to
,
a "pubKc power" without
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"political character" --will persist to perform certain "functions",
"analogous" to present state functions. The crucial difference between
the old and the new type of state appears to lie wholly in the universally
recognized, wholly instrumental character of the latter, as opposed to
the "independence" of existing states: "Freedom", Marx asserts in the
Gotha Program critique, "consists in converting the state from an organ
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superimposed upon society Into one completely subordinate to It...".
What then are the "functions" that an autonomous "society" requires
an instrumental "state" to perform? In an I872 merro to the General
Council of the International, Marx provided this "socialist" definition
of "anarchism":
when the aim of the proletarian movement, the abolition
of classes, has been attained, the power of the State,
which serves to maintain the great productive majority
under the yoke of a small exploiting minority, disappears,
and governmental functions are transformed into simple
administrative funct i ons . 22o
The identification of state with "administrative" functions recalls
Engels' argument in Socialism Utopian and Scientific (I88O):
As soon as there Is no longer any social class to be
held
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in subjection; as soon as class rule, and the individual
strugqle for existence based upon our present anarchy of
production, witti its collisions and excesses arisinq from
these, are reniovcid, nothing more remains to be repressed,
and a special repressive force, a stale. Is no longer
necessary. The first act by virtue of wiiicli the state
really constitutes itself the rtprc^sental i ve of the
whole of society--that is, at the same time, its last
Independent act as a state; State interference in
social relations becomes, in one domain after another,
superfluous, and then dies out of itself; the government
of persons is replaced i)y llic administration of things,
and by the conduct of the processes of product i on . 229
In this strain of thinking, communism docs not issue in any form of
"anarchism" in the usual sense. Only the state as "repressive", but
not as "administrative", "withers away" ("dies out"). Thus communism
might be compatible, not only i rans 1 1 i ona 1 1 y , but permanently, wiili an
extreme form o^ instrumental stale centralization in the interests of
economic coordination, [jlanning, direction. This is apparently the
implied judgement c()nt.lined '\\\ an 18^7 (()isth' of Lngels lo Marx: "The
real meaning of the abolition of the slate is tj^e most concentrated s_t_at_e
central i zat ion"
.
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The peculiar element here is that the anticip.iled extreme form of
administrative control is expected to fiave no pol i t ical_ i mp I i ci t i on . We
will return to lliis m.itter in our assessment below; for now Id us make
clear that this legitimation of "non-po li I i ca
1
" state centralization is
shared by Marx, and is not a mere aberration of Engels' native instru-
mentalism. In Capital III Marx unambiguously asserts the permanent
necessity for tiie directive authority of a "commanding will" over
all
processes of social production:
All labour in which many individuals cooperate necessarily
requires a comiu.ind i ng will to coordinate and unify the
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process, and functions which apply not to partial
activities but to the total activity of the workshop,
much as that of an orchestra conductor . 231
Marx is talking about al 1 labor here. The need for orchestration is by
no means diminished in communist society; as we read several hundred
pages later, the truth is just the reverse:
after the abolition of the capitalist mode of production,
but still retaining social production, the determination
of value continues to prevail in the sense that the regu-
lation of labour-time, and the distribution of social
labour among the various production groups, ultimately
the book-keeping encompassing all of this, becomes more
essential than ever. 232
Authoratat i ve regulation is unavoidable, inherent to all production
(hence to all social forms, on Marx's view). The necessity of adminis-
trative-management, however, poses no threat to freedom, Marx believes,
because management does not imply either power or coercion. Or more
precisely, it implies coercion under cap i tal I sm , but not under communism.
Here is a glimpse of the divided line that distinguishes alienated
society from the free, conscious mode of productive activity, a real
revolutionary leverage point. Marx recalls Saint Simon's distinction
between "owners" and " I ndustr i el s" ; only the latter are important at the
present level of production:
it is not the industrial capitalists, but the Industrial
managers who are 'the souls of our industrial system'...
The capitalist mode of production has brought matters to a
point where the work of supervision, entirely divorced from
the ownership of capital, is already readily obtainable...
Inasmuch as the cap i ta 1 i s
t
' s work does not originate in
the purely capitalistic process of production, and hence
does not cease on its own where capital ceases; Inasmuch
as it does not confine itself solely to the function of
exploiting the labour of others; inasmuch as it therefore'
originates from the social form of the labour-process, from
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combination and cooperation of many in pursuance of a
common result, it is just as independent of capital as
tinat form itself as soon as it has burst its capitalist
shell... 233
Administration is autonomous of class oppressiveness, of classes
in general. It springs from the "social form of the labour-process
itself". Thus the future socialist state may be conceived as a "non-
state" whose primary (sole?) function is to serve as the non-coercive,
managerial, "book-keeper" of a free, active, productive "society".
The decentralized, participatory state . In one place, the I87I Civil
War in France
,
Marx appears to surpass in both scope and detail all his
other reflections on a poss i b le- futu re state. The occasion for the
writing was the short-lived revolutionary upsurge cf the Paris Commune,
which despite its brevity of duration Marx hailed as "the glorious
harbinger of a new society". In his analysis of the Commune, Marx
not only implies the persistence of a future communist state, but
further seems to ascribe to this state a significance beyond the per-
formance of strictly instrumental functions: its institutionalization
of participatory democratic forms suggests the forms themse 1 ve5--and
most importantly, active citizen participation in them--£s consti tuti ve
of communist freedom.
On taking pov/er the Commune immediately moved to consolidate its
position and advance the Interests of the working class through a number
of essential reforms: Its first decree was "the suppression of the
standing army, and the substitution for It of the armed people"; the
police was "stripped of Its political attributes" and turned into
"the
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responsible agent of the Commune"; the churches were disestablished and
disendowed, and the priests sent off "to feed upon the alms of the
faithful"; educational facilities were opened to the people "gratui-
tously".
In structure and function the Commune was thoroughly participatory
democratic. Universal suffrage was the supreme principle of popular
judgement; it was to be exercised often, not "once in three or six
years" to decide "which member of the ruling class was to represent the
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people in Parliament". There were, certainly, to be representat i ves--
"municipal counc i 1 1 ors"--but these were to be "responsible and revocable
at short terms"; "nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the
Commune", Marx argues, "than to supercede universal suffrage by hier-
237
archie investiture". The majority of representatives were either
themselves workers, "or acknowledged representatives of the working
class". The Commune was, further, unconcerned for any stiff
separation of functions: the government combined legislative and
executive power, as it was to be "a working, not a parliamentary body";
and the judiciary lost "that sham independence which had but served to
mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding governments". Like
all public servants, "magistrates and judges were to be elective, re-
sponsible and revocable". Moreover, all functions were performed,
Marx stressed, at "workmen's wages ", undermining any attribution
of
superiority to state officials: the statesmen were workers' any worker
could be a statesman. In short. "Public functions ceased to
be the
private property of the tools of the Central Government. Not
only
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municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised
by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune".
There is a powerfully Utopian tone to Marx's reflections on the
Commune, strengthening the possibility of an identification of the
Commune's governmental form with the substance of communism itself.
The Commune was, first of all, to be the "model" of all France's in-
dustrial centers, and moreover would inspire the "self-government of
the producers" in the provinces as well. A decentralized federal
structure would replace "the old governmental power"; and "the few but
important functions which still remain for a central government .. .were
to be discharged by communal, and therefore strictly responsible
agents". Thus the Commune did not propose the disintegration of
national unity; on the contrary, that unity was "to be organized by
the Communal Constitution and to become a reality by the destruction
of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity
independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was
..2^3
but a parasitic excrescence .
Nor were the aspirations of the Commune limited to even the most
sweeping of national reforms. The Communards, Marx reveals, acted "in




the genuinely "national" unity of French society, the Commune was,
"at
the same time, as a working men's Government, as the bold
champion of
the emancipation of Labour, em|>hat i ca 1 1 y international. Within sight
of the Prussian army, that had annexed to Germany two
French provinces,
2^45
the Commune annexed to France the working people
all over the world".
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The Utopian strain is loudest of all, however, when Marx suggests
an inner connection between the revolutionary actions of the Commune,
and the dawning of a new citizen vi rtue :
Wonderful, indeed, was the change the Commune had wrought
in Paris! No longer any trace of the meretricious Paris
of the Second Empire. No longer was Paris the rendezvous
of British landlords, Irish absentees, American ex-slave-
holders and shoddy men, Russian ex-serf -owners , and
Wallachian boyards. No more corpses at the morgue, no
nocturnal burglaries, scarcely any robberies; in fact,
for the first time since the days of February, I8A8, the
streets of Paris were safe, and that without any police
of any kind... The cocotte s had refound the scent of their
protectors--the absconding men of family, religion, and,
above all, of property. In their stead, the real women
of Paris showed again at the surface--heroic
,
noble, and
devoted, like v;onen of antiquity. Working, thinking,
fighting, bleeding Pari s--almost forgetful. In its incu-
bation of a new society, of the cannibals at its gates-
radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic i n i t i at i ve
!
The reader of this account is certainly tempted , at least, to conclude
that Marx assumed (co an indefinite extent) a causal relation between
the Commune's political forms and the new virtue that was breaking out
all over. It is as if the Commune had moved to i nst i tut ional i ze hu-
manity's revolutionary metanoia , and thereby to guarantee it. A working
man's participatory democracy and universal humanity would there be one
and the same, a resurrection of the unblemished ideal of Athenian de-
mocracy, now reposited under condition of modern industrialism, and on
truly universal, all-inclusive foundations.





We may treat briefly the apparent
divergent "strains" of speculation
Though Marx's ambiguity precludes
opposition obtaining
regarding the future
certainty. It seems to
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me most consistent with his remarks taken together to discount any
absolute discrepancy between the "withering away" thesis and the
preservation of some form of communist state. The grounds for this
conclusion have already been given in the discussion above. The
likelihood is that Marx simply slipped (certainly confusingly, perhaps
purposely) into emoloying on different occasions two distinct notions
of "state"--the alienated v. the communist state. The differentium is
the highly restricted Marxian definition of "politics"; the rest is
simple logic: politics always implies class conflict; in socialist
society there vj\]] be no class conflict; therefore there will be no
"politics" in socialist society, hence no "state" in the usual sense.
The disjuncture between the "instrumental" and the "participatory-
democratic" state is at first blush more fundamental. Again, it is
impossible to be conclusive, but here too, I think, the discrepancy
is more apparent than real. On closer inspection, the Commune turns
out to be as (or nearly as) "instrumental" as the regulative, "book-
keeping" state. "The Commjnal Constitution", Marx argues in The Civil
War, "would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto
absorbed by the state parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free
movement of, society". In the Communal formula, political organization
is the unambi valently dependent variable; only "society" is autonomous.
The Commune, by abolishing the standing army and "state funct i ona 1 i sm",
provided "cheap government" in place of class rule; it realized "really
democratic institutions". "But", Marx insists in a critical passage,
"neither cheap Government, nor the 'true Republic' was the ultimate aim;
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2k7they were its mere concom? tants" . The Commune was
a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous
forms' of government had been emphatically repressive. Its
true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class
government, the produce of the struggle of the producing
against the appropriating class, the pol itical form at
1 ast d i scovered under wh i ch to work out the economi c
emancipation of labor...
The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting
the economical foundations upon which rests the existence
of classes, and therefore of class-rule. With labour
emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and pro-
ductive labor ceases to be a class attr i bute.^^°
In the first place, then, the Commune is instrumental to carrying the
revolution through its "dictatorial" transitional phase; the last line
quoted above ("every man becomes a working man") strongly suggests the
Commune as a "crude" communistic form. And insofar as it will persist
as a state form, the Commune is not so much a departure from the notion
of the state as purely "administrative" authority, as it is an adminis-
trative authority wearing Periclean overshoes: the "repressive" organs
of the state will be "amputated", while its "legitimate functions" will
be "restored to the responsible agents of society". There will re-
main, presumably, an "authority", but no "rule", "regulation" but no
"pol i t ics".
Here Marx displays both his debt to, and radical departure from,
the ancient Athenian ideal of self-government. "Our constitution is
called a democracy", Thucydides reports Pericles exclaiming, "because
power is in the hands not' of the minority but of the whole people' .
The whole citizenry assumes the burden of public service with a combi-
nation of Puritan responsibility and Dionysian delight. All are
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sufficiently competent to adapt themselves to the variety of public
251duties "with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility". But
the Greeks did not attempt to abolish, but in fact stressed, the dis-
tinction between "private" and "public", analogous if not identical
to what we today are accustomed to call the division between "society"
and the "state". For the Greek political animal, a citizen is one who
rules and is ruled in turn. Tiie problem remains a problem of "rule".
For Marx the problem is precisely the abolition of rule, the subordi-
nation of politics to siciety. The model of the city-state (here
translated as the "coirmune") is in any case, for precisely the reasons
Hegel gave (see Chapter 3), unsuited to the modern context; it is not
enough to simply assume an easy coincidence of the decentralized
communal form and the conditions of modern industrial society, to
simply assert, as Marx does in a decidedly un-Hegelian vein, that
"the very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course,
local municipal liberty, but no longer as a check upon the, now super-
ceded, state power". But here we see Marx harking back not even
to the original ideal but to a Romantic image of the Greek state even
more wildly incompatible with the modern world, one in which the very
distinction between the agent ic and the communal, hence the problem of
rule, has been dissolved in the revolutionary solvent.
We come back to the communal derailment as the
interprctational
key to all Marx's utterances regarding the state
and its "abolition".
Whatever discrepancies exist between and among this
or thai assertion.
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one or another strain, the principal ground remains unchanged. There
can be no doubt whatever that Marx intends the unqualified abolition of
the state insofar as it is a special sphere of med i ated commun i ty . The
state qua "abstract" community, is a sham by nature . There is no evidence
that Marx ever saw cause to alter the judgement of the German I deology :.
"In previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc. personal
Freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the
ruling class and only insofar as they belonged to this class. But this
was... not only a completely illusory community but also a new fetter
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because it was a combination of one class against another". "Po-
litical" community as such is the "illusory" community. This is not to
say that there v;ill oe no "transition" period encompassing the passage
from illusory to true community, nor that instrumental organs of central
direction, planning, etc. will not persist at the behest of the true
community. But "politics" is not part of the post-transition picture.
Politics means class rule, forcible mediation of "particular" and
"general". After class politics is abolished, none other--no other
modes of med i at i on--wi 1 1 take its place, none other will be necessary.
It is not the state £e_r S£, but the political space- -the encompassing
tension between porticular and general, the sphere of mediated community
that "withers away".
Wither away it docs. But in keeping with the nature of all de-
railments from the essential structure of human being, it persists
in
albeit withered form. The distinction between particular
and general,
expunged by the logic of the derailment, creeps back
into the socialist
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scheme in the form of "partial activities" and the "total activity of
the workshop", that is, in the form of the necessary regulatory agency
of the instrumental state. To admit this agency as a mediatory form,
however, which on Marx's own account in Cap i tal It is, would be to
fatally loosen the grip on the idea of a universal humanity as realized
only in communist society. At this point we again approach the limiting
point of the Marxian disjuncture between subjection to the division of
labor and the total appropriation of communal powers. Marx will have
it both ways (a division of labor that is somehow, without contradiction,
not a division; an individual at once particular and general vfithout
tension), but only at the price of shouldering a considerable strain
of internal Inconsistency. His tack is two-fold. There is on the one
hand the move we have already documented, viz, the insistence that the
mediation, being strictly instrumental. Is In noway "political", has
nothing to do with power . "Rule" is eliminated, has been transformed
into "book-keeping". We are now prepared to note that Marx can only
make this move by presupposing what the admitted disjuncture of par-
ticular and general disproves by Its very belng--i.e. realized humanity
as the immediate identity of particular and general. Marx enters a
visious circle of illigitimate validation: the lack of Immediacy
institutionalized in the form of the instrumental state is legitimized
on the ground of an immediate unity that the self-same legitimized
institution is meant to achieve . The disjuncture Is papered over
only by the presupposition that the tension of being
dissolves in the
non-political process of unalienated "cooperation" itself.
Marx writes
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in Cap i tal j_:
man is, if not as Aristotle contends, a political, at
all events a social an ima 1 . .
.
(T) he special productive
power of the combined working day is, under all circum-
stances, the social productive power of social labour.
This power is due to Cooperation itself. V/hen the
labourer co-operates systematically with others, he
strips off the fetters of his individuality, and de-
velops the capabilities of the species. ^5^
I am a "social" and not a "political" animal because I become, as it
were, automatically an all-round individual by mere involvement in the
division of labor. The "common good", the whole, the totality, is
apparent to me qua participant. "Administration" has no political con-
sequences because of the revolutionary "change of heart" I share with
my fellow workers. As a result of this change, the state appears to
me simply as "my" head coordinating the cooperative movements of "my"
body.
Perhaps because he was not himself satisfied with this solution,
Marx posited the otherwise incomprehensible distinction between the
realms of "necessity" and "freedom". Throughout the Marxian corpus,
the thrust of thought is toward the reconciliation of necessity and
freedom in the process of unalienated labor. But in the final volume
of Capital , Marx shows signs of having second thoughts: "In fact", he
says, "the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the
very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual
material pro-
duction". Within the sphere of necessity, "Freedom. . .can only
consist
In socialised man". But the "realm" of freedom Itself
lies beyond this
sphere (beyond socialized man?) , where "begins that development
of human
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energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom.
. .The
shortening of the working-day is its basic pre-requ i s i te"
. Here
labor is but the "basis" for a form of genuine freedom that is, pre-
sumably, to be found In leisure
. Is Marx then a communal "anarchist"
after all?
Concl us i on
In conclusion I should like simply to sumarize, with perhaps some
greater degree of specificity than I have achieved so far, the major
consequences of Marx's an t i -pol I t i ca 1 derailment. These consequences
I have organized into three interrelated "clusters".
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The "autonomy of polity" . Without classes, no power; without power,
no politics. With this razor's edge of logical reductionism Marx
amputates from the corpus of historical man the "perennial" problem
of pol i t I cs-as-such . But the casting away of offensive limbs is in
truth an impossible operation, a futile evasion of a "fact" of human
existence only too "real". !n its ideal form political power is the
force for realizing the communal will, for Integrating the multiplicity
of agentic social segments into a unified, if differentiated, totality.
But it remains political £owe_r, as such resistant to even the most
humanistically motivated endeavors to reduce it to a species of some-
thing else, in Marx's case, to a form of (economic) alienation from the
immediate identity of universal man. Class analysis is relevant, we
might even say supremely relevant, to the problem of power, but It is
not exhaustive, not definitive. Political power as perennial
problem
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knows its own "abstract" logic: as "ideal" representative of the
communal pole of ambiverse human being, it stands in constant danger
of derailment into a wi 1 1 to domi nate , rather than mediate, the agentlc.
Specifically political "alienation" is, in its own right, ever a live
poss i b i 1 i ty
.
Marx's dissolution of the problem of power blinds us to this possi-
bility, and hence to the perennial issue of the control of power, that
is to the problem of maintaining the tension of being in healthy form.
In essence this is the problem of mediation: of elaboroting an insti-
tutional cartography of the use (so that we might recognize the abuse )
of power for achieving integration and advancing the communal will; of
defining and interpreting the specific, always shifting, content of the
"public interest"; of developing, broadening and deepening the scope
and sense, meaning and purpose of political education. In short, of
self-consciously carrying on the purposive, preeminently human practice
of politics as a science of ends . By shifting our attention from the
perennially political, Marx exposes us to a blind-side attack on the
part of the practitioners of political domination, the lords of power
politics, bourgeois and "socialist", the perpetrators of political
alienation. History has taught us that a change in property forms
decidedly does not automatically spell a change in the quality of life,
much less a massive change of the human heart; that the failure to up-
hold and articulate a notion of the public interest supports by
default
domination by the ruling power; that the evasion of the responsibility
to politically educate the citizenry renders mass
manipulation all the
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easier; that the purportedly apolitical "administration of things",
because it inev.itably involves the government of persons, all too
easily derails into the treatment of persons as^ things, as so much
material fuel to be fed into the economic engine. What, as always,
remains significant today-- i ndeed
,
especially today, as states (a
fact i or i
,
socialist states) exercise increasing independence vis-a-vis
economic mechan i sms-- i s not the ex i stence
,
but tlie nature of the po-
litical reg i me
.
Marx's participatory-democratic comments on the Commune mi ght
,
if reformulated on a genuinely political foundation, provide a starting
point for correcting this most severe deficiency. But only a smarting
pol nt
.
The dilemma of i ntranundane eschatology . The anticipation of a massive,
revolutionary change in the human condition can oe a thrilling, but also
a terrible, burden to bear. While it suffuses the present with a sense
of purpose, of destiny even, it also forces us into a frightful silence:
Nothing of substance is to be said of the future state, nothing can^ be
said, until after the revolution. At the same time, all present forms
of existence, specifically the political, fall of necessity within tfie
chilling scope of visionary contempt. We are encouraged, if not com-
pelled, to the view that "freedom" as we know it and have perhaps come
to find it meaningful is necessarily tied to the preservation of
"alienated" culture, to the ignominious injustice of bourgeois order.
We are led to believe that nothing short of a shattering,
apocalyptic
change is worthwhile, that nothing less can set man free.
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We wait. But our waiting is not idle. We "produce". We are
compelled to prepare for the unspeakable future of self-salvation by
expanding our domination of nature: We will throw a seamless net of
domination over the whole spherical surface of the earth and all its
resources. Thus we work the soil in preparation for the only form of
"transcendence" available to homo faber : the sel f- i ntox i cat i on of
perpetual activity, the "praxis" that we serve up to ourselves as
welcome -'elief from the rigors of metaphysical anxiety. The dirt
beneath our nails testifies to Pascal's truth: "Nothing is as un-
bearable for man as to be completely at rest without passion, without
business, without distraction, without application to something". In
a state of rest men is all too aware of "his nothingness, his forsaken-
ness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his impotence, his emptiness".
Through praxis man does not merely create the world; he escapes his
nagging fears and doubts of the sufficiency of that world. If some
doubts persist, that is because we still wait, because we have yet to
make the final leap into freedom.
This attitude too undermines a politics conceived as the science
of ends. For the end has been foretold. Our task is to wait, to pre-
pare, to keep the faith: "We have been naught/We shall be all". After
the revolution.
Un institutional ized "community" . Here I would but sketch the barest
outline of a problem I will take up in some detail in the last chapter;
that is, the possibility that we might be condemned to a silence
ex-
tending not only until after the revolution, but then too.
The silence
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is a silence of the worst sort, a silence regarding fundamental
structural "values". Insofar as the Marxian theoretic projects an
"absolute" freedom (either through or " beyond" the division of labor),
it militates against any and all institutionalization of that freedom.
Beyond the "community" conceived as the open field of "social relations"
which communist man finds transparent to his creative and recreative
will, no institution may assume constitutive significance, "^he insti-
tutionalized community, conceived as ground rather than objec t of will,
would perforce appear as an encumbrance to the absolutely free will:
a target, we cannot help suspect, for the same "fury of destruction"
Hegel witnessed in the French Revolution, and warned against as a
primary pitfall of modern culture: the unbridled fury of self-Infatu-
ation (I am "generic man"; I am "God") conceived as the only real form
of freedom. We are left with the Imposs I b 1 1 i ty-- i ndeed , thus undesir-
abIlity--of settling down with, "Internalizing", taking one's bearings
from and living one's life (largely, if not completely) through a
definite set of "values". All values evaporate in the white heat of
the revolution. This Is perhaps the most frightening spectre haunting
the Marxian theoretic: the ghastly Irony that a philosophy oriented
wholly to humanitarian communion should make communion Impossible,
should replace community with the "permanent revolution". To be sure
no mediation is necessary: none is possible: there is nothing to
mediate: no differentiation, no institutional particularism, no multi-
plicity of divergent "interests". There is only the "community",
solidary because homogeneous in its passion for activity, revolution,
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"creativity", "freedom". Could this be what is in store? Is communism
a thin, bodiless social soup? Is socialist man in truth homogenized
man? The way, at least, is open.
It is true that communist man is neither Jacobin nor "mass" man;
he is indeed unlike any man alienated hiistory has ever known, can ever
know. But the vision of transfiguration only points to the depth of
the dilemma, and to one of the most dangerous of the specifically po-
litical consequences of that vision. For what if the revolution comes,
but man is not transfigured? What then? The Russian experience is
instructive, if not necessarily definitive: The Revolution is initiated,
it proceeds, but the Russian heart appears not to change. Meanwhile
order must be kept, production levels sustained, social policies propa-
gated ond legitimized, wars fought, etc. The theoretical problem is
indeed solved in "practice". The Russian state, the Party-bureaucracy,
revives the old traditions ("the old traditional muck"), pumps new
blood into the historical vision of holy mother Russia, prevails upon
Soviet patriotism and 1 aw-ab i d I ngness . At the same time the elite
does not admit the traditional and transmundane bases of community;
to do so would be to undermine Its own "non-political" dominance.
In-
stead it sustains, with undiminished ideological fervor, the
Intra-
mundane eschatolog i ca 1 tension, and hence its own favored
position In
navigating the transition to communism. Like every great
power, the
state is then free to indulge In the nihilism of
"national interest"




In this discussion I have emphasized (some will say, not without
a certain justice, overemphasized) the ant i -pol i t i ca 1 dimensions of
Marx's political theory. I have done so because I believe they are the
most important dimensions, that Marx's theory is basically ant i -pol i t i cal
.
For this, iiowever, Marx is far from irrelevant to present political re-
flection. Indeed, I cannot begin to document the many senses in which I
am convinced Marx is "right" in his political/economic thought. Largely
through Marxian eyes have we witnessed the revelation of the capitalist
corruption of the cooperative life and the degradation of common hu-
manity, the mockery of "equal exchange", the massive exploitation of
the working class, the hypostat i zat i on of narrow, psychologicaHy and
sociologically incompetent concepts of human "nature", etc. Largely
because of Marx is it impossible, rightly so, to relevantly discuss
power outside consideration of socio-economic productive organization;
impossible to ignore too the alienating character of the preponderance
of modern labor. Most importantly, Marx is a telling critic of the
individualist derailment; from the vantage point of the critique of
individualism he is able to penetrate the alienated character of poli-
tics in modern, specifically capitalist, society. His observation in
the "Jewish Question" is precisely to the point in this respect:
The political liberators (of France) reduce citizenship,
the political community, to a mere means for preserving
these so-called rights of man... the citizen thus is pro-
claimed to be the servant of the egoistic man, the sphere
in which man acts as a member of the commun i ty i s degraded
below that in which he acts as a fractional being, and
finally man as bourgeois rather than man as citizen is
considered to be the proper and authentic man. 259
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Because of his critical grasp of this "contradiction" Marx is able to
lay his finger on the sore spot of Hegelian political idealism (we might
say: al
1
idealism that is not socialist):
In time of peace (the ideality of the Hegelian state)
appears either as merely an external constraint effected
by the ruling power on private life through direct in-
fluence of higher authority, or as blind uncomprehended
result of self-seeking. This ideality lias its proper
actuality only in the state's situation of war or exi-
gency, such that here its essence is expressed as the
actual, existent state's situation of war and exigency,
while its 'peaceful' situation is precisely the war and
exigency of sel f-seeking.^^O
Capitalist politics does not admit a tens i on between the agentic and
the communal, 't portrays a gaping rent, a glaring contradiction. It
reduces the state to an "instrument of production" and tool of self-
seeking gain. Marx is, therefore, largely correct in his comprehension
of the alienated quality of bourgeois politics: it is derailed politics.
As a result, Marx's political theory still speaks truth to us as a
critique of power politics, and the state as class tool; as a reminder
that a purely "formal" c i t i zensh i p--a mere legal status--is an im-
poverished form of political membership, indeed an "alienated" con-
dition. Marx speaks pointedly to one of the most heartfelt spiritual
desires of our times: the desire for "participation", for a recon-
struction of "community", for the respi ri tual i zat ion of the "public
space". in these respects he is certainly a "political" theorist.
My argument is that Marx goes "too far", in the sense
that the
attempt to "transcend" the public/private division altogether in fact
undermines political sensibility and the "ideality" of political
communal
being by equating "political" and "social" activity:
Whether politics is
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reduced to the "social qualities" of man, or the multiplicity of
"social" activities elevated to "political" activities, the result
is the same: the communal derailment of human being.
If by this criticism I find Marx less attractive as a prophet of
apocalypse, it is because I would make his insights conform better, as
he would have it, to the "real"--to fit them into the structure of
hi.'man being as I perceive it. The demand of socialists, as ov all
civic-minded citizens, should be not for an equatio n of public and
private, communal and agentic, state and society, but rather for some-
thing I i I<e an Hegelian "un i ty- i n-d i f ference" : Our demand should be
for the private and the public, the agentic and the comiriunal, man and
citizen. The dissolution of tension between the agentic and the
communal is, at best, a mistaken and unnecessary truncation of human
experience, and perhaps even a derailed religiosity. If, on the other
hand, the demand for a restored tenslonality could be realized, human
existence would be a richer, fuller existence, if no less difficult,
troubled and painful, and in need of a little religion.
NOTES
David Kettler, "Beyond Republicanism", in Marvin Surkin and Alan
Wolfe, End to Political Science
,
eds. (New York: Basic Books, 1970),
p. 56.
2
See Kettler, pp. 56-58.
3 Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, trans, and eds., Writings of tne Young




^ Ibid., p. 39.
^ Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 39.
^ Ibid.











1^ Richard N. Hunt, The Political ideas of Marx and Engels (University
of Pittsburg Press, 197M, P. 30.
1^ Easton and Guddat, W ri tings , pp. 79, 81.
1^ Quoted in Hunt, Political Ideas , p. 38. Also: "A statute book is
the people's bible of freedom." Ibid,
Easton and Guddat, p. 80.
1^ Quoted in Hunt, p. 33-
216
19
Easton and Guddat, p. 130,
20 Quoted in Kettler, "Beyond Republicanism", p. 57. My emphasis
21






25 Quoted in Hunt, p. 3^.









30 Easton and Guddat, p. lAl.
Kettler, p. 59-





Quoted in Hunt, p.
Ibid., p. A3.
Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge
University Press, 1972) , p. 81
.
38 Quoted in Hunt, pp. 56-58.
218
Ibid.
^0 Quoted in Tucker, p. 86.
Quoted in Hunt, p. 58.
Quoted in Tucker, p. 86.
A3
Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right ', Joseph D'Halley,























55 Ibid., p. 42.



















, pp. 6^4, 69.
Ibid.




^5 Ibid., p. h5.
7^ Ibid., p. A6.
71 Ibid
Ibid., p. 115.
''^ Ibid., p. 79.














1 h i H P • jU
.
81
1 h I H P • At;op
82
















^5 Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 118.
q 1
Ibid., p. 117. My emphasis.
Ibid., p. 79.
Ibid., p. 32.
5^ Ibid., p. A8.
Ibid., p. 51:"The Identity which he has constructed between civil
society and the state Is the Identity of two hostile armies in which
each soldier has the 'chance' to become through desertion a member of
the other hostile army."














































Ibid., p. 39- My emphasis.
Ibid., p. ^lO. My emphasis.
Ibid., [)p. 77-78. My emphas







p. ]h. My emphasis









(New York: International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 1,
pp. 19-20.
1 22
"Introduction " to the Cr i tique
, p. 131.
Ibid.
















13^ Ibid., p. IM.
137 Ibid., p. 134.
13^














"Introduction" to the Cr i t ique
, pp. 131-132.
"On the Jewish Question", p. 225-
1 Zip
"Introduction' to the Cr i t iqje
, pp. 131-132.





T he German Ideology , in Easton and Guddat, p. A08.
Ibid., p. AI5.
Ibid., p. 407.












































































Ibid., p. 80. Marx's notion of the "transcendence" of the division
of labor seems in fact to take the form of a total obesiance to the
continually revolutionary "process" of "Modern Industry." See Capital I.
pp. m-m.
The argument is basically this: A constantly revolutionizing
productive system requires a constantly mobi le labor force. Thus,
laborers must be fit for a multiplicity of changing taska. "Modern
Industry... imposes the necessity of recognizing as a fundamental law
of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the laborer
for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his
varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society
toadapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law.
Modern Industry, Indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to
replace the detai 1 -worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of
one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to a mere fragment
of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of
labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the differ-
ent social function he performs, are but so many modes of giving free
scope to nis own natural and acquired powers." (pp. ^87-^188).
A number of factors nrlitate against this 'solution', however.
(1) Even if I ciiange jobs da ily , there is in this changing itself
no reason why I am more likely to identify with the whole of the
productive structure. I mey be less bored, but not any more "socialized".
(2) "Automation' will not disappear under communism, but will
increase. What is true of capitalist automation would appear to be true
of the communist variety as v;ell. See Cap! tal I , p. A23: "By means of
its conversion into an automation, the instrument of labor confronts the
labourer, during the labour-process, in the shape of capital, of dead
labour, that dominates, and pumps dry, living labour-power. . .The special
skill of each individual i ns i gn i f i cant factory operative vanishes as an
inf ini stesimal quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces,
and the mass of labour that are embodied in the factory mechanism and,
together with that mechanism, constitutes the power of the 'master'."
The master is no longer the capitalist, but "Modern Industry." Common
to both, it would appear, is"the technical subordination of the workman
to the uniform motion of the instruments of labour...."
(3) The totality of forces will necessarily outrun my ability to
work at various tasks in any case. The ideal of the all-sided Robinson
recedes all the faster the harder I try to realize it. A wholly ''un-
fettered" system would in all liklihood be less easy to grasp in its
"totality", even If, again, I change jobs incessantly.
(4) Most importantly, the unfettered system would seem to militate
mightily against the notion of "community", which Marx in the German
Ideology links to the division of labor. The identity of the "communal
being" and the Industri al chameleon envisioned in Capi ta l is hardly
obvious.
See Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (Duke University
Press 1975) Chs. 10 and 11. Cf. Karl Lowith, Meaning in
History
(University if Chicago Press, ]3k3) , ch. 2; and J. L. Talmon, Political
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This phrase is taken from Paul Ricoeur's essay, "The Political
Paradox," in Hv;a Yol Jung, ed.. Existentialist Phenomenology and
Pol i tical Theory (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1972), pp. 337-367.
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See Voegelin, pp. IkSfi. on this point.
Easton and Guddat, p. 237-
230
CjMtj^ue, p. 22. In fairness to Hegel, however, it should be noted
that, at least in my view, Marx misinterprets Hegel's phrase ( Phi losophy
of flight
,
paragraph 278), "the direct influence of higher authori ty ,"
to mean only "external constraint" in bringing the aims of citizens
back to the universal. The problem, of course, is the degree of genuine
civic vi rtue poss ible in the "riotously" self-seeking context of civil
society.
CHAPTER III
HEGEL'S THEORY OF STATE AND CITIZENSHIP
We might say that three notions of political authority are presently
viable (though by no means evenly matched) contenders for ascendency in
American political cultureJ First, the increasingly discredited yet
still ideologically dominant liberal thesis of the state as 'facilitator'
of the free transactions of 'civil' (non-political) society. The thesis
of course extends bevond the now long-defunct 'night-watchman state'
heralded by Mr. Locke, to encompass, with only slight, If persistent,
quaverings of self-conscious embarassment, the activist, interventionist,
'positive' welfare state. Though the emergence of the welfare state has
indeed upset the 'ideal' liberal equipoise of state and society, thereby
creating important new wrinkles in American attitudes toward the state
(especially regarding its role in securing distributive justice), it
has not basically altered the fundamental liberal alchemic formula:
more-or-less unbridled self-serving competition of each (individual or
"group") with all = the general good (at least insofar a's this 'ghostly'
notion may be said to have content at all).
Second, the "Marxist" concept of the state as the effective mode
of class domination via (a) coercive force; and (b) the propagation of
class-serving ideology. Other 'conflict' theorists, e.g. notably Mosca
and Michels (and much less recently, Thrasymachus--"Just i ce is the
interest of the stronger"), have held and advanced similar views. The
Marxist formulation is, however, not only the most powerfully convincing,
but the most frequently heard. It is emerging even in the United States
231.
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as the most intellectually respectable challenge to a decidedly de-
fensive liberalism, at least partly because its sophisticated cynicism
regarding purposes of state and state officials mixes easily, if not
soothingly, with the pervasive disgust with recent courses of American
politics and politicians.
Third, the "Hegelian" concept of the state, wherein public authority
functions (when it functions properly) to develop, enrich and sustain a
people's solidarity by providing a directive, referential (indeed, "rever-
ential" as well, to an important and ineliminable degree) focus that
transcends all particular wills and Interests. This is the "neutral"
state that simultaneously 's no mere servant to a liberated "society".
Of the three, the Hegelian state is the only one that survives, qua
"transcendent" state, the civil warfare waged among the aggressive members
(and their "groups") for exploitation of public resources. For the Marxist,
a "neutral" state is a figment of the class-riddled imagination; the best
the liberal mind offers is the stale, nu t r i 1 1 on- 1 ess state substitute of
governmental "procea jres" . Each perspective in its own way "withers
away" the state and undermines the status of membership within it. Both,
moreover, as bearers of the Enlightenment ethos, sever the human community
from any transcendental reference. On the former view the alienated
"citizen" awaits redemption as a restored "social man" delivered of the
dark night of the soul once and for all. The latter proffers for Its
part a badly fragmented secular personality: To be both "man" and
"citizen" is to be forever at odds with oneself--not only to range the
private against the public, but to be further divided within each sector:
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morality and egoism alike stake exclusive claim to the private space;
public purpose and private right square off in public combat. To be
self-conscious in this situation is to suffer greatly, and ingloriously:
the community-minded citizen must carry the guilt for the selfish sins
of civil man--wi thout
,
moreover, the sa\'ing grace of public Spirit.
By comparison the Hegelian offering is all the more unique: In the
state as a whole, as the representative of the Spirit's march through
the world in secular overshoes, a conjugation of unity and diversity,
capped by a public interest regarding statist neutrality vis-a-vis the
panoply of particular interests; in the citizen a personality reconciled
through the integration of its particular (homme bourgeois) and universal
(citoyen) aspects. For Hegel, the state "survives" the social conflict
tnat engulfs the Marxist-! iberal i st politics because it is no mere
product of, or appendage to, any "more basic" social processes and/or
structures. Nor is it even a strictly intramundane entity (at least
not in the usual sense). The state is an independent (though not "ab-
stract") framework of law and culture and outlook which, in the status
of legitimate heir to and developer of Christian civilization, joins
the personalities of its members in a unified nexus of public morale
and ontological meaning.
To be sure, political Hegel ianism is hardly in vogue, even if
Hegel scholarship is. I do not mean to suggest that such is the case
when I include the Hegelian alternative among the viable contenders for
ascendancy. Yet a certain degree of political "idealism" is never
far
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from the heart of a political community, America's as well as any other.
There is ample evidence that Americans want very much to be citizens of
something resembling (functionally) a Hegelian type of state, ^ even as
the greater weight of their political education encourages the belief
that this r.ort of membership is chimerical, not only for them, but
intrinsically so. It is a peculiar and hard position to be in, to
aspire to the apparently impossible. But these are hard and peculiar
times.
Whether or not it is ultimately regarded an idealist fantasy,
destined to finally flee the political field before the advance of




unappealing only to the very few--primari ly anarchists
and rabid authoritarians. For the promise of the Hegelian state is
perhaps the most sought after, and most illusive, of all Western prizes:
the conjunction of radical autonomy and meaningful, purposive, ethical
community, the harmonizing of the self-conscious individual citizen
with the equally self-conscious state. In Hegel's state, the duties
and rights of citizens are conjoined in a rational order that guarantees
at once the freedom of the individual, the integrity of the common good,
and the public representation of the Spirit.
This is the supreme "secular" achievement of a rationality that
Hegel believes to infuse the world of man, a fusion of subjective con-
sciousness and objective order unknown to lesser spheres of social
interrelations. Whereas in the family reason is clothed in "feeling",
and in "civil society" it wears the mask of self-interested instrumentality,
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in the state reason reaches the level of explicit self-consciousness.
The state "knows what it wills"; "it works and acts by reference to
consciously adopted ends, known principles, and laws which are not
3
merely implicit but are actually present to consciousness". In the
state, man qua citizen knows his actions to be rooted in his own sub-
jectivity, his own subjective will; here will and order, particular
ar.d universal, freedom and duty coincide sans contradiction or alien-
ation:
In the state everything depends on the unity of universal
and part i cu 1 ar .. .what the state demands from us is eo ipso
our right as individuals, since the state is nothing but
the articulation of the concept of freedom. The determin-
ations of the 'ndividual will are given an objective
embodiment through the state and thereby attain their
truth and their actualization for the first time.^
This unity of universal and particular is the essence of the state's
rat ion a 1 i ty:
The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the
actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in
the particular self-consciousness once that consciousness
has been raised to consciousness of its un i versa 1 i ty .
5
In sharp contrast to the liberal formulation, the state is not active
primarily in setting limi ts to freedom. In law, the most 'universal'
aspect of the state, the citizen finds not an obstacle or hindrance to .
the expression of his free personality, but that very expression Itself.
Hegel has in mind more than, but does not exclude, the laws of the state
when he says that the laws of the "ethical order"
are not something alien to Lhe subject. On the contrary,
his spirit bears witness to them as to its own essence,
the essence in which he has a feeling of his selfhood, and
in which he lives as in his own element which is not dis-
tinguished from himself. The subject Is thus directly
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linked to the ethical order by a relation which is more
like an identity than even the relation of faith or
trust.
°
The attraction of the Hegelian formulation is that there nothing i s-
lost, everything gained. Through his participation In the state the
citizen becomes his own universal self without in the transformation
disclaiming his 'prior' particular being. He sustains a right relation
to God, even as he affirms his undiluted commitment to the world of
men. The strength of the state lies precisely in its representation
(an active representation, a facilitation) of the integration of the
various modes of human being; it "lies in the unity of its own universal
end and aim with the particular interest of the Indi vidual . . . In the
state, as something ethical, as the inter-penetration of the substantive
and the particular, my obligation to what is substantive is at the same
time the embodiment of my particular freedom".^
This is a truly marvelous formulation, this unity of self and po-
litical order, thus stated in the abstract. My purpose in what follows
is to examine how this unity Is achieved, and to determine more pre-
cisely the sense of this achievement for my primary object of concern,
the citizen.
A word of attempted clarification to preface the discussion, how-
ever, which relies heavily on exegesis of The Philosophy of Right. We
have In this work a prime example of the conundrum of Hegelian philosophy;
it is a work that Is, In G. A. Kelly's phrase, "ambiguously historical
and transhistorlcal".^ Like all works of great philosophy, it suggests
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a significance both 'eternal', and bound by specific historical expression.
It is simultaneously 'above' history, a series of 'meta-comments ' about
the stream of human culture, philosophically deciphered, and a partici-
pant in the flux of historical forms, taking specific standpoints on
specific issues, at a specific point In space and time. Hegel's effort
is to tell us something necessary about the bonds of human community, and
specifically political community; but the expression of these necessary
relations are given to us In forms that we may or may not find acceptable.
Indeed, from the point of view of our own prevailing (not to mention
possibly emerging) norms and traditions, it is easier then not to find
Hegel's particular prescriptions decidedly objectionable. Among the
more strikingly troublesome aspects of the work are: an undeniably
sexist conception of the family, an ambiguously authoritarian, anti-
democratic structure of corporate interest groups, a pretentiously
impartial "universal class" of civil servants, whose administrative
expertise is characterized as (very nearly) the apogee of politics in
the modern state; an insistence on the necessity of a monarch to stand
for the solidarity of the political organism, and an inadequate welfare
statist approach to the serious problems the tremendously dynamic civil
society thrusts upon the community.
I do not mean to say that any of these issues are irrelevant
(certainly not In a theorist who avers the essential unity of "Idea"
and history). I do claim, though, that there is a great deal of the
permanently valuable to be gleaned from Hegel's concept of the state
and citizen, that his value to us Is not fundamentally vitiated by
these
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various "shortcomings". As I iiope to make clear, Hegel Is deeply,
supremely concerned for structuring the political community in such a
way as to educate citizens to realize the very best in themselves as
publicly as well as privately oriented persons; to ensure Western man
his religious heritage, his c i v i 1 i zat i ona 1 -- i ndeed his ontol og i cal --
birthright, even as he attains to new secular heights; to provide for
the highest degree of unity in a context of pluralistic diversity and
relative autonomy; to accomplish and preserve the maximum degree of
state-m indedness--of accountability, responsibility, and impartiality--
at the highest levels of legislation and administration. And so, I
believe, should we be. Hegel seems to me to serve as an essential
guidepost in tlie all-important business of developing today both the
objective reality of a genuine state, and the sense of having one on
the part of its members.
The Truth of Greece
At first blush, the modern Hegelian state might seem the idealized
ancient Greek polls, dusted off, refurbished and reposited. As in the
modern state, Hegel hit hard the theme of unity regarding the relation
of state and citizen in the polls. "As free men", he wrote, the ancient
Greeks
obeyed laws laid down by themselves, obeyed men whom they
had themselves appointed to office, waged wars on which
they had themselves decided, gave their property, exhausted
their passions, and sacrificed their lives by thousands for
an end which was their own... The idea of his country or his
state was the invisible and higher reality for which (every
individual) strove, which impelled h im to effort .. . Only in
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moments of Inactivity or oethargy could he feel the
growing strength of a purely sel f- regard i ng wish.
5
Indeed, Hegel's political philosophy owes a constant debt to his
interpretation of the Greek political experience. His appreciation of
the classical polls was more than nostalgia (though Hegel was not above
waxing nostalgic over Greece), more too than an example of the common
analytical device of holding up a critical standard of a "pure" or
paradigm case against which to measure a given state of affairs. "Truth",
for Hegel, is revealed historically. In the process of historical time
(for Hegel a rational, knowable process) the "Idea"^^ becomes "actual",
or existent in human community, and thereby transparent to the philo-
sophical consciousness intent on interpreting the collective human
project. Human experience in general has an irreducible "transcendental"
dimension; it is at once immanent and transcendent, and through this
conjunction acquires meaning, direction and purpose. The Greek ex-
perience in particular was not a series of passing phenomena destined
to perish before the advance of a merciless, meaningless temporal
process, but a "moment" in the progress of Spirit's actualization in
the world, preserved in philosophical memory.
It is an important moment for the theory of state and citizenship.
Given his negative assessment of the individualism, alienation and
social fragmentation of his own era, the memory of Greece could not
but inspire longing in Hegel. Unlike the modern individual who in-
terprets social life from the standpoint of the ego and personal
morality, the Athenian, according to Hegel, was preeminently "social".
2^0
Private and public self, inner and external worlds, here and beyond, all
converged in the civic experience of this free and freedom- lovi ng people.
In the language I have adopted In this work, the tensional unities of
"agency" and "communion", and "transcendence" and "existence", are given
a balanced and harmonious representation in social life. The freedom of
the citizens is rooted in the a 1 1 - i mportant consciousness of belonging
wholly to this established social order, an "ethical life", or
12
"S i tt 1 i chke i t"
,
wherein personal beliefs and aspirations do not
conflict with the demands of duty to the collective life qua bearer
of meaning in history.
For Hegel the individual is through and through socially determined
Individual reality, his life-world, his consciousness. Is indeed "social
constructed". For the nature given to the irdividual by birth is sub-
stituted a "second nature" formed by the Influence of concrete social
insti tutions--e.g. family, school, church, community, state, and their
bodies of habit, custom and law. By virtue of this second nature is the
world made over Into a truly human world that bears the imprint of the
divine-human spirit; by virtue of the Inward growth of this nature does
the individual become a truly human. I.e. ethical, being. Thus the
Individual lives his life "ethically" when he lives according to the
concrete customs and expectations of his peers.
The individual exercise of abstract reason alone cannot decide the
direction of the ethical life. Reason only demands that law be non-
contradictory, a criterion "quite indifferent to truth and untruth
alike": "The standard of law which reason has within Itself therefore
fits every case in the same way, and is in point of fact no standard
1
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at all". In the process of acculturation the individual's "natural"
self is overcome, his individuality raised to a new power through in-
tegration with the cultural substance. The individual is raised to the
level of his own implicit universality; he represents the collective
consciousness of the whole and as such 'becomes' what he 'is':
For the power of the individual consists in conforming
itself to that substar.ce-- i . e. by emptying itself of its
own self, and thus establishing itself as the objectively
existing substance. Its culture and its own reality are,
therefore, the orocess of making the substance itself
actual and concrete.
Where in modern life one finds everywhere individualism, Romantic sub-
jectivity, self-assertion and alienation from community, in the Greek
world there is effortless identification with the ethical whole. While
the modern world is obsessed with the "ought to be" compu 1 s I veness of
morality, the ancient comprised an ethical community, a comprehensive
body of social rules, that a 1 read y existed, unquestioned in the minds
of those that participated in it. As an individual, I am obligated to
it just because it already exists, because as such it is the basis of
genuine morality, my morality. It has nurtured me, made me into a moral
man; in return, I sustain it through the reproduction of its forms in my
every act. "1" and "it" are one, part of the total tapestry of
social
existence, a social existence that need not "ought to be", because it
already "is".^^
This ethical life that already is is an integral,
"worldly" ex-
istence. Scattered throughout Hegel's Phenomenology
-wh i ch is, in
Judith Shklar's assessment, in large measure a
"lament for Hellas"
2^2
are indications of the key elements of this life, all of which in some
form Hegel carries over into his own thought. They are so many aspects
of the relation of the individual to his culture, the "private" to the
"publ ic".
Underlying this fundamental relation is a delicate and subtle
balance of k i n and c i ty . Between these two spheres there exists a symbi-
otic spiritual relationship. Family and polity form a single ethical
continuum, to compose the spontaneous, undivided consciousness of the
Athenian citizen. The polls ensured the preservation of the family, and
the family reared men in the spirit of citizenship necessary to the life
of the polls. The "process (of the ethical realm) is an untroubled
transition from one of Its powers to the other, in such a way that each
preserves and produces the other". The Individual found pleasure and
fulfilled necessity within the intimate confines of the family; when he
rose above pleasure and necessity he rose to active citizenship, to his
"real and substantial" self.
Because it is only as citizen that he is real and sub-
stantial the individual, when not a citizen, and belonqing
to the family, is merely unreal unsubstantial shadow.
'°
Thus the Greek individual 'ascended' via an easy, 'natural' public edu-
cation, to participate in the ethical life of the city. The distinction
between the family and the polls, between "the Inner Indwelling principle
of sociality operating in an unconscious way", "the immediate
ethical
existence", on the one hand, and "the ethical order which shapes
and
preserves itself by work for universal ends",^^ on the
other: this dis-
tinction is a distinction within the unity of the integral
ethical order.
2k3
This is not to say that there can be no conflict, that the balance
cannot give way. Indeed, Hegel read Sophocles' Antigone as illustration
of just such a tragic breakdown of the kin/city balance. But the conflict
here is one between distinct, objective and valid ethical orders. It is
not a conflict between the "individual" on the one side, and the "state"
on the other. This Is an al 1 - important difference for Hegel, Both
Antigone and Creon assert valid ethical claims, both act as representatives
of their respective orders, the family and its natural, elemental piety,
and the state and its majestic and universal rationality. Neither acts
the part of the one-sided, "moralistic" indivldcal. On Hegel's view,
Creon's claim is super ior--the interests of the 2ti"ical whole nust win
out over the part, the less universal. But the most important point is
not this, but that the law is 1 ived in each case; it is immediate, for
both Antigone and Creon. The individual consciousness "knows and it-
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self does its duty, and is bound to its duty as Its own nature".
Within the circle of lived morality the choice between right and wrong
is crystal clear; it is part of a whole pattern of life.
The essence of the system of 'lived morality' is clearly, then,
the subordination of private individuality to the collective "substance".
Hegel approvingly notes that even Greek religion and.art--in modern life
the most subjective of modes--were collective expressions of an active,
shared, "worldly" existence. Religion was indeed, on Hegel's account,
identical with the collective beliefs of the polis. Pagan religious
rites did not aim to "transcend" daily life, but rather rendered the
transcendental part of dally life. Religion was thus not a private
affair, a one-to-one relation between God and me, but integral, common,
fully human. The same integral humanity is expressed in the dimension
of art.
What belongs to the substance, the artist imparted entirely
to his work; to himself, however, as a specific individu-
ality, he gave in his workno reality. He could only confer
completeness on it by relinquishing his particular nature,
divesting himself of his own being, and rising to the ab-
straction of pure action.
Not personal inspiration, but public spirit, is the essence of religion
and art.
Owing to this fundamental public sp i r I tedness , the government,
because it is not something external to the ethical life of the people.
Is able to command the highest loyalties of the citizen. The laws of
the state do not express the will of some detached and impersonal
"sovereign", but the will of eacli individual in his citizen capacity,
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"the self of the ration". In the realized state
the laws give expression to that which each individual
is and does; the individual knows them not merely to be
what constitutes his universal objective nature as a
'thing', but knows himself, too, in that form, or knows
it to be particularized in his own individuality and in
each of his fellow citizens.
Similarly, "Justice"
is neither an alien principle holding somewhere remote
from the present, now the realization (unworthy of the
name of justice) of mutual malice, treachery, ingrati-
tude, etc... On the contrary ... i t brings back to the
whole, to the universal life of society, what has broken
away separately from the harmony and equilibrium of the
whole:--the independent classes and individuals. In
this way justice is the government of the nation, and
is its al 1 -pervading essential life in a consciously
present individual form, and is the personal self-
conscious will of all. 2^
2kS
The products of men living, speaking and acting together, law and
justice provide the stable context for the consideration of future
action. They are the earmarks of a people who are accustomed to exer-
cising collective self-mastery, who understand fully the meaning of
disciplined freedom. "Virtue" for such a people is a civic act, not a
form of personal edification. Instead of the introspection of the
modern, in Greece we find the turning outward of the self tov;ard public
concerns. "Virtue in the olden time had its secure and determinate
significance, for it found the fullness of its content and its solid
basis in the substantial life of the nation, and had for its purpose
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and end a concrete good that existed and lay at its hand". The
psychic unity of the individual and the social unity of the polls were
the natural results of virtuous action. But "individuality" was not
valued in and for itself. The aim of the individual was to take up
a place in the civic order. For its part the body politic did not
pursue airy, abstract ideals, but the "concrete good that existed and
lay at its hand".
It is, thus, not surprising to find Hegel considering the col-
lective identity, and its preservation through war, to be the highest
expressions of political membership. in war, the defense of a people's
"individuality", the bond to the state, is strikingly manifest. In war
private cares and concerns, the concern for personal survival itself,
are put wholly to one side: To be sure, Hegel insists that a "plurality
of types and groups"^^ within the polity are essential to the preservation
of a free people. Articulating a principle of utmost importance to
his
later thought, Hegel claimed that the ethical community, even the
tightly knit polis, is a differentiated community:
...the reality of the ethical substance rests partly
in. ..its organization into a plurality of rights and
duties, as also on its organized distribution into the
spheres of various classes, each with its particular way
of acting which cooperates to form the whole; and hence
rests on the fact that the individual is contented with
the limitations of his existence.
.
.27
But these same "systems" have an inward tendency to "get rooted and
settled in this isolation and thus break up the whole into fragments
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and let the common spirit evaporate". In order to prevent the
fragmentation Into particularity, "governments have from time to time
29
to shake (the particular spheres) to the very co"e by war'.
In sum, every aspect of the polity, and every act of the indi-
vidual, on Hegel's interpretation of the Greek experience, Ideally
contributed to a wholistic, integral life that is itself expressive
of the force of Spirit in the world, of the Idea. In such a state,
and only in something resembling such a state, can man the citizen be
genuinely free. There is a "free nation", Hegel says, where
...reason is in truth realized. It is a present living
spirit, where the individual not only finds his destiny,
i.e. his universal and particular nature, expressed and
given to him in the fashion of a thing, but himself is
the essential being, and has also attained his destiny.
The wisest men of antiquity for that reason declared
that wisdom and virtue consist in living in accordance
with the custom of one's own nation. 30
2k7
The Truth of Subjectivity
The modern world was, however, quite another from the ancient.
Most obviously, the diminuitive size and general homogeneity of interest
were features of the polls lost to the sprawling, diverse and differ-
entiated nation-state, and which proved the absurdity of any notion of
duplicating the Greek experience in the modern context. But in Hegel's
estimation something more substantial than size distanced the modern
from the ancient world. A moment in the process of Spirit's realization,
the Greek contribution to the "history of freedom" was monumental. Yet
it was only one rronumt, destined to be superceded even as it was pre-
served in the aufgeheben cf dialectical spiritual progress. The Greek
world of spontaneous harmony was destined to destruction. Indeed, in
the fourth centur/ B.C., Greek "substantiality" had suffered through
and was finally destroyed by the development of critical subjectivity,
the alienation of community, the supplanting of "this worldly" religion
by a more strictly "transcendental" form of worship. The destruction,
Hegel held, was necessary for the deepening of the human spirit.
The rationality of the modern state is not simply given; it is
the outcome of a long process of historical development as deciphered
by the speculative consciousness. The principle that governs the
modern world is that of "subjectivity", precisely that which under-
mined the Greek community. Certainly, Hegel is no enthusiast of
"private conscience" and "subjective knowledge" served up in their raw
forms; his attitude is rather that of the contemplative connoiscur.
Subjectivity cannot make a state; indeed, abstract subjectivity
inspires only arbitrariness, accomplishes only anarchy and destruction.
But these same tendenc i es--a 1 1 explicitly evidenced in tlic specifically
modern reality of "civil society"--are, to Hegel's historical under-
standing, wholly necessary and rational. Subjectivity had developed
over a difficult course from the break-up of the polls: through the
abstract legal persona of imperial Romanism, the religious subjectivity
of Christianity, Kantianism, Romanticism, the French Revolution. In
civil society it attains new historical heigiits, as it comes to a
heretofore unequalled secularity of outlook and purpose. As will be
seen, while "opposed" to the state, which it calls forth to discipline
its own concentrated anarchic dispositions and drives, civil society
nonetheless shares the state's worldview, a truly worldly viev/, wiicrcin
man, as self-conscious citizen, partakes of a secular "divinity". As
immediately preposterous as this may sound to some, nothing less than
the red i V i n i 7at i on of the world, in a self-conscious way, is Hegel's
task.
The Greek world could boast nothing genuinely comparable to this
marvelous modern invention. Its primary structures, the kin and the
city, remained one-sided; it remained for civil society to give "all
•3 1
determinations of the Idea their due". The very attractiveness of
the Greek ideal turns out to be its most serious drawback. The Greeks
[tad no word even for "conscience", no concept of the "good will". The
good implied simply an imreflective participation in society according
to inherited tradition and custom. "Virtue" signified the complete
identification of person and polity, so complete that
the consideration of the state in the abs tract--wh i ch to
2k3
our understanding is the essential point--was alien to
them. Their grand object was their country in its
living aspect; this actual Athens
,
this Sparta, these
temples, these altars, this form of social life, this
union of fellow citizens, these manners and customs. 32
The phrase, "to our understanding" is here more important than it might
at first appear. We have seen how powerfully Hegel is drawn to the
harmonious unref lecti veness of the Greek social ethos. But in the
modern world virtue no longer could derive wholly from the objective
and existent order; it nov; must include the inner and the intellectual
as well. Only 'knowing' and 'being' together can now constitute the
good; neither alone, on its own terms. The absence of subjective
freedom was the basic defect of" the comprehensively social ethos. It
was the destiny of man to eat of the fruit of knov/ledge; the appetite
of the Spirit must be satisfied. To question the established and the
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accepted, to descry and decry the merely 'positive' was to Hegel
necessary and good, even if it did result in a (temporarily) heightened
sense of alienation from the social substance. Conformity for its own
sake was bondage. Higher esteem for the individual man represented a
higher, more developed concept of man ; not merely nan the s oci al indi-
vidual, but man the social individual was the standard of the new age.
If the new freedom implied by the new concept was more difficult to
achieve in practice, institutionally, it was so in part because it was
a higher, indeed the highest, form of freedom.
A new conception of the individual was already knocking at the
Athenian door in the fifth century B.C. By the fourth, the subjective
principle of morality (Moral itat) had already undermined the unreflecti
250
(Sittlich) social ethic. This new individualism, fruit of the Greek
Enlightenment harvested by first the Sophists and then Socrates ("the
inventor of morality"), exploded the spontaneous harmony of the polls
and introduced the age of Greek ruin. These early critics are in
Hegel's view the spiritual forbears of modern individualism, harbingers
of modern subjectivity.
In the face of the ruin wrought by the new subjectivity, Plato
attempted, on Hegel's view at least, to restore the old Sittlich. Hegel
was sympathetic, but critical:
In his Republj c. Plato displays the substance of ethical
life in its ideal beauty and truth; but he could only
cope with the principle of sel f-subs i stent particularity,
which in his day had forced its way into Greek ethical
life, by setting up in opposition to it his purely sub-
stantial state. He absolutely excluded it from his state,
even in its very beginnings in private property and the
family, as well as its more mature form as the subjective
will, the choice of a social position, and so forth...
The principle of the se 1 f-subs i stent inherent by infinite
personality of the Individual, the principle of subjective
freedom, is denied its rights. 35
Thus subjective particularity was not incorporated into
the organization of society as a whole; it was not recon-
ciled in the whole and therefore. .. i t shows Itself there
as something hostile, as a corruption of the social order. 3°
Thus the fundamental and philosophically significant difference between
the ancient Greek and the modern "Christian" worlds is an advance, in
essence a spiritual advance, from the level of immediate experience to
that of reflection. The evolution of consciousness, the world spirit
and the spirit of man, necessitated the tensional differention of private
and public life, the distinction between self and political order, the
development of an individual moral awareness and will beyond the confines
of the collective consciousness of community. This development is a
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cornerstone of the modern theory of state and citizen, says Hegel:
"The principle of the modern state requires that the whole of an indi-
vidual's activity shall be mediated through his will".-^^
The advance to subjectivity was not unambiguous, however. As we
have seen, it was the contemporary excesses of subject ivi ty--abstract
individualism. Romanticism, social al ienat ion--that had sent Hegel
flying to the Greek ideal for succor In the first place. For all its
necessity the modern principle seemed altogether Irreconcilable with
the ancient ideal. As they had met once already in mortal combat over
Greek destiny, these two spiritual 'moments' promised to continue warring
w'chout truce. Hegel summed up the difficulty in another remark on
Plato's Republ I c:
P 1 ato. . .makes everything depend upon disposition (un-
critical acquiescence in the law), the principle of
the state; on which account he lays the chief stress
on education. The modern theory is d I anietr I cal 1 y
opposed to this, referring everything to the indi-
vidual will. But here we have no guarantee that the
will in question has that right disposition which is
essential to the stability of the state. 38
The glorious Ideals of the French Revolution has miscarried Into terror
and despotism, Hegel felt, precisely because of this tendency toward
willful subjectivity and caprice. Hegel is In complete sympathy with
(a certain interpretation of) the revolutionary ideals themselves--
self-determination, liberty, political equality, "the struggle of
rational constitutional law against the mass of positive law and
privileges by which It had been stifled". It was the revolution's
failing that Its aims remained always abstract . . Hegel does not reject
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the aims but their abstractness
.
His own conception of the modern state
is intended as the concrete form of the rationality of revolutionary
ideals.
But the revolution took an opposing course to concrete political
action. It was fired not by a desire to institutionalize the new freedom,
but by romanticism, self-will (abstract egoism), and a finally destructive
fanaticism. These negative notions hang togethe'' both conceptually and
experient ial ly. The romantic consciousness is par excel lence the one-
sided self-willed subjective consciousness. To itself it is everything,
the whole world, sincerely supreme. It is a form of self-consciousness
that regards itself, and only i'tself, as the necessary element. It
knows that it has the universal, the law immediately within itself.
ko
This is the "Law of the Heart", the guiding light of the romantic
soul, that needs no fixed objectivity, no necessary embodiment in the
world. The subjective flaw can be fatal; for it easily, naturally
carries to the rejection of the world's reality, itself transported
to ecstatic, fanatical heights of fantasy by the unbridled enthusiasm
for pure transcendence, for absolute freedom. Reality seems to stand
against it as "a violent ordinance of the world that contradicts the
law of the heart", "an alien necesslty"^^ under whose weight man is
"crushed and oppressed" . For the romantic-minded, reality itself is
detestable, and what is detestable is to be attacked, done away with;
Zj/4
it is regarded "as a delusion" in need of d i.ss 1 pat 1 ng
.
This quintessential se 1 f-cen teredness is for Hegel the "negative
will", an orientation he unmercifully castigates. It is a
negative
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will because it betokens a negative reality only, a one-sided negative
"freedom". I.n its theoretical aspect, it works itself up as a
"fanaticism of contemplation"; in practice it is more dangerous, taking
social shape as "the fanaticism of destruction".^^ It struggles pur-
portedly to free man of his oppressive cultural fetters; but its motive
is in fact more desperate, less rational. Its mortal enemy is positive
social being, its life-blood is destruction: "Only in destroying some-
thing dees this negative will possess the feeling of itself as existent'
The negative will "imagines" itself willing a positive condition, but
it is precisely out of the annihilation of particularity
and objective characterization that the se 1 f -consc i ousness
of this ne.gative freedom proceeds. Consequently, what
negative freedom intends to will can never be anything
in itself but an abstract idea, and giving effect to this
idea can only he the fury of destruction.^^
The negative will is not a perversion of the "law of the heart". On
Hegel's view it j_5_ this law, the heart's legislation active in the
world. Romantic I nd i v i dua 1 I soi, which Hegel characterizes with acerbity
as "the heart-throb for tlie welfare of mankind", is in fact funda-
mentally anti-social, ant ' -pol i t i cal In the extreme; recognizing no
authority outside itself, it passes "Into the rage of frantic self-
conceit".^'^ Because It conceives itself as universal freedom Itself,
it tolerates no determinate particularity.^^ Thus Hegel understands
the French Terror--"the elimination of individuals who are objects of
suspicion" and "the annihilation of any organization which tries to
52 -
rise anew from the ruins".
...during the Terror ...all differences of talent and
authority were supposed to have been superceded. This
period was an upheaval, an agitation, an irreconcilable
25^
hatred of everything particular. Since fanat i c i sm w i 11
s
an abstraction only, nothing articulated, it follows that,
when distinctions appear, it finds them antagonistic to
its own indeterminacy and annuls them. For this reason, the
French Revolutionaries destroyed once more the institutions
which they had made themselves, since any institution what-
ever is antagonistic to the abstract se 1 f -consc i ousness of
equal i ty . 53
The romantic philosopher Rousseau bears the brunt of much (unfair, I
think) criticism here, for it is Rousseau that Hegel considers the
theoretical inspiration of the revolution. Apparently ignoring the
critical distinction between the "general will" and "the will of all',
Hegel sees Rousseau as the philosopher of an individualistic historical
period, whose philosophy reflects the individualist temper. The
community has disintegrated, virtually disappeared, revealing the
social raw material of isolated private persons. Every man is free
("absolutely free") to transform--or attempt to t rans form--h i
s
private convictions into political reality. The result is the dis-
astrous "supercess i on" of all social differentiation in favor of an
abstract equality, the negation of "all differences of talent and
author i ty".
The mediating bonds between "people" and "government" arc then
snapped, dissolved into the undi f ferent iation of the homogeneous
community. The political community is polarized into the formless
mass of citizens (the general will) on the one side, and the government
(the particular will that supposedly embodies the general will) on the
other. There is no intermediary power; under the circumstances no such
power is possible. Hegel is loathe to the idea of the social contract
even as metaphor; it is to his mind an artificial device that does not,
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cannot in fact unite individual and general will in a common unity.
The social contract presupposes the negative concept of freedom, which
presumes that "what is fundamental, substantive, and primary is supposed
to be the will of a single person in his own private self will".^^ This
is freedom as "arbitrariness", "the ability to do what we please".
Ultimately it is the "freedom of the void", that can never will anything
"but an abstract idea".^''
Since government is necessary, it necessarily becomes centralized
government, whicii in turn generates among the citizens further alien-
ation, atomicity and hostility. Tnere are no "mediatory organs" that
stand "between the government in general on the one. hard and the nation
r O
broken up into particulars (people and associations) on the other".
The revolution infused France with the spirit of centralization; the
Republican France of 182^ still lacked those "associations wherein
particular and universal interests meet", and which are, says Hegel,
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"the proper strength of the state". By contrast, in fi-ance the
"fundamental presupposition is that a state is a machine with a single
spring which imparts movement to all the rest of the infinite wheel-
work...". The centralized state is possessed of
the pedantic craving to determine every detail, the il-
liberal jealousy of (any arrangement whereby) an estate,
a corporation, etc., adjusts and manages its own affairs,
(a) mean carping of any independent action by the citizens
...The appointments of every village schoolmaster, the
expenditure of every penny for a pane of glass in a
school, church or a village, tlie appointment of every
toll-clerk or court officer or local justice of the




Abstract idealism thus leads unfortunately to the reciprocal exclusion
of individual and universal. The individual rejects all part i cu 1 ar i zat i on
as so many barriers to his freedom and so destroys as unfree and inegali-
tarian the very institutions he himself creates: "any institution what-
ever is antagonistic to the abstract self-consciousness of equal ity".^^
The government for its part stifles individuality and grows despotic.
This is the stinging paradox of the abstract assertion of individual
freedom; theoretically it proclaims the absolute freedom of the indi-
vidual, but practically it demands the authoritari an rule of the "one
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individuality" of the state over the citizen.
France was not the only connection in which Hegel had considered
and criticized the abstract state. Imperial Rome qualified for a re-
lated rebuke; the Romans were as "unethical" as the French were
"fanatical". Like the revolutionaries, Rome failed to forge a true
political community between community and state. Founded on force,
force remained the basis of Roman unity; the state was an "unspiritual
unity", an "abstract sovereignty". State and citizen fell out of
true, common orbit. V/ith imperial Rome ended the republican spirit
of classical antiqu'ty:
The picture of the state as the product of his own energies
disappeared from the citizen's soul. The care and over-
sight of the whole rested on the soul of one man or a few.
Each individual had his own alloted place, a place more or
less restricted and different from his neighbor's. The
administration of the state machine was entrusted to a
small number of citizens, and these served only as single
cogs deriving their worth solely from their connection
with others.
Without ethical ties to the state, any motive to work for the whole, the
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Roman individual is an isolated person, an egoistic, atomistic unit
within the mass:
all individuals are degraded to the level of private
persons equal with one another, possessed of formal
rights, and the only bond left to hold them together
is abstract insatiable self-will. ^5
With neither opportunity nor will to serve the interest of the whole,
everyone wori<ed for himself or else he was compelled to
work for some other individual... All political freedom
vanished also; the citizen's right gave him only a right
to a security of that property which now filled his en-
tire world. 60
Similarly, modern individualism was capricious and devo'd of ethical
content; with it "ethics Is reduced to the special theory of life held
by the Individual and his private conviction". What Is required are
authoritative Institutions that can educate the potentially arbitrary
and tyrannical private will. Such Institutions do not negate the will,
but rather represent Its rational fulfillment: "When conscience appeals
only to itself for a decision. It is directly at variance from what it
wishes to be, namely the rule for a mode of conduct which is rational,
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absolutely valid, and universal". Hegel has no sympathy for the
social monad, the abstract I nd I v I dua 1 I sm of liberalism/radicalism.
Hegel's aim too is to "liberate" human vitalities. But he saw clearly,
unlike many others, that freedom, "liberation", requires, first of all,
a context of restraint. Energies must be guided, educated, directed.
They cannot simply be loosed. And secondly, this context must be
recognized as having an ontological ground. Modern 1 1 bera 1 i sm was
uncognizant of these fundamental principles of political order. It
was abstract; it tried to structure politics and create freedom outward
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from a pure, abstract, unmediated "ego", envisaged as timelessly uni-
versal, yet devoid of metaphysical content. Thus liberalism not only
failed to be public-regarding, but failed also to be self-conscious of
its own historical development, philosophical antecedents, and trans-
cendental obligations.
On the other hand, Hegel's notion of state and citizen is no simple
"organic" conception, nor is it a static embodiment of the Idea as re-
vealed, say, in Scrioture. Hegel affirms that the essence of modern
political organization is the subjective will. He castigates abstract
subjectivity and all *:hat proceeds from it, socially and psychologically,
because his end is to yoke subjectivity to an objective, 'sittlich' order
of public virtue and service to an ongoing community of ontological
stature. The importance of the i ntersubject i ve traditions of a culture
in 'situating' subjectivity In this way cannot be overstated. Hegel is
very much the Burkean in this respect. Habit, custom, t rad i t i on--the
accumulated "prejudices" of a people: this Is the valid and vital
foundation on which individual consciousness and political structures
alike are raised. In the Phi losophy of Right this 'organic' sense
carries most vividly from Hegel's remarks on the constitution; e.g.
"A constitution is not just something manufactured; it is the work of
centur ies";^^ "It is absolutely essential that the constitution should
not be regarded as something made, even though it has come into being
in time. It must be treated rather as something simply existent in and
by itself, as d I v I ne . . . " ; "the constitution _i_s, but just as essentially
it becomes, i.e. it advances and matures".'^' But the constitution and
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the community too are rooted in the will, rightly understood. The will
itself produces the system of right, "a realm of freedom, made actual,
the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature"7^
Hegel, unlike Burke, insists that citizens consciously recognize, and
give assent to the complex of traditional life; though for this tradition
is no less important.
The Worldly Divinity of Wi 1 1
Hegel was convinced that it was not the abstract version of freedom
that would finally prevail over Europe's political future. Rather he
expected the eventual actualization of his own concept of the state,
which essent i a 1 i zed the emergent (he believed) political and social
organizational features of V/estern Europe. The new state would give,
in the language of the Ph i I osophy of Right
,
the spheres of "abstract
right" and "morality" their due, but these would be but aspects of a
more comprehensive, mediated ethical life. This "absolute" ethical
life, pluralistically differentiated, educative of the citizen body,
integral and integrative, and "divine" in Hegel's own peculiar under-
standing of divinity, would be crowned by a "neutral" state expressing
7 ^
Its ov^n "inward organic life", administered (though not "controlled")
by a state-minded universal class. Unlike any prior, this state would
be "legitimate" because rat i ona
1
--"thought out" rather than simple felt
as an immediate presence;^^ a state that guaranteed equally the freedom
of homme bourgeois and homme citoyen, neatly and noiselessly colored
both Platonic and Kantian in the moments of its dialectic.''^
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We saw above that it is the will
,
rightly understood, that supplies
the life-blood of Hegel's theory of state and citizen. But how is the
will "rightly understood"? In the first place, and most importantly,
metaphysically. It is at the developmental "stage" of "will" at which
the Phi losophy of Right addresses the "Concept":
Mind to start with is i nte 1 1
i
gence , . .
. the phases through
which it passes in its development from feeling, through
representative thinking, to thinking proper, are the road
along which it produces itself as will, and. ..will, as
practical mind in general, is the truth of intelligence,
the stage next above it. 76
"Will", claims Hegel, "is thinking reason resolving itself to finituae".''
It is the "form", one of the tvjo moments of the Idea, the other of which
is the "content", or the existence of the concept, i.e. its embodiment
in the realm of the finite--a series of rights, subjects and institutions
embody i ng the will.
7R
Thus the will for Hegel is "mind" or "spirit" objectified. What
we are given in the Introduction to the Philosoph y of Right is the more
strictly metaphysical account of how the free will abandons caprice and
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embodies itself in ethical life in general, and politics in particular.
The remainder of the work seeks to establish the actual institutional
embodiment of that same will, a will which is at once the will of the
Idea and the will of the individual subject citizen. This is Hegel's
definition of "right" in a nutshell: "An existent of any sort embodying
80
the free will, this is what right is". As the embodiment of the
I.
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"absolute concept" of freedom, right is "sacrosanct :
The basis of right is, in general, mind; its precise place
and point of origin is the will. The will is free, so that
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freedom is both the substance of right and its goal,
while the system of right is the realm of freedom made
actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself
like a second nature.
Will is necessari ly free: "Freedom is just as fundamental a character-
istic of the will as weight is of bodies". "Will without freedom is an
empty word, while freedom is only actual only as will, as subject".
The will of the individual person is, then, bounded on the one
side by a full-blown metaphysic, and on the other, as we have already
seen, the i ntersubject i ve life of an ongoing SI ttl ich . ' should like
here to briefly note something of the 'in-between' life of the will, as
each 'moment' is in the last analysis an essential contributing ingredient
to the Hegelian sense of state and citizenship.
The first determination of the free will as right is "abstract
right". As with every teleological process of Development, the be-
ginning point is immediate, indeterminate and abstract in comparison
with the end result. Hegel thus starts out from the standpoint of the
strictly individual will, the will of the single "unit", tne legal
"person" unconnected by the complex ethical bonds that comprise a
holistic community. He thereby at once makes contact with and attempts
to transcend modern theories of "natural" law and right which had
originated with Hobbes, and were carried forward, most notably by
Kant, to his day. Hegel's aim is not to simply refute these theories,
but to qualifiedly vindicate them precisely by showing their limitations.
This individual, as unit, is the bearer of a formal, universal form
,85
of personality which is self-conscious but otherwise contentless.
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The individual has rights, is a subject of rights, and is at liberty to
do whatever he pleases to do, so long as he is prepared to recognize
that everyone else, all other units like himself, have the same right
as he does, viz. the same right to embody his will in the external world.
The sole injunction, the one duty, in this sphere is to "Be a person and
86
respect others as persons". The liberty of this unit, this merely
legal person, never refers directly to the liberty of others, but only
to his own will, his capability of acting on his particular impulses
and desires, and to those objects of the world that do not themselves
87have r
i ghts--objects that are collectively referred to as "things".
As infinite spirit actualizes itself in the medium of finitude,
will needs the things of the world in order to fulfill itself. The
individual needs to create the conditions for his freedom through these
things. He therefore has, Hegel says, a right to them, "the absolute
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right of appropriation which man has over all things". Thus possess ion
is the immediate embodiment of freedom, personality objectified. The
right of private property is equally shared by all individuals. Notice
that Hegel does not found the right of property on the satisfaction of
material needs; its rationale is rather the "supercess ion of the pure
subjectivity of personality". The free will must be translated into
89
an external sphere, "in order to exist as Idea". Nor does Hegel
make private property as such an absolute, foreshadowing later develop-
ments of the Idea by insisting that "the provisions concerning private
property must be subordinated to higher spheres of law, a community,
a state". Still, the individual right to private property \s_ an
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absolute right, a necessary right if freedom is to be realized. In
order to be conscious of himself, an individual must distinguish him-
self from others. So insofar as individuals face one another as
totally 'autonomous' persons, that Is, neither as members of a family,
a corporation, a state, nor even as 'moral' men, they relate to one
another "abstractly", i nd i v i dual i s t i call y , as property owners. Mutu-
ality as this point extends no further than the mutual recognition of
property ownership. Yet implicit here is the basis for a genuinely
moral point of view, which Hegel develops directly from the dialectic
of will.
Insofar as I can put my will i nto things and make them "mine", I
can take my will out of things, thereby "alienating" them; possessing
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property and alienating property are complementary rights. And in-
sofar as individuals recognize these complementary rights, there is a
relation of will to will, a first appearance of exp licit med i at i on of
immediate wills. They can 'deal' in things: they can trade, give
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gifts, exchange. In short, they can "contract" with one another.
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In the contract two wills relate as a "common will"; but this common
will remains nonetheless a purely contingent agreement of particular
wills, in the sense that the content of the contract is due simply to
the arbitrariness of the parties to it. The impl ici t contingency of
contract becomes explicit in the breach of contract, that is, in the
doing of "wrong":
In contract, to be sure, making a covenant entails the
right to require its performance. But this performance
is dependent again on the particular will which qua
particular may act in contravention of the principle
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of Tightness. At this point then the negation, which
was present in the principle of the will at the start,
comes into view, and this negation is just what wrong
is. 94
In wrong, the particular will is pitted against the universal will
embodied in the principle of abstract right: "If the particular will
is explicitly at variance with the universal, it assumes a way of looking
at things and a volition which are capricious and fortuitous and comes
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on the scene in opposition to tne principle of rightness". Wrong is
not purely negative, however. Its positive significance is the demand
that this particularity be welcomed into the will itself, be recognized
as part of the will, not as something outside the universality of the
will, in the impulses and desires given to us by nature. This, Hegel
says, is the implicit claim of the criminal, that the universality of
right is one-sided and abstract, and that particularity and universality
be reconciled in the will of the person. The challenge thus posed, the
only solution is to satisfy the claims of the particular by allowing
that the universally right must be mediated by the particular consci-
entious convictions of the subject. In short, we must substitute for
the abstract conception of "personality" the more concrete conception
of "subjectivity". We must become moral agents above and beyond mere
subjects of rights. When we do, we take up the standpoint of "Morality".
The "moral standpoint" is a more satisfactory determination of the
philosophy of right, and as we have already seen, a critical condition
for the existence of the specifically modern state. Now the free will
is not embodied in abstract rights, but in a particular will; this is
the standpoint of the will "which is infinite not merely In itself but
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for itself", that is, the person is explicitly aware of himself as
infinite will, as subject. The individual remains primarily responsible .
for himself here; he is in this sense yet isolated from the fullness of
99
ethical social relations. But whereas "abstract right" only addressed
the externalities of individual behavior, "morality" is concerned with
those norms and principles by which the conscientious person conducts
his own life. Whereas the object i fi cat ion of the abstract will is
property, "the externa 1 i zat i on of the subjective or moral will is
action". Hegel rejects any Final opposition of external and in-
ternal, "legality" and morality, negative and positive injunction.
Each must complement the other in the self-conscious, autonomous person.
In morality, Hegel pays his tribute to Kantian ethical theory, as in
abstract right he qualifiedly vindicates Hobblst natural law. Kant's
"categorical imperative" was already operative in the imperative of
right, "Be a person and respect others as persons". In morality the
imperative is internalized to form the basis of the subjective moral
] ife.
As a purposive agent, I am responsible only for those deeds my
101 ... 102
Wl 11 is in fact author of. Mine is the "right of intention".
the right to make my own particular content "the soul of the action",
• ,,
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"the right of the subject to find satisfaction in the action .
Moreover, I have a "right of insight into the good
II.
The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is
to recognize as valid shall be seen by i t as good, and
that an action, as its aim entering upon external ob-
jectivity, shall be Imputed to it as right or wrong,
good or evil, legal or illegal, in accordance with its




As conscientious moral agent I may demand that any and all claims on
my obligation "be based on good reasons".
But the right of morality too has its rather strict limits. Spe-
cifically it breaks down at the border of the family, the first "moment"
of ethical life, where the rule of love over-rides that of individual
will. If the "moral" will were wholly uninhibited "ethically", the
family, and marriage, v;ou1d be a contract. This, Hegel says emphatically,
they are not :
The object about which a contract is made is a single
external thing, since it is only things of that kind
which the parties' purely arbitrary will has in its
power to alienate.
To subsume marriage under the concept of a contract
is thus quite impossible. .. ^'^^
Hegel makes the same argument as to regarding the contract form as the
basis of the state, the third and highest (most "concretely" developed)
of ethical life's three moments. In general Hegel refuses to allow the
purely "subjective" will freedom outside the limited orbit of relations
among individuals qua individuals. Even within civil society, where
the individualistic is by far the dominant dimension, it is, as we shall
sec, but one dimension of a fuller ethical life. Hegel has little
patience with strictly subjective "moral ism":
However essential it is to give prominence to the pure
unconditioned self-determination of the will as the
root of duty, and to the way in which knowledge of the
will, thanks to Kant's philosophy, has won its firm
foundation and starting point for the first time owing
to the thought of its infinite autonomy, still to aditere
to the exclusively moral position, without making the
transition to the conception of ethics, is to reduce
this gain to an empty formalism, and the science of
morals to the preaching of duty for duty's sake.'^/
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Worse, the "pure" subjectivity is given to championing the anarchic
claim of intention over consequence:
It is one of the most prominent of the corrupt maxims
of our time to enter a plea for the so-called "moral"
intention behind wrong actions and to imagine bad men
with well-meaning hearts... The result is that crime
and the thoughts that lead to it, be they fancies how-
ever trite and empty, or opinions hov/ever wild, are to
be regarded as right, rational, and excellent, simply
because they issue from men's hearts and en thus i asms . ^
To Hegel this is the "final, most abstruse, form of evil, whereby evil
is perverted into good and good into evil, and consciousness, in being
aware of its power to effect tliis perversion, is also made aware of
itself as absolute, is the highwater mark of subjectivity at the level
of morality; it is the form into which evil has blossomed in our present
1 09
epoch...". Ironically, and paradoxically, "co have a conscience",
if conscience is only formal subject i^'i ty, is simply
to be on the verge of slipping into evil; in independent
self-certainty, vyith its independence of knowledge and
decision, both morality and evil have their common root.
Precisely because this is so does Hegel aver that the "substantive base"
of morality, as also abstract right, is the "absolute" ethical life that
1 i es beyond them.
In sum: The modern citizen would know his "rights", as he would
his way around the sphere of conviction and conscience, while at once
going beyond the one-s i dedness of subjective moral i cy to recognize and
assent willingly to the claims of the objective social whole. A properly
educated conscience would inspire conviction that not only separated man
from organized society, but equally united him with it. The ideal
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individual would be one who, first educated to the standpoint of Moral itat,
is able to reconcile this conscience with the objective ethical laws of
community and state. The painful contradictions of the day would then
be overcome through a rational system of individualism and social ethics.
Yet a positive social ethic could not take root in the soil of a
strictly Christian cultureJ^^ Equally was the pagan patriotism of
fifth-century Athens unsuited to tne modern climate. And either without
the other, Hegel was certain, led inevitably to moral error, and set
the ship of state on an uneven keel. What, then, was the source of
Hegel's optimism? His dilemma appears acute. In a world run rampant
with individualism, particularism and alienation, where did Hegel find
cause to proclaim the emergent ijnity of freedom and order, to hail the
1 1
2
modern state as "the march of God in the world", and declare that
"the basis of the state is the power of reason actualizing itself as
1 1 3
wi 11"? ^
Paradoxically, the basis of order is the basis of disorder itself.
On Hegel's analysis, the very "civil society" that Inspired a "riot of
self-seeking" has within itself the beginnings of those means necessary
to contain its own forces of atomization. The self-same society that
opposed the directive, integral power of the state was at once the
state's necessary complement. This is the peculiar nature of the
relationship of state and civil society, a unity of opposites active
in the tensional mutuality of interrelated dualities: differentiation/
integration; particularity/universality; subjective selfhood/objective
political order. Hegel's 'eternally valid' Insight regarding the
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relation of state and civil society can be put, as a first approximation,
in two parts: (1) In the non- tyran i ca 1
1 y organized society, in which
the particularity of persons is encouraged to develop, and not suppressed,
a relatively autonomous civil society must be allowed to flourish; (2)
On the other hand, a complex and unorganized (or poorly organized) civil
society will, if unchecked by a restraining public will oriented toward
the general interest, continually overreach all restraints. Then the
"public interest" may indeed fall into disuse in political Discourse,
or survive only as an ideological cover for the propagation of one or
another private good. Many will then doubtless come to claim that the
very idea of a public interest is chimerical, that in reality justice
finally _[_s_ always, as Thrasymachus said it is, the interest of the
stronger.
Hegel's view is that state and society are at once opposed and
mutually supportive. The state is al 1 - important to Hegel not because
through revelation it has appeared to him as "the march of God in the
world", but because the state helps to create and sustain, through its
historical process, a human community at once immanent and transcendent,
a denizen of the In-Between zone bounded by transcendental ideality
and contingent worldliness, engaged in representing infinity in the
realm of the finite. The state is the leading edge of the effort to
achieve, sustain, and develop meaning in history. As Kelly explains,
the state makes culture, the civilization of man, possible : "it is to
the creation and preservation of culture in time and through time that
the task of politics is ultimately addressed". In sharp contrast
to
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the Marxian interpretation, it is the stateless communi ty that represents
"pre-history".
.
Man without the state is only half-man. Community minus
the state is only, barely, one step removed from the thralldom of un-
conscious nature. The state, by working and acting "by reference to
consciously adopted ends, known principles, and 1 aws ... actual ly present
to consciousness",^'^ serves as "the effective vessel of culture";''^





A safe harbor for historical meaning, the Hegelian state is thus
above oil else the institutional anchor, the "ground" of unity and
diversity in modern society. It both promotes and protects, through
its educative and sovereign political power, tha culture of th2 di-
versified community. Politics is the organizing principle of a stream
of culture that persists despite the decline and disappearance of
particular political units. The state is an enabl i ng institution,
i.e. it grounds those other institutions and common experiences that
in turn make the state Spirit's most potent of humanizing forces. As
a comprehensive organ of justice and the common life, it facilitates
those "higher" purposes to which the human spirit aspires. As such
the state stands in a reciprocal relationship with the rest of "society"
that sidesteps any simple "ends/means" character i ;?at ion.
The Hegelian state is thus neither purely interpolated from civil
society, nor superimposed upon it. The relationship is far more complex.
As against the ideology of the ancien regime , the Hegelian state, it is
true, belongs to aUj but as against liberal theory, it is no one's
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convenience. Indeed, civil society at a point "goes over" into the
state. In general
,
civil society is the sphere of conflict, the state
that of reconciliation. But the higher forms of civil society are in
fact inseparable from the interests of the state. The state does not
all at once spring into being. It exists, if only in germ, in every
cohesive society; "the state as such is not so much the result as the
beginning. It is within the state that the family is first developed
into civil society and it is the Idea of the state itself which dis-
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rupts itself into these tv/o moments". But the full development of
the state depends uoon a condition especially, if not distinctively,
modern--viz. the condition whereby the competition of various social
spheres threatens to tear apart tfie life of the whole.
The Cunning of Economics
For Hegel, as for Marx, political economy is the progenitor of
the modern state. Prompted by his reading of English political econo-
mists, Hegel clearly perceived the emergence of a new "civil society",
a new social sphere exhibiting a number of remarkable new features;
increased specialization, an expanding market of accelerating commodity
exchange, accumulation of capital resources, the inchoate creation of
an industrial proletariat, the appearance of a full-blown "contract"
consciousness, the shaping of the new man of the new age, homo economicus ,
the bourgeois man who leads a private life fully distinct f rom-- i ndeed
,
to all appearances opposed to--public existence. It is finally useless
to lament this development, Hegel believes. Much more important is it
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to descry the positive significance of civil society, to grasp how "the
creation of civil society is the achievement of the modern world which
has for the first time given all determinations of the Idea their due"J^^
Civil society is indeed the cause of much atomization, social dis-
location, etc. In contrast to the family, which finds its truth in
mutual feeling, and the state, firmly rooted in the standpoint of
Reason, civil society is the sphere of egoism loosed of all religious
and eth i co-pol i t i cal considerations. Its power is well-nigh irresistible:
"Civil society is the tremendous power which draws men into itself and
claims from them that they work for it, owe everything to it, and do
1 20
everything by its means". Here the subjective will is given an
apparent free rein. Civil society appears as a mode of social relations
wherein ethical life seems completely lost in a riot of self-seeking
egotism. In my drive for subjective satisfaction I treat everyone as
a means to my ends; my attention is always focused unwaveringly on my_
aims; my motive--that of enlightened sel f- i nterest-- i s guaranteed by
arrangements of law and justice.
This principle of civil society--universal egoism--is certainly
not to be discovered only in the modern world. It is inherent to all
possible forms of society. But unlike previous forms of social organ-
ization, modern society develops a distinct social sphere out of this
egoism. For the first time man stands full forward in his new amphibian
guise; now he is man as member of civil society as well as man the
citizen of the state. It. is this, and the momentous endeavor to strike
a balance between these two aspects, that is distinctively, if not
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exhaustively, descriptive of politics in the modern age.
Within the new sphere the free play of individual passions and
interests is unhampered. Civil society is the sphere of the "concrete"
person, the play of individual interests to their fullest extent. Civil
society is at once the logical and existential destruction of the family
as dominant ethical unit. The whole movement of civil societ/ is away
from the mutuality of the family. This is as it should be, thinks Hegel
The interdependence born of civil society is less subjact to irrational
and destructive forces than is the family. It does not break down and
dissolve as families natural Iv do when children leave and parents de-
cease. Culture is impossible on the basis of families alone. The
rationality of civil society is not so easily dissolved, and as such
is integral to the freedom of the modern individual. As the "external
121 ...
state" we experience civil society as the ongoing, i ntersubject i ve
institutional reality that it is.
We owe civil society's effulgence of subjectivity, says Hegel, to
a division of labor unparalleled in degree and complexity by an prior
age. The division develops through a dialectic of need : civil society
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is the "system of needs". Particularity is first of all subjective
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need, which attains to objectivity through external things and wopk.
Civil society first of all considers man as_ the creature of needs--not
the "person" of abstract right, nor the "subject" of morality, nor the
family member--but the "burgher". Man as burgher transcends the re-
strictions of animal existence through (l) the multiplication of needs
and the means of their satisfaction, and (2) the division of need
into
27k
P^r^s : each part of a need becomes then itself a need J This is
the basis of the ad infinitum multiplication of needs and thus the
possibility of human fulfillment.
^o'"'< is therefore as central to the philosophical anthropology of
Hegel as it is to Marx's. Man works in order to fulfill his needs, in
modern society themselves the product of the specialized division of
labor. All that man consumes is human labor, for everything is worked
1 26
on by labor. Man thus makes his own needs; by his own activity,
therefore, he makes himself, frees himself from the restricted par-
1 27ticularity that constltutss animalistic bondage to nature. Work is
thus one hinge or which sv/ings the freedom of man. There is always a
"moment of liberat'on" involved in man's creation of his own situation
through work.
'^^
But the division of labor/multiplication of needs is not self-
limiting, and in this lies a potentially fatal flaw. The multiplication
of needs alone never lifts humanity above the sphere of needs itself.
What is worse, man can become the craven slave to irrational false
needs. Civil society literally spills over an endless excess of
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desires that carry to a "false infinite". Particularity is mad
with the power of its own apparent fullness: "Particularity by itself
is measureless excess, and the forms of excess are themselves measure-
1 ^0
less". Articulating at an early date what would become a most
familiar criticism of capitalist culture, Hegel says that the pro-
ducers, the capitalists, indeed purposively create false needs of
131
"comfort" in order to realize higher profits.
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The unlimited multiplication of need produces too a polarized
class structure. The production of false needs results in unequalled
luxury on the one hand, but, vyhen particularity is measureless, Hegel
says, "want and destitution (is) measureless too".^^^ "In a state of
unimpeded activity"'^^ civil society creates a "rabble of paupers"^^'*
1 35and a culture of poverty on the one side, and "the concentration of
disproportionate wealth in a few hands" on the other. It creates,
moreover, "distress" for the working class, robbing it of "the broader
freedoms and especially the intellectual benefits of civil soc I ety" . ^ "^'^
Clearly civil society on its own terms degrades life, tears the fabric
of society apart. Here it stands in most clear-cut opposition to
the state, and it is the state that must finally take contro', or try
to: "the discord of the situation can be brought Into harmony only by
1 39the state which has power over it".
Hegel believed that the tendency toward unlimited particularity,
class polarization, and disintegration is matched, if not equally, by
a counter- tendency tovvard universality, sociality, and integration,
within civil society. V/e may say that if his recognition of the former
Is the basis of the opposition between state and society, It Is faith
in the latter that underglrds the notion of their reciprocity.
Human need implies association. At the same time that the indi-
vidual pursues self-oriented action, he Is universally dependent on
the whole of civil society. His needs can only be met In civil society:
"In the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends... there Is formed
a system of complete Interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness,
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and legal status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness
and rights of all. On this system individual happiness, etc. depends,
and only in this connected system are they actualized and secured" . ^
The division of labor only enhances this universal interdependence;
the result is that the "whole sphere of civil society is the territory
of mediation".
The fostering of the implicit universality of human associ at ion--
through the manifestation of that universality in concrete social re-
lations that at once embody the substantive will of the i nd i v i dua 1 -- i
s
the great achievement of civil society. Within the compass of civil
society, my every self-oriented act reflects the interdependence of
all on all:
The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference to
others introduces here the form of universality. It
is from others that I acquire the means of satisfaction
and I must accordingly accept their views. At the same
time, however, I am compelled to produce means for the
satisfaction of others. We play into each others' hands
and so hang together. To this extent everything private
becomes soci al . .
.
To a degree, then, Hegel endorses the notion of Adam Smith's notorious
"hidden hand" of economics, though in the Hegelian optic it is the
"cunning of reason" inspiring society its first breath of universality:
When men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally
related to one another in their work and the satisfaction
of their needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a
contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of every-
one else, that is to say, by a dialectical advance, sub-
jective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the
particular through the universal, with the result that
each man in earning, producing and enjoying on his own




The merely implicit universality of a hidden hand-- insuf f I cient ground
for the raising of a true state--is supplemented by more explicitly
universal forms, necessary preconditions for the state's development.
These are civil society's more complex, mediating aspects--"cul t i vat ion"
(Bildung), the execution of political justice (Polizei) and the "classes'
and "corporations" out of which the true state emerges. It is on the
latter aspects I should like now to focus.
In the first place, the social division of labor implies social
differentiation in the form of class divisions. This division is
essential; in the Philosophy of History Hegel says that
a real st£ite and a real Government arise only after a
distinction of classes has arisen, when wealth and
poverty become extrem-B, and when such a condition of
things presents itself that a large portion of the
people C£n no longer satisfy its necessities in the
way in which it has been accustomed to do so... 1^*5
1^6
Hegel is more than aspiring to metaphysical neatness here. Neither
is he simply making virtue of necessity. Rather he is noting a basic
institutional and psychological fact, viz. that until such time as
society feels the pressing need of a self-conscious directive and
restraining force, there vvi 1 1 properly develop neither objective state,
institutions nor the subjective "sense" of the state on the part of
citizens. Humanity makes the leap ahead to the next, and higher,
sphere of being only v;hen It lives in danger of expiring at this , the
given level. The state comes onto the scene when bourgeois society,
imprisoned by the pull of anarchic self-seeking, realises itself cut
off from the higher manifestations of spirit. When it experiences the
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state as loss, as deprivation, the state is called upon to accomplish
the breakthrough to the higher forms. To take an example close to
home: Precisely because it had yet to articulate itself into antago-
nistic class divisions, America on Hegel's view was suspended, temporarily
at least, outside the "Germanic" stream cf history. No true state was
possible on American soil, for the ground was not yet broken up by the
antagonism of class conflict. The United States had not yet risen above
1 hi
the "system of needs".
Yet in the Hegelian schema class is not one-sidedly divisive; it
is at once a mode of integration, of mediation. The individual is
linked to the universal through his class membership, for it is itself
a limited universal. Through membership the Individual takes his place
in the social order; he is a "somebody", that is, someone whose Indi-
vidual existence carries larger social relevance:
When we say that a man must be a "somebody", we mean
that he should belong to some specific social class,
since to be a somebody means to have a substantial
being. A man without class is a mere private person
and his universality is not actua 1 1 zed .
^
Though classes are themselves part of the "private" sphere, bound
tightly to the realm of the particular, through class membership the
individual, the "bourgeois", takes his first step toward the uni-
versality of public existence. He begins the 'ascent' to citizenship.
Class membership is a particularity that is not mere particularity,
but particularity tied d I a 1 ect I ca 1 1 y to the universal. It is thus
the primary building block of Hegel's theory of citizenship in the
articulated modern state. The principle of the bourgeois (will.
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talent) is thus championed by Hegel, yet mitigated by the inte-
grative dimension of class.
Where formerly stood a multitude of Isolated "persons" now stands
a set number--three, exactly--of classes, each uniting its members not
merely regarding their relation to the "means of production", but more
importantly, in modes of life and consciousness. Briefly, (1) the
agr icul tural class, having "its capital in the natural products of the
soil which it cultivates" practices a mode of life "in general such
that this class has the substantial disposition of an ethical life
1 50
which is immediate, resting on family relations and trust"; it is
thus the most conservative class; (2) the bus i ness class, in contrast,
for its livelihood "is thrown back on its work, on reflection and
intelligence, and essentially on the mediation of one nan's needs and
work with those of another". Where the agricultural class is rooted
In the immediacy of existence, close to feeling aid reliant on nature,
the business class establishes itself through the modes of craftsman-
ship, mass production and exchange, and thus lives a mediate, "reflective"




^ it is infused with
the spirit of individualism, and demands law and order as the guarantee
1 52
of the fruits of industry; the un i versal class, which we will return
to below, is relieved of laboring directly to provide its livelihood;
Its task is "the universal interests of the community". In this class
immediate and mediate are most closely joined, as "private interest
finds its satisfaction inthe universal .
Thus class is a mode of commonality for its members. Each class
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expresses a form of universality, uniting individuals and making wholes
out of what was formerly merely parts. Class is a legitimate form of
social division, since through class membership merely physical de-
pendence is sublimated into relations of ethical interdependence.
Through class affiliation the individual achieves ethical being: "A
man with no class Is a mere private person and his universality is not
actual i zed".
On the basis of their integrative function, Hegel accords the
classes institutional political meaning. As "Estates", "which are the
'classes' given a political s
i
gn i f i cance"
,
^ they form part of the
legislative power, and "stand between the government in general on
the one hand and the nation broken up into particulars (people and
associations) on the other".
The classes and Estates are an al 1 - important bridge between private
and public life, between bourgeois and citoyen:
The Estates have the function of bringing public affairs
into existence not only implicitly, but also actually,
i.e. of bringino into existence the moment of subjective
formal freedom, the public consciousness as an empirical
universal, of which the thoughts and opinions of the
Many are part i cu 1 ars . ' 56
More on this shortly.
Class membership is, however, but the most general of a circle of
involvements that constitutes the mediated identity of the individual
with the universal nature of himself. As a concrete manifestation of
the universal/particular duality of modern life, class is a precondition
for political life, but it is hardly public life itself, especially from
the standpoint of the single citizen. The individual draws closer to
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true, full political existence through membership in the corporations
,
those associations in which lie, says Hegel, "the proper strength of
the state"J^''
The Corporate Mind
In the legally integrated corporation, or what G. Heiman calls the
1 58
system of "lega 1 -pol i t i cal pluralism", we confront the cornerstone
of Hegel's concept of citizenship. In the corporate doctrine dovetail
all the elemental factors requisite to "membership" in the modern state:
recognition of the free personality of the individual, the institutional
mediation of private and public interests, citizen participation in public
business, the cultivation of civic virtue, educated respect for the rule
of law as the highest expression of the articulated state.
In a serious sense, we are in Greece again. In the corporate as-
sociation Hegel believes he has discovered the modern analogue to the
socio-political "space" that was the pol is; the philosophical memory
has found, as it were, a space wherein to disgorge its spiritual content.
But Hegel's doctrine has in its own right deep and meaningful historical
and legal roots; corporatism is a doctrine familiar to the European po-
litical consciousness, if foreign to the American manner of thought.
Especially in a setting (Germany) breft of any more modern modes of
political integration--e.g. British-style political parties--was Hegel
intent on tapping a rich heritage than included ancient Roman as
well
as later German jurisprudential sources. As Hegel handles it, how-
ever, the corporation is no mere substitute for something
superior but
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absent from the scene. Refurbished and pressed into modern service, the
corporation Is the linchpin of Hegel's attempt to fashion a model of an
articulated political community adequate to the modern context. In the
corporation, the individual takes the fateful step out of the cave of
need and into the light of public experience.
The immediate philosophical and social context of the theory v;e
have already reviewed to some degree; it can be read as a catalogue of
the woes attending the emergence of the modern age from tfie disintegration
of medievalism. In contrast to the apparently warm and decentralized
feudal universe of guild, company, association and f el 1 ov^/5h i p , we have
seen that the modern world was bedeviled by t^.e interrelated problems of
alienation, individualism, abstract idealism, and the un i ta r i an i sm and
centralism of political power. This last characteristic, especially as
flavored with the abstract ideal of a direct citizen/state relationship,
denied the possibility of active membership, and undermined all inter-
connections of public and private life.
To be sure, Hegel is most intent on achieving a union oF universal
and particular ends. It is his constant theme that this union resides
at the right hand of the "Idea" of the state; and the empirical state
that does not at least approximate the condition of union raises its
political edifice over badly broken turf: "Stability", Hegel says, is
only secured
when universal affairs are the affairs of each member in
his particular capacity. What is of utmost importance is
that the law of reason should be shot through and through
by the law of particular freedom, and that my particular
end should become identified with the universal
end.'^U
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The particular well-being of the citizens tops the priority list of that
state that values survival: "If all is not well with them, if their sub-
jective aims are not satisfied, if they do not find that the state is
the means to their satisfaction, the footing of the state is insecure"J^^
But in a political community wanting of mediatory organs, centralization
is the unavoidable rule, as is hostility between citizens and government,
and the mutual alienation of each from the other. The state cannot deal
1 62
with an unorganized multitude, a mere mass of "heap", except wi th a
heavy hand. To rewrite Madison somewhat, if unorganized men vjere angels,
they would have no need of centralized government. But in a society
governed by self-seeking motives, the critical lacuna left by the absence
of organization and control is chaos, anarchy in its most negative sense.
An atomized society begs ^or a mighty nucleus to hold it together.
Now, the corporations, too, might be manipulated by the centralized
state for purposes of control. This was Mussolini's tactic, as that of
corporate fascism in general. But the manipulated corporation is other
than the organization Hegel had in mind. His aim is to have the masses
1 63
"mighty and powerful". He has only contempt for empty, if often
eloquent, talk about an undifferentiated "people": "When we hear
speakers on the Constitution expatiating about the 'people', ttiis un-
organized collection, we know from the start that we have nothing to
expect but generalities and perverse declarations .
The good political community is the pluralistically differentiated
. .
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community, and the corporat i on--the legally "authorized" association
is the- sun of the plural universe Hegel envisions. Not surprisingly,
in
28A
the corporation we discover Hegel's clearest and most practical meaning
of "mediation", the i nd i spens i b 1 e cement of the state, expressed in
specific, concrete terms. The corporation is the political link ofthe
subjectively moral individual to the comprehensive rationality of state
and society. Here competing interest and common interest, private and
public, all are rationalized. Hegel intends to ensure that the indi-
vidual is fitted into a life larger than his limited bio-'social' ex-
istence can provide, and at the same time guarantee that that larger
life does not oppress his free individuality. In the corporate life
are met political needs beyond the reach of a civil society mireo in
the "system of needs". The individual can be a fully 'paid-up' citizen
through membership and participation in one or another of these organs
of mediation. We discern here Hegel's central political impulse at its
most unambiguous: above all, Hegel wants everyone to have a stake in
the 'system', to participate in an order that equally guarantees public
and private good, and thereby to bind, through his own subjective will,
every individual to the order of Being that is the Idea.
As everywhere in Hegel, Spirit is immanent. The corporate organ-
ization is a further division of the "labor organization" of civil
society. When individuals are split "into different branches" by
virtue of the sort of work they do,
the implicit likeness of such particulars to one another
becomes really existent in an association, as something
common to its members... a member of civil society is in
virtue of his own particular skill a member of a Corpo-
ration . ^ ^7
Corporate membership is to hold close to everyday life; indeed its meaning
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hinges on "selfish purpose, directed toward its particular self-interest".
It is clear that the 'idealist' philosopher Hegel means for the corpo-
ration to provide a stable focus for citizenship precisely because it
is rooted in everyday purposes, "Its proper task and Interest".
Indeed, the corporation is like a "second family for its members",
1 69protecting them "against particular contingencies" and providing
them "the education requisite" for their participation as members. ^^'^
The corporation secures tlie individual's livelihood, he in turn con-
tributes his time, energy and sici 1 1 , By virtue of his relationship
with the corporation, he further determines his universality:
this nexus of capability and livelihood is a recogn I zed
fact, with the result that the Corporation member neecs
no external marks beyond his own membersnip as evidence
of his skill and his regular income and subsistence, as
evidence that he Is a somebody. It Is also recognized
that he belongs to a whole which is Itsel^ an organ of
the entire society, and that he is actively concerned
in promoting the comparatively disinterested end of the
whole. Thus he commands the respect due to one in his
soc i a 1 pos i 1 1 on . ^ 7
1
Conscious of his place, the individual looks beyond his mer e self-
interest to the Interest of the corporation. Thus through his membership
the individual achieves a critical measure of social Integration: "Un-
less he is a member of an authorized Corporation, en individual is without
rank or dignity, his Isolation reduces his business to mere self-seeking,
and his livelihood and satisfaction becomes insecure .
In this connection Hegel expresses a profound psychological insight
into the rapacity of the common bourgeois. Because he Is ethically "un-
connected",
he has to try to gain recognition for himself by giving
286
external proofs of success in his business, and to these
proofs no limits can be set. He cannot live in the manner
of his class, for no class really exists for him, since
in civil society it is only something common to particular
persons which really exists--i.e. something legally con-
stituted and recognized. Hence he cannot achieve for
himself a way of life proper to his class and less idio-
syncrati c. ^73
Hegel is counting on an ethical collaboration of family and corporate
association to prevent the engendering of a viciously anomic dialectic:
"As the family was the first, so the corporation is the second ethical
root of the state... The sanctity of marriage and the dignity of Corporate





civil society revolve .
But it is an explicitly political function that forms the leading
edge of the corporation's general role in achieving social integration.
It is unavoidable, says Hegel, that "under modern political conditions"
the ordinary citizen is shut out from direct participation in the
business of the state; yet
it is essential to provide men--ethical ent i t i es--wi th
work of a public character over and above their private
business. This wot-k of a public character, which the
modern state does not always provide, is found in the
Corporation. We saw earlier that in fending for himself
a member of civil society is also working for others.
But this unconscious compulsion is not enough; it is in
the Corporation thot it first changes into a known and
thoughtful ethical mode of life. ..its purpose i s . . . to
bring an isolated trade into the social order and elevate
i t to a sphere in which it gains strength and respect. '75
it is true that Hegel is inclined, at least at one point in the Philosophy
of Right, to denigrate both the importance of the corporation's business
and the competence of the corporate members handling it.^^^ But this
business is by no means inherently "trivial"; it includes all those
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"particular interests which are common to everyone" within the as-
sociation , ^ And participation, however indirect, in the management
of these affairs is an essential ingredient in citizenship training; the
179
"activity directed on a universal end" that the corporation provides
its members is the foundation for civic virtue. An ascending spiral of
involvements connects individual and state. Just as in the course of
his corporate activity the individual looks beyond his mere self-interest,
so in the course of self-government the corporation recognizes the
grounding of its own particular common interest in the general aims of
the state. In this recognition of a higher commonality of interest,
Hegel says, lies the substance of "patriotism":
This is the secret of patriotism of the citizens in
the sense that they know the state as their substance,
because it is the state that maintains their particular
spheres of interest together with the title, authority
and welfare of these. ioO
Participation at the assoc i at i ona 1 level is thus an i nd i spens i bl
e
variable in the formula for political unity. Through participation in
the public business of the corporation the individual is drawn out of
his purely private self; he grows "virtuous". This is the process of
"Bildung", or civic education, by which the antagonistic bourgeois
grows into the cooperative, state-minded citizen, and of which a solid
bond of public and private is born. The consciousness of the inter-
section of universal and particular interest means that "the
corporation
mind, engendered when the particular spheres gain their title to
rights,
is now inwardly converted into the mind of the state,
since it finds in
A u 181
the state the means of maintaining its particular ends
.
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The requirement that citizens have a field for the exercise of
political particlpation--a political "space"--colors the Hegelian po-
litical community a decidedly pluralistic hue. The administration of
the state shall be arranged so that "civil life shall be governed in
1 82
a concrete manner from below where It is concrete", thereby leaving
1 PiT.
"outside the absolutely universal interests of the state" a wide
sphere of activities and interests. The proper arrangement of social
powers results not in fragmentation, b'Jt that coincidence of universal
and particular which underlies both the stability of the state and the
meaningful political life of the citizens: "The concrete state is the
whole, articulated into its particular groups". True enough, Hegel
says, corporate associations
won too great a measure of self-subsistence in the
Middle Ages, when they were states v/ithin states and
obstinately persisted in behaving like independent
corporate bodies. But while that should not be
allowed to happen, we may none the less affirm that
the proper strength of the state lies in these as-
sociations. In them the executive meets with
legitimate interests which it must respect, and
since the administration cannot be other than help-
ful to such interests, though it must also supervise
them, the individual finds protection in the exercise
of his rights and so links his private interest with
the maintenance of the whole. 1^5
Hegel could hardly be more affirmative of the state's reliance on
this "group" system. The plurality of corporations is "the firm
foundation not only of the state but also of the citizen's trust in
it and sentiment toward it. They are the pillars of public freedom
..."J^^ instrumental in guarding "the security
of the state and its
187
subjects against the misuse of power by ministers and their officials".
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"The state is actual only when its members have a feeling of their own
self-hood and it is stable only when public and private ends are identi-
cal". Without this identity, "the state is left in the air"J^^
Nor is the political function of the corporation restricted to its
alloted measure of devolved self-government. The diversity of voluntary
associations is directly reflected in the constitutional organization
of the state "proper", wfiere a system of corporate representation in
the Lov/er House of the Assembly of Estates functions as the primary
institutional mediation of the particularity of the associations on the
one hand and the universality of the social/political whole on the
other. As such it is yec another mode of integration, a more specifi-
cally "political" check on egoism, uncontrolled part icu 1 ari zat ion, and
fragmentat ion
,
We have already noted the central importance Hegel attributes to
the Estates, the "classes" accorded political significance: "The real
significance of the Estates lies in the fact that it is through them
that the state enters the subjective consciousness of the people and
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that the people begin to oarticipate in the state". The corporate
association is the determinate form of this participation. Hegel
vehemently opposes the principle of liberal representat ion--d i rect
universal suf f rage--preci sely because it fails to mediate between popu-
lation and government. Rooted in the standpoint of the isolated indi-
vidual, it falls prey to the fallacy of a direct relationship of citizen
to state, and so to the serious dangers that fallacy spawns. At its
best the practice of direct elections encourages the indifference of
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the ci tizens:
especially In large state (popular suffrage) leads in-
evitably to electoral indifference, since the casting
of a single vote is of no significance where there is
a multitude of electors. Even if a voting qualification
is highly valued and esteemed by those who are entitled
to it, they still do not enter the voting booth. Thus
the result of an institution of this kind is more likely
to be the opposite of what was intended; election actually
falls into the power of a few, of a caucus, and so of the
particular and contingent interest which is precisely what
was to have been neu t ra 1 i zed . ' 90
The liberal outlook is blind to the true, i.e. social, character
of human historical being. It can imagine nothing but the single voter.
Boasting loudly of "equality" and "liberty", but breft of "fraternity",
it abstracts man from his collective affiliations and thus erodes the
foundations of political community:
The circles of association in civil society are already
communities. To picture these communities as once more
breaking up into a mere conglomeration of individuals
as soon as they enter the field of politics, i.e. the
field of the highest concrete universality, is eo ipso
to hold civil and political life apart from one another
and as it were to hang the latter in the air, because
its basis could then only be the abstract individual
of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be grounded
i n change . . . ^ 9^
A system of direct suffrage can only compile single votes, ab-
stractly forming, by sheer numerical addition, a "people". On Hegel's
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view this "people" is nothing but an "aggregate, a formless mass .
In their unorganized isolation the masses are left politically alienated,
powerless, and uneducated in affairs of state; in short, an intolerable
political condition: "It is of utmost importance that the masses should
be organized, because only so do they become mighty and
powerful. Other-
1 93
wise they are nothing but a heap, an aggregate of atomic units".
And
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as such they are given to being "elementary, Irrational, barbarous, and
frightful" J^'^
The group system means to avoid the flaws of liberal electoral
practice. V/hen citizens elect deputies according to corporate affili-
ation,
in making the appointment, society is not dispersed into
atomic units, collected to perform only a single and
temporary act, and kept together for a moment and no
longer. On the contrary, it makes the appointment as a
society, articulated into associations, commun'ties and
corporations, which although constituted already for"
other purposes, acquire in tliis way a connection with
pol i t i cs . 195
The deputies selected are necessarily "conversant with and participants
in (civil society's) special needs, difficulties and particular inter-
1 96
ests". All the "main branch-es" of society are to be represented;
for deputies are really "representatives in an organic, rational sense
only if they are representatives not of 'ndivlduals or a conglomeration
of them, but of one of the essential spheres of society and its large-
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scale interests".
It appears that Hegel might be preparing a primer in twentieth
century "group theory". But the context, and hence the meaning, of
his approach is a far cry from that of contemporary grcuoist per-
spectives. The deputies represent their special spheres of Interest;
but they are moreover required to transcend purely private in the
higher interest of the general good. Hence a capacity for upholding
the autonomy and dignity of the "public" sphere--that is, for realizing
that the relation of universal and particular is a difference In unity,
a "determinate" un i ty--emerges as the key criterion in the selection
of
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deputies. A far cry indeed from common "democratic" practice:
Since deputies are elected to deliberate and decide on
publ I
c
af f ai rs
,
the point about their election is that
it is a choice of individuals on the strength of confi-
dence felt in them--i,e. a choice of such individuals
as have a better understanding of these affairs than
their electors have and also as essentially vindicate
the universal interest, not the particular interest of
.^o
a society or a Corporation in preference to that interest.
The relationship of elected and electors "is not that of agents with a
1 99
commission or specific instructions". In Rousseau's language, it
is not the "will of all", but tne "general will" that is the anticipated
outcome of public activity. Through his corporate activity the indi-
vidual is linked to this will, that is, to the promulgation of law,
the most perfect representation of freedom and unity in the idea of
the state. The individual and nis position in society are thus "po-
liticized". In this way civic virtue is broadened, the sense of abiding
patriotism deepened.
Thus both through elect Ions and a^ a_ resu 1 1 of the elections of
deputies, the body of citizens is educated to the universal interests
of the state. After deputies are installed in the legislature, the
process of Bildung continues to the benefit of both deputies and
ordinary citizens: "their assembly Is meant to be a living body in
which all members deliberate in common and reciprocally instruct and
convince each other". These deliberations concerning the highest
matters of state "are a great spectacle and an excellent education for
the citizens, and it is from them that the people learn best how to
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recognize the true character of Its interests". Not only does Hegel
expect "political truth" to emerge d I a lect i cal 1 y from these deliberations.
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but that the virtue and skill required of public officials will serve
as exemplary ideals for citizen behavior:
The idea usually dominant is that everyone knows from
the start what is best for the state and that the
Assembly debate is a mere discussion of this knowledge.
In fact, however, the precise contrary Is the truth.
It is here that there first begins to develop the
virtue, abilities, dexterities, which have to serve
as examples to the public. ^02
In sharp contrast to a prevalent view of governmental process, the
publicized activity of the Estates Assembly amounts to a great deal more
than the open exercise In problem-solving: "publicity here is the chief
means of educating the public in national affairs. A nation which has
such public settings Is far more vitally related to the state than one
203
which has no Estates Assembly or one which meets in private".^ The
vital norm of universality, that it Is not too much to call the "essence"
of the state constitution, Is through publicity sunk ever deeper into
the public consciousness.
The publicity of assembly proceedings is moreover a check against
governmental foot-dragging regarding Important issues, as well as, we
may expect, governmental abuse of the public power entrusted to It.
State officials must not only take account of the power of public
opinion; they must themselves keep their noses pressed to the public
grindstone:
It is only because their every step Is made known
publicly in this way that the two houses keep pace
with the advance of public opinion, and it then be-
comes clear that a man's castle building at his
fireside with hi-s wife and his friends is one thing,
while what happens in a great Assembly, where one
shrewd idea devours another, is something quite
different. 20^
29^
This mention of public opinion raises further the important quest
of the nature and arrangement of political power in the Hegelian state
Hegel is of course the exponent par excellence of "positive freedom";
he is preeminently concerned to yoke the dignity of citizenship to the
transcendent grandeur of the state. Through the mediation of citizen-
ship in the articulated state, radical subjectivity merges with the
recovered S i tt 1 i chke i t , the common life. Obedie.nce to the lav/s of the
state, the practice of public virtue, is no hard "duty" (as it is
usually conceived), but the tie that b-nds individual to polity, which
I on
is only itself the manifestation of the individual's "universal" po-
205litical self. We have seen also, however, that Hegei is alert to
the dangers of centralist tyranny. The system cf corporate authority
is devised in part as a critical restraining force:
The security of the state and its subjects against the
misuse of power by ministers and their officials lies
directly in their hierarchical organization and their
answerability; but it lies too in the authority given
to societies and Corporations, because in itself this
is a barrier against the intrusion of subjecti^/e caprice
into the power entrusted to a civil servant, and it
completes from below the state control which does not
reach down as far as the conduct of i nd i v i dua 1 s . 206
Yet it is clear that Hegel neither hopes nor expects the diverse
system of corporate plurality to execute the historical mission of the
modern state. The deputies of the corporate associations comprise only
one-half the Estates Assembly; and this Assembly is itseH" but one
moment in the constitutional structure of the state. The most "repre-
sentative" of institutions shares the political stage with the Upper
House of the Assembly, the Monarchy, and, most importantly, for to here
is directed most of the political limelight, the Universal
state executives.
The Upper Reaches of Political Universality
The Upper House and the Crown we may dispose with In short order,
though this is not to denigrate their significance in Hegel's schema.
They are intended, and so should be Interpreted, as integral moments
in the 'totality' of the state. We observed above that on Hegel's
analysis there are three basic classes, agricultural, business and
universal. The business class is represented in the Lower House, and
the universal class _i_s the executive. The Upper House is, therefore,
the province of the agricultural, or rather for the landed aristocratic
segment of the agricultural class. (Though it seems strange to unite
peasants and landed aristocracy in a single cl ass--though perhaps no
stranger than bringing managers/owners and workers under the heading
of "business" clas£--Hegel does so, and accords the pr i v 1 1 ege--and
obi
i
gat ion--of pclltical activity to the aristocrats.) The gentry is
not represented, but participates directly In debate and legislation.
Hegel thought their "natural" ethical life ("whose basis is family
life") and "Independent" capital (rendered "Inalienable, entailed, and
burdened" by the venerable practice of primogeniture, which Hegel
supports for the political reason about to be given) especially suited
this class "to the task of existing as in essence the moment of mediation"
between state and civil society. That is to say, this class is most able




of state business. Because the private interest of the aristocrats is
In land, its pursuit does not, like the businessman's, depend on the
cooperat ion--or compet i t i on--of other members, on the dangers and
vicissitudes of profit-making, or the benefit of state favors. ^^'^
The constitutional monarch--the "cro//n"--embodies Hegel's moderate
and subtly balanced concept of sovereignty. Neither people nor monarch
per se possess sovereignty, but the state as a whole, with respect both
to its own differentiated i nterna 1 i ty^*^^ and externally to other states.
The person of the "sovereign", a monarch, embodies, 1 i teral ly , the unity
of secular authority in the modern state. The scate needs, Hegel holds,
a particularized willing agency. In the modern state, in contrast to
the feudal or ancient state, this agency is man himself (the "...'I
2 1
0
will' must be pronounced by man himself") represented by the person
of the monarch, shorn of all charismatic characteristics and qualities
of "be lovedness" . He does not render a personal 'I will': "As a matter
of fact, he is bound by the concrete decisions of his counsellors, and
if the constitution is stable, he has often no more to do than sign
2 1 1
his name". Ideally, all decisions of the monarch are mediated
(hence motivated) by his deep sense of the complex internal articu-
lation of the political community. But since Hegel's monarch is
9 19
hereditary, the state is prepared to suffer the poor performance
of a bad sovereign: "he has only to say 'yes' and dot the 'i', because
the throne should be such that the significant thing in its holder is
not his particular make-up... In a well-ordered monarchy, the objective
aspect belongs to law alone, and the monarch's part is merely to set
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2 1 ^
to the law the subjective 'I will' ".
For all hi.s constitutional limitations, however, the monarch is not
without "majesty". His " 'majesty' " is "the Idea of something against
2 1 k
which caprice is powerless", and through which "the unity of the state
is saved from the risk of being drawn down into the sphere of particulari
2 1 5
and its caprices, ends and opinions". Clearly, the legitimacy of the
willing agency is not grounded in the liberal concept of consent; the
'I will' of just anyone (even one so 'majestic' as an elected President)
will not do. The agency must symbolize above all taint and suspicion
of faction and division tfie living community, the "organic moment im-
manent in the state", "an inwardly developed, genuinely organic, to-
tality": "Taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole
which is the i ndespens i b 1 e and direct concomitant of monarchy, the
,216
people is a formless mass and no longer a state' . Wnen the citizen
looks to his monarch, then, he sees not a powerful and despotic lord
to be fearfully venerated, but a symbol of his own substantial self;
he is inspired with loyalty and pride in the state that is both premise
and promise of his freedom and the freedom of his fellow citizens.
The "universal class" is the Platonic guardian class Hegel ianized
in the form of bureaucracy. One class among others in civil society,
the bureaucratic class is at once above the conflict that characterizes
the everyday life of the civil order. It is "universal'" precisely be-
cause its focus is whol ly general . It engages in neither the clash of
special interests nor their "comp rom i se"
. ^ ^
^ Its contact with particular
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is limited to the application of 1 aw--un i versa ] i ty embodied— to specific
cases according to recognized norms. It is unsmudged by particular motive
in its responsibility for "the maintenance of the state's universal inter-
est, and of legality, In the sphere of particular rights (the corporations,
municipal governments, etc.) and the work of bringing these rights back
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to the universal",
Hegel is loathe to the notion of a sphere of universality created
by mere legislative will; law J_s law because it embodies the universal
good; universality is not so merely because a law has been passed through
the legislature. Hsre Hegel breaks decisively with Rousseau and the
whole of the democratic tradition. We have noted Hegel's general ab-
horence to the vague and i 1 1 -coice i ved notion of a "people"; he is yet
more scathingly contemptuous of the idea that the "people" already embody
the general good and have only to express it: "If 'people' means a par-
ticular section of the citizens, then it means precisely that section
2 1
9
which does not know what it wills...". In place of the supremecist
legislative will, en especially knowledgeable, cultivated, dedicated
class of executives Is fojnd necessary to realize that sense of higher
purpose that nourishes the notion of the state. Nor does this class
owe its legitimacy to popular Investiture grounded in legislative will,
majoritarian or otherwise; the Hegelian bureaucracy is legitimate be-
cause it is universal.
This conception of the universal class springs neither from a simple
thirst for administrative efficiency, nor from elitist prejudice and un-
ambiguous authoritarianism; it is grounded in a pol I tical -phi losophical
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position entirely consistent with the whole of Hegel's theory. Especially
prominent here, is the concept of Bildung
, that process of acculturation
to the modes of existence constitutive of the political community and
the culture at large. On Hegel's view society indeed belongs to all
equally, but not all share equally in political intelligence. Partici-
pation in government service ls_ in principle open to all,^^° but qualifi-
cations are very stiff; only those with "competent knowledge, experience,
22
1
and a morally regulated will" need apply. While he intends that the
ordinary citizen rise to his highest self through Identification with the
universal will of the state, he harbors no illusion that an unschooled
citizen body already knows what is generally good. Hegel is hoping (his
whole political vision, we might say, comes to a head here) for a self-
renewing class of civil servants selflessly committed to the general good,
and it alone: they "shall forego the selfish and capricious satisfaction
of their subjective ends; by this very sacrifice, they acquire the right
to find their satisfaction in, but only in, the dutiful discharge of
222
their public function".
Because of their education In a philosophical (humanist and classl-
223
cal) culture, and presumably their close and extended involvement in
corporate activity In civil society, they are the most insightful and
articulate interpreters of the collective purpose. Their state-mi ndedness
22k
is unquestionable (they are "dispassionate, upright and polite");
their "sense" of the social totality deep and intuitive, yet fully
rational. They are the mouthp iece of political order. Because of this
special cultural wisdom they are able to differentiate within the maze
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of political detail essential from accidental, and to implement the
former while rejecting the latter. Within the oven of political wisdom,
unbaked premises of order are transformed into formed and effective
political resolutions.
The modern state is the thoroughly "rational" state; that is, as
we have noted above, it is explicitly guided by rational principles
present to consciousness ("it knows what it wills"). The universal
class, the most politically educated class of citizens, share directly
in this rationality. Theirs is the highest form of political virtue
—
"the willing of the absolute end in terms of thought"; hence to them
is entrusted the responsibility for leadership and sustaining public
confidence in public purposes. This rationality is not only the basis
for a conscientious administrative efficiency, but the essence of the
state's neutrality rn the face of the competing interests that fill
civil society to the point of overf 1 ovyi ng . This neutrality must be
inflexible; the moment the state is identified as partisan, the system
begins to dissolve. As a vitalizing form of superior social unity, the
state becomes worthless. The ethical base for its directive role
crumbles.
Clearly, extraordinary qualities of performance are expected of
the executive class. For this reason is it regretable that Hegel is
not more specific regarding the process by which the required rigorous
.,226
standards are inculcated. The "education in thought and conduct
of the civil servants i s unfortunately indefinite. Hegel does tell us
something of what he means by education:
By educated men, we may prima facie understand those
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who wilhouL the obtrusion of personal idiosyncrasy can
do what others do . . . educat i on rubs the edges off par-
ticular characteristics until a man conducts himself
in accordance with the nature of the thing. Genuine
or igina 1 i ty. . .demands genuine education, while bastard
originality adopts eccentricities which only enter the
heads of the uneduca ted . 227
For the executives, moreover, genuine education is something quite-
distinct from training in "public administration". It is "a mental
counterpoise to the mechanical and semi -mechan i cal activity involved
in acquiring the. so-called 'sciences' of matters connected with adminis-
tration".
But beyond such rather vogue hints, Hegel suggests only the middle
class origin of the executive class as indicative of the source of its
character. Education combin(!s with social origin: "The midd'e class,
to which civil servants belong, is politically conscious and the one
in which education is most prominent. For this reason it is also the
229
pillar of the state so far as honesty and intelligence are concerned".
It is in this class that "tlie consc i ousnoss of right and the developed
230
intelligence of the mass of people is found". We know too, however,
that this self-some class is the seat of all the conflict and "riotous
self-seeking" that is so largely constitutive of civil society. We are
thus left hanging as to the substantial ground of ':)u reaucrat i c knowledge.
Hegel is somewhat more definite as to the means of maintaining a
dutiful dedication to the hallowed norms of neutrality and universality:
"The sovereign working on the middle class from the top, and Corporation-
rights working on it at tlic bottom, are tfic institutions which effectively
prevent it from acciuiring the isolated position of an aristocracy £uid
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using its education and skill as means to an arbitrary tyranny".
Also: "The security of the state and its subjects against the misuse
of power by ministers and their officials lies directly in their
hierarchical organization and their answerabi 1 i ty".^^^ Hegel is more-
over careful, insofar as possible without resort to extreme Platonic
strictures, to economically insulate the bureaucracy: the universal
class must "be reMeved from direct labor to supply its needs, either
by having private means or by receiving an allowance from the state
which claims its industry, with the result that private interest finds
its satisfaction in its work for the un i versa 1 ". ^-^-^
We arrive again then at the question of power and its potential
misuse. We have seen that the pluralistic constitutional structure of
the state is one important "safeguard" in this respect. Similarly the
"hierarchical organization and answerability" just mentioned. Concen-
trated power, Hegel believes, is an invitation to abuse. Yet he is far
from making common cause with liberal antagonists of governmental
tyranny. To Hegel 'i political understanding it is inconceivable that
government as sucli should be subject to citizen suspicion. Hence he
is no devotee of the "division of powers" as commonly conceived:
Amongst current ideas, mention may be made... of the
necessity for a division of power within the state.
This point is of the highest importance and, if taken
in its true sense, may rightly be regarded as the
guarantee of public freedom. . .But when the abstract
Understanding handles it, it reads into it the false
doctrine of the absolute self-subsistence of each of
the powers against the others, and then one-sidedly
interprets their relation to each other as negative,
as a mutual restriction. This view implies that the
attitude adopted by each power to the others is hostile
and apprehensive, as if the others were evils, and that
their function is to oppose one another and as a result
of this counterpoise to effect an equilibrium on the
whole, but never a living unity. 23^
I ew
No "checks and balances" for Hegel, but rather a balanced vi
toward the necessity of achieving unity through differentiation: "In
the rational organism of the state each member, by maintaining itself
in its own position, eo ipso maintains the others in the i rs'' . ^-^^
The same sense of balances marks Hegel's consideration of public
opinion, which may rightfully be considered a further restraining in-
fluence on overweening governmental power. "Public opinion... is a
repository not only of the genuine needs and correct tendencies of
common life, but also. In the form of common sense... of the eternal,
substantive principles of justice, the true content and result of
legislation, the whole constitution, and the general position of the
236
state". Here again Hegel waxes Burkean, referring to the "all-
pervasive fundamental ethical principles disguised as prejudices" that
anchor the state solidly in the i ntersubject I ve life of the whole
popu I at i on
.
The freedom to voice opinion is moreover essential to the "formal
237
subjective freedom of individuals": "everyone wishes to have some
238
share in discussion and deliberation". The law must therefore
239guarantee "freedom of public communication". But Plato continues
to hold the upper hand: 'Common sense' is not knowledge; it is "in-
fected by all the accidents of opinion, by its ignorance and perversity,
2^0
by its mistakes and falsity of judgement". Public opinion is to be
30k
"despised" as well as "respected", and has in fact to be shaped by
those who have .glimpsed the truth: "to be independent of public opinion
is the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational
whether in life or in science". "The great man of the age is the
one who can put into words the will of his age, tell his age what its
will is, and accomplish it".^'*^
The guarantee of freedom rests finally with the supremacy of the
rule of law, as Hegel comprehends it. "Despotism" is precisely "any
state of affairs where law has disappeared and where the particular will
as such, whether of a monarch or a mob. -.counts as law or rather takes
the pi ace of law". Law is public and knov;n zo all citizens; that
the laws be within reach of common understanding is essential to tfieir
universal i ty:
If laws are to have a binding force, it follows that...
they must be universally known.
To hang the laws so high that no citizen could
read them is injustice of one and the same kind as
to bury them in row upon row of learned tomes, col-
lections of dissenting judgements and opinions,
records of customs, etc. and in a dead language
too, so that knowledge of the law of the lana is
accessible only to those who have made it their
professional study. Rulers who have given a
national law to their peoples in the rorn of a
we 1 1 -ar ranged and clear-cut legal code... have
2/^5
been the greatest benefactors of their peoples...
The 'bottom line' of freedom is always the citizens' educated
awareness of political and legal processes. In Hegel's view the
political is the public, is the known, and shared in common; yet it
is a "common" that specifically includes a stress on the individual
citizen: "The right of self-consciousness, the moment of subjective
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freedom, may be regarded as the fundamental thing to keep before us in
considering the necessity for publicity in legal proceedings and for
the so-called jury courts, and this in the last resort is the essence
of whatever may be advanced in favor of their institution on the score
of their utility". The publicity of law and legal proceedings helps
to raise the subjective consciousness to the awareness of its own uni-
versal i ty
.
Finally, we should note in regard to the issue of freedom and po-
lit'cal power Hegel's position vis-a-vis the 1 imi ts of legislation.
Here for once he does strike a decidedly 1 i bera 1 -sound i ng note, dis-
tinguishing his modern concept of state and citizen from that of the
ancients, or the homogeneous rustic community of Rousseau. The law
is concerned with "ethical ties based on the heart, or love and trust",
"but only in so far as these involve abstract right as one of their
aspects. Morality and moral commands concern the will in its most
private, subjective, and particular side, and so cannot be a matter
for positive legislation". "In the higher relationships of marriage,
love, religion and the state, the only aspects which can become the
subject of legislation are tliose of such a nature as to permit of their
being in principle external".
With this we are reminded that the Hegelian project is that of
i ntegrat i ng the diverse aspects of human being. It suppresses only in
the sense of sublimation, never extirpation. The Hegelian state frees
man qua citizen because it liberates him from his own destructive
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political appetites--from anarchic dissolution on the one hand, and
tyrannical centralism on the other. It obliges him to redirect his
drives to the destruction of liberty, insisting on his conformity to
a rational, cooperative venture of politics sufficiently decentralized
to be of human scale and purpose, yet constantly supervised and guided
by the clear-sighted vision of, and will to, the universal good. The
Hegelian state is neither an obstacle to the flowering of the free
personality, nor a necessary restraint on the irreducible evil of
fallen man. Rather just the reverse. Its mission is to encompass
without consuming the personal and subjective in man. It draws out
and perfects the citizen without crippling the bourgeois.
We are reminded, too, that the question of organizing persons and
purposes in common relation--in short, the question of the state--though
critical, is for Hegel not the only question. It partakes of divinity,
even enables, we may say, the transcendental to have its way in the
world. Yet it too has its circumscribed place within the a 1 1 -encompass i ng
Hegelian system. Spirit, the breath of Being, moves ever on from lower
to higher stage, here from the sphere of Objectivity to its Absolute
engagements in art, religion and philosophy, to complete the vast and
immeasurably deep circle of self-knowing that is itself.
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stantial will nianifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking it-
self, accomplishing what it knows and insofar as it knows it."
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State. But since it is easier to find defects than to understand the
affirmative, we may readily fall into tlie mistake of looking at Iso-
lated aspects of the state and so forgetting Its Inward organic life.
The state is no ide<'il v;ork of art; It stands on earth and so in the
sphere of caprice, chance, and error, and bad behavior may disfigure It
in many respects. Sut the ugliest of men, or a criminal, or an invalid,
or a cripple, is still always a living man. The affirmative, life,
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79 The will passes through the stages of the "absolute abstraction or
uinversality" of the ego, the "pure thought of oneself," where anything
and everything can be willed; to the "determinate" stage, where the will
gives itself a .content: it wills something specific and so restricts it-
self (Ibid., Paragraphs 5, 6, pp. 21-23). The ego thereby attains to
"individuality" (Paragraph 7, p. 23), as it becomes "se 1 f -med i a t i ng .
"
It attempts to revert back to the state of pure abstraction (Paragraph
1^, p. 27). But as it is now dependent on some content, it tries to
settle for the content of the uneducated natural "impulses" (Paragraph
15, p. 27). But this is not freedom, but only "arbitrariness," "con-
tingency manifesting itself as will" (Paragraph 15, p. 27). Through
education reflection must be brought to bear on the impulses, to invest
tnem with universality (Paragraph 20, p. 29). Then and only then, when
the will takes "infinite form"--i.e. itself, the educated will — for its
"object, content and aim," is the will free both "in and for itself";
only then is it "the Idea in its truth " (Paragraph 21, p. 29). "A
will is truly a will only when what it wills, its content, is identical
with itself, when, that is to say, freedom wills freedom" (Paragraph
21 addition, p. 232). The "infinite form" that edtcatei the will is
none other than that embodied in the objective ethical law of the com-
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graph 10^, p. 7k.
98
Ibid., Paragraph 105, p. 75.
Hegel is of course not playing the desert isiand moralist See Ibid.,
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which is at the same time to me an other. The achievement of may aim,
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of an individual, and Its form is not that of feel ing or any other pri-
vate (i.e. sensuous) type of knowing, but essentially that of univer-
sals determined by thought, i.e. tiie form of laws and principles. Con-
science is therefore subject to the judgement of its truth and falsity,
and when it appeals only to itself for a decision, it is directly at
variance with what it wishes to be, namely the rule for a mode of con-
duct which is rational, absolutely valid, and universal."
"Luther had secured to mankind spiritual freedom and the reconcili-
ation (of the objective and the subjective) In the concrete." Phi loso-
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lb d.. Par ag raph 203, p. 131.
lb •d.. Paragraph 204, p. 132.
lb •d.
,
Parag raph 204 addi t ion
,
p. 207.
lb d.. Pa rag raph 205, p. 132.
lb d., Pa rag raph 303, p. 198.
lb d.
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Parag raph 307, p. 197.
lb d., Paragraph 301, p. 195.
lb d., Paragraph 290 addition, p. 290.
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G. Heiman, "The Sources and Significance of Hecjel's Corporate
Doctrine," in Pelczinski, Hecjel 's Pol itical Phi losophy
. pp 111-135
Ibid.
Pl_ii losophy of Right
,
Paragraph 265, p. 163,
ibid., Paragraph 265 addition, p. 28l
.
Ibid., Paragraph 290 addition, p. 291.
Ibid., Paragraph 290, p. 190.
Ibid.
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Paragraph 303: p. 198.









Of the three Estates, the corporate form is "specially appropriate"
to the "formal," ot business, estate; this because the business class
had greater need of mediation, as it is "essentially concentrated on the
particular." Ibid., Paragraph 250, p. 152. However, this class includes,
according to Hegel's classification, a very large part of the entire
population. Though it may strike us as naive or unrealistic, it en-
compasses workers in an enterprise as well as the ov\/nc rs/managers
.
Hegel's division follows craft lines; it does not turn on the relation-
ship of a group of people to tlic means of production per se.
Ibid., Paragraph 251, p. 152. Hegel's principle is compatible with
other sorts of associations as well. Knox notes that Hegel is indeed
"thinking not only of economic organizations but also of religious







See Paragraph 252, p. 15^: "Within the Corporation the help which
poverty receives loses its accidental character and the humiliation
wrongfully associated wi t1i it. The wealthy perform their duties to
their fellow associates and thus riches cease to inspire either
pride or envy."









1 78 See Ibid,: "The filling of positions of responsibility in Corpora-
tions, etc., will generally be effected by a mixture of popular elec-
tion by those interested with appointment and ratification by higher





Ibid., Paragraph 255, p. 15^.
Ibid., Paragraph 255 addition, p. 278.
Ibid., Paragraph 289, p. 190.
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Ibid., Paragraph 289, p. 189. Cf. Paragraph 268, p. l6/(: "Patriot-
ism is often understood to mean only a readiness for exceptional sacri-
fices and actions. Essentially, however, it is the sentiment which, in
the relationships of our daily life and under ordinary conditions, luib-
itually recognizes that the community is one's substantive groundwork
and end. It is out of this consciousness, which during life's daily
round stands the test in all circumstances, that there subsequently al-






























290 addition, p. 290.
265, p. 163.
295. p. 192.



















Ibid., Paragraph 301 addition, p. 292.
Ibid., Paragraph 311, pp. 202-203.
Ibid., Paragraph 303, p. I98.
Ibid.
Ibid.. Paragraph 290 addition, pp. 290-291
Ibid., Paragraph 305, p. I98.
Ibid., Paragraph 308, p. 200.
Ibid., Paragraph 311, p. 202.
Ibid.
Ibid., Paragraph 309, p. 201.
Ibid.
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Ibid., Paragraph 150, p. 107: "Talk about vi rtue. . . readi ly borders
on empty rhetoric, because it is only about something abstract and in-
determinate .... I n an ethical community, it is easy to say what a man
must do, what are the duties he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous:
he has simply to follow the well-known and explicit rules of his own
si tuat ion. . . .Vi rtue is the ethical order reflected in the individual
character . ..."
Ibid., Paragraph 295, p. 193.
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Sec Ibid., Paragraphs 305, p. 199; 306, p. 199, and addition, p.
293; 307, pp. 199-200.
208 r. .Ibid., Paragraph 276, p. 179: "The fundamental characteristic of
the state as a political entity is the substantial unity--i.e. the
ideality of its moments." See also Paragraph 278, pp. 179-18O: "Sov-
ereignty depends on the fact that the particular functions of the
state are not se 1 f -subs i s tent or firmly grounded cither on their own
account or in the particular will of' the individual functionaries, but
















Paragraph 280, p. 184.







Ibid., Paragraph 279, p. I83.
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Ibid., Paragraph 303, pp. 197-198: "The universal class, or, more
precisely, the class of civil servants, must, purely in virtue of its
character as universal, have the universal as the end of its essential
activity."
Ibid., Paragraph 289, p. I89..
Ibid., Paragraph 301, p. 196.
Ibid., Paragraph 291, p. 190: "Individuals are not appointed to of-
fice on account of their birth or native personal gifts. The obJect ive
factor in their appointment is knowledge and proof of ability. Such
proof guarantees that the" state will get what it requires; and since
it is the sole condition cf appointment, it also guarantees to every
citizen the chance of joining the class of civil servants."
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Paragraph 296. p. I93.
d., Paragraph 1 87 addition, p. 268.
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Paragraph 296, p. 193.
d.. Paragraph 297 addition, p. 291.




Paragraph 295, p. 192
Paragraph 205, p. 132
234^ Ibid., Paragraph 272, p. 175- Cf. Paragraph 300 addition, p. 292:
"The idea of the so-called "independence of powers" contains the funda-
mental error of supposing that the powers, though independent, are to
check one another. This Independence, however, destroys the unity of
the state, and unity is the chief of all desiderata."
Ibid., Paragraph 286, p. I87.
''^^ Ibid., Paragraph 317, p. 204.
Ibid., Paragraph 316, p. 204.
ibid.
239 Ibid., Paragraph 319, p. 205. Hegel is well aware of the practical
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benefits freedom of speech offers to the state: "Once (the citizen) hashad his say and so his share of responsibility, his subjectivity hasbeen satisfied and he puts up with a lot." Paragraph 317 addition, p.
240
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Parag raph 228, PP
See Rousseau's Social Contract
,
Book III, chapter 15: "The better
the Constitution of the state is, the more do public affairs encroach
on private in the minds of the citizens. Private affairs are even of
much less importance, because the aggregate of the common happiness
furnishes a greater proportion of that of each individual, so that
there is less for him to seek in particular cases."
248




Paragraph 213, p. 137.
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Ibid., Paragraph 213 addition, p. 272.
CHAPTER IV
LOCATING THE POLITICAL: CITIZENSHIP AND THE TENSIONS OF BEING
What follows is a woefully inadequate start at articulating a
viable political theory, or more specifically a theory which situates
politics, state and citizenship in the context of reality. It involves
neither a developed philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of conscious-
ness, without which it seems to me no political theory can be structurally
sound (this whether we proceed from 'material reality' to 'universals' or
vice versa). However, it is, it is hoped, a not totally useless beginning
in the elaboration of a philosophical anthropology (a science of princi-
ples) by which we may meaningfully, if not exhaustively, categorize
political phenomena, and so grasp their sense. In short, it attempts
to describe certain fundamental features of human nature and the human
cond i t i on
.
For this it is not without ontological significance. As will be
abundantly evident, I make what will perhaps strike many if not most
readers as some quite immoderate ontological claims. In this regard
let me say in advance that I welcome with open arms the charge that I
do not adequately substantiate these claims. Not that I am happy over
this sad truth (it pains me to admit it); nor will I claim that an in-
tuition or revelation of their validity raises them above the requirement
of iiubstant iat ion . I am convinced that their validity can be corroborated
(insofar as any claims of this sort can be corroborated), that indeed
various studies in existentialism, psychology, political theory, and
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philosophy and literature in general, not to mention theology, have
already laid a substant i a 1 basis for their corroboration. Part of the
inadequacy of the present study is that it does not incorporate the
variety of substantial contributions in this area. It will, however,
be evident that I have already incurred considerable intellectual debts.
I am especially beholden to the philosophy of Karl Jaspers, the monu-
mental civi 1 izational studies of Eric Voegelin, and the brilliant literary
depth psychology of Fyodo'- Dostoyevsky . ^
The simple fact remains, however, that over the course of a fair
amount of agitated pe-sonal reflection, 1 have come to certain (in the
sense of 'some', no^ 'indisputable') conclusions regarding the human
condition largely via a process of 'intimation'. At this point 1 see
no way around admitting this to be so. More importantly, I see no
reason to be silent on the issues involved because it is. The reader
must, as always, make his own judgement as to whether there is anything
to it all. On the other hand, he may decide that I make much ado about
nothing; that all of what follows is really quite common stuff, if not
exactly mundane and ordinary; or at least that it has all been said
before, and far better. I am tending to become more and more convinced
of this myself. So be it.
Overv i ew
The basic structure of the argument is fairly simple. I believe
that the essential condition of man (always the necessary context for
the location of the political) may be grasped in terms of two fundamental
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'dualities': (l) the duality of 'transcendental' and 'existential'
being; (2) the duality of 'agentic' and 'communal' being. By duality
I do not mean antagonistic dichotomy. Some degree of modal integration
is indispensible to social life as such, and a high degree is possible.
Thus the necessity to think and speak in terms of life in 'tension',
and not, say, in 'contradiction'. But integration is inherently un-
stable. Not by contingent circumstances (e.g. the predominance of
capitalist social relations) but by nature is man doubly emphibious:
He must first of all be considered as living on earth, that is, in
history, but also in the Spirit. Moreover, his being must be con-
ceived of as encompessinc two distinct 'poles', an individual, isolate
pole, and a social, comm-jnal poie. These dualities, and the ambiguities
and tensions thereby implied, comprise the basic structure of a human
being which includes Being, man and society.
The two dualities are complexly interrelated. From the more
strictly ph i 1 osoph i ca 1 /metaphys i ca 1 point of view, agency/communion
is a dimension of tr.e a 1 1 -encompass i ng transcendental/existential
tension: everythino is part of Be i ng -as-such . On the more strictly
pol i t i ca 1 point of view, hiovyever, problems of the Spirit may well be
fruitfully viev/ed as one aspect of the historical task of achieving
existential integration: Be i ng- for-man is worldly, institutionalized
being. To oversimplify, the nature of the relationship will depend on
whether one's gaze is cast to heaven or more rigorously confined to the
earth. The non-deduct i ve dua 1 i ty of viewpoint is part of the human
situation as such. The difference of reference can be important, with
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major consequences depending on specific circumstances. For the moment,
however, the main point is only the interrelationship itself, coupled
with the requirement of conceptual distinction between dualities for
purposes of analytic clarity and faithful description.
In this interrelationship we discern the fundamental first co-
ordinates for the location of the political. Out of man's peculiar
situation in the chain of Being arises the imperative that hs order his
existence. This task, of establishing "order in history" (Voegelin),
is clearly the function of politics in its most general and expansive
sense. Political theory, when it embraces all its dimensions, is onto -
1 og i ca
1
theory as well. As Hegel insisted, politics, as a mode of
Spirit, partakes of the 'divine'. Its existential character does
nothing to alter, though it may do much to obscure, this fundamental
fact. At the same time, the immediate task of the political is to co-
ordinate, mediate and Integrate the multiple and constantly evolving
vitalities of 'society' as a whole into a unified political culture.
This it does in the context of a perspective of right order in history.
But this context itself, except during periods of crisis/disintegration,
may operate quite successfully wholly at the level of tacit assumption.
It is the stage on which the actors in the empirical play of politics
may well forget they are standing on.
It will perhaps be helpful to preliminarily define terms in advance
of a fuller discussion. The 'transcendental/existential tension' refers
to the condition of human participation in the order of Being-as-such,
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a Being which encompasses both the divine Reality 'beyond' space and
time (and so may be referred to as 'God') and the h i s tor i ca 1 -- ' ex i s-
tentiar--empirical being sustained by this Reality. Man has from
earliest times felt the urgency to relate himself to nature, creation,
infinity, destiny: an urgency expressed in the symbols, myths, etc.
that constitute distinctive cultural being, as these are the symbols
encapsulating the primary experiences of man (persons living together
in history) relating himself to nature, his fellov/men as co-ca rt i c i pants
in Reality, and Being in general (God and the universe). The mystery
that fires human vyond^r is man's 'standing in' the relationship of
existence and non-existence, what Paul Tillich calls the human 'problem'
of "ultimate concern": "Our ul timate concern is t hat which determines
our being or not being ... Man is ultimately concerned about tfiat which
determines his ultimate destiny beyond all preliminary necessities and
accidents".^
Existence and non-existence, finitude and infinity, mortality and
immortality: their mysterious relations set the mind tc spinning and
the heart to stirring. Precisely because man defines himself to a
very great degree--because, that is, he is a self-conscious, symbol-
making being situated in an unse 1 f-consc i ous v;orld--he is drawn as by
a magnet to the 'hidden', unmanifest aspects of his being. He senses
that much that is mean i ngf u 1 -- i ndeed all that is most mean ingf u I 1 ays
'behind' the evident. The essential dimensions of being--the unknown,
unexplored stores of Rearity--man seeks so that he may more meaningfully
define what he is to himself by, pa radox i ca 1 1 y , d i scovcr i ng what indeed
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he really, already 'is' in the order of Reality. As the character
Stepan Trofimov.ich remarks in Dostoyevsky
' s The Possessed : "The whole
law of human existence is that man should worship something immeasurably
great. The Immeasurable and the Infinite are just as necessary to man
as is the tiny planet on which he lives". Thus we find that the tension
between the sacred and the profane, between the spiritual and the strictly
secular, is characteristic of even primitive religious conceptions that
lack a definite conception of the deity. ^ But the concern Is not
strictly 'religious': All philosophical preoccupations presuppose an
orientation tov;ard Being; In an echo of Aristotle Karl Jaspers writes
in the Foreward to his Ph
I
] osophy : "Philosophy means to dare penetrate
the inaccessible ground of human sel f-awareness . . .The point of philoso-
phizing is a single thought, ineffable as such: the consciousness of
being".
^
In a formulation which I will employ in the general discussion,
Eric Voegelin has expressed the tensionality of the transcendental/
existential duality in terms of the Platonic concept of "metaxy".
Human existence, Voegelin argues, "has the structure of the In-Between
of the Platonic metaxy , and if anything is constant in the history of
mankind it is the language of tension between life and death, immor-
tality and mortality, perfection and Imperfection, time and timeless-
ness...".'^ Man lives 'between' the divine and the somatic: Being
remains 'outside' man and world, even as man and world 'participate'
in it. There is no escaping the tension. While he may marvel at the
ultimately impenetrable mystery of his situation, it cannot be evaded:
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as he watches all that is worldly pass away, from the depths of his own
transitory being man seeks contact with the everlasting God of Psalms
90:2 : "Before the mountains were brought forth or even thou hadst
formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting,
thou art God". Han's very humanity is formed "through man's openness
to divine presence";^ in transcendence he seeks the eternal ground of
order in his own finite existence.
The terms "ogcntic' and 'communal' 1 have borrowed, in adapted
form, from David Bakan's study. The Duality of Human Existence . The
first part of Bakan's explanation of his usage will serve our discussion
equally well. "I have adopted the terms 'agency' and 'communion' to
characterize two fundamental modalities In the existence of living
forms, agency for the existence of an organism as an individual, and
communion for the pa r t i c i pau i on of tlio individual in some larger organ-
gism of vyhich the individual is a part". For us the "larger organism"
is one or another social form, and specifically political society.
The 'tension' here refers quite simply to the inherent resistance of
mahy agentic modes (e.g. the desire for solitude, instinctual ex-
pression, contempt for prevailing social and/or political norms,
dyadic love, self-aggrandizing egoism, particular 'communities'--
especially the family, but also 'voluntary associations', 'interest
groups', etc. ...) to easy 'social' integration. The tension is
absolute in the sense that it cannot be eliminated, but only mediated.
This mediation is precisely the task of the political; from the individual
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^ I on
standpoint the mode of integration is precisely the mode of citizenship.
An important ambiguity in the terms will be at once apparent; in
fact, a double ambiguity. In the first place, 1 have not restricted
the reference of the terms to the individual. They are to a degree
relative to the entity involved: the individual person is agentic in
relation to the family-as-community, which is in turn agentic in relati
to the local community; the city is agentic in relation to the state,
etc. Thus not only the individual but every social entity has agentic
and communal dimensions. This relativity is introduced in the interest
of unity and flexibility of discussion without the multiplication of
unnecessary terms and categories. Our main focus is the state; as the
'highest', most 'abstract' community, the state does not mediate only
individual citizens, but various collective entities in which citizens
participate. Hopefully the usage will not serve to obscure. For the
most part we will be emphasizing the individual person qua 'agent' in
his quest for self-conscious, 'authentic' existence, and the relevance
of this quest for the communal modality of citizenship.
This clarification already suggests the second ambiguity, viz.
the applicability of the term agentic to both the transcendental and
existential modes. Consider on the one hand the individual who turns
'inward' to seek Being in the pure stillness of meditative solitude;
on the other the individual v/ho shuns the company of his fellow men
out of unmixed misanthropic sentiments. Both are 'agentic'. But the
difference is of course immediately evident. The misanthrope has no
aspiration to transcendence (unless it is to 'transcend' the communal
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pole of human being itself, in which case a more appropriate language
is that of 'repression' and 'derailment').
Consider again, however, two divergent modes of agency which do
both aspire to transcendence: the mystic and the social revolutionary.
Here we discover perhaps the most critical area of transcendent/exis-
tential, agent ic/communal tensional overlap. Mystic and revolutionary
alike share a 'critical' attitude toward existence. Bor.h justify their
efforts by reference to a principle of experiential transformation. The
mystic contrasts the unillumined life with the life of grace, spiritual
Insight, etc. The revolutionary sets a vision of life as it could and
should be--a real, fulfilling existence—over against what it 'is'--
impover i shed
,
'alienated', etc. There are cases in which mystics may
be social revolutionaries, and social revolutionaries mystics. But
this is hardly the usual case in our age. What then is the difference?
Not, certainly, that the revolutionary seeks generally social trans-
formation, and the mystic merely individual salvation; (part of the
argument here, following Voegelin, is that symbol i zat ions of Being
deriving from transcendental experiences are essertial to social order
as such.) The difference, rather, is a difference of transcendental
type. We have already preliminarily 'defined' the first transcendental
type: transcendence for the mystic refers to the experience of Being-
as-such, the 'source' or 'ground' of ontological order; immanent or
inner-worldly reality may be 'attuned' in a better or worse manner to
this fundamental order. 'Transcendence' for the social revolutionary,
on the other hand, derives from the cognition of different dimensions.
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or 'levels', of world- Immanent reality; the given social order, marked
for 'negation', is to be transcended precisely because it denies or
fails to realize certain critical dimensions of this reality. It is
the experience of a fuller, more Integrated 'world' that the social
Q
revolutionary seeks, not the experience of Being 'beyond' the world.
Dante Germino has conceptualized this difference of type in terms of
the distinction between "horizontal" and "vertical" transcendence. '
°
Within limits both are valid modes; in the present essay, however,
the term 'transcendence' will be, unless otherwise specified, restricted
to the 'vertical' mode. 'Agency', on the other hand, will refer to
either mode, depending on context.
A final note, by way of Introduction, I quite v;e11 realize that
much of the following discussion is more than a little remote from the
common athe i s 1 1 c/agiost 1 c , an t i -ontol og i ca 1 and an t i - ' con tempi at I ve
'
,
extremely activist framevyork of contemporary Western political thought.
As I have suggested in the discussion of Marx, I suspect this is part
of the 'problem', that it is likely that a large measure of modern man's
spiritual malaise may be £ttributed to his dogmatic closure to experiences
of 'vertical' transcendence. Again, this is not to either deride activism
or to suggest that great gains for humanity cannot be made through various
modes of 'transcendence in Immanence'. On the contrary, 1 am convinced
that many such gains are long overdue. At the same time, however, I am
inclined to see some truth in Pascal's view that vje have erred in putting
too many eggs in tfie basket of immanence. The 'evil' of modern activism
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is that men "seek it as if the possession of the objects of their quest
would make them really happy"; "To be happy (man) would have to make
himself immortal; but, not being able to do so, it has occurred to. him
to prevent himself from thinking of death" by keeping 'busy' at all
times. He sustains himself, both individually and collectively, by
manufacturing goals which sustain temporarily qua goals, but collapse
as their realization is approached.
On the question of the prevailing athe i sm/agnost I ci sm-- the 'dea:h
of God' in the modern ege--l would only say at this point that I am
inclined to agree with the Delphic oracle's ancient pronouncement:
"Invoked or not invoked, the god will be present". To say this, of
course, proves nothing; it is merely to stake out a position.
Metaxy: Being and Existence
It is necessary for things to perish into that from which
they are born; for they pay one another penalty for their
injustice according to the justice of Time.
--Anaximander^
The condition of metaxy is both the motor of transcendence and
the chain that binds to the earth. Metaxy means that man is the two-
faced Janus: the God-man, the self who is also a Self, and can afford
to dispense with neither aspect of his being. Between him and God is
at once a great gulf and a narrow bridge. The gulf is the gulf betv;een
the polarities of eternity, infinity and the absolute on the one side
and finitude, particularity and mortality on the other. The experience
of v/orldly existence teaches that "solutions can only be finite, can
resolve only particular conflicts in existence, while a look at the
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whole will always show the limiting insolubilities. There is complete-
ness only in particularity and relativity; existence as a whole remains
1 h
unfinished". The bridge, on the other hand, is the awareness that
the latter may be shaped in reference to the former; the mundane can be
'attuned' to the divinely Real. Life in tension of this duality is the
essence of metaxy. The 'why' of i t we do not fathom, but only know that
it is, and for us as v^e are could not be otherwise: "a world without
antionomies, one in which absolute truth would objectively exist and
endure, would mean that Existenz (i.e. the capacity for 'authenticity'--
M.F.) had ceased--and with it the being in existence to which transcendence
1 5
can make itself felt".
The In-Between condition is a distinctively anxious state. "Both
the play and the role are unknown. But even worse, the actor does not
know with certainty who he is himself". Human being in the metaxy
means that man is, from the ontological point of view, radically free.
The duality of self-affirmation is open to any man who contemplates the
metaxic condition, who raises the 'religious' question. He must decide
whether 'transcendence' is real or not, whether th?. world is with or
without God. This alone is enough to place man 10,000 feet above the
rest of 'nature'. "Great Heavens, what are the laws of nature to me!"
declares Dostoyevsky in Notes from the Underground . "Obviously I cannot
pierce the wall with my forehead..., but neither will I reconcile myself
to it just because it is a stone wall". The human enterprise "consists
exclusively in man's proving to himself every moment that he is a man
and not a cog". Deep within man, juxtaposed to the merely biological
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processes, is the spiritual phenomenon of freedom, the apotheosis of
man
.
Yet because he is exalted, the more can he be disorganized, spirit-
ually dis-eased. Because he is able to see the light, the darker can
the human world be. The truly human' task is not that of taking stock
of the world's walls and accepting confinement within them, but of
attunement to the t ranscendent
1 y Real against which man breaks his
head in a wholly different sense. Attunement is a necessity if man is
to be fully man. But as much as man can turn toward Being, so can he
turn away. Life is not tiie pleasantries of sweetness and light; it is
the dilemma of gooo and evil, the necessity of hard choices, the question
of faith.
The awareness of choice is only possible because man harbors within
himself a faculty of transcendence, a sensorium of divine awareness, a
'soul'. It is the soul that perceives the metaxic tension; it is the
soul which is capable of both the direct experience of Being and the
derailment into an unmitigated alienation from it. Plato strikingly
(if, I believe, overly harshly and d i chotomous ly) symbolically depicts
this perception in the P haed rus '
s
account of the philosophic super-
sensible vision:
we beheld with our own eyes that blessed vision..,; then
were we all initiated into that mystery which is rightly
accounted blessed beyond all others; whole and unblemished
were we that did celebrate it, untouched by the evils that
awaited us in days to come; whole and unblemished likewise,
free from all alloy, steadfast and blissful were the
spectacles on which we gazed in a moment of final reve-
lation; pure was the light that shone around us, and pure
were we, without taint of that prison-house which now we
are encompassed withal, and call a body, fast bound therein
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as an oyster in its shell, '
The body dies, the shell goes to dust. But the soul is immortal, and
carries the memory of immortality throughout its wanderings in the world.
At death, or importantly, in moments of philosophic, neotic, Insight in
which the somatic bondage is broken through, the soul returns into it-
self. Then, as the Phaedo tells us,
when it investigates by itself alone, it passes to that
other world of pure, everlasting, immortal, constant
being, and by reason of its kinship thereto abides ever
therewith, whensoever it has come to be by itself and
is suffered to do so; and then it has rest from its





But from its situation in empirical being, within history, the soul
do(js not necessarily return into itself. Again and again a man may ask,
'who am I?', and not 'remember'. The path of awakening is perhaps open
to every person: but how many will dare to tread its difficult course?
There is not only the 'pull' toward the experience of Being, but the
'counterpul 1 ' away from it. By the nature of the human case, as man
has no choice but to seek the truth of being from within the limited
experiential parameters that constitute this being, he may conclude, if
indeed he has stopped to ask the question, that there is no beyond-being,
and thus no value in pursuing the phantasm, perhaps that the very idea
of Being is an invented fiction, a hoax, an opiate to ease the pain of
abused existence. Thus through the use or disuse, the proper or improper
use of the transcendental faculties, man finds truth or falls into de-
lusion. The transcendental/existential tension allows man to go either
way. Voegel in wri tes i n The WoHd^ of _y2£ P£l_ii.:
The conflict occurs between two types of experience.
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Truth is the philosophy of the realissimum that we
experience if we follow the way of the immortali-
zation of the soul; Delusion is the philosophy of
the reality we experience as men who live and die
in a world that itself is distended in time with a
beginning and an end. The characterization of the
philosophy of reality as a Delusion derives its
justification from the experience of a superior
real i ty. . J9
Here the tension is at full strength. The perception of truth is
deliverance, 'redemption'. The capitulation to delusion is 'idolatry',
in Bakan's words "the loss of the sense of the existence of the un-
man ifest, the loss of the sense of search, the loss of the continuous
freshness of the encounter with the unmanifest. Idolatry is to yield
20
to the bribe of the manifest".
Ontological freedom in itself is blind, not only wlien it is
harnessed to the biological passions, but as much when it joins with
the naked 'intellect'. The 'genuine' man who has freed himself from
unsel f-conscious submission to convention and tradition may, with
Raskolnikov of Crime and Pun i shment and Ivan Karamazov of The B rothers ,
'rationally' reach the nihilistic conclusion that 'everything is per-
mitted'. Morality has no foundation, he reasons, beyond a relative,
that is, groundless, conception of 'human being', an arbitrary exhor-
tation of this sort of rule-following person over that sort. Both--
al l--concept ions are equally meaningful, equally meaningless, equally
'other' for the self-conscious individual who has dared to lift the
veil and has looked point-blank into the void,' the vacuity and utter
emptiness of all culture. To in this way turn one's back on the Spirit,
to reject the attitude of transcendence, is to invite the disorganization
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of the soul; worse: it is already a kind of disorganization. Onto-
logical freedom thus moves in two mutually exclusive directions: (l)
toward psychic integration and transfiguration; (2) toward 'crime',
perversion of the will and the disclosure of psychic chaos, even if
the crime be blessed by a particular, social order as the very ideal
of man
.
Yet metaxy means above all else hope. By the very confrontation
with his own capacity for pride and evil, hubris and existential revolt,
a man may realize, full force for perhaps the first time, the personal
imperative of choice, between good and evil, between the affirmation
and denial of transcendence, the way toward and the way away from the
Ground. Man perhaps best approaches transcendence when he moves to
the 'limit' of finite experience. And as a result of this realization
he may activate his capacity for metanoi a
,
fo*- a turning to true Being.
Plato's Phaedrus asserts the possibility of conversion: "Every human
soul has, by reason of her nature, had contemplation of true Being:
else would she never have entered into the human creature" (2A9e-250a)
.
And everyman's Christ calls out for the conversion itself. "For who-
ever v/ould have his life will lose It; and whoever loses his life for
my sake will find it. What then, will it profit man, if he gains the
whole world but has to suffer the destruction of h i s life?" (Matthew
16: 25-26). In the JDhannine context, Jesus's mosaic 'I am' is the
soul's experience of divine Being that has only to be awakened: "I
am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in
darkness, but shall have the light of life" (John 8:12); "I am the way.
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the truth, and the life" (1A:6); "I am the vine, ye are the branches"
(15:5).
In the acceptance of the challenge posed by the condition of metaxy
lies the possibility of experiencing "beyond all preliminary necessities
and accidents" Being itself, the possibility not only of a personal
redemption, but also of articulating those symbols that render that
experience intelligible, the "ciphers of transcendence" (Jaspers) that
reveal in their universality the unity of all human beings in the Spirit,
and in their particularity constitute the substantial foundation for
civi 1ational--pol i tical--order. "God took seeds from other v/orlds and
sowed them on this earth... and everything that could come up came up,
but what gravis lives and is alive only through the fe;eling of its
contact with other mysterious wor 1 ds . . . Many things on earth are hidden
from us, but in return for that we have been given a mysterious, in-
2 1
ward sense of our living bond with the other world...".
Be i ng . What is this 'other world', this 'superior reality'. Being-as-
such that we suggest as the proper focus of the awakened spiritual
energies? Can it be defined? Indeed, can it be talked about at all?
The whole weight of religious and mystical testimony, and a good deal
of philosophical reflection, insists upon the impenetrable 'mystery'
of Being, that It is 'beyond rationality', far too rich for articulation,
unspeakable, 'unknowable'.. "Knowledge is, as it were, environed by
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being" (Marcel); "what sees is not our reason, but something prior
2 3
and superior to our reason..." (Plotinus); ^ "If we desire to taste
7h
God In our own selves we must pass beyond reason..." (Ruysbroeck)
;
3A0
"God is not gotten by study, but only by grace; By the affection he may
be secured and kept, but by the thought never" (CJoud of Unknowi ng) .
Being is said to altogether escape the human capacity for conceptual
articulation because it is, unlike the human consciousness that dwells
within it, unlimited. It is not that which might be exhaustively de-
fined by Juxtaposition to such categories as Becoming, Seeming, Thinking,
etc. As unlimited Being it encompasses and transcends all such juxta-
positions. It is more too than a conceivable 'highest being'. It is
the unmanlfested overreaching of all discernible manifestations.
Thus Being does not 'exist'. "It is as atheistic to affirm the
existence of God as it is to deny it", insists Ti'Mch."^^ Proving the
existence of God can only be a degradation of Being, its reduction to
an object subject to location within the coordinates of space and time,
an actual or potential subject of sense experience. In spatio-meta-
phorical language (about which it Is important to remember It _[s_
metaphorical) Being is 'beyond' space and time, 'beyond' the realm
of sense: "The things which are seen are temporal", says Saint Paul,
"but the things which are not seen are eternal" (2 Corinthians, iv:l8).
Thus Being eludes the conceptual grasp of any and all metaphysical
'systems'; for no obj ect I f I cat i on or relflcation of Being Is possible,
however brilliant or subtle. It is beyond systems, as the infinite
beyond the feeble grasp of the finite human intellect. it is 'irystery',
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the concealed ground of all metaphysics", thp ultimate Ineffabillty
commanding, in the last analysis, the pure silence of the Spirit: "God
is in heaven, and thou upon earth; therefore let thy words be few"
3'n
(Psalms, ciii:25-27). Or as a humble Richard Hooker has it:
Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade
far into the doings of the most High; whom although
to know be life... yet our soundest knowledge is to
know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither
can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning
him is our silence, when w.e confess without confession
that his glory is inexplicable, his greatness above
our capacity and reach. He is above and we upon
earth; therefore it behoovcth our words to be wary
and few. 28
It should cone as no surprise if such a real i ty--myster ious , 'non-
existent', unseen, ' unknowab 1 e ' --appears suspect, even ludicrous, before
the chilling eye o^ the skeptical consciousness. Where is the evidence
to attest to the validity of this 'unspeakable' truth? What kind of
truth is it that will not submit to any test of verification? No hard
'proof is possible, to be sure. One cannot touch transcendence as one
might tap a table top. But of itself this can hardly be counted an
objection; the 'proof for those ideals for which men are most willing
to suffer and d i e-- ' freedom
' ,
'justice', ' commun i ty ' --no more readily
admit of sensual \/eri f icac ion. Yet just as 'evidence' may be adduced
to attest to the value of these ideals, so is there 'evidence' of a
sort that the aspiration "o ti^anscendencc is legitimate and carries
its own kind of empirical weight.
This evidence is of two basic types: experiential: and 'logical',
or ' metaphys i ca 1 ' .
The experiential type is itself of two sorts. The first is the
sort already alluded to in the introduction and which will be developed
further below, i.e. the existential experience of "boundary situations"
3^2
ences
I s I on
(Jaspers), such as the 'negative' experiences of suffering, great
personal loss, and death, etc.; but also the great passions of love
and joy, which may impel the agent to seek a stratum of reality beyond
the immediately apparent and immanent. Here there is no direct awareness
of the transcendent, but there is the definite intimation of its being.
Secondly, however, there are those distinctly transcendental experii
that may (and ought to) be referred to quite neutrally without deri
as 'mysticar--i .e. the intuitive, direct and unmediated perception of
and 'union' with transcendental Reality. On the meaning and truthfulness
of these experiences we can immediately only do slightly better here than
to quote V/illiam James' Varieties of Religious Experience:
In mystic states we become one with the Absolute and
we become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting
and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by
differences of clime or creed. In Hinduism, In Neo-
Platonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in
Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so that
there is about mystical utterances an eternal una-
nimity which ought to make a critic stop and think,
and which brings it about that the mystical classics
have, as has been said, neither birthday nor native
land. Perpetually telling of the unity of man with
God, their speech antedates languages, and they do
not grow old.29
We might only add here that beyond this 'union' with the Absolute, there
results further the inner ordering of the united soul, arising out of
the perception of transcendental order.
Compared to experience, the 'evidence' of logic is necessarily
limited and 'negative', yet not without force. Logical analysis,
carried to the limit, inevitably points to a certain 'something',
though It cannot say what that something is. "(B)elng is that which
withstands--or would withstand--", says Marcel, "an exhaustive analysis
bearing on the data of experience and aiming to reduce them step by
step to elements increasingly devoid of intrinsic or significant
value". ^° The skeptic may well balk at the reality of the Real, but
he is then likely to balk at the possibility of all and not only
transcendental knowledge; for aU_ knowledge refers back to a mystery
of the prccognitive: "contrary to what epistemoiogy seeks vainly to
establish, there exists well and truly a mystery of cognition; knowledge
is contingent on a participation in being for which no epistemoiogy can
account because it continually presupposes it".-^' That is to say, the
origin and end of existing things may not be discovered through explo-
ration of the field of things but must be traced to a 'something' beyond
the field itself, something not located in the empirical stream of em-
pirical being. On these same grounds Heidegger arcues the limitations
of traditional metaphysics: We might speak of a ' un i ty- i n-d i st i net ion
'
of Being and beings; 'metaphysics' consciously concerns itself only
with the latter, while yet presupposing the forirer: "Because meta-
physics inquires about beings as beings, it remains concerned with
beings and does not devote itself to Being as Being"; "Nevertheless,
when metaphysics gives answers to its question concerning beings as
such, metaphysics speaks out of the unnoticed revealedness of Being";
"The truth of Being may thus be called the ground in which metaphysics,
as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is
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nourished".
All thought, we may' say, necessarily begins with Being, a reality
that encompasses a 1 1 --consc i ousness , the object of consciousness, and
3kk
more, i.e. that which we do not, and cannot, 'know' via rational conscious-
ness. Thought is not at a total loss, by any means. Man is a participant-
In the reality of Being. As such he is able, through the articulation
of (philosophical) concepts, to 'illumine' his participation. But the
illumination is inherently partial, limited, analogical; man's 'in-
betv/eenness
'
means precisely that he is related to a ground of Being
that he does not and cannot grasp, either with exactitude or exhaustively,
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conceptually. For the subject, surely, being Is always object-being,
i.e. a 'that there' which Is exc'uded from subjectivity. In the search
for truth we therefore become conscious of the subject/object division
as the basis of phenomenal experience. But this concept (of the di-
vision) already drives us beyond the division to the point of inter-
section and to that which 'encompasses' (Jaspers) both subject and
object. Rea 1 I ty--th I s 'encompass I ng ' --cannot be restricted to what
falls v/ithin the confines of the subject/object divisional compass; it
must encompass the encompassing. I.e. it must be^ the 'Encompassing':
"being in itself, that is that being which makes all beings an entity,
is their common ground and out of which all beings come". Thus object-
being is not the totality of Being, and man cannot grasp Being in thought;
for thought always presupposes the object for the thinking subject, and
it is just these subjects and objects that Being is 'beyond': "the
truth of Being docs not exhaust itself In being there (i.e. in worldly
objects--M.F.) , nor can it by any means simply be identified with it
after the fashion of the metaphysical proposition: all objectivity is
35
as such subjectivity".
Human 'participation' in Being means, then, not conceptual defi-
nition, but ontological experience. By virtue of his life in the
metaxy man senses the 'pull' toward the divine, even as he suffers'
the counter-pull away from it. Being, that "something which moves
without being moved, being eternal, substance and actuality" (Aristotle,
Metaphysics
.
1072a 23f ) , stirs the soul and draws >t toward itself. Man
is an object-being, a being- in-the-world, but he is more too. 'More'
in a double sense: man shares with all beings a fundamental, pre-
cognitive connection with Being. But man alone among beings contemplates
this connection; he alone ponders the meaning of the apparently simple
inlinitive 'to be'. Via the luminosity of consciousness man can 'go
irside' himself, 'to the roots' of Being, there to discover a kind of
Augustinian cogn i t io f idea
,
a knowledge of faith: "Now faith is the
substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen .. .Through
faith we understand that the worlds were framed by God, so that things
which are seen are not made of things which do appear" (Hebrews, 11:
1,3). Thus the conscious self is, further, always more than all we can
know of it: existence is existence in the tension of knowledge and
f ai th.
Both senses of 'more than' is encompassed by Jaspers' notion of
human being as 'Existenz', a self-conscious participant in Being. "We
say 'Existenz', and talk of the being of this reality. But Existenz
.
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is not 3 concept; it is a sign that points 'beyond all object i veness .
Or as Heidegger has it, man stands "open for the openness of Being" in
which he "stands". 'Participation' is the human link to the Encompassing,
3A6
the expression, once again, of the transcendental/existential duality
and tension. Being moves toward man and moves away, shows itself and
hides, speaks to man in riddles: "in its openness. Being itself
manifests and conceals itself, yields itself and wi thd raws"
. It is
the human task to respond to the call of Being through an 'opening' of
the consciousness to the perception of non-objective transcendence, a
conversion of consciousness to an awareness of that beyond objective
consciou5ness--an inner transformation, 'metanoia' by activation of the
transcendental 'sense'. "Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling; for it is God v;ho worketh in you..." (Philippians 2: 12-13).
As it turns out, then, Being is not quite so fneffable as it
originally appears. The mystical tradition, which insists most vehe-
mently on the incommun icab i 1 i ty of transcendental experience, has
spawned the volumes of 'utterances' referred to by James. '^^ Religion
is not silent about God, nor philosophy. The unspeakab 1 eness and un-
knowability of Being really lies not in any inherent inability to talk
about it, but rather in the necessity to talk about it in a most par-
ticular and limited way. The awareness of Being is radically experi-
ential. Like 'horizontally' transcendent notions such as love, justice,
freedom, friendship, etc., the experience Is primary to genuine under-
standing: the euphoria of love means nothing to one who has never
loved, the idea of justice would mean little to a man who has never
been wronged. In such cases there is no external thing--e.g. that tree
there--to which one can point as the object to v;hich it is but necessary
to apply the proper label. The person must 'know' what it is to be a
3^7
friend with his whole being and not merely with his intellect.
But the experience of Being as such goes beyond even this sort of
experiential knowledge. For even the most 'ideal' social concepts
occupy a situated place in the topography of shared social existence.
Should this existence come to an end', so would the concepts. Political
'freedom', for example, is an i ntersubject i vely experienced symbol i zai- i on
of specific interections obtaining in a particular social order. It
is, or should be, moreover an inner experience, but one which refers
essentially to this outer order. Because social life exists in a state
of flux, because, that is, history has no established and designated
end-point, it is not possible to wholly exhaust the meaning of freedom.
But 'freedom' as it is used in this context, here and now, constitutive
of this social situation, and in this sense 'objective', can more-or-
less be exhaustively defined. The several ideas (and dimensions) of
which it is compo'Jed , and the objective experiences to which it refers,
can be laid bare by the dissecting surgery of conceptual analysis.
Not so for Being. being fs neitlier subject to definition and analysis;
nor is it in any way constituted by symbol i zat i ons of it; nor is it an
i ntersubj ect i ve reality. Being is in no way 'dependent' on the human
consciousness, even as consciousness participates in Being, even as,
^1
it may be said, Being becomes luminous to itself through consciousness.
Reality is 'prior' to consciousness. The experience of this reality
is, therefore, necessarily a meditative, intuitive, 'mystical' experience,
In so far as social interaction is involved, the interaction itselt is
purely incidental to the experience.
3A8
Following this essential qualification, it remains possible to
speak of, and practice, a philosophical science of Being, "a science
which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to




practice it must be accepted as akin to genuine mysticism, for through
ngthe practice of the science the philosopher "approaches the real bei
and enters into union with it". ^ That is to say, the philosopher
'bracicets out' all being that partakes of merely created existence,
to grasp in the intuitive meditative moment Being as encompassing
Ground. In the fleeting moment of insight the philosopher intuits how
'ic all is'. This experience of the Ground provides, tnen, the 'raw
material' for the i 1 lumination-through-symbol izaticn of created ex-
istence. Man as participant in Reality experiences the process of
Reality as it passes through him in time, and he must, precisely be-
cause he is bound spatially and temporarily, symbol i cal ly express his
experience, if he is to express it at all, in a structured ordering of
concepts. The truth for man-qua-man is essentially, necessarily,
historical truth. "While consciously participating, man is able to
engender symbols which express his experience of reality", and which
in turn are, potentially, the foundation for principles of political
(in the broad sense) order.
Thus a philosophical science of Being is likewise akin to a
revelatory experience of ontological order. Human participation in
the process of Reality comes to full flower in the process of symbolic
articulation; the order of heaven and the order of earth are here wed.
3^9
and man Is freed, not from finiteness (impossible so long as he lives)
but from limiting totalistic attachments to definite, limited being.
Through the symbol i zat i on of concrete experiences of Being man con-
ceptualizes his tension toward the Ground and thus 'remembers' who he
is, a being who lives not simply in 'this world', but in the metaxy.
The meditative moment is, then, that in which the philosopher
does not 'think' but rather 'opens' his consciousness (equivalant to
the soul, or the 'knowing' aspect of the soul) to the experience of
the Encompassing. Jaspers refers to this opening by various names---
"fundamental knowledge", '"philosophical faith", "self-awareness";^^
Voegelin calls it the participatory "noetic" consciousness^'' th3t arises
out of the self-conscious tension to the Ground; Heidegger expresses it
in terms of a "new type of thinking" that is really a "recalling"
prompted not from within thinking itself, but at the behest of Being.
In every case the 'opening' of the consciousness as the sensorium of
transcendence to transcendental experience itself is a response to the
call of the Real to man. That "which prompts such thinking can only be
that which is to be recalled. That Being itself and how Being concerns
our thinking does not depend on our thinking alone. That Being itself,
and the manner in v/hich Being itself, strikes a man's thinking, that
rouses his thinking and stirs it to rise from Being itself to response
and correspond to Being as such". The permanent and essential caveat
is that this beyond-consc iousness cannot be absorbed i nto consciousness;
thus symbol i zat ion is always the symbol i zat ion of inherently, ultimately
ineffable Reality of which man as man can attain but a bare glimpse.
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Symbol ization is the work of the 'thinking' consciousness; it is thus
already once removed from primary experience. "Here below we see
through a glass darkly" (1 Corinthians 13); the apostolic insight is
not vitiated by the symbolic act.
It is for this reason that even the greatest metaphysical systems
must be considered only 'pointers' to Being, no more, even as they arc,
if based upon true insight, participants in Being. For this they are
surely not to be degraded; but neither are they to be hypostat i zed , or
otherwise cherished beyond their significance, which lies in their
value as experiential and not strictly 'logical' vocabularies. The
true end of the science of Being, then, all 'metaphysics' worthy of
the name, is to mediate the metaxic tension by developing the least
inadequate corcepts to convey the perceived 'knowledge', and so il-
lumine the human condition. In this it is equivalent in function to
its companion forms of transcendental med i at ion--my th
,
revelation,
'prophecy' (to a lesser degree the purer forms of poetry and art).
Nor can philosophy dispense with these other forms; no mode of transcen-
dental mediation is ever outdated or devoid of significance. "Meta-
physics is only truly itself", says Bergson, "when it goes beyond the
concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid and ready-made
concepts in order to create a kind very different from that which we
habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid representations,
always ready to mold themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition".
There can never be certain, 'absolute' knowledge about either Being or
the human condition, because for man reality remains a process ultimately
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mysterious; its end is not known, its depths are obscure. Being is
ever elusive:
-"the knowledge of reality conveyed by the symbols can
never be the final possession of truth, for the luminous perspectives
that we call experiences, as well as the symbols engendered by them,
are part of reality in process".
Finally the most transcendent of symbols remain yet metaphors for
an experience of Being that is necessarily partial, of the character
of a 'perspective', simply because man is man, a member of the vast
society of created existence, and not God Himself. But this 'per-
spective' of experience is not 'relative'; it does not evaporate into
tlie mists of 'social relations' or this or that ungrounded 'point of
view'. Its starting and end point alike is the Ground itself.
Ex istence
.
The 'world', in contrast to non-existent Being, is all that
persists in time
,
the world of subjects and objects--"emp i r i cal reality
in space and time; dead and living matter; persons and things; tools
and material; ideas that apply to reality; cogent constructions of ideal
objects...; contents of the imag inat ion. . --the totality of the
mundane. The mundane world cannot be sold short; existence is the
utter fascination of the finite: the pov/er and the beauty, the squalor
and the fright of the perpetual flux of everyday being, the emotionally-
charged, mu 1 t i -d imens i ona 1 change and flow that at the slightest touch
flowers into a 'mystery' of its own: at once (potentially at least)
rich, purposive, powerful and delicious, and profoundly disturbing,
perverse, flat, dull, senseless. Here, in the clearing made by conscious-
ness in the dark forest of Being, we discover the richly woven tapestry
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of civi 1 izational ex i s tence--the historically concrete, 'common sense'
reality of socially constitutive sel f
- i nterpretat ions
,
rules, practices,
institutions, 'ordinary language', etc.; in short, the 'forms of life'
(Wittgenstein) that comprise the specific content of philosophical
anthropology. Here is the place where human beings are born, love,
fight, strive, 'commune', suffer, learn, rejoice, grow, nature, die.
Here too is where the sciences of man carry out iiheir rich variety of
detail work, where, within bounds, the relativity of the 'sociology of
52knowledge' reigns supreme, and we must begin the search for the
specific determinations of socio-political order.
The world can be quite a grana place unoer itii own aspect, ap-
parently sans reference to the 'beyond'. At least many v/ho have either
denied outright, or 'bracketed', transcendence ha\'e without qualm found
it so. (Even some, who like Camus, have opened themselves to the ulti-
mate, unintelligible 'absurdity' of life so conceived.) V'ith these
hardy souls, the transcendenta 1 /ex i s ten t i a 1 tension is not allowed to
intrude too much into the pleasures of the world cua objactlve being.
(Please! Already life is so short!) Yet It Is no,ietheless against
the beyond of Being that man has perenially measured his existence and
found the charms of the unillumined life lacking. The fascination of
the finite endures, but emphasis shifts from fascination to finitude
and the experience of human 'creaturel iness ' . In the first place, as
Voegel in has it,
man discovers himself as being not a world into himself,
but an existent among others; he experiences a world of
existents of which heis a part. Moreover, in discovering
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himself in his limitation as part in a field of
existents, he discovers himself as not being the
maker of this field of existents or any part of it.
Existence acquires its poignant meaning through the
experience of not being sel f
-generated but having
its origin outside itself. 53
Furthermore, dazzling as they are, the treasures of the world lay in-
escapibly "where moth and rust doth corrupt". it is a regal pageant,
but not the crowning glory itself. In the passing away of the most
insignificant being appears the whole mystery of Being and the 'in-
betweenness' of man. In its objective form the world quite simply 'is
not enough'. It is necessary to turn from life itself to the power
that upholds life. Perennially man begins with the intuition of the
poet: "0, how shall summer's honey breath hold out/Against the wreck-
ful siege of battering days, /When rocks impregnable are not so stout,/
Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?" (Shakespeare, Sonnet
65); and comes to the conclusion of the apostle: "the world passeth
away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth
forever" (I John ii: 17), "he that soweth to the flesh shall of the
fiesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit shall of the
spirit reap everlasting 1 . fe" (Paul, Galatians iv: 8).
It is, hov^ever, necessary to exercise here, as everywhere, care
in handling such symbol i zat Ions of existence in the metaxy, lest we
derail into a conviction of the inherent 'evilness' of the world as
such. This is an all too easy route to take, in reaction to the
perceived insufficiency of the world qua ungraced existence to reach
the erroneous Gnostic conclusion that the whole human task is to
escape from the utter corruption of existence. But to go this route
is to abandon the tension of being in favor of a lapse into absolute
dualism. At this point politics is abandoned to the nether-realm 6f
Invariable corruption; it has no transcendent functions, at its best
only a harsh and coercive guardian against fleshly wickedness, a cold
Leviathan. This is an erroneous view. Man
_i_s_ wor 1 d 1 y : "man Is the
human world, the state, society" (Marx). There is no retreat from the
world, so long as man breathes. If it is a 'prison', It Is several
cuts above a dark and hellish dungeon. Better to think of it a? the
atmosphere which the bird requires for its flight; despite the over-
tones of existential revolt, Plato perceived that the oyster could not
go without its shell. To attempt to sustain a posture of un i nvol vement
with the world is not only Impossible, but stupid, a futile exercise in
self-mutilation (perhaps not at all unlike the 'scientific' effort to
turn the whole world into a manlpulable object for a disembodied subject)
"Al though ... Ex i stenz cannot be objectified and has no mode of appearance
of Its own, each of its manifestations Is necessarily rooted in some
unique situation and concerned with some special task. Existenz must
appear In connection with Dase i n ('existence' here--M.F.) which is
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always local izable within the spatio-temporal continuum".
All sense of the t ranscenden ta 1 /ex i s tent i a 1 tension would be
sapped from human being If for man the 'soul' were a detachable entity,
if, that Is, the person did not occupy an objective 'place' in spatio-
temporal belng--i.e. If his subjectivity were not 'situated' within a
geographical environment and an historical process. Without the tension
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of "this union of myself with my Dasein as appearance" (Jaspers), man
would not be man, but either a beast of a god. Man can only "transcend'
from his rootedness in the world, propelled by the anxiety that arises
out of being-in-the-world and the paradox that the world is at once
infinitely important and infinitely worthless, that it is the tensional
constitution of the world to be at once both full and empty, enchanting
and disquieting, inspiring and anxious.
But the point which reeds to be addressed now is not the metaxy
itself but the way in which man occupies it: that is, how he mediates
the transcendental/existential tension in the medaim of expressive
symbol ization. In truth there is no absolute break between being as
such and human cultural being. As we noted in the introduction, some
deg ree of transcendental/existential modal integration is i nd i spens i bl
e
to social life as such, and a high degree of integration is at least
poss i b 1
e
,
however inherently unstable this integration is. The substance
of social being, the panoply of institutional forms that make up the
cultural whole, is 'psyche' or 'Mind', as Hegel sa'd. This is a truth
accepted in many quarters. V/hat is perhaps less widely palatable is
the corollary idea that the multiplicity of social sel f-undarstand ings--
the mind of the culture in genera 1 --ar i ses on the foundation of en-
compassing transcendent symbols which are translations of the ordering
experiences of direct awareness of Being, and which express, in communal
form, so long as they are viable, the original engendering experiences.
On an understanding originating with Plato, which we will examine
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in more detail in the last chapter, we can say here that symbol izations
resulting from direct engendering experiences: (l) arise out of the
ordered soul that has experienced Being (for Plato the 'philosopher',
for Aristotle the ' spouda i os
' ) ; (2) suggest a paradigm of right social
order in the image of the well-ordered soul; and as such (3) provide
the conceptual criteria for judging the state of existential being--
uhe heart of a genuine episteme
,
an inherently critical science of
politics committed to resisting the social corruption which can in
turn re- immerse the soul in a disordered state. They are thus focal
points of orientation for human historical being. Through his tran-
scendent symbol izat'ons mn experiences the process of Reality moving
through him in time, and creates structures of order in their image.
This experience, then, comprises the core of the philosophical
meaning of history, and establishes the absolute central ity of 'myth'
(in the broad sense of a conception of reality penetrated by tran-
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scendent Being) to historical sensibility, as argued by such phi-
losophers as Voegel in and Cassirer. The "experience of participation
in a divinely ordered cosmos extending beyond man can be expressed only
by means of the myth; It cannot be transposed Into processes of thought
r O
within consciousness...". If consciousness cannot capture the truth
of Being, man is nonetheless compelled to give accounts and interpre-
tations of his encounters, and the dramatic metaxic context in which
they occur. The overarching accounts are always 'mythical' in
character, which then, as grandiose "ciphers of transcendence", head
up the whole parade of human symbolic existence: "Myth is one of the
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oldest and greatest powers In human civilization", avers Cassirer. It
is closely connected with all other human act i v i t i es-- i t is inseparable
from language, poetry, art and from early historical thought".
The mythic, "universe-maintaining" (Berger and Luckmann) Influence
on culture is easy enough to recognize in primitive cultures, where it
is explicitly operative. The whole of reality, social and cosmic, is
conceived as of one piece: everyday life is penetrated, if not satu-
ftited^ by sacred forces which can render the apparently most mundane
activities cosmolog ical ly significant. The Pueblo Indians of New
Mexico, for example, believe that the sun is their 'father'. In their
re'igious practices they 'assist' the sun's daily journey through the
atmosphere; neglect of these practices would bring about the result
that "in ten years the sun would no longer rise" and "it would be night
forever". As Carl Jung observed regarding this people and its mytho-
logical belief, "the 'dignity', the tranquil composure of the Individual
I nd i an . . . spr i ngs from his being a son of the sun; his life Is cosmo-
loglcally meaningful, for he helps the father and the preserver of all
life in his daily rise and descent". ^'^ The mythological substratum Is
also easy enough to detect and appreciate in certain explicit religious
beliefs; millions of Christians, for example, still (presumably) hold
fast to the mystery of the Immaculate Conception of Christ. It Is,
however, perhaps a little hard to swallow In our own age. The dominant
opinion, which has only grown and strengthened since the Enlightenment,
is that mythological cons t ruct I ons-- i ndeed anything less than 'scien-
tific' construct ions--are in fact naive, infantile misconstructions
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that ought to be outgrown and overcome in the mature confrontation of
reality. It is an attitude which reflects the modern infatuation with
the evolution of consciousness toward increasing truth qua objectivity,
facticity and conceptual rigor. We are reminded of August Comte's
progressive schema of a human consciousness evolving through myth and
philosophy to the rationality of positive science. The triumph of the
secularizing scientific We 1 tanschuung has thoroughly de--d i v i n i zed the
world: "Science not only completes the removal of the sacred from the
world of everyday life, but removes universe-maintaining knowledge as
such from that world. Everyday life becomes breft of both sacred
ligitimation and the sort of theoretical i nte 1 1
i
g i o i 1 i ty that Kould
link it with the symbolic universe in its intenced totality".
Some, like Sartre, will argue that the modern break-up of symbolic
meaning is simply the price man pays for his existential 'freedom'.
But if so, we are still not free, for we have yet co pay the price in
full. Leaving aside the question as to whether the rejection of God
necessarily compels the destructive delusion of 'mangodhood' (this is
the vievy of Voegelin, Dostoyevsky, John Hallowell and others), or
simply the experiential agony of alienation from Being, it is a
certainty, as we saw in Chapter I, that our most fundamental consti-
tutive symbols are yet penetrated by vertically transcendent (If not
precisely cosmolog ical ) significance. It is beyond my own capacity
to envision how it might be otherwise without a total lapse (even now
ever-threatening) into relatlvistic nihilism.
Generally, all societies require complex transcendental symbolism
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for the consistently sel f- interpretative expression of historical
existence. 'S[>irit' in this sense is the active force of social/
civi 1 izational existence, infusing merely empirical objects with the
sense of the metaxic insight. Spirit, as Hegel knew, gives history
meaning, raising human action above a d i s- i ntegrated 'flux' of mundane
events to the level of purposive c i v i 1 i zat i onal endeavor. It is the
indispensible creative spark of human world-orientation, the bone and
blood of all man-made, inter-subjective entities. As the mediatory
mods of the transcendental /exi stent ial tension. Spirit might be called
the 'soul' of the political. The phenomenal social world has meaning
for man so long and in so far as the Spirit lives within it, that is,
so long as an at least limited transcendence of subject and object is
accomplished, and the given is not simply given, but 'blessed'.
Let the Spirit die and the cultural vessel crumbles to dust. We
are today perhaps increasingly appreciative of the essential truth that
"there is an important dimension of politics that can only be under-
stood in the light of the universal human aspiration to be in contact
with some larger, fuller, more significant life", while simultaneously
denying that this aspiration might have any connection to vertical
transcendence. Contemporary students of political thought commonly
overlook the apprecietion of past 'masters' for religious 'truth' qua
spiritual binding agent of civilization. It goes without saying that
the ancients and medievalists could not even conceive of political
community apart from the' Idea of a corporate 'people under God (or
gods)'.^'^ The concern is not limited to these periods, however; even
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the famous 'contract' theorists of the modern age stopped short of
ridding the polity of references to religious symbolisms. Hobbes,
whose political thought is emphatically secular, radically shutting
off political appeals to heavenly sanction, nonetheless articulates a
paradigm of a Christian Commonwealth, expMcitly assuming a single
form of public worship, a national church, and rejecting without reser-
vation the possibility of a commonwealth "of no religion at all".^^
Locke, though considering religion a strictly private affair, refuses
in the "Letter Concerning Toleration" to tolerate atheists, end more
significantly, assumes universal adherence to an explicitly Christian
liveral civil theology; state officials, for example, "in teaching,
irstructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason... may certainly
do what becomes any good man to do. Magistry does not oblige him to
put off either humanity or Christianity".^^ Rousseau, in the Social
Cont ra ct the enthusiastic admirer of Roman virtue, is militantly anti-
Christian, but insists on rigid adherence (on pain of death) to a
civil religion that makes the citizen "love his duties". Similarly,
the greatest of 'contract' political societies, the United States, had
no qualms about expressing its first effort at collective self-definition
in terms of the will "to assume among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's
God entitle them..." (Declaration of Independence), that is, in terms
of the right relationship to transcendent reality, however deistically
conce i ved
.
it should give us much pause, too, to consider that Comte, the
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inventor of 'positivism' and the spirited prophet of the 'positive
polity' based on the new scientific 'positive philosophy', also in-
vented the new religion of 'Humanity', the 'Great Being' (complete
with detailed ritual and 'sacraments') and set himself up as the 'High
Priest of Humanity'. The conception of the Great Being of Humanity is
the central point
toward which every aspect of positivisn naturally
converges. By :t the very conception of God will
be entirely superceded, and 3 synthesis be formed,
more complete and permanent than that provisionally
established by the old re 1 ig ions .. .Towards Humanity,
who is for us the only true Great Being, we, the
conscious elements oF whom she is composed, shall
henceforth direct every aspect of our life. Indi-
vidual or collective." Our thoughts will be devoted
to the knowledge of Humanity, our affections to her
love, our actions to her service. 6^
Similarly, Saint Simon, another prophet articulating a new 'divine
science', was moved to manufacture an immanentlst socio-rel igious dogma
which would aim at the "general application of (philanthropic) ideas
and feelings to political developments, or encouraging the faithful
to apply moral principles in their daily re 1 at I onsn
I
ps" . Saint Simon
promoted himself to the office of the new Pope--"7he best theologian
Is the real Pope, God's deputy on earth. If the deductions I have
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made are correct...! shall have spoken in the name of God".
The form of political society Is neither a given nor a Hobbist
artifice, but "results from the I n te rpenct rat I on of institutions and
69
experiences of order". Scratch a major socio-political institution,
and you are bound to uncover a complexity of constitutive social
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meanings. Look for a moment behind the immediate significance of
these meanings, and you are further bound to catch a glimpse of the




"Wouldst thou", so the helmsman answered,
"Learn the secrets of the sea?
Only those who brave its dangers.
Comprehend its mystery",
--Longfellow, The Gal ley of
Count Arnaldos
Without the elevating, binding force of (at least implicit) faith
in the duality of die human condition and its mediation via transcendent
symbolism, society stands in constant danger of a nihilistic fall from
Being. Unfortunately the faith is none too easy to maintain. As we
have seen, when the 'beyond' of Being moves into man's consciousness
it necessarily walks in the clothes of symbolic language. But not only
is language not able to capture the truth of Being in its reality, not
only is it bound to the narrow character of a 'perspective'; once
language is in the world, as it must be by its nature, it is subject
to the processes of the world: "When it enters history, truth has to
carry the burden of death and time".^^ The symbolic language grows
old, the distance increases between the original transcendental en-
gendering experiences that gave living sense to the symbols, and the
ordering truth expressed in the symbols lessens in force. In short,
almost from the moment the symbols are first coined, a process of
ossification sets in. The final, extreme result of this ossification
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is the utter vacuity of the symbols involved: this even should the
symbols themselves persist in the form of logical systems or (what is
often the same thing) dogmatic 'doctrines' of one or another stamp.'
The truth of reality is lost, finally beyond regain.
The symbol is thus double-edged. it is meaningful only so long
as its engendering content is present to daily life. In so far as it
continues to carry and express a transcendent experience, it helps to
'raise man up' to a right orientation to Being and the world. Yet
since it belongs to finite experience, it is always in danger (in-
creasing danger with the passage of time) of falling into limited,
faulty, and untruthful interpretation and usage. Thus it would appear
that in so far as man is a social being, bound to his finite concepts
for the truth of the Real, he is to a large degree necessarily cut off
from the Real. Only the single individual (the 'philosopher') sinking
into the depths of the psyche can be directly aware of Reality. And
indeed this is so, inescapibly so. In so far as it shows a transcendent
dimension, ordinary i ntersubject i ve reality represents the ossification
of symbolic representations of other men's experiences.
Social structure and political order may either aid or inhibit
the individual struggle for the truth of Being. But it cannot substi-
tute for it; there _i_s_ no substitute. The world itself is of course a
given. Existence is worldly existence. But the tensionality of this
exi stence--the tension of Being as such and objectified be i ng--engu 1 f
s
the world and the social and political order of the world. At its
best, in the ideal form, this order will reflect, because infused with.
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the soul's intuition of transcendent cosmological order. The order of
the world has, then, as it were made a truce In the struggle with the
divine Ground. Symbol I zat I ons of the agent's experience of the Ground
is there the same as that symbol i zat Ion which forms the living substance
(tradition, ethics, etc.) of the social world. But this 'Ideal'-'the
existential mimesis of a paradigm of right order--occup i es a precarious
perch in the historical stream of being. The same tension can pull down
what it has built up^ exhaust what it has inspired. Once corrupted,
the social body is difficult, to put it mildly, to reform.
At this point we reach the ontological parallel of "Rousseau's
72paradox" of civic virtue. Only when social inst.tutlons already
promote moral virtues, the virtues of the weil-ordered soul. Is It
likely that the citizenry will experience In large numbers right ori-
entation to the transcendental Ground. When right orientation is not
promoted, of course, is when it is most needed as a call for spiritual
reform; but this is precisely when it is least likely to appear, or,
if it should appear, to be heeded. What appears instead in periods of
disorder are increasing signs of spiritual disease, some of the po-
litical forms of which we examined in chapter 1. At this point Is
the tension between the 'order of the soul' of good men and social.
(dis)order greatest.
Yet even when the tension is muted, that is well mediated by
symbolic and Institutional forms. It is never really abated, certainly
never dissolved. World remains world, for the human person an ob-
jectified 'other'. Man is ' be ing-thrown- into-the-world ' (Heidegger).
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True: Man is implicated from birth in a network of enveloping social
interdependencies and mutual states of awareness. 'Society' constitutes
his 'truth'; the social world is the human world. Yet it is the typical
experience of man in all but the most primitive social settings that he
Is always something of a 'stranger' to the social world. He is thrown
into it without his asking, he is j_n it up to the neck, but somehow
never wholly of it; it is a perpetual mystery: the more so the more
despiritual ized and irrational and 'anti-social' the social foundations;
but for the self-conscious individual always so to an irreducible extent.
In right-ordered society and among persons who live 'in the spirit',
there is endless opportunity for "l-Thou" relationships (Buber) . But
there is ever the lesser or greater residue of the "l-lt" as well, the
inevitable clash of subject and object. "I perceive something. I am
sensible of something. I imagine something. I will something, I feel
something. I think something".' If the world could be Interpreted as
pure subject, man might be altogether 'at home' in it. But objectivity
wi 1 1 not be den led:
This is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every
Thou in our world must become an Jjt_. It does not matter
how exclusively present the Thou was in the direct re-
lation. As soon as the relation has been worked out,
or has been permeated with a means, the Thou becomes
an object among objects. 7^
Man is perpetually 'estranged'. In a spiritually vibrant political
order, there are at least pointers to the right orientation toward
Being. Where there are no pointers, so much the worse. If the agent
will not acquiesce in desp i r i tua 1 I zed social half-truths, if he refuses
to succumb to pressures of an unfree conformity, he has no choice but
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the inner struggle for dignity, spiritual in-
distance from his plight.
What vve are of course assuming here is a fundamental distinction
between the 'personal' and the 'individual' in human being. This is
but the distinction between transcendence and existence as it surfaces
in the life of the individual person, the expression in each man of
the general condition of metaxy. 'Individuality' is rooted in matter,
it is that dimension of human being immersed, ontol og i ca 1
1 y , in spat:-
ality and in time, that is, in the world. 'PersonaUty' on ;:fie other
hand is the transcendental dimension, "related not to matter but to
the deepest and highest dimensions of being". Individuals are un-
divided (indivisible) existents, distinct from all other existents,
Democritian atoms; persons, however, are directly related, via the
transcendental faculty, to the Absolute; their "spiritual homeland is
the whole universe of the absolute and of those indef lectable goods
which are as pathways to the absolute whole which transcends the
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world". Thus, while the individual is only a part of a greater
whole, the person is already, in potential at least, a universal con-
tent; whenever man acts as a part, it is not by virtue of his person-
ality, but by his individuality. Individuality at best opens unto the
bustling bazaar of immanent worldly existence. Personality opens to
unlimited transcendence, to infinity, to God.
The relationship of i nd i v i dua 1 i ty and personality is complex. Like
Being and being they are in man inseparable: human being is at once
to bear the burden of
tegrity, and critical
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individual and personal: we are not talking here about discrete
'substances', but rather about a tensional duality of the single
'substance' man. Yet to be sure it is the personality that is by
far the more valuable dimension, the crown jewel of creation. With
Berdyaev we can agree: "If man were not a person albeit a personality
which has not yet emerged into full view, or which has been crushed,
albeit one struck down by disease, albeit a personality which exists
only as potential or possible, then he would be like other things in
the world and there would be noth'ng unusual about him".''^ By nature
man is an individual; only by the spirit is he a person.
This great riddle of creation, the personality of man, which
speaks directly and so poignantly to the higner nature and vocation
of man, is the essence of human freedom, its ground. We refer neither
to political or 'social' freedom in particular, but ontologica! freedom,
freedom which comes only of the spirit, which lives in the spirit, and
dies out of estrangement to the spirit. Because personality and indi-
viduality are joined in the concreteness of historical human being,
there is much In personality that belongs to the existential 'common':
family, race, class, tradition, history, etc. But the distinctly
personal transcends all such limltlve categorization, even the highest,
horizontally transcendent categorization, politics and the state,
rightly understood. What is personal represents the triumph of man
over his total determination by the existential group(s) . "The social-
ization of man is only partial and does not extend to the depth of
7 8
personality, to its conscience, to its relation to the source of life".
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Compared to the necessary and important, yet relative, values of
society, state,- civilization as such, the value of personality is
the supreme value. The spirit resides first of all in the person and
only afterwards in organizations of persons. Even as he needs it for
his very life, even as it offers a multiplicity of opportunities for
the realization of his immanent capabilities, for the person the world
stands forth as the 'material' for the cultivation of personality, to
he 'used' in freedom. It is a 'minister' to the formation of the
79person
.
This freedom is not the arbitrary freedom of the will, which so
easily, so quickl/ can degenerate into sheer perversity. Freedom is
neither license, nor 'self-expression', nor even 'conscience' in the
usual vapid sense of 'doing what one thinks is right', where 'thinking'
amounts to no more than ungrounded 'feeling'. Freedom has its roots
in the deeps of the metaxy, in the perception of the Ground that is,
or should be, the source of all relative 'value-systems', in the
personality of man. The other side of this freedom, the negation of
freedom (though how often dees it usurp the name of freedom, and is
believed!), is the craving for, in the words of Dos toyevsky ' s Grand
Inquisitor, "someone to worship, someone to keep his conscience, and
some means of uniting all in one unan imous . . . an t-heap" (The Brothers
Karamazov) . Like all forms of freedom this freedom is at once freedom
from and freedom to: From, as Whitman says, "the painful constipation
and poor narrowness of eccl es i as t i c i sm . . . f rom party rings and mere
convention in Pol i t i cs--and better than all, a general freedom of
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One's-Self from tyrannic vices, habits, appetites, under which every
man of us, (often the greatest brawler for freedom) is ens1aved";^°
Freedom to attune oneself to the forces of order and right life sunl<
deep within the soul, to 'transcend unto the depth' of Being. Freedom
8
1
from 'evil', freedom to good. Freedom from individuality; freedom to
become a person, and to resist the temptations to renounce our sacred
personalities: for the Christian to "stand fast therefore in the
liberty wherewith Christ has made us free" (Galatians, 5:1).
There are in fact presented to human freedom two ways 'out' of
circumscribed individuality. We have met them before as the modes of
'horizontal' and 'vertical' transcendence. The first is the route of
worl d- immanent reality; the second the path of quest for the beyond
of Being, the transcendental Ground. The former is legitimate within
limits, that is so long as it does not take itself for the whole of
Reality and begins to insist that the whole personality of man is ex-
pressed in this/that/or/those objectified forms--soc i ety
,
state,
church, etc. (Even human being conceived as individuality cannot be
exhausted in any particular list of forms, but only by the totality of
these forms; it is only in relation to the totality that the individual
is related as a 'part'. Being in immanence is in its own terms
enormously fecund, as totality already a cipher of transcendence.)
Only the transcendental way offers the hope of the complete realization
of personality. Immanent existence can be expanded, deepened, 'im-
proved'. In the 'ideal' case referred to above the paradigm of right
order might infuse the order of history to the point where there is
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the closest possible approximation to 'paradise' on earth. But immanent
existence cannot itself be lifted above the level of object! fication;
here we must take a stand against Hegel and say that objecti fication is
not the necessary realization of Being, but its antithesis and limitati
The political ramifications of the personality's transcendental
agency are far-reaching. It is a crime against nature to deny the
dignity of the human person, not to respect persons (oneself as well
as others); it is a crime against divinity. There are times, it is
true, as Machiavelli insisted, when the 'prince' (gene-ally, the po-
litically responsible agent) must know how no t^ to be 'good', must
sacrifice the part for the whole, the one for the many, must torture
and kill the existential 'enemy', must maim the innocents in war, must
know how to be 'cruel'. But because they are 'necessary', these things
are no less crimes. If the prince Is truly responsible he will bear
willingly the burden of guilt for his crimes, even as he commits them,
and even as he knows he wi 1 1
,
by force of circumstance, comniit them
again. If your enemy strikes you on one cheek, says Jesus, turn to
him tlie other. But I am a man--an Individual, a person, a social
being, a citizen: if my enemy strikes me I will strike him back. But
for this have I any less failed my God? Am I any less a sinner?
The tension of Being permeates the political fabric, and sometimes
seems to rend it in two. Because the divine and the material, the
person and the individual, are joined in one life, yet distinguished,
and because one can predominate over the other, is it proper to say
that the person who resists social pressure in favor of the life of
on
,
the Spirit, who 'forgers' the city for the truth of remembering God--
this person still serves the city: as Socrates served Athens, and
through Plato humanity, even as the corrupted humanity of the Athenian
citizenry stained itself with his blood. Thus to say that persons may
reject (object i vi zed
,
ossified) society is not to say that they may
reject other persons
.
They reject only the 'accidents' and not the
'essence' of their fellow human beings, the 'law' but not the 'spirit'
of the law, the 'state' but not the 'idea' of the state. The person
Is an hi'.Uorical existent, a social unit, thus necessarily a participant
in the 'common good', "the common good (which) is common because it is
8?
received in persons, each one of which is a mirror of the whole".
This tension is perhaps the outstanding fact of political member-
ship; it cuts to the core of the issue of citizenship. It is the most
difficult and challenging of human existential tasks to mediate--for
the political actor is himself the med i ator-- the sometimes open struggle
betv^een the knowledge of right Being and the exigencies of existential
order. Especially so in corrupt times. Especially so for those 'good
men' who will not simply vralk away from the public arena when the
breach with Being looks too great to bridge, who will not give over
the political space to the sophists without a fight.
It is against the backdrop of the transcendental/existential
tension that the third part of this essay, the discussion of agency
and communion and the existential modes of politics and citizenship
proper, should be received. For the spiritual dimension cannot be
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eliminated; it can at best be assumed, 'forgotten', or worse, perverted.
To forget is to at least risk serious misunderstanding. To pervert is
to alienate man from the depths of Being, his own personality, to an
extent altogether unnecessary. Before moving on to this discussion,
however, it will perhaps do well to treat briefly the experiential
nature of transcendental agency, in hopes of bringing the aomittedly
airy notion of transcendence closer to the earth.
The topic of transcendental agency may be subdivided without undue
violence into two major 'stages': the stage of 'awakening' of the
transcendental faculty itself; and the stage of actual transcendental
experience, conscious participation in Reality. This latter stage
mjght be further subdivided along various dimensions, particularly
according to type and intensity. We will be content to mention only
two further 'stages' along the latter dimension, i.e. the stage of
'Illumination' and the stage of 'Unity'; neither of which we can say
very much about here in any case.
Awaken i ng . Jaspers has most admirably treated the most out-
standing experiential 'calls' of transcendence to man according to
his notion of the "boundary (or 'ultimate') s i tuat ion"--"someth i ng
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immanent which already points to transcendence". Of course, the
very historicity of human existence is a sort of general, encompassing
'boundary' situation when seen for what it is, i.e. being in the metaxy,
and not an ultimate reality. We have covered this ground already, and
need not cover it again. But because of this historicity, it is
possible that any experience, the most mundane, might serve as a
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transcendental cipher, a vehicle of 'grace'. It Is extremely unlikely,
however, that this will occur to one who has not been prepared in ad-
vance by a restless dissatisfaction with the ordinary view of things
and the vague consciousness that something essential to peace Is lacking
from the ordinary scheme. Thus the young Whitman was 'awakened' by the
lapping of waves on a Long island beach; but the lapping he heard was
more than mere lapping; the ses whispered to Whitman only the one word,
"Death, death, death, death, death". Oeath is to be sure the most
ultimate of ultimate situations. It was this 'situation' that aroused
in the mere boy "the "Ire, the sweet hell within/The unknown want, the
O r
destiny of me".
In addition to Death, Jaspers counts as specific boundary situations
Suffering, Struggle and Guilt. We will treat briefly each In turn.
Death can strike us as boundary situation In many forms, especially
in the form of the death of loved ones, and most particularly as the
anticipation of one's own death. Death is not a boundary situation,
it should be made clear, so long as we only seek to avoid It, or avoid
thinking of it. "Truth is neither the death wish nor the fear of death;
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It Is the presence of Existenz as appearance disappears". It only
becomes a genuine boundary when we accept it as the brute datum, the
absolute unavoidable necessity that it is, and allow It to 'stand in'
our lives. The horrifying knowledge of coming non-being ("Nothing is
reversible; it Is the end for all time") compels me to seek what is
truly real within me, to separate grain from chaff and decide upon
'priorities'. "Compulsion" is perhaps too strong a term; for certainly
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we can close our ears to the call of transcendence: we can prepare to
have our bodies quick-frozen at the onset of terminal disease to await
in deathly un-death the ultimate cure science will most certainly deliver
eventually, or hope for the quick development of the cloning technology
that will provide us an inexhaustable number of replacement parts; or,
at the other extreme, we can embrace the philodoxy of 'live for today,
for tomorrow we die'. Both attitudes are very much (too much) with us
today; both are pernicious toward the transcendental principle of re-
spect for persons. To respond to the call of transcendence in the
situation of death is to refuse both the blind will to live and nihil-
istic despair in the face of certain existential extinction. "Vital
fear is lifted whenever death is looked upon by real Existenz--by a
conscious being which appears to itself in time, which can know itself
only as a phenomeion in tine, but which is this knowledge is assured of
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an origin it does not know". Death "does not call for an answer, for




to live and to test my life in view of death". In this "test" we
discover the profound paradox of metaxic life, that existence is most
meaningful when it is relativized in relation to true Being.
If Death passes on life its final blessing, Suffering is life's
constant companion. In its endless variety of forms--phys i cal , mental,
emotional — Suffering is like Death unavoidable. There can be no
evasion, even as we fight, as sentient beings must fight, to minimize
Suffering, to limit j_t_ as it limits us; even when we know some success
in this struggle, when we are fortunate, misfortune stalks the periphery.
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"I fight my suffering, trying to limit and postpone it; but however
alien it is, I still find it belongs to me. I end up neither in the
harmonious tranquility of passive suffering nor in the rage of dark
one can
comprehension. Everybody must bear and fulfill his burden. No
relieve him of it". Indeed, 'happiness' in the sense of total release
from Suffering, strikes us as strangely empty, dull and colorless.
Clearly, if the whole of existence were happiness in this sense, there
would be no urge to transcendence, no call. Genuine happiness settles
on me only against the backdrop of my al 1 -too-human suffering. I can-
not be genuinely happy unless I am aware of myself as personality; and
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I become aware of myself through my suffering.
The dimensions of Struggle are several; for brevity's seke we may
say that there are three primary forms. First, materially conditioned
struggle: As existents we are born into relatively fixed power re-
lations. In the context of these relations we, as much as we can,
defend, expand, define, etc. our living spaces. Secondly, there is
the struggle for "creation in the agon of minds". We struggle for
achievement, recognition, love, communication, reciprocity. Thirdly,
there is struggle within the self: "I stunt possibilities that are
inherent in me and coerce my impulses; I shape my given propensities,
question what I have become, and am aware of being only when I do not
9
1
recognize my being as something I own". The 'who' of my being, my
personality which I do not 'own', quarrels incessantly with the 'what',
the determined, that which I insist on calling 'mine'. Struggle erupts
as a boundary situation for me when I perceive through it the limitations
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of existence and am called to see that there is something more: "no
matter how I fool myself about the conditions of my own existence-
conditions from which I benefit without having created them-there will
be occasions when I scent threatening perils, when I get nervous and
feel vaguely oppressed as it becomes clear that lawlessness and strife
may be i nsol ub 1 e"
. We can neither, in honesty, affirm the struggle,
nor deny its existence. We decry force and violence against our own
and other personalities, yet wa are compelled to commit it by virtue
of the fact that v;e are historical existents.
Guilt follows Struggle. ! use others, I hurt others, I fail others,
as I use, hurt, fail my own person. Even for the most ''ighteous, "Every
act has consequences in the world which the actor i-;new nothing about.
The consequences of his action frighten him because, although ne never
thought of them, he knows he caused them". The soul seeks simplicity,
freedom from the exploitation of others, freedom from responsibility for
the sins of others. Yet everything is so complex, I benefit in so many
ways I vyi 1 1 never know from the humiliation and exploitation of others,
I am responsible. "Purity of soul is the truth of Existenz, but an
existing Existenz must risk and realize impurity in orde."--always
guilty--to undertake the infinite task of purifying itself in the
tension of temporal existence". This is not the kind of guilt and
responsibility which at the level of individuality results in either
shameful paralysis ('how can I act, when I know my action will harm
someone?'), or shameless nihilism ('we are all guilty, therefore no one
is guilty'). This is rather guilt and responsibility at the level of
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personality; the level at which I am my brother's keeper, at which we
are all, as human being, equidistant from God and all share a common
fate
.
Other 'situations' might be described, no doubt. Each of the above
have, further, dimensions we have not even suggested. One could fill
volumes on Dostoyevsky
' s brilliant treatments alone; few have so pro-
foundly explored the natures and inner connections of pride, struggle,
guilt, etc. in relation to transcendence and the freedom of the person-




. The full flowering of personality requires
a pruning of the human plant beyond the preliminary awakening of the
soul. 'Illumination' is the symbol we invoke here for the stage of
transcendental growtn between awakening and full-fledged unity with
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Being. The overall process is one of continual concentration of
energies directed toward the Ground as consciousness reorganizes itself
to attune more perfectly to the 'secret order' of Reality. "We are
like a choir v;ho st^nd round the conductor, but do not always sing in
tune, because their attention is diverted by looking at external
things", says Plotinus. "Bui when we do behold Him, we attain the
end of our existence and our rest. Then we no longer sing out of tune,
but form a truly divine chorus about Him; in the which cliorus dance
the soul beholds the Fountain of life, the Fountain of intellect, the
Principle of Being, the c^use of good, the root of soul". The dis-
tinction between Illumination and Unity is a matter of intensity and
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depth. Illumination is the re-
' center ing ' of consciousness that is not
yet full participation in Being. There is real vision and knowledge
attained, transcendental wisdom. Yet while an enormous advance over
the uninspired consciousness, there remains in the Illumined state an
overriding attachment to the 'ego', the continued dominance of the
individual over the person. The recurrent experience of the Illumined
consciousness is probably the inspiration of poets such as Keats,
Shelley, Browning, Whitman, indeed of all artistic geniuses v/ho
usually in their most creative moments of composition find themselves
'drunk' with transcendental inspiration. There is an ongoing ordering
of the sou! not yet complete. The whole of transcendence may in fact
appear as encapsulated in immanence: "actual physical perceptions
seem to be strangely heightened, so that the self perceives an added
significance and reality in all natural things: is often convinced
that it knows at last 'the secret of the world'. In Blake's words 'the
doors of perception are cleansed' so that 'everything appears to man as
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i t _i_s, inf ini te' ".
Few personalities ever develop past the point of illumination.
Without doubt it is this stage at which the bulk, though not all, of
those symbol i zat i ons of Being discussed above are inspired. Those who
go on to the stage of Unity might well be called 'saints' in one tra-
dition, and 'philosophers' in another. They have achieved the consum-
mation of the contemplative quest, the triumph of the personal over the
individual. (We need hardly mention here that for man as man the dis-
tinction itself cannot be eliminated.) The interior alchemy at last
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attains its goal, the complete reorganization of the soul in line with
the order of Being. We are here far, far out of our depth, and can
perhaps best conclude by quoting Underbill, who has made a deep study
of the subject, on the "capital marks" of the state of Unity. These
are
(1) a complete absorption in the interests of the Infinite,
under whatever mode It is apprehended Dy the self;
(2) a consciousness cf sharing Its strength, acting by
Its authority, which results in a complete sense of
freedom, an invulnerable serenity, and usually urges the
self to some form of heroic effort or creative activity;
(3) the establishment of the self as a 'power for life',
a center of energy, an actual parent of spiritual vitality
in other men. 9°
Thus we should not imagine thaf the 'philosophers' need either to desert
the world or become enemies of order in history. On the contrary, they
are the world's 'ambassadors to the Absolute' and the inspired source
of order-through-symbol i zat ion and attunement. Tlirough them and their
activities are "all things made new".
Agency and Communion
Sinne of self love possesseth a1 mine eie
And all my soule and al my every part;
And for this sinne there is no remedie,
It is so grounded inv/ard in my heart.
--Shakespeare, Sonnet 62
Located in the Metaxy, human society is neither divine society nor
like the 'society' of insects and lower animals. It is 'in-between'.
A perfect society would be a society of pure Persons, uncorrupted by
material individuality. In the Perfect Society there would be pure
Commun i ty--each person is in the other via unmediated communion; the
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'common good' Is precisely the absolute good of each person. (Something
like this, I have argued, was Marx's conception of 'true communism'.)
The pseudo-'soclety' of the insect/animal world, on the other hand,
admits of no true common good, for there is no 'communion' whatever
among member individuals. (The ind Ivldual istical ly-derai led polity
tends in this direction.)
The metaxic human community is neither the Perfect nor the pseudo-
society. It is composed, rather, of human beings who are at once persons
and individuals, 'agents' In a double sense. The complete person would
be an absolute whole, the universe In totality, the Beyond-being of
Being itself: God Himself. Mar. is much less, and more limited: as
a creature of particular needs, wants, purposes, he enters society as
a 'member'
,
that is, as a part of a whole which Is beyond himself and
his particular interests. Part and whole, particular and universal,
agency and communion, these are the twin poles of existential human,
socio-political being.
In the following I will attempt to characterize this second duality
of human being and its relevance to the location of the political and
the meaning of citizenship. First I will sketch those modes of exis-
tential agency, 'psychological' and Institutional, that strike me as
most basic to the situation of the political; then move on to consider
the communal mode of politics and citizenship in relation to the agentic
forms
.
Psychological agency . We will consider under this heading three modes:
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(1) egoism; (2) instinct; (3) 'authentic life'. As will be evident, it
is difficult even with such elementary categories to strike firm and
fast distinctions. Yet the phenomena of agency justify a measure of
conceptual differentiation at least suggestive of their range and vari-
ability. We will pass quickly over egoism and instinct; our main concern
is the third mode,
' authent i c 1 i fe ' , the site of the most' 'existential
'





To be bound to the flesh is to be anchored in the permanent
possibility, if not necessity, of prideful backsliding from the fullness
of personality. Egoism is strictly non- t ranscendent : neither hori-
zontally nor vertically does the egoist seek a 'beyond' of given being.
Egoism is the unremlttant exhaltation of limited self-being. Individu-
ality over personality, and shows a lack of self-scrutiny, criticism,
and self-imposed sublimation of ends. It is essentially a naturalistic
category, close bound to the Splnozan premise that "Each thing, insofar
as it is in Itself, endeavors to persevere In its being" ( Eth i cs )
,
Hobbes' certainty that passion largely unchecked--barely sublimated,
unregulable but by the counterforce of the most powerful of passions,
the fear of death, and only 'guided' by an instrumental reason--Is the
true engine of human existence. Egoism is that unreflective agentic
mods perhaps best represented by the purely self-regarding mundane goals
of, in Freud's words, "honor, power, wealth, fame, and the love of
women".
^^'^ (Obviously, Freud was writing before the advent of the 'new
v/oman', hell-bent on attaining the same egoistic self-satisfaction
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heretofore restricted to the privileged province of the male.) The
egoistic attitude well enough understands the exigencies of instrumental
'order', but looks askance at all common 'social' interests, and es-




'"^^'"ct- What I refer to here as the mode of 'instinct' occupies
a kind of middle space between the modes of ego and 'authenticity'. In
the absolute demand for self-centered satisfaction, the instinct is
close to egoism; egoism is indeed commonly expressed a^_ the behest of
instinctual demand. At the same time instinct, at least in some of its
more sublime expressions, merges with certain dimensions of the mode of
authenticity. Instinct is in the first place the uncompromising demand
of the 'will' for a full life, and not merel/ the 'civilized', abstractly
'rational' life. As Dostoyevsky put it in Notes from Undergrou nd, "...
reason is an excellent thing, there is no disputing that, but reason is
nothing but reason and satisfies only the rational side of man's nature,
while will is a manifestation of the whole life, that Is, of the whole
human life including reason and all the Impulses. And although our
life, in this manifestation of it, is often worthless, yet it is life
and not simply extracting square roots .
Freud perhaps best understood the profound agent i c/communal tension
in its instinctual dimension. Freud well recognized the Janus character
of social life: social institutions, by providing a focus of directive
order, promote ego adaptations, confirm identities, etc.; they are in
this sense i nd i spens I b 1 e means of se 1 f- fu 1 f i 1 Imen t . They moreover have
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the 'positive' function of inhibiting aggression, the ineradicable
"mutual hostility of human beings"J°2
^^^^^ however, civilized
social life is a source of great frustration; we must "include the in-
fluence of civilization among the determinants of neuroses. It is
easy. ..for a barbarian to be healthy; for a civilized man the task is
hard".^*^^ "The whole course of the history of civilization is no more
than an account of the various methods adopted by mankind for 'binding'
their unsatisfied wi shes . . . "
.
^ There is an inevitable conflict be-
tween the individual and tne social order; the dimensions of human being
defy neat integration. It is the costs of this Irreducible tension that
stand out in Freud's account. "The replacement of the power of the indi
vidual by the power of the community constitutes the decisive step of
civilization. The essence of it lies in the fact that the members of
the community restrict their selves in their possibilities of satlsfacti
whereas the individual knew no such restriction", But the agent does
not simply accept this constraint without protest. Experience teaches
us, Freud insists, that "for most people there is a limit beyond which
their constitution cannot comply v;ith the demands of civilizations";
"every individual is virtually an enemy of civilization".'^'^
The amatory is of course the primary instinct ("it is quite im-
possible to adjust the claims of the sexual instinct to the demands of
1 08
civilization"). But in the sublimated forms of love, instinctual
agency Is already close on the border of 'authenticity'. We are all
1 09
familiar with how the "secular religion of love" is capable of
transporting its initiates beyond the ordinary rule of social decorum.
3sk
All that matters to the lovers, at the height of erotic ecstasy, is
their own shared se 1 f -de 1
i
ght
, erotic individualism, sensuality and
self-indulgence. But where the erotic passion of the lovers does hot
flower into a love of one another as persons, it commonly takes the other
as the means to experiencing the reflected inner world of narcissistic
emotion. Love of this sort can be the entry point to an impassioned
solitude, a mirrored loneliness opening onto a range of otherwise in-
accessible emotions. Paul Zweig has pointed out that Plato approaches
such a conception of love in the Sympos ium . According to the myth o^
the egg, man and woman were primordial ly generated from a single an-
drogynous being split in two. Since the split, "man and woman pursue,
and love, each other because their souls are incomplete: they conserve,
in their emotions, a nostalgia for their ancient unity. According to
Plato's theory, love is, paradoxically, a desire for solitude: a need
to cure man's a 1 1 - too-human loneliness by reviving the perfect self-
communion of some prelapsarian experience before time had begun".
Authent i c i ty . Authenticity is the agency of autobiography, a
'self-love', but a self-love altogether unlike, 'higher' than, egoism.
We are here in a horizontally transcendent mode. For Rousseau the two
forms of self-love are related, to the blame of society and civilization.
"Amour de soi" is the governing virtue of the 'natural man', uncorrupted
by social forces; "amour propre" is the non-virtue of social man gone
sour. Rousseau quotes Aristotle's Pol i tics as the motto to the Discourse
on Inequality: "We should consider what is natural not in things which
are depraved, but in those v^hich are rightly ordered according to nature",
And in the notes to the Di_scourse Itself we are instructed to "not
confuse selfishness (amour propre) with self-love (amour de soi); they
are two very different passions both in their nature and in their
effects".
Self-love is a natural sentiment, which inclines every
animal to look to his own preservation, and which, guided
in men by reason and qualified by pity, is productive of
humanity and virtue. Selfishness is but a relative and
factitious sentiment, engendered in society, which in-
clines every individual to set a greater value upon
himself than upon any other man, which inspires men
v/ith all the mischief they do to each other, and is the
true source of what we call honor.l'l
It is 'society' which corrupts the natural humanity, engendering the
fall from natural being in which every man considers himself "I'.^e only
spectator who observes him, as the only being in the universe which
takes any interest in him, as the only judge of his own merit". As
soon as they "began to consider different objects, and to make com-
parisons", "It became to the interest of men to appear what they really
were not. To be and to seem became two very different things, and from
this distinction sprang haughty pomp and deceitful knavery, and all the
1 1
2
vices which form their train".
The quest for solitude, personal truth, the 'true self, is the
outstanding characteristic of the agentic mode of authenticity. The
agent engages in a private rhetoric, a colloquy of self with self; he
seeks the solitude of emotions which have their own 'purity' and 'truth'
for him qua individual self. Authentic agency ""equ i res the break with
thoughtless conformity and mediocrity. It is 'cultural', to be sure,
but peculiarly so: it is directed against establ ished cultural institutions
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--not. simply in the sense of opposing these particular institutions, but
cultural institutions as such. The authenticity of isolation, inward-
ness, and self-overcoming is exalted over all 'externa' authority. It
is, thus, at the least ant i
-authorl tar Ian ; and at the extreme, positively
anti-social, the secularization of the hard words of Christ: "If any
.-nan cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father and mother and brethern
and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke
15:26); or Rousseau near the end of life, having made the sharp, final
break social fellowship: "Here am 1, then, alone upon the earth, having
no brother, or neighbor, or friend, or society but myself". ^^-^ But
whether in extreme or mitigated form, agency Insists upon the reality
of dimensions of existential being which slip through the normal social
net, important pieces of life left out of the "social construction of
reality" that can on'y be "found on mounta Intops ... through suffering
1 ]hborne gladly, and voluntary solitude".
The common offers a kind of 'middle range' of emotions shaped and
constituted by the i ntersubject i ve meanings of collective being. Even
here there are limits to sharing, limits imposed by the condition of
'plurality' (Arendt), the ' asymptomacy ' (Pranger) of the Individual's
relationship to the social wliole, the distinction between the 'I' and
the 'me' (G. H. Mead).^^"* Yet beyond this, there are other 'ranges'
of emotions and meanings which can be even less shared. They are common
in so far as every individual progresses through typical emotional/
psychological experiences, which are internalized as personally ir-
rational images-- ' archetypes ' , 'internal objects', etc. But interpersonal
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relations cannot contain the whole of this 'inner world', there are
severe limits posed to the commun i cab 1 1 i ty of the fullness of this
inner realm. Strictly speaking, one cannot 'tell' another of this-
reality, but only "appeal" (Jaspers) to the other's reality, to "con-
fess" oneself, as Rousseau tried, to one's fellows, revealing oneself
to the common in hope of understanding: "I will say boldly: This is
what I have done, what I have thought, what I was... I have shown myself
as I was: mean and contemptible, good, high-minded and sublime, ac-
cording as 1 was one or the other. I have unveiled my inmost self...".^
Every man who acts the authentic agent becomes a spiritual 'hero'
in Kierkegaard's sense, for each must tread alone the path of inward
purification to 'find' the self 'behind' social attachments . ^ ^'^ "Thus
to be a hero, not in the eyes of the world, but within oneself, to have
no plea to present before a human tribunal, but living immured within
one's ov/n personality, to be one's ov/n witness, one's own judge, one's
1 1
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own prosecutor, to be in oneself the one and only". For the authenti
agent, the meaning of life is not, cannot be, exhausted by the range of
meanings offered by society. The individual is more than the functional
end purposive relationships in which ie is concretely engaged, more
than the 'role', or roles, he 'plays' in the ongoing life of a com-
munity; more even than the unique 'individuality' G. H. Mead is willing
to concede when he writes.
The fact that all selves are constituted by or in terms
of the social process, and are individual reflections of
it. ..is not in the least incompatible with, or destructive
of the fact that every individual self has its own par-
ticular individuality, its own unique pattern; because
each individual self within that process, while it reflects
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in Its organized structure the behavior pattern of that
process as a whole, does so from its own particular and
unique standpoint within that process, and thus reflects
in its organized structure a different aspect or per-
spective of the whole social behavior pattern from that
which is reflected in the organized structure of any
other individual self within that processJ19
For Mead the proper analogy of individuality is the Liebnizian monad
which "mitrors" the universe "from a different point of view, and thus
mirrors a different aspect or perspective of thar jniverse" 120 The
authentic agent, hovyever, finds the Bergsonian attitude
-nore appropriate:
to be sure, the individual is a 'part' of the social whole.
But in the first place, for society to exist at all the
individual must bring_ into it a whole group of inborn
tendencies; society therefore is not self-explanatory,
- so we must search below the social accretions, get down
to Life, of which human societies, as indeed the human
species altogether, are but manifestations. But this
is not going far enough; v/e must delve deeper still If
we want to understand, not only how society 'constrains'
individuals, but again how the individual can set up as
a judge and wrest from it a moral transformation. '21
The authentic agent will go to the limit to realize a personal
'truth'. The 'negative' experiences of 1 i fe--cont i ngency
,
'nothing-
ness', anxiety, despair--are embraced as pointers to this truth, exis-
tential conditions for the 'leap' into authentic being. Even if one
does not aspire to transcendence proper, the boundary situations of
human being move the agent beyond the merely socially given, to 'wonder'
and a thirst for personally meaningful existence, possibly to 'revolt'
against the 'absurdity' of existence. Thus in Jean Anouilh's modern
version of Ant igone , the heroine insists at risk of death on executing
a stale and empty religious ritual over her dead brother's body, despite
King Creon's injunction against it. Her nearly inarticulate rationale
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for doing so speaks precisely to the point of the agent i c/communal
tension:
£reon_: And did you never say to yourself as you watched
them, that if someone you really loved lay dead under the
shuffling, mumbling ministrations of the priests, you would
scream aloud and beg the priests to leave the dead in peace?
Ant igone : Yes, I've thought of that.
Creon: And you still insist on being put to death--me re 1
y
because I refuse to let your brother go out with that
grotesque passport; because I refuse his body the wretched
consolation of that mass-production jibber-jabber, which
you would have been the first to be embarrassed by i f I
had allowed it. The whole thing is absurd!
Ant igone : Yes, it's absurd.
Creon : Then whv
,
Antigone, why?.., For whom?...
Antigone : For nobody. For myself. ^^2
"For myself". Authentic agency Insists upon boldly looking into the
void, on wrenching from the jaws of an encompassing contingency a meaning
that is certainly personal, perhaps common and political, but in every
case disruptive of the settled scheme of things. As Arendt would have
it, "The act of politics teaches men how to bring forth what is great
and radiant-- ta megc?la kai l ampra
,
in the words of Democritus, as long
as the pol i
s
is there to inspire men to dare the extraordinary, all
123
things are safe; if it perishes, everything is lost". 'Political'
action here _i_s_ authentic agency; the polls is the proper setting in
which the great actor can reveal his great soul via the great deed, and
by his greatness chip off a measure of lastingness in the face of certain
existential annihilation.
He thought of. those little cities of old time where men
had murmured of the 'Indies', built a ship and freighted
it with hopes, that men might see their hope outspread
its wings across the sea. All of them magnified, lifted
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above themselves and saved--by a ship! He thought: thegoal, perhaps, means nothing, it is the thing done that
Within the agentic ambit, the political, the common, is the medium of
self
-overcoming and exaltation, the platform on which one 'reveals'
one's self, the audience to which one 'confesses'. Thus the political
common and the personally extraordinary may intersect and conplement
one another without tension. But one suspects that the conditions under
which they do are themselves extraordinary, not at all common. Authentic
agency more likely either stops short of the polls, as in Kierkegaard's
solitude, or shoots well beyond it, as in Camus 's affirmation of human
solidarity through rebellion: "the individual is not, in himself
alone, the embodiment of the values he wishes to defend. It needs
all humanity, at least, to comprise them". Rebellion "founds its
first value on the whole human race. I rebel --therefore we exist".
Institutional agency
. At least since Aristotle's critique of Plato's
Republ i c an important strain of Western political thought has recognized
(and praised, but that is not our concern just here) the necessity of
social diversity and plurality. (V/e have reviewed one outstanding
representative of this strain in our analysis of Hegel.) Proceeding
from a social theory of human nature, it is found that real 'community'
for man lies not at the 'abstract' level of comprehensive state unity,
but at the level of the 'lesser association'. On this view society is
best conceived not as a single undifferentiated order, but as commun i -
titas commun i tatum--a "community of commun i t i es"--as it is the plural
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communities that are the differential source of identity, value and
meaning (commonly referred to, collectively, as 'ideology'). The





is, unlil<e the 'artificiality' sovereign-state legitimacy-a measure
of (usually functional) autonomy within its own sphere, and hence a
rightful measure of independent authority.
It is this authoritative autonomy which interests us. We are
justified in referring to these
' assoc . at i ons ' here under the heading
of Institutional Agency because, while their relative independence is
by no means inherently antithetical to comprehensive order, this inde-
pendence must be actively media'ted by the structure of th e state
(comprehensive political order), if the ever-present potential for
institutional d i s- i ntegrat i on and dis-order is not to be actualized:
this perhaps especially so in the present period, one of a veritable
explosion of particularized 'needs', and the pervasiveness of 'liber-
ationist' ideology.
Here again our intention is not to exhaustively depict the mode of
institutional agency. Again our effort is but to suggest something of
the nature and range of this agency, so as to bring to sharper focus
the med i a tory/ i n tegrat i on i s t role of politics and citizenship. Needless
to say also, we are forced to overlook important differences of: (l)
types of ' assoc i at i on ' . In what sense is a face-to-face association
of neighbors anything like a faceless bureaucratic 'community'? The
inverted commas here are- not incidental. Can the latter be considered
a community at all? Tonnies' distinction between ' geme i nshaf t ' and
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'gesellshaff would clearly apply here. But certainly a bureaucratic
community exercises agentic power; and (2) degree_of_^gency
. We can,
however, mention two rules in this regard: The first is to look to the
agency's position vis-a-vis the established structure of power: the
American Petroleum Institute, we maybe quite certain, exercises superior
agentic influence than the United Farm Workers. Second, the more an as-
sociation contributes to the construction and maintenance of a particular
'ideolog/', that is, the more it serves, in Burke's serene image, as an
"inn and resting place" of the human spirit, the more is that association
(potentially at least) agentic.
We should perhaps also itetate once again that we are dealing not
with mere empirical contingencies, but with a problem, though political-
culturally variable, that is rooted in the human condition. Especially
can vje not sidestep the tension of agency and communion by fancy specu-
lative footwork regarding human 'universality'. As Marcel has said,
"the normal development of a human being implies an increasingly precise
and, as it were, automatic division between things for which he Is
responsible and those for" which he is not. Each one of us becomes
the center of a sort of mental space arranged in concentric zones of
1 26decreasing interest and participation". The political import of the
arrangement of this 'mental space' cannot be exaggerated. Its differ-
entiation of commitment Is the source of those conflicts of loyalties
that motivate the profoundly political acts of opposition, dissent,
disobedience, withdrawal, treason and the like.
Our analysis comprises four categories, one quite narrow (l).
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another relatively so {h)
,
the other two (2 and 3) quite broad and to
a degree overlapping. These are: (1) the family; (2) 'involuntary'
associations; (3) voluntary associations; {h) i ntra- ' establ i shment
'
organizations. (Empirical 'filling' for these categories is drawn
from United States culture; the newspapers daily suggest, however,
parallel examples from other Western, and also non-Western, cultures.)
FamJJjy. The family, whose 'death' and obsolescence has of late
been naively and prematurely declared over and over again, has in al'
periods of history been recognized as the primary building block of
political order. As Burke argued in his Reflections on the Revolution
in France
,
"No man was ever attached by a sense of pride, partiality,
or real affection to a description of square measurement .. .We begin
1 27
our public affections in our families...". Perhaps because of its
continuing contribution of ordering strength to a social order per-
ceived as irremediably corrupt and unjust has the family (a fort ior
i
,
the atomized 'nuclear' family) been so scathingly reviled by some social
critics. Jean Elshtain has, however, recently employed a Freudian per-
spective to put paid the idea of the f ami ly qua mere transmission belt
of dominant values. In capitalist society, "the family both reproduces
certain capitalist social relations, but resists the total intrusion
1 28
of the capitalist world and thus keeps alive an alternative". The
agen tic/communal tension resides at the very heart of the familial
function of child-rearing. Children, if they are to mature into
morally and socially responsible and self-critical adults, "must be
reared in a highly charged emotional setting in which they are loved
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and love in a manner which establishes basic trust, based on nurturance
and constancy".. And this setting, essentially involving "the con-
tinuing presence of specific beloved other", is already part of "the
tension between individual and group demands and imperat i ves" J It
is intimate, while society is 'other', close while the state is distant,
private while the world is public. If the family is a force for social
order 'as such', it Is inherently a potential counterforce to any par-
ticular order.
Involuntary association
. The phrase 'involuntary association' is
admittedly somewhat arbitrary. I mean to denote by it not that being,
say, black, automatically makes' a black individual or group agentic, but
rather more generally that race is a (in this case biologicallv) 'given'
identification, on the basis of which institutional agency may be mani-
fested. The same may be said with varying degrees of intensity for
religion, class, and residence (e.g. I am a Southerner).
Race and ethnicity
. Both race and its weak sister, ethnicity,
have been staples of agency in U. S. (melting-pot American) history, no
less now than in the past. To be black, brown, red or yellow in a pre-
dominantly white culture is already to wear a kind of badge, to be
self-conscious of one's difference. The self-consciousness is of
course not restricted to the colored peoples. The presence of racial
minorities in a population is only too likely to make the white majority
all the more conscious of its whiteness. Especially when this difference
is institutionally employed as a criterion of discriminatory treatment,
a biological determinant of better and v;orse peoples, it is likely that
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racial agency will manifest itself, perhaps violently (again, not only
for the racial Tninority but for the white majority). In this respect,
a rapidly expanding U. S. Hispanic population, much of which is non-
English speaking, may ultimately prove to be considerably more agentic
than even its black counterpart, and in turn provoke an even greater
white 'backlash' (perhaps already beginning) than black agentic acti-
vism. In the same vein we might take note of the very serious American
Indian claims to tribal sovereignty and the return of vast tracts of
lost land; some Indians are pressing for nothing less than territorial
statehood, the creation of many nations within the nation. (Blacks,
and more recently a small number of radical feminists, have advanced
similar claims, but with no sol'd legal ground.) Less intense, but
growing in strength, is the widespread reassertion of 'ethnic pride'
among populations of immigrant ancestry, often several generations re-
moved from the 'Old Country'. Everyone seems impassioned by a new
'need for roots', roots which in every case trace to somewhere other
than U . S . soil.
Re 1 ig i on . Little need be said here, but that v^e refer primarily
to the non-cultic 'traditional' re 1 i g i ons--Protes tan t/Ca thol i c/Jewi sh--
identification v/ith which an individual is usually born to, and which
are in a position, and are often inclined, to assert agency in regard
to salient (especially 'moral') public issues. This agency can only
increase in strength in so far as the organized churches are successful
in reintegrating the new wave of do-it-yourself religiosity into the
established fold. The ncwcultic religiosity (itself largely 'voluntary'
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in character) cannot however be discounted as to agentic significance,
especially in so far as it continues to grow in numbers of adherents.
In this regard the fact of born-again Carter's election to the Presidency
is a matter for serious thought.
C_las£. Economic class is another generally sociological cate-
gory on the basis of which a multiplicity of specifically agentic forms,
more than we can hope to specify here, can and do arise: from the im-
mensely powerful organizations of the corporate Goliaths, both capitalist
(the individual corporations and their lobbies as well as their 'umbrella'
organi2ations--e.g. the National Association of Manufacturers, the
National Industrial Conference Board, etc. --and t hei r lobbies) and
proletarian (the big unions), to the myriad of lesser unions, organi-
zations of small capital, and professional groups, to the feeble
representatives of the culture of poverty (e.g. the National V^elfare
Rights Organization). Class is the backgone of the 'group system' made
so much of by contemporary plural ists; class agency is commonly the
deciding factor in political struggles over public policy, with the
capitalist class, having most successfully penetrated the decision-
making structure, commonly emerging the victor. The cent r i f uga 1
1
y
agentic force of class is greatest, as might well be expected, since
it is most firmly anchored in material interest, during periods of
economic stagnation and/or decline.
Res idence . Political geography is yet another agentic staple
of the American historical experience. Though the identification of
'place' cannot be discounted as an independent agentic power (the
reemerging enthusiasm for 'the neighborhood' is instructive), region-
alism, like class, is primarily an economic phenomenon, largely en-
gendered and sustained by rivalry over government and corporate favors,
the control and exploitation of valuable economic resources, markets,
etc. Like class too, this agency can only be expected to intensify
under conditions of economic crisis. (The desperate claims of the
forgotten cities represent a complex variant of this same phenomenon.)
Voluntary association
.
Any subject of sommon concern can inspire
a voluntary association, vrom Bach appreciation to b i rd-v/atch i ng and
Brahma-worship, but those of most relevance to political agency share
the characteristic of parochial ideological orientation.
Tradi tional
. Traditional agentic ider t i f i cat ions include
increasingly lukewarm party identifications; identifications with one
or another basic political i deol ogy--dom i nant (cen ter- ' conservat i ve
' )
,
accomodative (center- ' 1 iberal
') , opposition (left-radical, right-
1 3
1
radical); identification with a 'political class' (e.g. Mew York
T imes and N^. Y_. Rev iev; of Books readers v. N^. Y_. D a i ly Navys and
National Enquirer devotees); identification with t.ie not yet dead




etc. Closely related to the 'political
class' phenomenon, further, are professional identifications with . the
relatively distinct educational sector: especially the identifications
of the academics who staff the quas i -corporate universities, and of
these especially those academics in the liberal arts and humanities.
After members of the mass media and politicians proper, these indi-
viduals are perhaps the most influential 'opinion-making' cultural
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group, If on the whole (it is at least hoped) their orientation is less
strictly parochial than their consciousness-shaping counterparts.
Causes, sects, movements
. Perhaps more interesting in the
current context of proliferating parochialisms are issue- and sect-
oriented agentic identifications (themselves often closely conjoined).
In general there is the proliferation of particular social groups,
following the exarr.ple of the '50s and '60s civil rights drive, pressing
hard for the definition and redefinition of 'rights': most notably,
women and homosexuals, and to a lesser extent, the aged, children, mental
patients, prisoners, the handicapped, etc. (Of these the women's and
homosexuals' movements may be considered doubly agentic, as they provoke
vociferous ant I -femi n I st and ant I -homosexua 1 backlashes.) Similarly,
'issues' abound as foci for the mobilization of particular participatory
energies: abortion, 'right to work', affirmative action, ecology,
nuclear power, etc. Issues-politics seems increasingly to overtake,
to the woe of traditional politicos, party-mediated politics. Again,
in periods of 'crisis', when few consensual assumptions are sacred,
and problems defy simple solution, issue-oriented activism is destined
to intensify, as well as to expand in scope.
Intra-' establ i shment ' organ i zat I ons . Within the sprawling
expanse of modern national government--whI ch must include not only
elected officials and the courts, but a mammoth bureaucracy--as well
as the related power centers of the military, the 'Intelligence com-
munity', and the press, there is more than a little room for the
manifestation of multiple agencies. The ground for I ntra-governmental
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agency Is already prepared by the constitutional separation of powers;
the general fragmentation of government conditions socio-economic agency
in general, and welcomes the very usurpation of governmental authority
by the partial authority of lesser associations. The bureaucracies
pursue their own dynamics of self-preservation and growth; the big press
parlays its 'watchdog' role into a position of independent agentic power;
the intelligence agencies go so far as to defy constitutional oversight.
Pol
i
tics and ci tizenshi p. The lion's share of the exisLcntial political
relation is contained within the shaky but endurable contours of the
quarrelsome relationship of private and public, 'particular' and 'uni-
versal', agency and community. in brief, politics is a unified and
continual process of conflict and integration. V/e can further venture
a converse--tha L the truncation or otherwise undue mitigation of this
re 1 at i onsh
i
p-- I ts collapse Into either a lustreless, however magnetic,
identity, or a dichotomized dua 1 I ty--wou Id signal the demise of politics
itself. Despite some serious thrusts in one or the other direction by
a large number of political thinkers, the fatal blow has yet to be
delivered. Fortunately, the 'genuinely' political is a hardy strain;
man reaily is and must be, as Aristotle averred, the 'political animal':
at least as long as he is led by life to taste the exh i 1 erat I ons and
exigencies of both individual and collective being, and neither one
nor the other singly.
The task of the political is to draw together into one knot both
the particular and universal of life, to yoke agency and communion; but
It is itself closer kin to the latter. Its task is to work 'upward'
from the particular to the general, as it is the particular that is
given, and ordered communion that need be achieved out of a plenitude
of agency. From a political standpoint, the 'flaw' in the merely par-
ticular is two-fold: it is at once too narrow and too broad. It is
too narrow in so far as it fails to address the common affairs of a
people in a rational, self-conscious, and comprehensive way. It is
mired in the private, the limited, the mundane, the sen i
-consc i ous
sphere of 'tacit' knowledge, and partial and contradictory meanings.
It is too broad, paradoxically, for very much the same
-eason. Agentic,
'personal' experience is potentially boundless, intensely subjective,
and apparently inexhaustibly mu 1 1 i -faceted
,
for the indi\'idual person
and the 'group' alike. From a political perspective this experience
remains undeveloped, ambiguous, 'chaotic', without intrinsic order or
common definition. Out of this infinite wealth of experience it is
the political task to craft a common arena, a created 'space', wherein
all in some measure reside and are connected by vi-tue of the common
bond of membership, where all who share are known equall/ as 'citizens'.
An altogether new order of experience and meaning is thus forged in
the political furnace out of old materials, an order of axperience be-
yond and other than the 'inner world' of private experience and limited
agency: a publ ic experience of 'universal' origin, definition and con-
sequence.
Now, to say that an essential ingredient of the political, and the
animating cord of citizenship, is the agency/communion, private/public
tension, is not to suggest either the bifurcation of life into two
^01
separate spheres of public and private, or the subordination of one to
I on
the other. In liberal theory, for example, the American variant of
which we have examined supra
,
just such bifurcation and subordinat
occur simultaneously, as counterparts. Public and private are bound in
a single uncomfortable compass only by the instrumental and altogether
alien relation of government to 'the people'. Of the two the private
is, moreover, primary, the province of man's true nature. The public
is to be put to use
,
its power harnessed in service of the insipid
interests of the private. The organized interests of private property
in particular speak in a loud and demanding voice; the public space is
their sounding board. The result Is familiar enough: the degradation
of the total living space, a deneaning of both spheres. Privately,
individuals experfence a failure of common culture, a dearth of social
areas of cooperative activity, a breakdown of relations of reciprocity
and social discipline. Publicly, they face a paucity of participatory
public space-- i nst i tut i ons
,
forums, organizations and associations of
public s
i
gn I f i cance -- to serve as a mode of public 'togetherness'.
There Is a general level irg of public life. In such circumstances the
citizen is a citizen in name only, only formally; he is alienated from
the civic substance.
In contrast, the concept we proffer here, like the concept of
Metaxy in regard to the relation of transcendence and existence, hopes
to sustain communion and agency in a tensional whole, each related to
the other yet distinct from It. As such the concept is at once more
expansive in scope than some alternative notions of the political, and
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more restrictive than others. It is more expansive than those notions
that would limi.t the political to the strictly governmental (here again
liberal political theory comes to mind); on the tensional view politics
in varying degrees may be discovered 'everywhere', at all social levels,
in every 'sector'. But it is more restrictive than those concepts that
tend to fuse public and private into an undifferentiated, unmediated
jpity (e.g. 'the personal is the political' sort of pos i t i on) ; ^ the
tensional concept considers the public/private demarcation itself to
be unyielding and beyond reproach. From this point of view, it is
possible to pose a continuum of coinniun i ty , or ' pub 1 i ca 1 i ty '
,
to suggest
both the ubiquity and limitations of the political relation. Not all
elements of 'society' are to be taken as 'political' in the full sense
of being 'public'. For example, personal 'life-style', as the field
for the exercise of the arbitrary will, whim and caprice, falls most
fully within the parameters of the strictly individual, non-public,
and hence 'non-political'. The 'family', in contrast, is considerably
more political because of its obvious and critical public relevance,
though not so political as those arrangements, constitutional or other-
wise, that delimit the exercise of power on the part of public officials
Few social things, vie might say, are utterly without political aspect;
but, equally, relatively few things are 'genuinely', that is, fully,
pol i 1 1 ca 1
.
Those things that arc genuinely political are collective, and
shared as such in the se If -consc i ousness of a political (politically
organized) people. Here agentic particularity has its place--both the
A03
diverse particularity of social life itself, and the more general par-
ticularity of geographic limitation, ethnic and cultural uniqueness,
and particular historyj^^ But both forms are .transmuted politically:
the latter into the cohesive communal base on which politics are formed,
and whose unity real states strive to elaborate and perfect; the former
into the inexhaustible material that fuels the engine of perennial po-
litical practice. Politics on this view is thus primarily a mode for
creating (seldom without discord) a consciousness of collective caring
about matters of common concern. It is the regularly rising (and of*:en
very rough) wave on which the individual, as citizen, is carried to the
collective shore of historical existence to take his place among a
community of equals.
Above we delved a bit into the sense in which politics embodies
transcendental noti on s , expressions of the experience of human life in
the Metaxy. Now we see that the political embodies a not unrelated
'horizontal' dimension. Indeed, 'dimension' is surely too weak a
word: the horizontally transcendental transfiguration of the agentic
(the private) is the essential existential function of politics. Poli-
tics is transcendent, in the first place, ' instrumental ly ' : The organ-
ization of common purposes reveals politics as an 'autonomous' moment
of social existence. Not that politics is detached from 'material life'
and its many manifestations. Quite the contrary. But the political
is not reducible to an e'p I phenomenon of any more 'basic' social pro-
cesses. Autonomy implies neither Isolation nor absolute independence.
chimerical conditions in any case. Nor is it equivalent to the
'primacy' of the political so prevalent in the twentieth centuryj^^
when the operations of the political apparatus, especially in the
communist nations, appears increasingly independent of economic insti-
tutions and mechanisms. Here certainly is evidence of the autonomous
political 'moment'. But even where the "repol i t i c i zat i on of the re-
1 36latlons of production" has not occurred, where, even, the political
appears 'lost', submerged in the economic, politics remains the "soul"
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or economics.
In the same sensi? in which I have spoken of the ubiquity of poli-
tics do I mean to say that the autonomous political moment persists in
all social relations; it is 'everywhere', thougfi, again, it orly comes
to fruition in the wholly public relations of the state. It becomes an
active moment whenever and wherever the call is for the integration of
diverse elements into a single unified whole; whenever and wherever
men put the private and everyday behind them and apply their conscious
efforts, their words and actions, toward the organization of themselves
for the pursuit of common enterprises and the execution of common under-
takings; whenever and wherever common focus and alternative claims fuse
to form a complementary tensional whole.
The phenomenon of politics may be described, then, as the 'rational'
expression of the fact of human beings living under and through the
authority of common bonds, that they live together in a relation of
freedom vis-a-vis nature and its rhythms. Wherever and whenever there
are humans living under common rules, in common c i rcums tances , facing
the pressing need for common solutions to common problems--there is
politics. There is no human life, no communal life of any kind, with-
out politics. 'Bad- politics are perhaps the product of badly organized
existence. Perhaps, too, political coercion and violence is necessary
because, finally, men are themselves in some fundamental, unremediable
sense, 'bad'. But pol i t ics per se pers i sts for no less reason than
that human life itself is political. Politics orders, transforms, re-
creates existence, exchanging mere existence for human life, and changing
individuals into citizens. This, ! take it, is what the "life of common
1 ^9involvements" ' is in the first place all about.
But clearly this 'instrumental' transcendence is already an eth ical
transcendence. ' Cu 1 tu re ' --as 'society in general', a world of artifice
and man-made insti tut ions-- i s of course already a break with nature, a
first emergence into freedom from the thralldom of unconscious nature.
But 'culture' alone has severe limitations as well. It is, we have
seen, characterized by the particular and the disparate, and very often
by the petty, the mundane, the egoistic. It is between nature and poli-
tics, not fully adequate to the potentialities of human freedom.
Only politics, at its best, has the power to transfigure the given
world into a specifically human world of self-conscious organization and
self-selected purpose. Only through the political relation can man
'work up' out of the fragmented particularity and agency of the every-
day, the multiple quests for personal authenticity and for limited
community, a common space--a perspective from which the human animal
can announce both his affirmation of his given, natural existence and
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the transcendence of it. Only in the state can the fully human person
lead the fully ethical existence. Man can be human without being fully
human, free without being fully free; he is only 'really' free, approaches
freedom and independence in a full sense, when he acts politically, that
is, in concert with his fellows, aiming at some particular goal, some
conscious purpose, some 'good'. Humanity's second nature is not by
nature freely given. It is not bestowed at birth, but must be forged
forcibly in a cultural crucible of moral and civic education, self-
discipline, and self-conscious participation in public enterprises.
Politics in this sense is the 'salvation' of social life, a re-
fined and sweetened extract from the bitter juices of that life. What
matters most to political man is not mere life, but the organization of
life: if it is good, if it can get beyond the merely given, his time
in the world may be well spent. if not, it is a waste of the highest
that is in man. The central thing for him always is not merely to
live, for to only live cannot give expression to the central paradox,
that in life alone life has no meaning. Something 'higher' than mere
survival, even rich, colorful, comfortable, pleasurable survival, must
inform day-to-day existence, whatever the hazards risked in achieving
it. The central thing for man is to live we 1
1
.
Living well, living the 'good life', is possible not because poli-
tics in itself provides some Archimedean point from which to 'objectively'
survey the world below, some absolutely rational principle or set of
principles to be rationally applied to public affairs. Politics is not
'rational' in this sense. We can go this far at least with Oakeshott:
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n political activity... men sail a boundless and bottom-
less sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floorfor anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed
destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an
even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the
seamanship consists in using the resources of a tra-
ditional manner of behavior in order to make a friend
of every hostile occasion.^^O
Yet a 'new truth' of politics is possible because the activity of
"keeping afloat on an even keel" engenders and sustains a new order of
existence, a "traditional manner of behavior" fundamentally other than
the traditional manners of the particular and the private.
The repository for the new truth is, broadly speaking, what we





symbolic, yet durable, construct carved from the common involvements
of a people's life and given a governmental focus. It is the crafted
configuration of these involvements, crafted to form a context of inter-
subjectively shared political meanings--a "political culture", or what
we might call a political "form of life", to use Wittgenstein's phrase
— into which citizens are educated to speak and act as political persons.
The elements of this culture, the public space, comprise overlapping
considerations both physical and non-physical: territorial, populat ional
,
functional, institutional, broadly ethical and sp i r i tua 1 --known to the
minds (and hearts) of citizens as identifications, loyalties, rights
and duties (as well as 'styles' of exercising and performing these),
issues, dilemmas, etc. Generally, political space is that space
bounded and constituted by the functional and non-functional 'organi-
zation' of a people, and by geography only incidentally. I have in
mind here much what I take Arendt to mean when she describes the Greek
^08
pol is:
it is the organization of the pol is as it arises out of
acting and speaking together, and its true space lies
between people living for this purpose, no matter where
they happen to be. '^2
Individual citizens and political groups alike, no matter how
numerous or diverse their interests, all occupy the political space,
and live their political lives through it. Their thinking about them-
selves and the political world, their behavior, the application of their
resources, indeed their very interests and purposes, are guided by the
parameters of the political construct. To step too far outside these
parameters always amounts to self-exclusion; to stay with them is
to 'belong' to the political community, a relationship which transcends
that of mere reciprocity and exchange. Functional interdependence is
involved, to be sure. But the seriousness of the membership runs deeper
than mere instrumental relations. It must, because only for those who
so belong--who speak and act together in the light of common involve-
ments and shared purposes— does the political lexicon reserve the most
condemnatory terms of public guilt and shame: 'disloyalty', 'treason',
'betrayal', and the like. This is so because only they share the
fundamental political characteristic of living a common life in a
state, and can be said to genuinely belong together in common commit-
ment to governmental association. Only citizens can break faith and
commit "crimes against allegiance".
Political culture is of course situated in the more comprehensive
context of general culture, and thus in the still more comprehensive
context of transcendental order. There is no sharp disjuncture, no
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cultural chasm running between these contests. Yet the political culture
sustains a reality and a meaning all its 'own'. It is from the context
of the political culture that central terms of political association and
discourse draw their most concrete sense: here 'justice', 'freedom',
•power', the 'public interest', even 'l^w' and 'constitution', come
alive and endure the living processes of interpretation, modification,
elaboration. Here the common standards that constitute the political
culture are applicable to all; all that accept, respect, and abide b/
them, enforce them, find their freedom in them, appeal to them for
justice, etc. are 'loyal' members of the political association, 'belong'
to it.
This is not to say that disputes do not arise over such rules and
s tandards--over the interpretation of their meaning and their applica-
bility to specific circumstances. As we saw in the discussion of
institutional agency, a political culture is almost certain to comprise
more than one form of 'political consciousness' or ideology--fundamental
orientations to politics that underlie the myriad agreements, disagree-
ments, actions, projects, victories and defeats that continually occur
within their context. But few ever challenge in more than the most
partial way the prevalence and validity of the bulk of common rules
and standards. And certainly none but the most an t i -pol i t i cal renegade
challenges the validity of commonality as such. Those who take either
tack play a risky game, for they effectively renounce their membership
in the polity, and so put themselves out of the political association.
As such they become liable to punishment and denunciation, either
through legal or extra-legal action, or through public opinion.
From the notion of political culture we can infer, following Hegel
and the diverse assemblage of thinkers who lean toward an 'organic'
interpretation of politics, that while the political space, like any
meaning system, is 'created', it is not 'manufactured'. It is not a
pair of shoes, a commodity. It does not spring into being today,
without ancestry, without roots, without prior intimation in practice,
tradition, habit. Its power is like t^at of the river that runs wide
and deep, not the evanescent lightning flash. Its style is the style
of a form of discourse, that for the most part evolves gradually (if
neither always gracefully nor without degeneiat i on) over time, de-
veloping inflection, nuance, subtlety. For this it is not without
breaks, decisive, perhaps revolutionary, breaks at times; not without
new, powerful, even 'paradigm-shifting' entries to the ongoing vocabu-
lary of political life. New insights are gained, new projects are
conceived, new starts made. But viewed internally as well as ex-
ternally, it displays a large measure of discernible continuity despite
change, a unity that persists in and at times through change and
difference, and accounts for the persistent 'identity' of political
cultures and states in the face of apparently massive institutional
alteration.
Within this context ideals of justice and community, and visions
of f reedom--what it means to be a full member in a full sense--are
articulated and experienced, ideals for the realization of which lav/
is drafted as scaffolding: not freedom itself, but its necessary form.
All
For such symbolic attachments-for 'freedom', for the 'constitution',
for 'community '--men and women are prepared (and expected) to live, and
in some circumstances to die, go to war and struggle for peace, leave
the immediate security of the private for the danger and unpredictability
of the public. In so far as they are' able and willing to rise from their
purely private selves and interests to become public persons, and to
affirm above all else the 'public good'.
The tension of agency and communion, the pivot of the political
'
relation, gives essential sense to the 'role' of citizenship. The
second nature of this role provides man his most Important communal
identification, his (nost essential determination as historical existent,
his entrance ticket Into an exclusive world of collective meaning and
purpose. In this world the lights are set at other angles, and the
sounds are of different sorts, than In the everyday world. His action,
his thought, his feeling are affected, infused by the significance of
his communal status; warmed by its heat, they flow more freely, more
vigorously: the Individual Is revealed to himself and to his colleagues
each time he part i c i Dates--speaks or acts--in this mode. As the concrete
individual, the existing person whose lived biography represents a unique
and non-dupl icable unity of experience, the individual person occupies
a place in a pluralistic universe of perspectives reflecting the multi-
dimensionality, ambivalence and enigma of human experience. For him
the citizen status, the political role, provides a common focus for
the interpretation and se 1 f- I n te rp re tat i on of this experience, the
opportunity for that experience to come into a new fullness and thereby
acquire a new sense, a new dimension, a new truth.
The public may be said to 'create' citizens, and citizens may-be
called the "trustees"^''^ pub 1 i c-- i nd iv i dual s taking on a public
role, wearing a public persona. In the political sense, the individual
is 'true' to himself when he is true to this public visage. In this
capacity he commands the respect and loyalty of his fellow citizens, as
they common his respect and loyalty for themselves. They are equals,
members of an exclusive association, the association of citizenship In
a state, bound by rules and roles, traditions and expectations that are
exclusively the! rs--Amer lean and not French, Japanese and not Russian,
etc. Those who share the status of membership 'count', and share a
sense of collective belonging, solidarity against the rest of the world.
Inhabitants of that 'outside' world do not count the same way (if at
all); they are 'aliens', who subscribe to other rules and roles, who
1belong, or ought to belong, to other states.
Citizenship is thus a particular and very special mode of mediation
between one individual and all the rest. In and through this status,
and by the activity that constitutes its content. Individuals, inde-
pendent egos, become yoked to a collective ego, a larger and more
comprehensive 'self. The fate of two worlds are conjoined: indi-
vidual and collective self are housed under one roof, supported by
the tension of a political relation that contains within itself all
the potentialities and pitfalls of human conmunlty. The incessant
activity of forming the common unity, of defining the division of
^3
private and public interest, is thus at once the ongoing activity of
defining self and others. This is an al 1 - important aspect of the po-
litical: it is the activity of meaningful, purposive, and active
citizenship, the 'universalizing' ether of the political, which enables
the finite self to mitigate the oppressiveness of its own fragile exis-
tential finitude. The political culture, the state-a world of meaning
beyond the strict limitations of time, causation, and individuation as-
sociated with the 'naturar--is internalized by the political individual
(albeit from his singular perch), making him a 'new man'. Via civic
education and participation, the transformative mediation of his member-
ship, the citizen 'becomes' the political culture, the public interest,
the state. His substance is a new substance. As citizen, he obeys not
other individuals, nor even other citizens, but the common good, the
public Interest, to which all are equally obliged by virtue of their
public being. All drink from this fountain of supra-personal vitality
and youth; all are obliged to tend its magic waters.
Citizenship Is, then, the specifically pol i t i c a 1 form of mediation,
joining together \r\ a single tenslonal focus both 'private' and 'public',
'self' and 'other'. Deriving sense from the total i ns 1 1 tu 1 1 otia 1 con-
text, Its true ground is the autonomous political moment that Integrates
the diverse particularity of a culture Into a unified, yet differentiated,
whole. The citizen needs the state. Until he belongs to a valid state,
the individual, even the 'social' individual, is a mere private person.
Only In the state can the individual wear the manteau of full membership.
Only there is it possible to speak of the perfection of common association
and mutual obligation under law.
In the first place, his status is formally defined in a developed
state, in a set of formal institutional arrangements that comprise the
legal category of citizenship. The law, as regulator of external form,
defines the citizen as the subject of 'rights', describes what he as a
willing agent with a public status may and may not do, and defines his
relations with his fellow citizens (and non-citizens). Civic education
introduces the individual into the formal institutional complex of right
and obligation, from which he deviates only with dange^ of recrimination
and possible violence. This complex contributes heavily to the defi-
nition of the 'way of life' of the political association, for it
establishes those formal patterns of behavior and expectation that
comprise the persisting 'structure' of the political culture, its
'positive' formal framework. But citizenship is more than a set of
legal arrangements, as the state is more than a body of positive law
and the power of enforcement.
Properly viewed, then, the category of membership is the key to
the symbolic meaning and truth of the political space. Membership
arranges for the individual participant the system of political
meanings into recognizable elements of purpose and priority, as civic
education provides, or strives to provide, a roughly common perspective
on political reality. His citizenship suggests to the individual what
has public import and what is trivial, v-yhat dots and does not make
political 'sense', does and does not call for (what kind of) political
response. The public gaze is directed immediately toward certain
phenomena, the inclination of the citizens to act preestabl ished.
The lens that brings to focus a shared perceptual field, membership
'
stands forth as a category of continuity between individual and collec-
tivity, and as such serves as an essential mode of the sel f
- i n terpretat i on
of both. Through the mode of citizen awareness (and action) a people
comes to know itself in terms of the collective symbols it has created
and recreated for itself, hence in a way that no individual, no group,
no class merely situated within the total configuration can. Citizenship
is not the only such mode, nor, in the final analysis, even the 'highest'.
But it is, certainly, i nd i spens i b 1 e : it, 1 ike no other existential mode,
affirms a continuing and largely consistent order of common existence
in the face of lesser agentic Identifications. All other modes, in a
sense, presuppose this one: nothing persists socially that does not
bear an existential relation to the state, and so to the status of
c i t i zensh I p.
In the state the bonds of private life--the constant pull of im-
mediate concerns, individual caprice, a thousand (relatively) petty
problems--are (temporarily) left behind; outside the hothouse of the
strictly private and the personal the citizen fills his lungs with the
cold, crisp air of a public that is none other than his own self ele-
vated and Invogorated, indeed transformed. In the state the citizen
contributes to the legislation of those norms that at once define and
are his freedom (the freedom of all c i t I zens) --the refined version of
communal meaning refracted in political consciousness, the highest
meaning of social life, wrested from the confusion and troubles of that
^16
life. In the state the citizens collectively take control of their
lives in common; in the state they make the life that matters most
existential ly, and forge the highest and most profound form of exis-
tential freedom.
I sm
The skeptical reader who resists this sort of analytic lyrici
might at this point insist on re-raising a couple of questions: In the
first place, is this politics of mediated 'communion' really any more
than a sophisticated (or perhaps not so sophisticated) theoretical hat
trick? Yes, certainly, a kind of instrumental 'transcendence' is im-
plied in the political relationship. But isn't that (really) as far
as it goes? Doesn't agency (the 'private'), in its various psychological
and institutional guises, finally carry the day? Secondly, why, if we
should for the sake of argument entertain for a moment the plausibility
of 'ethical t ranscendence ' --the idea of the state as ethical community--
why should this community remain only partial, limited, 'tensional'?
Why not a 'total' community? Isn't this the inevitable logical outcome
of this kind of argument?
If the political sprang full-blov/n onto the scene without prior
ground, like mushrooms after a rain, these questions (or rather their
implications) would have more merit. If the tension of agency and
communion appeared nowhere but in the political realm, then one might
indeed take the issue either way: to conclude on the one side that
the notion of the ethical state is so much idealist fantasy, or on the
other that agency is so much self-indulgence, a political perversion to
be eliminated, or if not eliminated, at least suppressed. But such is
not the case. The tension permeates the entire fabric of social ex-
istence; the political is 'only' its most complete, its most forceful
and comprehensive expression.
The tension thoroughly conditions the attitude of the authentic
agent. For however imperfect he finds It to be, the agent must make
his peace with the world. Existential subjectivity must be 'situated',
it cannot 'be' no place. If the authentic impulse arises out of the
sense that the world is not man's home, it must nonetheless return to
the world. The communal dimension of being affirms the ultimately un-
shakeable truth that the world j_s_ 'home', however hostile. There is
first of all simple need; like it or not, the ind'vidual depends for
his very life on countless forces beyond his control. But there Is
further the psychological need for existential 'reality' maintenance.
"For us, appearance— someth i ng that Is being seen and heard by others
as well as by oursel ves--const i tutes reality. Compared with the reality
which comes from being seen and heard, even the greatest forces of
intimate life--the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind,
the delights of the senses--lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of ex-
istence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatlzed and de-
individualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public
appearance". If life in-the-world requires for its continued
meaningfulness contact, via 'separate' spiritual individuals, with
1 r o
the Beyond-Being, the 'separate' individuals must 'return' to the
world, or risk loss of their humanity. "For having traffike with thy
selfe alone/Thou of thy selfe thy sweet selfe dost deceave" (Shakespeare,
Sonnet
.
Rousseau the solitary must relate the "history of his soul";
in the Confessions we read that "someone who gathers all his emotions in-
side him, finally loves nothing but his own self. ..his frozen heart no
longer trembles with joy... he is already dead". Similarly, Kierkegaard
the Single One pours forth volumes of words for the eyes of others: "Is
there a worse dancer, a worse paralysis, than to isolate yourself, end-
lessly gazing only on your own self? The history of the world, the life
of men, in short everything, disappears, and like the Omphalopsychi tes
sitting in an egotistical circle, you end up seeing nothing but your own
belly button".
The authentic man interrupts his silent dwelling to speak to his
fellow human beings, to affirm the common world. This dependence on
the word
,
on language, is most significant. For it is language, in
itself not political, above all else that by its very nature manifests
the tension of agency and communion.
Language is always a communication, a un i versal i z ing-- i t belongs
not to the individual as his private possession, but to the whole human
community that uses it; it is the public, that which is of, belongs and
applies to, everyone. In the very act of using language, in speaking
or writing, the individual 'gives himself up' to the community. Champion
of singularity Kierkegaard considers this offering of singularity to the
common the very essence of the 'ethical': "The ethical as such is the
universal, again, as the universal it is the manifest, the revealed.
The individual, regarded as he is immediately, that is, as a physical
^19
and psychical being, is the hidden, the concealed. So his ethical task
is to develop out of this concealment and to reveal himself in the uni-
versal".
That there can be a conflict between the demands of common language
(what can be said) and the will of the speaker (what he wants to say,
his desire to reveal himself 'authentically', in all his uniqueness and
idiosyncrasy) is clear enough. But that is not our point here.
Language is not simply universal, it is not purely common in the
sense of bearing a very definite, incontestable meaning for all those
who employ it. On inspection we find that the most important concepts
of a language invariably portray an "internal complexity" and an "open-
ness" which admits a variable difference of use not only according to
difference of factual interpretation, but indicating a difference of
mean ing
,
as the shared rules for the use of the concept are themselves
interpreted differently by different agents. Such concepts are
"essentially contested".
^ In this sense they are as intensely
'subjective' as they are 'objective'. They are shared, but not fully,
not finally and absolutely. They are both agentic and communal, a
public expression of the tension between agency and communion, sepa-
ration and union, conflict and integration.
Language proves to be fertile ground for the growth and sustenance
of agency, both psychological and institutional. In his Terms of Po-
litical Discourse, V/illiam Connolly has shown the practice of politics
to be permeated by 'contestable' concepts. He lists, for example,
eight dimensions of meaning involved in the concept of 'politics'
k20
itself, and suggests that "a more thorough canvass" would uncover still
more; the same sort of canvassing could be done of all essential
political concepts, 'power', 'equality', 'rights', 'freedom', 'justice',
'interest', etc. The language of politics is not an application of
comprehensive rules to a given set of circumstances; it is a language
of tension In use.
Verbal statements are thus inherently ' impe-fect
' . Because they
are public they are the staple of communication, of integration and
mediation, of community. But because they are 'private', their own
'
public character can be turned to a private purpose and to a denial of
communion, or at least a refusal of the 'total' community in favor of
the partial community that shares a single 'private' interpretative
use. This play of public-private, agency-communion is not incidental
to the political. The tension lies at its very heart, at the roots of
153the "political act" "^--the revelation of particularity In a public
context. Any attempt to 'close' this essential openness of discourse
in the interests of comprehensive 'community', to undermine the internal
complexity of linguistic usage by fiat of the political will, can only
be interpreted as an act of terroristic revolt against the human con-
154dition as such, a form of communal derailment from ambiverse exis-
tential human being.
As a closing effort in elucidation I shou.ld like to discuss briefly
two additionla, recently quite popular, forms of agentic derailment--
what I call the 'politics of authenticity' (after Marshall Berman's
^21
book by the same name) and the 'politics of pure participation'. These
forms correspond roughly, though by no means perfectly, to the psycho-
logical and institutional modes of agency.
The politics of authenticity
. Much social criticism of the nine-
teenth century on, including the philosophy of 'inwardness' examined
above under the heading of 'authenticity', originates in the opposition
of the ideals of personal self-perfection, 'wholeness', etc. to the
harsh ard blatant facts of the 'alienation' of modern civilization.
From our point of view this criticism is to be more than welcomed,
but only so long ar, it does not fall into the error of assuming the
possibility (let a^one the 'necessity') of a perfect and unruffled
harmony of the 'true self and the community.
The 'politics of authenticity' makes precisely this assumption.
Consequently, it is prepared to settle for noching less than political
community qua ground for the unmitigated self-realization of the
authentic agent: "a dream of an ideal community in which individuality
will not be subsumed and sacrificed, but fully developed and expressed"
In this ideal setting, the individual would be free to manifest his at
present unman i fes ted
,
bec<ause blocked, creative energies. Everyone
Id be liberated, everyone would be totally autonomous, everyone
Id be 'OK'. This political culture is not merely 'open' in the
limited sense considered above. it embodies a free-wheeling 'flexi-
bility' that is unambivalent about only one thing--the right of each





Granted, so baldly put this 'politics' is more a mood than a co-
herent ideology; granted that as such it would be unfair to identify
serious thinkers as unqualified examples of this mood. But to a sig-
nificant degree it is a mood that is evidenced by a bevy of (otherwise
diverse) thinkers that includes Amitai Etzioni, Theodore Roszak, R. D.
Laing, Henry Kariel, Herbert Marcuse, Marshall Berman and Erich FrommJ^^
What these theorists share is a common rejection of the sense of 'tragedy'
surrounding the clash between self and socio-political order that per-
meates the work of such giants as Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Dostoyevsky, Freud. Indeed, altogether gone now is the clash itself.
There seems fused together three distinct notions that might usually
be considered not altogether reconcilable: the 'creative, Dionysian
self';'^'^ society as repressive force^^^ (these two ideas do fit rather
nicely); the 'social self. It is this last notion which seems to
cut against the grain.
In truth there is no (theoretical) contradiction, however. The
theorists of authentic politics have, as it were, historicized Freud:
Society has repressed, and still does repress the true self; but it
does not have to. A civilization wholly without 'discontent' is
possible. Hence in place of Freudian (Rousseau i an , Ki erkegaard i an . .
.
)
pessimism stands the implacable demand that the conditions for radical
'self-realization' be created through political efforts.
What is so painfully lacking in the arguments of these proponents
of authentic politics, for all the clamor about the 'self, is any
'sense' of self, any elucidation of this sel f s substance . In place
k23
of a concept of 'character' ('social' or otherwise) we are presented a
vision of the self as unbridled, spontaneous, 'creative' and 'expanded'
personality. Thus Karlel describes man as "no mere role-player, but
at core a discriminating being who picks and chooses from available
roles. Drawing on his primordial animal energy, he interprets them,
transforms them, and creates new ones".^^^ Is the 'self, then, no
more than "primordial animal energy"? Similarly, Fromm champions the
"free activity" of "the self as the suoject and agent of one's powers",
the primary one of which 's the power "to transcend the role of the
1 62creature. .. by becoming a 'creator' "... But why should spontaneity
and creativity be absolute values? Are we not justified in asking,
spontaneity and creativity for what ? Moreover, according to Roszak,
the manifestation of such god-like power requires not the slightest
shred of discipline: "The expansion of the personality is nothing
that is achieved by special training, but by naive openness to ex-
perience". The experience of transcendence/enlightenment/illumination
requires no conversion on the part of man: "the homely magic of such
turning points vjaits for all of us and will find us if v;e let It.
What befalls us then is an experience of the personality suddenly
swelling beyond all that we had once thought to be 'real', swelling
to become a greater and nobler identity tiian we had previously believed
possible". All that perverts the realization of the authentic self
is the alienated structure of culture. The a'm of politics can only
then be the elimination of this structure and the 'establishment'
(one must take care not to reify) of a state In which all can 'get
k2k
with the Flow'. Citizenship, if it is to mean anything at all. can
only be identical with the realized personality, in Etzioni's phrase,
the "uninhibited, authentic, educated expression of an unbounded member-
ship".
But the politics of authenticity is really no politics at all, and
it is incapable of making sense of the idea of citizenship. For clearly
it has abandoned rhs standpoint of existence; or more correctly, it has
attempted to absorb (vertical) transcendence into existence. It is a
religious aspiration in secular guise, demanding secular satisfaction.
In the crucible of authenic i c i ty without limit, all distinctions are
dissolved. At once man is turned into a god while society is held re-
sponsible for his feeling or not feeling god-like. The new ideology is
a 'political' syrup soaking the whole of human being. Politics is no
longer concerned with establishing and maintaining meaningful existence
in history, but with transfiguring existence into transcendental freedom;
no longer with crafting a mediated common space out of the multiplicity
of agencies, but with the transformation of this space into the direct
realization of these agencies. Unmitigated particularity, not politics,
is the result.
In light of such Promethean aspirations, it is of glaring sig-
nificance that none of the authentic politicians is able to provide
anything beyond the vaguest hints in the way of positive political re-
construction. Some, like Roszak, are willing to rely upon the "naive
openness" to experience. Others, like Marcuse and Laing, offer only
1
the "Great Refusal". Definite criteria of criticism and judgment
k25
are apparently taboo to the authentic consciousness. Considering the
strong apocalyptic, antinomian tone of the politically authentic atti-
tude, we are reminded here of Hegel's depiction of the abstract moral
consc t ousness
:
This is the freedom of the void which rises to a passion
and takes shape in the world... Of course it imagines that
it is willing some positive state of af f a I rs , . . , but in
fact it does not will that this should be positively
actualized, and for this reason: such actuality leads
at once to some sort of order, to a part i cu 1 ar I zat ' on
of organizations and individuals alike; while it is
precisely out of the annihilation of particularity and
objective characterization that the sel f
-consciousness
of this negative freedom preceeds. Consequently, what
negative freedom Intends to will can never be anything
but an abstract idea, and giving effect to this idea




Clearly this consciousness is no historical curiosity restricted either
to Hegel's period or our own. It Is an attitude destined to reappear
again and again, each time the grounding principles of political order
become obscure, and the troubled psyche flails about In search of
answers that are not there.
The politics of pure participation . This second form of agent I
c
derailment fuses the fact of institutional agency with an extreme par-
ticipatory democratic ethos, to produce a theoretical 'participatory
polity' ground in the 'lesser associations' comprising the social
structure and deemphas i z I ng (sometimes denigrating outright) the state
as comprehensive formal structure. In large measure it too, like the
politics of authenticity, is a direct reaction to the sense of Kaf-
kaesque alienation shrouding the modern age: loss of community and
self-esteem in the face of the extreme depersonalization, Instrumental-
^26
Izatlon, centralization and distance of modern politics. Unlike the
theorists of authenticity, however, pure part i c ipat ion i s ts are first
of all citizenship theorists. The 'community' is the locus for the
decentralization of political authority and the direct involvement of
citizens in
' se 1 f
-managemen t
' ,
'power from below', 'making the decisions
that affect our lives', etc.'^^ This involvement in turn can be expected
to satisfy some, at least, of the therapeut i call v-t inged authentic
longings, ^^'^ while realizing fully the values of democracy by extending
them throughout the social sphere.
On the tensional view, the fault of the politics of pure partici-
pation is its overemphasis of immediate 'community' (here, particular
institutional agency) to the neglect of the comprehensive state, and
the issues involved in the tensional mediation of particular and
general. 'Participation' becomes the supreme--somet imes the only--
1 68political value; diversity (often, too, 'creative disorder') is
championed at the expense of unity. Mediation either drops from the
political picture entirely or is given exceedingly short shrift. With
some theorists the very distinction between particular pursuits and
interests on the one side, and the 'general good' on the other, is
eliminated: it is assumed that particular and general will immediately
and
1 69harmoniously reinforce one another; the latter indeed is often
considered to 'flov;' naturally from the former. ^^'^ In every case the
continuum of ' pub 1 I ca 1 i ty ' we have enunciated is reversed. It is not
what is more public that Is more political, but rather what is more
available to participation. The shop floor, the neighborhood, the
427
school, the leisure activity, etc. is considered a .ore political 'space'
than the official forums of public decl s ion-mak I ng J ^
^
Initiatives for social democratization (especially, as Pateman
argues, regarding economic arrangements) are hardly objectionable. To
be sure, they should be welcomed by all who oppose the concentration cf
social power. But surely, too, democratization of erstwhile non-political
social relations ^s no sfbstitute for the citizen's concern for the wel-
fare of the political community as a whole; it can only appear as substi-
tute by the dilution of this, the 'genuinely' political, by the expansion
of the category of polUics to encompass every partially 'common' space.
It is this diUitlor. which we find objectionable. For is It not
only another form of t r I v i a 1 I zat I on of the citizenship role? If every-
thing, or nearly everything. Is political, then nothing, or very little,
is spec i f I cal ly pol 1 1 i ca I . The tension of agency and communion is dis-
solved; the latter is absorbed into the former. We are Inclined to
agree with the commonly voiced pa r t i c I pat I on I s t claim that involvement
in the common affairs of 'lesser associations' educates political sensi-
. . . 172billtles, thereby enhancing citizenship. This, we will remember, was
Hegel's claim as well. But unlike the pure part i c
i
pat ion i sts
,
Hegel
insisted that political sensibility only attains to Its proper depth
when it is linked, via the mediated structure of the state, to the uni-
versal consciousness of the political community as such--that is, to
the state's ethically 'transcendent' purpose. Unfortunately, partici-
pation theorists, In their zeal to promote the democratic process , too
easily rob the citizen of the capacity for realizing the horizontally
^28
transcendent purpose of citizenship. In this case agency does not, can-
not, promote a genuine (tensional) politics of integration and mediation,
but only a pseudo-politics of fragmentation and particularity.
Concl us ion
The tensions of transcendence and existence, agency anc communion,
hold the political in an unslackening grip. Living out these tensions,
that is, living a 'genuinely' political life, as a responsible citizen,
can be a difficult 'art' i ndeed--undoubted
1 y a primary reason for the
tendency to fall into one or another derailment. There are no set rules
for life in this narrow but critical strip of human existence, ^here is
only the possibility of sharpened awareness of the nature of the situ-
ation, the bounds in which all responsible action must take place, and,
most significantly, example, especially the examples set by great
leaders, genuine statesmen.
If ! have emphasized the 'positive', 'transcendent' dimensions
of politics and citizenship, i have done so not meaning to deny the
'negative' side of political existence. As i have noted in various
places, human existence is not all sweetness and light. Politics in
particular can be a matter of hard choices, of distasteful decisions
173
and unhappy results. In politics in particular can people get hurt.
In politics in particular can it be painfully difficult to be a re-
sponsible agent, to balance the tensions of being with courage, honor,
and without self-deception. But if nowhere as in politics is it so
difficult, nowhere, equally, is it so necessary and important.
NOTES
If I acknowledge the works of these authors less than 1 might and
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Not on ly the 'political.' Tensional duality is the presupposition
of all religion, philosophy and morality, as well as a great deal of
art. (Indeed, as we will see below, a non-objec c i ve tensional duality
is the framework of consciousness as such.) Morality is a good illus-
tration. While naturalistic treatments of morality tend to conclude
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reason. Cf. Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Pessimism (C^'mbridge
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ty of Human Existence (Boston: Beacon Press
IJbb;, p. lit. I have, however, taken over neither Bakan's negative
usage of agency nor the extremely positive conception of communion:
Agency manifests itself in the urge to master, communion in non-
contractu.ll cooperation. Agency manifests itself in the repression of
thought, reeling and impulse; communion in the lack and removal of
repression.
. ."(p. I5). My use Is evaluatively neutral in the sense that
It IS much more schematic. This is not to argue against Bakan, but
only to say that \ emply the terms differently.
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dimensionality of existence or the fact that certain of these dimensions
are denied expression by a given social order. Burkean conservatism
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extravaganza" ( Order and History , vol. h, p. 28). Thus, for example,
1 believe a "transcendence" of American capitalism in favor of a social-
istic organization of society Is altogether desirable, even though some-
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I do not mean to Imply, conversely, a simple, positivistic relation-
ship of concept and 'fact' in relation to the phenomenal world. On
the one hand, it might be said that even the simplest object defies
exhaustive depiction. For two reasons: (l) However many 'qL-alities'
we might note of an object, there remains always the Kantian 'in-itself-
ness of the object; the 'in-ltself of course points to the transcendent
dimension of wordly being; (2) Depiction depends largely on purpose or
'point of view' (e.g. what is here a walking cane is there a weapon):
as these shift so does the 'reality' of the object. This suggests
the further observation that our concepts themselves, which even in
regard to non-social reality must be admitted to in part constitute
(for L's) the world (a point abundantly established by Tiiomas Kuhn's
study, The Structure of Scientific Revolution (2nd ed.. University of
Chicago Press, 1970l, are ' open- textured ' : "no concept is ever com-
pletely defined; every concept is incorrigibly 'open-textured.' In our
definitional statements we limit a concept in particular directions, but
there 'are always other directions in which a concept has not been
defined.'" V/illiam Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Lexington,
Mass: D. C. Heath, 197^), p. 6A. Both our concepts and the world to
which they relate are 'internally complex.' The essential difference
between 'ordinary language' concepts and the symbol i zat i on of Being
Is that the latter refer to a strictly supra-rational experience,
from which they are necessarily removed; they do not help to 'constitute'
Rea 1 i ty
.





Heidegger, "The V/ay Back, p. 271. The an t i -sys temat i c mystery
surrounding this notion of Being is what differentiates it from Hegel's
concept of Reason. What Hegel gives us, brilliantly, in the 1 og i
c
is a skeleton of essences on which hangs the meat of the phenomenal
world. The categories are fully intended as a depiction of the 'mind
of God' before He is manifested in the World. There is nothing what-
ever mysterious about the. scheme: The relationship of Reason and the
world is clear to the analytical eye of the discerning philosopher; the
categories themselves are exhaustive of the Being of God.
Jaspers, Ph i losophy , vol. !, p. 66.
i»33
37 Heidegger, "The Way Back, " p. 271.
38 Ibid.
39 For the best single introduction and overview of mysticism see
Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961).
See above note 3'*.
k]
Thus I would agree with Hegel that God 'realizes' Himself in history,
while dissenting from the conclusion that He must so realize himself,
that without human history He is nothing but an abstraction.
42
Various traditions involve dancing, chanting, and various sorts of
orgiastic behavior.
The Republ i c of PI ato , trans. F. M. Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 19^0, 490b, p. 193-
"By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which
one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is
unique in it and consequently i nexpress i b le''--Hen r i Bergson, An
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. T. E. Hulane (New York: Putnam's,
1912), p . 21. Only here the 'object' is the non-object of Being as such.




See Gerhard Knaus, "The Concept of the Encompassing," in Schilpp,
Philosophy of Jaspers .
"Man is conscious of reality as a process, of himself as being part
of reality, and of his consciousness as a mode of participation in its
progres5"--\/oegel in, quoted by Germino, "The In-Between," p. IO3.
Heidegger, "The Way Back," p. 26?.
Berg son, Metaphys ic s , p. 21.
50 Voegelin, quoted by. Germino, "The In-Between," p. I04.
Jaspers, Phi losophy , vol. I,, p. 47.
^3^
^°^9elin, "Debate and Existence," quoted by Germino. Beyond Ideology,
p. 164. Voege1.n_ insists, as we have suggested above. thiTThe 'anxiety
of existence is inherent to human being as such. In this he departs
significantly from the Hegelian philosophy of history: at his center, saysVoegelin, man is unknown to himself and must remain so, for the part ofbeingthat calls itself man could be' known fully only if the community
of being and its drama in time were known as a whole. Man's participation
in being is the essence of his existence and this essence depends on the
whole, of which existence is a part. Knowledge of the whole, however
IS precluded by the identity of the knower with the partner, and ignorance
of the whole precludes essential knowledge of the part. The situation
with regard to the decisive core of human existence i s ... profound 1
y
disturbing, for from the depths of this ultimate ignorance wells up the
anxiety of existence." Order and History
,
vol. 1, p, 2. On this point
Voegelin and Jaspers are of one mind.
5^
"The Gnostics--l ike the Christians and the Neop 1 aton i s ts--descr i bed
life on earth, and the earth itself, as a tragic corruption of the
Spi ri t.
. .Unl ike the Christians, who believed that even the fallen earth
has been divinely created, the Gnostics condemned the world entirely.
God was absent from it, they felt; its laws and conditions were entirely
perverse. Even the stars were signs of worldly oppression, and therefore
hateful. The only trace of the hidden God that men could discover lay
hidden in their souls, 'sleeping' or 'drunk' with earthly poison. By
awakening the 'spark', the Gnostic escaped from his earthly prison."




Jaspers, quoted in Walraff, Karl Jaspers
,
p. 208.
See Republ ic (Cornford ed.) 368d-e for the notion of society as man
written in "large characters"; for 'government' in particular, see
S^hd-e: "Do you see, then, that there must be as many types of human
character as there are forms of government? Constitutions cannot come
out of sticks and stones; they must result from the preponderance of
certain characters v/hich d raw the rest of the community in their wake."
57 The dogmatic mytli is no longer a suitable symbolic expression of
metaxic being. Not only is man now self-conscious, but the soul and
its order has replaced the order of nature (the cosmion ) as the reference
for social order. "At the same time, however, the philosopher discovers
that the myth is the ineluctable instrument for communicating the
experience of the soul." Order and History , vol. 3, P- 170.
^35
58 Voegelm, quoted in Germino, "The In-Between," p. 11;^,
Ernst Casslrer, The_Myth of the State (Yale University Press, 19^16),
60
Carl Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections






John H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political Thouqht (New
York: Holt, I96I) . ^
6*^
Charles Taylor, The Pattern of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1970)
, p. 1 I3.
This IS as true for Aristotle as for Plato, despite the former's more
'naturalistic' bent. It is impossible in light of the analysis of the
spoudaios in the Ethic s to turn Aristotle into anything other than a
theocentric philosopher. The 'mature' man lives the bios the oretikos
,
"in so far as something divine is present in him...VJe must not follow
those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being
mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves
immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best
in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in pov-ver and
worth surpass everything." Ethi cs
,
Ross trans. (Oxford University Press,
195^)
,
X, 7, p. 265.
65 See Levianthan, ch. 31-
66 Quoted in Germino, Modern Western Political Thought
, p. 135, nt. 38.
Quoted in ibid., pp. 3^9-350.
Quoted in Ibid., pp. 279, 282, nt. 18.
69 Voegelin, Order and History , vol. 1, p. 60.
See for example Voegelin's brilliant treatment of the concept of
"representation" in New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1952).
^36
Voegelin, Order and History
, vol,
, p, 39,
72 „Rousseau writes in the Social Contract: " In order for a people
fil ^^k^'k'"?




73 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York:Scribner, 1958), p. 4.
7^
' Ibid., p. I6f.
75 Jacques Mar i tain. The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J.
Fitzgerald (University of Notre Dane Press, 1S66) p. i)0.
Ibid., p. kl.
'^'^
Nikolai Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom
, trans. R. M. French CNew York:




79 Walt Whitman, "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry,": "You have waited, you always
wait, you dumb, beautiful mi n i sters ,/We receive you with free sense at
last, and are insatiable henceforward
,
/Not you any more shall be able to
foil us, or withhold yourselves from us, /We use you, and do not cast
you aside--we plant you permanently within us,/ We fanthom you not--we
love you--there is perfection in you also,/ You furnish your parts toward
etern i ty , /Great or small, you furnish your parts toward the soul."
80
V/hitman, "Freedom," in H. Blodgett, ed .
,
The Best of Whitman (New York:
Ronald Press, 1953) , p. 388.
8
1
I do not pretend to comprehend the ineffable mystery of evil. Yet
the cond i t i on of evil, it seems to me, must certainly lie in the pre-
ponderance of the individual aspects of being over the personal. Evil is
freedom derailed.
82
Maritain, The Person and the Common Good
, p. ^9-
Jaspers, Phi losophy , vol. 2, p. 179- See also p. 2l8:"ln every
boundary situation, I have the ground pulled out from under my feet, so
to speak, There is no solidly extant existence I might grasp in being.
^37
There is no perfection In the wor 1 d .Whatever existence would pose asintrinsic being, it will fade before the question about the absolute. Thetact that all existence is open to question means that we can find no restm It as such. And the form in which the boundary situations everywhere
show existence to be inherently dubious and brittle..,,"
8^
Mystical literature as a whole is replete with examples of individuals
suddenly overpowered and uplifted by the transcendent power of nature's
beauty. I doubt that few individuals have never felt something of this
at one time or other. Zen literature is filled with examples of aspirants
being enlightened by a master's crook of the finger, pointing to a passing
flock of birds, a shout, a rap on the head, etc. To such examples we might
compare the story reported of Plato:"On the evening of his death he had
a Thracian girl play the vlute to him. The girl could not find the beat
of the nomos. With a movement cf his finger, Plato indicated to her the
Measure." Voegelin, Order and History
,
vol. 3, p. 268.
85 Whitman, Leave s of Grass and Selected Prose, ed. John Kouwanhowen






cf. Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom
, p. 28:"PaIn in the human world is
the birth of personality, its fight for its own nature."
Jaspers, Phi losopny
,










Jaspers, Ph i 1 osophy
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Underbill's chapters h and 10 (Myst i c i sm ) , "The illumination of the
Self" and "The Unitive Life," are the inspiration for the usuage and the
source for the essentia] content for the remainder of this section.
^38
InilEld, VI, 9. in Underbill, Mysticism
, pp. 233-23^^.
ll'tltL^^^^^^^^^^^ P-^^f; ^^verythin, is st.an.e
W. W Norton, 19^0), p. I2/, ltsZ[
beauty and deny t ranscendenrp ;^r^ in f^^,- • <-eieDrate worldJy
n.itid transcLden;:ry'ruf % :i^^?^r'°^:'I,i"?^^^.^''r•
was the case with Nietzsche (.ore so In ,\TlZe ChH a ! i'u e'""than when he was engaged in "philosophizing with a hammer") and cllus.
98
Ibid., p. /|16.
99 Needless to say, I am far from the first to focus on the centrality
of this duality' to politics and citizenship, and the 'tension' therLyimp! led.
^
Important recent works relying on this or a closely related
?i?ftr'w'??-'"'i'^^ ^''"^V'
H^^^n Condition (University of Chicago Press,195dj, William Connolly, "The State and the Public Interest" (Paper)-
Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politi cs, trans. Robert North and Ruth'
Murphy (New York: Bobbs-Merr i 1 1
, 196^; Robert Pranger. Action, Symbolism
and Order (Vanderbilt University Press, I968); H. Mark Roelofs, The Te~nTron
of Citi zensMp_(New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957); Joseph Tussma n, Obliga-
t ion and the Body Politic (Oxford University Press, I96I); Michael Walzer
(New York: Clarion Press, 1970); Sheldon Wolin, Politics and
'
V' ^ 'on (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., I96O).
T he Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud
,
ed,
J ame s Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), vol. 26, p. 376.
~
Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground
,
trans. Andrew R, MacAndrew (New


















vol 21, p. 195.
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Jhe Heresy of Self Love, p. 86. Cf.. Dostoyevsky. Notes, p. 173:Love IS a d.v.ne mystery, and must be hidden from the eyes ^TThe worldas must whatever takes place between lovers."
ia,
Zwe
I g , p . 1 H
.
Ill DRousseau The Social Contract and the Discourse on Inenu ^Hi-v, Lester





Ibid., pp. 256, 218, 22^1.
113
Rousseau, The Reveries of a Sol itary
,
trans. John Gould Fletciier (New
York: Burt Frankl in, n.d.) , Fi rst Promenade, p. 31.
]]h
Hermann Hesse, If the War Goes On: Reflections on War and Politics,




^'^^See Arendt, Human Condition ; p. 57:"the r3ality of the publ-c realm
relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspective and aspects
in which the common world presents itself and fo-- which no common measure-




, p. 200: "The meeting between public and private can be des ignated
' congruency
' ,
but as the confrontation often lacks complete identity of
aims, the relation between public and private involves tension"; Mead,
Mind, Self, and Society
,
ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago University Press,
193^), pp. 19^, 196; the 'me' represents "that g'-ojp of attitudes which
stands for the others in the community...'; the 'I' "is the response of
the individual to the attitude of the community as this appears to his
own experience."
Rousseau, Confess ions (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), p. 3.
"I am going to try now to direct my eyes calmly into myself, and begin
to act from within; for, like the child whose first effort of consciousness
teaches him to use the 'I', that is the only thing which will enable me to
use it less superficially." Kierkegaard, Journal
;
quoted in Zweig, He resy
,
p. 188.
Kierkegaard, Repet i t ion (New York: Harper Torchbook, I96M, p. 9^.
119
Anselm Strauss, ed. The Socia l Psychology of George Herbert Mead




MHenri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion
, trans. R. A.
Audra and C. Brereton (Garden City. New York; Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956),
p. 100. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of R




one of the commoner features of history (e.g. Socrates, the Stoics and
others), the tendency to look deeper into oneself and to know and deter-
mine within onself what is right and good appears in ages when what is
recognized as right and good in contemporary manners cannot satisfy the
will of better men. When the existing world of freedom has become faith-
less to the will of better men, that will fails to find itself in the
duties there recognized and must try to find in the ideal world of the
inner life alone the harmony which actuality has lost."
122






12^ Antoine Sa i nt-Exupery , N i ght Flight
,
trans, Stuart Gilbert (New







Albert Camus, The Reb^l , trans. Anthony Bouer (New York: Vintage
Books, 1956), pp. ^,"22.
1 26
Marcel, Philosophy of Existence
,
p. 27.
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and V/inston, 1965), p. 2^3.
Jean Elshtain, paper delivered at the University of Massachusetts/
Amherst Socialist Conference, 1977.
'29 Ibid.
'30 Ibid.
The tripartite division of fundamental ideologies derives from Frank
parkin. Class Inequality and Political Order (London: Paladin, 1972),
It might be objected that these identifications too are 'biological'
(hence not 'voluntary'), and so they are. But as modes of agency they
have not the same historical heritage as race and class; nor is it clear




''^^ "^'3^' '^^ "^^^^
'P^^^ partlcipation-
non np^ |- o
^.Tection. See critique below; cf. Bernard and Ver-
'Pluralism, Participation and Politics: Reflections on the Inter-mediate Group-, . Political Theory
,
Vol. 3, no. 2 (May, 1 975)
, PP • 1 80- 1 97
.




Gramsci 's Marxism (London: Pluto Press. 1976) dd114-116. '
^"^ See Trent Schroyer, "The Repol i 1 1 c I zat I on of the Relations of
Production: An Interpretation of Jurgen Habermas' Analytic Theory of Late
^^pitaUst Development'', New German Critique
, No. 5. (Spring, 1975) pp.
137
See Paul Ricoeur, "The Political Paradox", in Hwa Jung, Existential ist
Phenomenology and Political Theory (Chicago: Henry Regny Co., 1972).
138
Cf. Robert Pranger's definition of politics in his Eclipse of
Ci t izenship (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I968), p. 95. Politics is
said to exist wherever there is "common focus, alternative claims, and
adjudication."
1 39 Sheldon Wolin, Pol i t i cs and V i s ion
, p. ^3^.
Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics
,
quoted in Kenneth R. Minogue
"Michael Oal<eshott: The Boundless Sea of Politics", in Anthony deCrespIgny
and Kenneth Minoque eds. Contemporary Political Philosophers (London:
Metheun and Co., 1975), p. 120.
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S. I, Benn discusses the problem of 'identity' in "The State",
The Encycloped ia of Philosophy , 8 vols. Paul Edwards, ed. (New York:
Hacmillan, I9S6), Vol. 7, p. 7- Aristotle in the Pol i t ics is of course
the first to confront the problem.
See Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic .
Hence the primary problem of nation-states: their mutual suspicion






Ihe men of moderation have always suspected th;,t ^nm.^t.- • . •circumscribed world depended on excess i ve men
^°"^^th,ng ,n their
versal worship of heroes, the venera to o? sa ^ts theT i'/'^
from the god; [ha ] ?e wMr'"." ^"'^7^°°^ ^ guarantee, a sign
PP. 173-17?
continue to be meaningful" Zweig, Heresy.
-^o^rna I
.
quoted in Zweig, p. I92.
150 _
197017^:^:^^^^^^^ ''''''' (Princeton University Press,
^51 r ^^ ^






For a related analysis regarding the relationship of politics andthe imperfection' of verbal statements, see J. C. A. Pocock, "Verbalizing
a Political Act: Towards a Politics of Speech," Politica l Theory I
, No 1(February. 1973). Pocock's is a subtle analys isT^MV^s-iTTT^ihi-powerdimension of language acts, which assumes the agent i c/communa 1 tension
Ihe agent uses language as an act of power in his own interests; but be-
cause language is shared, it is "relatively" uncontrollable and so hard
to monopolize (p. 35). Polity for Pocock i? that 'common' which mediatesthemultipl icity of agentic power acts--"where people succeed in communi-
cating--that is, m making and replying to statements in such a way that
there is some not too remotely discernible relationship and continuity
of medium between statement, reply and counte r- rep 1 y" (pp. 32-33).
Alistair Maclntyre has explored the way in which rational criticism
IS founded on conceptual openness. Maclntyre classifies societies as
either 'closed' or 'open' according to the degree of rational criticism
allowed within their respective conceptual orders. Stalin's Russia is
an example of a closed society in which state power grants a rigid
Marxist ideology inmunity from criticism. "A Mistake About Causality in




i tics and Society (Second Series (New York; Barnes and Noble, I $62).
Marshall Berman, The Politics of Au thenticity (New York: Atheneum
1972), p. ix.
^
Etzioni, The Act ive Society (New York: Free Press, 1968); Roszak,
The Mak ing of a Counter-Cu I ture (Garden City, N.Y. : Doublcday Anchor Books,
kk3
1969); Laing, The Pol itics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books,
1967); Kariel, The PromiTT'of Politics (Enqlevvood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1966); Marcuse, Eros and Civil ization; A Ph i losoph i cal Enqu i ry into
^reud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955)^ Berman, Politics of Au thent iTiTv;
Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955)!
157
Laing claims we have "at one and the same time lost our selves and
developed the illusion that we are autonomous egos " (p. 73) ; the ego is
a "false self." Similarly Roszak is convi need" that the "scientific
world view, v/Ith it entrenched commitment to an egocentric and cerebral
mode of consciousness is suppressing a pure, non-aggressive benevolent
self: "There must be a new culture in which the non-intellective capacities
of the personal i ty--those capacities that take fire from the visionary
splendor and the experience of hijman commun ion--become the arbiters of
the good, the true and the beautiful" (pp. 50-51).
1 58
"The search for authen t i c i ty . . . i s bound up with the radical rejection
of things as they are. it begins with an insistence that the social and
political structures men live in are keeping the self stifled, chained
down, locked up"(Berman, p. xix)\
1 59
"Man is not unless he is social; what he is depends on his social being,
and what he makes of his social being is irrevocably bound to what lie makes
of himself " (Etzioni, p. 2).
1
Thus Marcuse argues in Eros
,
p. 18^: "This transformation of the libido
would be the result of a societal transformation that released the free
play of individual needs and faculties. By virtue of these conditions
the free development of transformed 1 i bi do beyond the institutions of the
performance principle differs essentially from the release of unconstrained
sexuality within the domination of these institutions. The latter process
explodes repressed sexual i ty ; the libido continues to bear the mark of
suppression and manifests itself in the hideous foi-ms so well known in
the history of c i v i 1 i zat i on . . . I n contrast the free development of trans-
formed libido within transformed institutions, while eroticizing pre-
viously tabooed zones, time, and relations, would minimi
I
'e the manifesta-
tions of mere sexuality by integrating them into a far larger order, in-
cluding the order of work. in this context, sexuality tends to its own
sublimation: the libido would not simply reactivate pre-ci vi 1 i zed and in-
fantile stages but would transform the perverted content of these stages."









bridal .h'^'^i °^ '^''^'^^ possesses no concepts which couldge the gap between the present and it^; fnt-nro- k 1 ^ •
DimensionaL^ (Boston: Beacon Press







expresses a widely shared ideal when he writes "peoplea e e gaged ,n a function and the organization is how to cooperateAuthority is delegated away fro. the top as much as possible and there




increasingly aware of the whole opera-tion and works at it in hi, own way according to this capacities. Groupsarrange their own schedules...."
"Decentralization." in'paul Griss and'faul Osterman, eds. In^d^vi dual i s.n:Man in Modern Society (Dell, 1972).
1 67
"Participatory democracy would revive and invigorate small communities
wh. e fostering the reelings of community solidarity that strengthen
abilities to cope with the psychic tensions of modern life." Terrence
E. Cook and Patrick M. Morgan, eds. Participatory Democracy (San Francisco:Canfield Press, 1971), p. 9,
'68 ....
Ihe citizen's mam task is. ..to be himself and to participate direct-
ly and spontaneously in creating public bus i ness ,,,,Author i ty
,
power and
success will be less important in these participative situations than the
experience of participating together in a unique creation," Robert Pranger,
Eel ipse of Ci tizership
, p. I7. Cf. C. George Benello and Dimitrios
Rossopoulos, eds. Th e Case for Participatory Democracy (New York: Grossman
Publishers, 1971), p. 6: "Participatory democracy assumes that In a good
society people participate fully, and that a society cannot be good unless
that happens."
MTU r ,The argument of the participatory theory of democracy Is that par-
•




enable the Individual to better appreciate the connection between the
public and the private spheres" Carole Pateman, Participation and Demo -
cratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, I96O), p. 110.
~
See e.g., Benello, "Group Organization and Socio-political Structure,"
in Benello and Rossopoulos, The Case for Participatory Democracy : "Where
politics is dissolved into the social structure, issues arise out of the
organized constituencies making up that structure" (p. 5^); "Where a local
assembly represents the totality of local intprp<;i- t-h^ u k-. r • , .
in terms of public interest is Lximi^ed - '"''^ ^^'"^'"^
!t! orr!qh"'Io 'ToG)
"^T^nition of industry as a political system inI s wn right (p. 106 , and suggests as well the introduction of aparticipatory system" in higher education and involving esMents inrunning large housng developments" (p. I09). Dennis Thompson! n iheDemocrajic Citizen (Cambridge University Press, 1970), suggest thatzenship activity must extend to educational and leisure activities ^ adi-t.onally considered to be firmly rooted in the private sphere: "In thefuture educational and leisure activities will be as important as life at
work. Citizen involvement in decisions in these activities has been
neglected by most citizenship theorists as well as by many reformers. Buttheir significance in the future is bound to increase, as the work-weekfor most citizens decreases. Greater citizen participation in decisions
atfecting local schools and recreational activities thus must be an im-
portant objective in reform oriented toward enhanced citizenship" (pp. I78-
179). On neighborhood governemtn, see Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Gov-
ernment: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Bobbs-Mer r 1 1 1 , I963).
For discussion of ' counc i 1 s
'
,
' assemb 1 i es ' amd 'communes', see MiTray
Bookchin, "The Forms of Freedom," in Benello and Ro:-,sopou los , The Case
fo r Participatory Democracy
.
1 72 See e.g., Pateman, p. 110; Thompson, p. l82.
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As Hoederer, the responsible, highly prgamatic communist leader in
Sartre's play Pi rty Hands
,
remarks: "I have dirty hands. Right up to
the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope?
Do you think you can govern innocently: J. P. Sartre, No Exit and Three
Other Plays
.
trans. L. Abel (New York: Random House Vintage edition, 1955),
P- 22 A. Sartre's play is in many respects a brilliant treatment of the
conflict between 'principled' and 'prgamatic' politics involvIng(from my
point of view, if not from Sartre's) both the transcendental/existential
and agentic/communal tensions. Anouilh's Creon faces up to the same
dilemma of 'dirty hands'. He addresses the 'authentic' Antigone: "Kings
my girl, have other things to do than to surrentder to their private
feelings" (Anouilh, Five Plays
, p. 31). When Antigone charges him with
being a "loathsome man," he responds: "My trade forces me to be. We
could argue whether I ought or ought not to follow my trade; but once I
take on the job, ! must do it properly' (p. 35). My own argument is that
every genuine citizen must take on (to an Indeterminate extent: less than
a leader, but more than a passive 'subject') the responsibility of the
political 'trade': "It is easy to say no. To say yes, you have to sweat
and roll up your sleeves and plunge both hands into life up to the elbows"
(p. 37).
CHAPTER V
POLITICS AND THE CRISIS OF VALUES
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before
can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all
hoi y is profaned ...
--Marx, The Communist Manifesto
Away
!
There fled he surely
My final, only comrade
My greatest foe,




--Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarat hustra
The Problem of Nihilism
In a concise but acutely perceptive essay, "The Next Stage
of Nihilism," George Kateb proffers a pessimistic prognosis for the
human tomorrow. "The future belongs to nihilism," he writes with an
unqualified bleak candor. This dim forecast is based not on the
almost daily revelations of doomsday ecology (though this too is cer-
tainly part of the nihilistic outlook), that is, not on nature or the
prospect of natural catastrophe, but on man's own current and anticipated
thinking about himself, his own self-degrading concepts of what he
essentially is, what kind of being he is. For nihilism is an





tells us, when "the Idea of the human being as person loses its
sense, loses its meaning for more and more people. Less and less
they regard themselves and others as persons; more and more as
objects."
.
Thinking about persons as objects, Kateb argues con-
vincingly, necessarily undermines interpersonal respect, love, caring,
"meaning." By sapping human being' of its transcendent (my language)




"the will to have life go on undes truct i vel y , unviolently, unmurder-
o;jsly--or simply the will to have life go on at all."-^
What has engendered this awful circumstance of debased self-
thinking? Wny does the human ^uture seem so certainly to belong to
anti-humanity? The particulars of historical being lending to the
cheapening cf life are multiple and everywhere apparent; indeed the
'causes' of the contemporary "sickness of moral confusion, intellectual
anarchy, and spiritual despair" seem coincident with the very circum-
stances of the modern age: all the more painfully, as they are
paradoxically associated vyith modern man's greatest triumphs.
Today, for example, the world teems with people. Quantitatively,
at least, there is more human life than ever. Too much life: every-
where it is agreed that our poor planet is badly "overpopu 1 a ted . " All
the nations may wail publicly when the earth opens to swallow two or
three million of China's multitudes, or a typhoon sweeps away several
hundred thousand starving Indians. But who cannot suspect that there
is secret rejoicing at the death of a few anonymous millions, when the
well-fed nations openly talk of "triage," of letting the starving ones
starve In any case? What can the loss of a few million mean, when in
a single day many times that number of new hungry bellies will be among
us? Life Is cheap to these people of the earth, these poorly paci<ed
sard I nes
.
Of course, we may all of us be dead tomorrow, if the 'superpowers'
let loose their titanic engines of destruction. The sheer horror of the
prospect, bitter fruit of some of the best human minds, is numbing to
the human sensibilities that deplore it. The perverse logic that
entails piling up weapon upon weapon for the sake of peace derails the
rational process; in the freeze frame of instant extinction only the
Pentagonlan rationality prevails: the rationality of the cipher, of
the calculated kill ratio. Life Is only worth as much asthe dollar
cost of the nuclear stockpile, x% of the GNP.
But what of it? many ask. V/hat If we do roll back all of nature's
millennial labors in one crude stroke, turning ourselves and our whole
mother earth Into a radioactive ash? Vihat Is this sorry planet in any
case? Science has shown it to be but a tiny speck of coagulated dust
in a universe whose chill vastness defies the powers of human imagina-
tion ^ (even as we race to vyarm it up with mass fantasies of cosmic
neighbors paying ever more frequent quickie visits to the earth, of
species-fathers from outer space who care about their troubled children
and will perhaps before too long come to relieve them of their suffer-
^^9
ings). On the planet earth, as the perspective shifts, as the sense
of 'place' slackens, an already cheapened life seems to grow cheaper,
more transient and accidental, still.
The whole thing, the whole sorry, sordid business of 'life,' has
somehow gotten out of hand. Erstwhile optimism oozed out long ago, even
when we thought we had it yet in our pockets, while we still awaited the
promised panaceas to our ills; (when we weren't all watching the last
of it evaporated in an oven heat over Auschwitz). The milk has gone
sour, the honey's lost its sweetness. The omnipotent timekeeper
'Progress' once promised a dose of self-satisfaction in every pay
envelope, but then somehow forgot to put it in. The humans arc suddenly
the losers in the 'game of life.' The winners are their 'creations'--
the alienation of man from creation at which Marx fired salvo after
critical salvo, and which finds its epitome in the 'economic' system of
technocratic, globe-trotting capitalism.^ The strangeness of objcctivi ty
swells to intolerable, overwhelming proportions.
If objectivity is all, is not man himself but an object, human
life one very big beehive, an outrageously high anthill? Certainly, we
must be: all the sciences seem to tell us so, in particular those that
take the most pity on humanity and the deplorable human plight. They
are, Kateb argues, the main bearers of tlie 'next stage' of nihilism.
New researches in biology and psychology, he avers, "work v;ith an ever
more lethal effect" in a context of already realized biological practices
that include contraception, abortion and organ transplants, as well as
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the various drug and 'behavior-modification' psychological therapies.
Both contraception and abortion cannot help but contribute to "the
sense of the child as a made thing";^ sophisticated medical technologies,-
even while they prolong life (thus apparently presuming respect for
persons), seem to demonstrate "that you can, as it were, repair
people, that people are only an aggregation of replaceable parts. "^ In
the case of manipulative psychology, "experience is short-circuited
as evidence is given of the power of chemicals, and machines, and more
refined psychological techniques to produce transformations—or what
pass for transformations— that used to require long periods of intro-
spection, devotion, study, observation, discipline, prayer, self-
control, self-punishment to achieve."^ Nor do apparently impending
technologies sucgest a rei nvi gorat ion of the free-willing faculties
of man. Genetic engineering opens the possibility of producing (and
reproducing endlessly by clonitig?) only 'desired types' of human
beings. Similarly, more exact psychological conditioning anticipates
the capacity (of the engineering elite, that is) to correct the
failures of nature, the social group, and the free will to produce the
same desired types.
The Brave Nevy World seems almost upon us, Walden II just around'
the corner. Yet frightening as they are, vie must not allow the
particularities of the nihilistic impulse to obscure the larger
issue--that is, the encompassing issue of man's place in the scheme
of Being, his situation In the Metaxy. In the last analysis, nothing
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less is at stake. Nihilism in general is a condition in which the
situation of human existence in history as such strikes man as
senseless, asa result of a major upset of the spiritual balance of
transcendence and existence. In the modern case, existence is
'
describable either in terms of desp i r i tua 1 i zed brute 'order,' the
'laws of nature'; or, what comes to the same thing from a human point
of view, in terms of di sorder
,




aim is lacking; 'why' finds no answer. Anxiety and despair gnaw
not at the periphery, but at the vitals of existence.
It is against this general onrush of nihilism, this crisis of
the first magnitude, that we must finally measure the situation of
the political and the meaning of citizenship. Clearly, politics and
citizenship can have no meaning In a context of mean inglessness
;
clearly, their sense depends upon participation In an order beyond
nihilism. Whether or not the future--pol I t Ics
,
citizenship, and
indeed the v;hole of the human existential project--in fact "belongs to
nihilism" depends upon how much can be said, and done, before we reach
that "certain point," after which "the best one can do is become
silent. "^^ This last chapter might be described as an exploration of
a way In which we might avoid that last terrible silence.
Responses to Nihilism: Hobbes
,
Hegel, Marx
The specter of nihilism haunting V/estern civilization, a long
time in the wings, is dramatically introduced onto center philosophical
stage by Nietzsche. Kateb makes his point of departure Nietzsche's
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remark in The Genealogy of Morals that
the real danger lies in our loathing of man and ourpity of him. If these two emotions should one dayjoin forces, they would beget the most sinister thing
ever witnessed on earth: man's ultimate will, his will
to nothingness, nihilism.
~
But nihilism means more for Nietzsche than the conjunction of pity and
disgust. Or, rather, the conjunction of pity and disgust arises from
sources much deeper than the emotions themselves. Most specifically,
from a single source: from the loss of Christian faith, fro:,i the
fact that "God is dead."
the most important of more recent events--that 'God is
dead,' that the belief in the Christian God has become
unvyorthy of bel ief--al ready begins to cast its first
shadows over Europe. To the few at least vfhose eye,
whose suspec_tjj2£ glance, is strong enough and sub:le
enough for this drama, some sun seems to have set, some
old, profound confidence seems to have changed into
doubt: our old world must seem to them daily more
darksome, distrustful, strange, and 'old'. ..12
Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, Nietzsche is unable to find
consolation in either the paying of empty lip service to Christian
morality, or in tiie substitution of an inevitable 'historical process'
for this morality. Bereft of God, Nietzsche knov^/s , mati now finds
himself without ground, without a solid sense of his own being,
without 'meaning.' He is utterly vulnerable to the onslaught of
nihilism that comes whenever 'values' lose their sense. Already there
are everywhere the signs of advanced cultural decadence. Nietzsche,
the "Madman with the Lamp," wonders:
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Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we notdash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards
in all directions? Is there still an above and below?
Do we not stray as through infinite nothingness? Does
not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become
colder? Does not the night come on continually darker
and darker? Shall we have to light our lanterns in the
morn i ng? ' 3
The crisis of 'faith' is generally, as we have suggested, the
crisis of situation in the t ranscendenta 1 /ex i stent ia 1 tension, the
crisis of meaningful existence in history. We will return shortly to
Nietzsche's 'solution' to the crisis of faith. First, however, we
will do well to assess briefly the positions of our three major
' ideologies'
--American liberal, Hegelian, Marxian--vi s-a-vi s this same
crisis; for each is, in its way, a response to the disorientation of
fundamental value in the modern age. We may be brief: first, because
the main lines of these positions are adumbrated in the first three
chapters: and secondly, because all are clearly inadequate when
measured against the anxious insights of the tortured Nietzschean soul
(even though, as we will see, Nietzsche's own 'solution' is itself
wholly unacceptable).
Liberalism. Insofar as liberalism partakes of optimistic babbling
about inevitable progress, it ignores the onrush of nihilism altogether,
taking refuge in the smugly complacent belief that we live in a 'best
(and getting better) of all possible worlds.' Insofar as it is in-
clined to uphold a prior Hobbist pessimism about the human condition,
as are the American Founders, it again sidesteps the crisis of values.
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this time by rendering up to the individual autonomy in and authority
over his own moral universe, and attributing to the collective order
an entirely instrumental, utilitarian, and arbitrary status. As we
indicated in Chapter 1, a primary focus for the exploration of the
specifically American crisis must be the political theory of Hobbes.
Though American liberalism is compounded by both Hobbist and later
Enlightenment prog ress i v i s t presuppositions, it is the Hobbist base
that is most fully represented in American Madisonian constitutionalism.
We will recall Hobbes' assertion that
...because the constitution of a man's body is in
continual mutation, it is impossible that all the
same things should always cause In hin the same
appetites, and aversions: much less can all men
consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same
obj ect
.
But whatsoever is the object of any man's
appetite or desire, that is it v-jhich he for his part
calleth good : and the object of his hate and
aversion, ev i
1
: and of his contempt, vile and in-
cons i derab 1
e
. For these words of good, evil, and
contemptible, are ever used with relation to the
person that useth them: there being nothing simply
and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and
evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects
themsel ves . . . 1
^
Hobbes' presumptions are both naturalistic and individualistic. It
would be more than two centuries before Nietzsche would sound the death
knell for the Christian faith, but the process of secularization begun
with the Renaissance, the triumph of regnum over sacerdot i um that would
be its undoing, was already well under way. 'Values' no longer find
their locus in the revealed trutfi of shared religious faith, but in
the individual taste. The articulation of the paradigm of a Christian
Commonwealth In Leviathan, and the retention of the category
'natural law,' indicates that Hobbes either did not want, or was not
able, to dispense altogether with God's ordering force. But clearly
the emphasis falls not on faith in God, but on submission to the
'Sovereign,' that "mortal God" "whose command is addressed to one for-
merly obliged to obey him."^^
Hobbes' political theory emerged from the experience of the
English religious civil wars, themselves expressions of a profound
shift in the t ranscenden ta 1 /ex i s ten 1 1 a 1 relationship. At the root
of the civil unrest Hobbes diagnosed a Puritan 'conscience' liberated
from the directive, restraining strictures of catholic faith. This
mentality, he shrewdly psychologized, was not, appearances and
pretensions to the contrary, motivated by grace and Cfirlstian goodwill,
but by egoistic pride, amor sui
, and 1 i bido domi rand i . Disguised by
a religious cloak, as it were, passionate self-assertion threatened
to destroy all vestige of the old order without erecting a positive
substitute. Brought out into the open, however, which Hobbes by his
theorizing attempted to do, and then tempered by the fear of death at
the hands of a mighty sovereign, this same egoism could be directed
as a substantive force g round ing a new priciple of strictly utilitarian
order.
This is a radical 'resolution' of the problem of tensional dis-
ruption on the side of existence, revolving on the rejection of amor
Dei as the proper formative force of the spiritual personality. The
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rewards of this unspiritual resolution to a spiritual crisis we are
reaping today, as collective values continue to crumble, and the
political order shows itself able neither to protect, nor build upon,
'
what little of them is left.
IHeg£l_. As we have seen, Hegel was wel 1 aware of the spiritual dis-
orientation of the age (it is now barely two generations before
Nietzsche's proclamation). The very individualism Hobbes had hoped
to turn to an ordering purpose was already tearing apart the social
fabric; the continuing relentless process of enlightened seculariza-
tion was fast making it a dominant prejudice of the European elite
that religion was a mere superstition (albeit a socially efficacious
superstition), a phantasm fit only for moral tenderfoots. The Christian
orbit was i r.creas i ng 1 y shrunken and fragmented. But for all this Hegel
did not believe that the Divine had deserted man. On the contrary,
through the sel F-movement of Spirit qua 'Reason,' the tension of
transcendence and existence is thrashed out historically, necessarily,
rationally. What is disruptive today may well serve tomorrow, in
mediated form, as an essential ingredient in a higher, more spiritually
developed form of order. Thus Hegel turned a rational philosophical
eye tovyard the historical process:
The only Thouglit which Philosophy brings with it to the
contemplation of History, is the simple conception of
Reason; that Reason Is the Sovereign of the World, that
the hi~story of the world, therefore, presents us with a
rational process... On the one hand, Reason is the
substance of the Un I verse . . . On the other hand, It is the
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iilLii!ii£-il]£rjy the universe... U is > he infinite
complex of thin gs, their entire Essence and TTITth
That this
-Idea' or 'Reason' is the True, the Eternal
the absolutely powerful essence; thaTTT revea ls itse lf
in the World, and that in the World nothing else Is
revealed but this and its honor and g1ory--Is the thesis
which... has been proved in Philosophy, and Is here regarded
as demons t rated , '
"
Thus, Hegel discovers, not by accident but by the force of historical
logic, that 'civil society' is the most highly developed form of willful
subjectivity (with roots in Christianity, the Enlightenment, Kant and
the French Revolution). And by the same logic does civil society call
forth the state, at once Its completion and corrective.
The relationship of this high-flying
' secul ar I zsd ' dialectic to
its "religious cocoon" (G. A. Kelly) is complex; we dare not attempt
to lay It bare. Suffice it to say that the modern S 1 1 1 1 I chkei t , the
'objective' social ethos Hegel develops, of which the state is the
crowning glory, is meant to embody the authority of God without God
(or v/i th God as a secondary backup), via a Reason working the will of
God in the world v;hether nien know It or not, whether or not they have
faith. God Himself has been as it were subordinated in the Hegelian
Aufhebung of Christianity (v;hich is not at all to say that He has
been d I scarded)
.
The ordering values of Christian civilization were not to be
lost, but rather were in philosophically strained and rationally
refined form to animate a political community which exalted and
deepened these same values. The modern state fulfills the mission of
freedom it inherits from an ant I -Cathol i c Christian faith. Despite
the extreme care with which Hegel extracts the secularized state
from the clutches of the Church, his state Is still, after its
own fashion, a 'religious' state. The "march of God in the world,"
it is, as it were, an example of Jesus' own teaching (John ]7 :2h) :
"Verily, verily, I say unto you. Except a corn of wheat fall onto the
ground anc! die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth
much f ru i t."
The violence thereby done by this immanent i zat ion of the Spirit
to the concept of human existence in lensional Metaxy (where the
tension between transcendence and existence may be mitigated but never
dissolved) might be judged a fair price to pay had the anticipated
outcome in fact been realized. But of course It was not. God did not
die to be (partially) resurrected and represented In the rational,
ethical state. To be sure, the 'state' helped tc bury HIm--not the
Hegelian state, however, but the idolatrous nationalistic state, whose
sole scheme of values originated and terminated In a r aison d 'etat for
themost part identical with the reason and purposes of a decadent
(in Nietzsche's sense) capitalist class. The tri umphan t ups ho t of
'subjectivity' In the modern world was not to be, as Hegel hoped, an
ordered community of values uniting agent and divinized social world,
but rather, as Marx could see more clearly, the anti-values of capi-
talism run amok.
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Marx. Marx too, we may say, was well attuned to the nihilistic
crisis of value. In the Marn^e_s^ the climax of his depiction of
bourgeois society, he improvises on an image drawn from Shakespeare's
Jempest: "All that is solid melts into air," he writes, "all that is
holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to with sober senses
face the real conditions of life and his relations with his kind."^^
In this one sentence we are at once treated to Marx's re-
markable insight :nto the va 1 je-des truct i ve d imens ions of bourgeoi
s
culture, and brought to its limits. For Marx clearly sees that an
unbridled capitalist market economy undermines every traditional value,
tears down the whole world to remake it in its own self-serving image.
But in the final analysis he celebrates the wholesale destruction, for
in the mirror o" the bourgeois image the discerning eye discovers the
reflection of the naked truth, and through truth the way to a new order
of being.
The bourgeois ie. has pitilessly torn asunder the motley
feudal ties... and has ^eft remaining no other nexus
between man and man than naked self i nterest . . . I t has
drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious
fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine senti-
mental ism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation...
In one work, for exploitation, veiled by religious
and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shame-
less, direct, brutal exploi tat ion . '
9
The bourgeoisie reveals through its own rapaciousness the 'real' world
of human relations as they have heretofore persisted in history. It
is a world of callous exploitation falsely dignified by a valuational
scrim. Revealed as such by capitalist nihilism, it becomes possible
now to look tov/ard the prospect of truthfu l existence. The central
question is: is the anticipated new order of existence an answer to
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nihilism, or only a new nihilistic 'order'?
Bourgeois nihilism is revealed as the flip-side of its marvelous
creativity. On the one hand, "The bourgeoisie, during its rule of
scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal
productive forces than have all preceding generations together.
On the other, "It has resolved persona^ worth into exchange value, and
in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up
that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade"; "The bourgeoisie has
stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up
to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the
priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers."^^
As we noted in the general discussion of Marx, he is not opposed to
bourgeois activism per se, but to the 1 imi ts imposed by that particular
(exploitative) form of activism. Bourgeois activism is subordinated




unhampered by any secondary valuation whatsoever. Marx's
dream j_s_ the dream of bourgeois stripped of its last limitation--
eminently volatile, moving, doing, changing, controlling, organizing:
an unbounded, restless Ideal of vita activa
,
a process of permanent
'growth' and 'renewal,' the absolute transiency of all things.
Marshall Berman has well characterized the basic personality
structure befitting the modern activist man:
personality must take on an open form. Modern men
and women must learn to yearn for change: not merely
to be open to changes In their personal and social
lives, but positively to demand them, actively to seek
them out "and carry them through. They must learn not
to yearn nostalgically for the 'fixed, fast-frozen
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relationsh-ps' of the real or fantasized past, but todelight in mobility, to thrive on renewal, to lookforward to future developments in their conditions oflife and their relations with their fellow men.^^
Marx does not repudiate this personality type, the creation of the
bourgeosie, but embraces it with fervor. He labors to liberate it
fully. The bourgeoisie has opened up the moral abyss; the proletariat
will plunge in with relish, daring and vigor.
Thus Marx carries Hegel's immanent i zat ion of the Spirit to a
new extreme. Whereas Hegel anticipated a resolution to the modern
crisis of values through a 'settling down' to a secularized Christian
culture, Marx welcomes the crisis itself as a passageway to an o-der
of being wherein all va 1 ucs , -sp i r i tua 1 and secular, share the same
transient fate of al; human 'creations.' His 'answer' to bourgeois
nihilism is, to oversimplify somewhat, but I think not too much,
prol etar ian
, universalized nihilism.
Nietzsche's Analysis of the Crisis
Both Nietzsche's interpretation of the nifiilistic crisis and
his answer to it proceed from his analysis of man's fundamentally
historical be i ng--hence , tlie 'historicity,' or relativity' of all
values. Nietzsche often expresses a powerful strain of epi s temolog i ca
1
skepticism. Sometimes this skepticism takes the extreme form of an
apparently cynical denial of all 'truth.' In the J oyful Wisdom, for
example, we read, "One only is always in the wrong, but with two
truth begins. --One only cannot prove himself right; but two are
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already beyond ref utat ion . "^^ And later on: "But what after all
are man's t ruths?--They are his irrefutable errors. "^^ More
significantly, however, Nietzsche's skepticism often takes the less
extreme form of perspect i vi sm. In the Preface to Beyond Good and Evil
he declares that
it must certainly be confessed that the worst, the
most tiresome, and the most dangerous of all errors
hitherto has been a dogmatist er ror--namel y , Plato's
invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself. ..It
amounted to the ver/ inversionof truth and the denial
of perspect i ve --the fundamental cond i t i on--of life,
to speak of Spirit and the Good as Plato spoke of
them... 25
All truth is perspective, or 'interpretation,' In moral matters
above all. "There Is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a
26
moral interpretation of phenomena''; "... there are no such things
as moral facts ... Mora 1 i ty Is only an interpretation of certain
27phenomena..." Yet despite the relativity of all interpretation,
man needs his perspectives, his "horizons" of truth. Without them
he could not persist as an historical being. History has for Nietzsche
no overall meaning as It does for Hegel and Marx; there is no
historical process working toward a rational end. History is blind
(and somewhat mad as well). In this blind movement man has on 1 y his
perspectives, his delineated 'world-views,' to contribute value,
meaning, and 'health' to his existence. "This is a universal law:",
Nietzsche avers in The Use and Abuse of History , "a living thing can
. . • .,28
only be healthy, strong and productive within a certain horizon...
Nietzsche is emphat I c -that the question of 'truth' (in the sense he
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ascribes to Plato) does not enter into the validity of an historical
horizon. "The falseness of a judgment is for us not any objection
to it," he argues in Beyond Good and Ev il
. "The question is, how
far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving,
perhaps species-reari ng. . . "^^ ^ balance of selective remembering and
forqetfulness, a horizon is like a lighted clearing in the dark forest
of historical being. it comprises the most basic assumptions that
constitute a mode of soc i a 1 /e th i ca 1 life. The horizon may not be
seriously questioned without the bottom falling out of that mode of
life. In this sense, the perspective is omnipotent; without it
nihilism overcomes life.
It is easy to see why Nietzsche is apprehensive about the loss
of Christian faith. He is himself violently opposed to Christianity,
for reasons we cannot detail here, but he cannot help but anticipate
the ultimate consequences of God's 'death' with dark foreboding. The
enlightened optimists believe that they can consistenly reject the Chris-
tian God while preserving the values of Christian morality. Nietzsche
knows otherv/ise.
When we renounce the Christian faith, we abandon all
right to Christian mora 1 i ty . . . Chr I s 1 1 an I ty is a
system, a complete outlook upon the world, conceived
as a whole. If its leading concept, belief in God, is
wrenched from it, the vyhole is destroyed; nothing
vital remains in our grasp. 30
Without the Christian horizon, a total nihilistic crisis of Christian
cu 1 tu re ensues
.
At the same time Nietzsche Is optimistic: he forces himself to
be optimistic. After all, he reasons, no permanent historical horizon
is possible Ih any case; Nietzsche denies without reservation the
transcendental dimension of human being. There Is no permanent
truth 'beyond' the world. There is no permanent truth
_in the world.
There is rather only the "finality of becoming." Man may become totally
degraded by the crisis of values. On the other hand, the Death of
God can also introduce man to the fullness of his own creative powers.
For where do horizons come from If not man's creatlvlfy? The great
men of history to Nietzsche are precisely those who have (unconsciously)
created through sweeping "revaluations of value" the horizons In which
the masses of men then live for generations. The relativity of
horizons, of truth, proves that man is the creator of his own life.
His is the absolute power. A man conscious of this power realizes that
history is a 'free project,' can create, as the great men unconsciously
created, his own horizons, the most glorious of all. Now man can be
real ly "free":
What a feeling of relief there Is in the thought that
we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to
any system of teleological aims. Likewise, that the
concepts reward and punishment have no roots In the
essence of existence! Likewise, that good and evil actions
are not good and evil in themselves, but only from the
point of view of the preservative tendencies of certain
species of humanity! Likewise, that our speculations
concerning pleasure and pain are not of cosmic, far less
than of metaphysical, importance! 32
There Is here an obvious contradiction betv/een the freedom that
results from 'wisdom' (knowledge of the relativity of all value) and
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'life' as Nietzsche himself describes it ("All living things need an
atmosphere, a mysterious mist, around them... it is so with all great
things 'that never prosper without some i 1 1 us i on ' . . . "^^)
. But we
must overlook this contradiction in order to examine another, even
more centrally involved in the Nietzschean 'resolution' to the nihilistic
crisis of order.
Nietzsche is convinced that "Since the belief has ceased that
a God directs in general the fate of the wor 1 d . . .men themselves must
set themselves oecumenical aims embracing the whole earth. "'^'^ But
clearly some sort of standard is called for, not only in order to judge
"oecumenical aims," but to rank the myriad of perspectives likely to
erupt within the liberated field of 'freedom.' Nietzsche is well aware
of the di f f icul ty
.
The wo'ld...has once more become 'infinite' to us: in so
far as we cannot dismiss the possibility that it contains
Infi ni te interpretations
. Once more the great horror
seizes us. ..there are too many ungodly possibilities
of interpretation comprised in this unknov^n, too much
devllrrent, stupidity and folly of interpretation...^^
How is one to evaluate valuations? To set a limit to the infinity of
possible Interpretations? Without an ultimate ground, perspecti vi sm
easily derails into a runaway relativism capable of supporting only a
solipsistic moral universe. Though he has cut off reversion to a trans-
cendental ground, Nietzsche will not abide by an infinite valuational
regress. Instead he attempts to find a substitute ground in the same
place he finds his ultimate answer to the nihilistic crisis--in the
"win to power . "
The doctrine of Will to Power appears as an uncomfortable blend
of Darwinist '-survival of the fittest' quasi-dogma, and the idea of
the philosopher as teacher and law-giver. "The real phi losophersV
Nietzsche exclaims in Beyond Good and Ev i
1
,
are commanders and law-g ivers : they say, 'Thus shall
it be! '...They grasp at the future with a creative
hand, and whatever is and was becomes for them a
means, an instrument, and a hammer. Their 'knowing'
is creating
,
their creating is a law-giving, their
will to truth i s-- Wi 1 1 to Power- - . 3^
At once there is the suggestion that these genuine philosophers are
at bottom positlvist natural scientists:
To carry out the task of reestablishing the laws of life
and action is still beyond the povyer of our sciences
of physiology and medicine, society and solitude:
though It is only from them that we can borrow the
foundation-stones of new ideals...
we must become the best students and discoverers of
all the laws and necessities in the world. We must be
phys i c i sts In order to be crea tors . .
.
Ultimately, the will to power proves Itself In action. All life, says
Nietzsche, is will to power. The great will prove their greatness 'In
practice.' Their valuation will v/In out by virtue of their being more
powerful, by virtue of the fact that the more powerful i mpose their
valuations on the less powerful. This Is life's bottom line:
Here must we think profoundly to the very basis and
resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is
essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the
strange and" weak
,
suppression, severity, obtrusion of
peculiar forms, incorporation, and^at the least,
putting it mildest, exp 1 o I ta t i on . 3^
The self-affirmation of the strong Is Its own standard. Power proves
power. Power begets power. "What is good?" Nietzsche asks In
Antichrist
. And answerr>:
All that enhances the feeling of power, the Will to
Power, and power itself in man. V^fhat is bad? All
that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness?
The feeling that power is i ncreas i ng-- tha t resistance
has been overcome.
Not contentedness but more power; not peace at any price
but war; not virtue but (fitness) (virtue in the
Renaissance sense, virtu, free from all moral ite
acid). 39
It would be a mistal<e to take Nietzsche fu^ly at his word in
such passages. I think it fair to say that he dees have a scheme
of implicit values beyond the will to power. He is not in fact
arguing that 'might makes right,' but rather that only 'higher types'
have the right to make 'right-through-might.' "The aim of mankind,"
he says, "can lie ultimately only in its highest examples, "^^ and by
highest it is certain that he means something otner than 'most brutal.'
But it is precisely a justification of this scheme of values,
a ground of the 'highest examples,' that Nietzsche is unable to
deliver. As meta-ethics, V/i 1 1 to Power is a flop; Nietzsche is forced
to groundlessly pack his preferred values into such apparently value-
free notions as 'instinct,' 'power,' etc. In Twi light of the I do!
s
,
for example, we read:
first example ofmy ' Transva 1 ua t i on of all Vak'es':
a wel 1 -const i tuted man, a man who is one of 'Nature's
lucky strokes,' must perform certain actions and
instinctively fear other actions...^''
This is in no way, nor can it be, an answer to nihilism. It is better
classified as a desperate gamble on a kind of evolutionary miracle when
recourse to transcendental values is desired but disallowed. !t is a
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tone of frantic desperation that underlies Zarathustra
' s prescription.
"I teach you the Superman ," he cries.
Man is something that is to be surpassed. What haveye done to surpass man?
All beings hitherto have created something beyond
themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great
tide, and would rather go back to the beast than
surpass man?
What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of
shame. And just the same shall man be to the
Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame...
Lo, I teach you the Superman!
The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your
will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the
earth!^2
The prescription--to "surpass man"--is desperate because the
situation is desperate. Without God the world is senseless. Man is
at the critical juncture: he can either go the way of nihilism or
become God himseH (Thus, any superficial resemblance between
Nietzsche's Superman and Aristotle's Spoudaios is only that, a
superficial resemblance.) The Superman measures himself in part by
the amount of suffering, emptiness, and despair he is able to endure
without flinching; he "delights in cosmic disorder without God, a
world of accident, to the essence of which terror, ambuigulty, and
seductiveness belong." For the rest, he commands:
Me passes the judgment: '\7hat is injurious to me is
injurious in itself; he knows that it is he himself only
who confers honour on things; he is a creator of values .
He honours whatever he recognizes in himself; such
morality is se 1 f-g 1 or i f i ca t ion . ^5
Two not unrelated strains of conclusion emerge from Nietzsche's
essayed revaluation of values, one of them distinctively political.
The first, apolitical, strain counsels (potential) Supermen to flee
public life, to put as much distance between themselves and the "herd"
he
as possible. The explicitly political strain would on the other hand
institutionalize the "pathos of distance" separating Supermen and
herd in a "new order of rank":
Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been
the work of an a r i s tocra t i c soc i ety--and so it will
alv/ays^ be--a society believing in a long scale of
gradations of rank and differences of worth among human
beings, and requir'ng slavery in some form or another.
V/ithout the p_athos of di stance, such as grows out of the
incarnated difference of classes, out of'the constant
outlooking and downlooking of the ruling caste on
subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally
constant practice cf obeying and commanding, of keeping
down and keeping at a d i stance--that other more mysterious
pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever
new widening of distance within the soul itself, the
formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended,
more comprehensive states, in short, just the elevation
of the type ' man ' . .
,
Nietzsche's is an apocalyptic politics which makes Marx's world
revolution look by comparison like a schoolyard fist fight. "Great
politics" will call forth "great wars" for the domination of the earth;
Nietzsche approvingly anticipates a eugenics program: he looks forward
to a time when who^e regions of the eath will be given over to man's
experimentation on man. V/here Marx v/ould embrace nihilism as the way
to a true community of the creative many, Nietzsche repudiates "social
i
as only another form of decadence, proffering instead the rank order
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of the few (the "Promethean barbarians") requiring, as he himself
candidly admits, "slavery in one form or another." This is not an
answer to nihilism, but an invitation. It is an especially virulent
strain of spiritual disease, as great or greater than the one
Nietzsche diagnosed.
Dostoyevsky Contra Nietzsche: The Grand Inquisitor
Our lodestar in this critical appreciation of Nietzsche is
Dostoyevsky, who in his major literary works explored not only the
same themes as Nietzsche, but Nietzsche's very 'solution' to the prob-
lem of nihil ism--to quite opposite conclusions.^^ V/here Nietzsche
would extirpate the last vestiges of religious consciousness (among the
supermen at least) to make way for the saving new order, Dostoyevsky
vyas convinced of the hideous monstrosity of an order conceived without
God. Where Nietzsche championed the willful triumph of the human
personality in the face of a universal menaingless void, Dostoyevsky
propheslzed only psychic and social disintegration, the degradation
of man by man and the destruction of the personality, as the necessary
outcome of the unfastening of this 'humanitarian' impulse from Its
traditional religious yoke.
The central issue for both thinkers Is exactly the same: attune-
ment to the revealed order of transcendent Being versus defection
from this order, through conscious rebellion. In favor of radical im-
manence; faith and perseverance in the tensionality of the human con-
dition versus existential revolt and prideful ambition to overturn
not this or that aspect of man's fate, but fate itself; in brief,
Godman versus the mangod.
Each half of these coterminous oppositions represents a
possible 'answer' to the nihilistic crisis of values. Dostoyevsky con-
sidered the second, Nietzschean, half, and found It wanting. Worse
than wanting: It was, he was certain, a way station on the -oad to
the greatest possible nihilism
-the anthropological ground for
spiritual, ethical, and political totalitarianism,
Dostoyevsky is a brilliant anthropologi st of spl r i tual disease.
The mangod and the consequences of his appearance as an historical
force is a prominent theme in all his literature. Raskolnikov, for
example, the hero of Crime and Punishment
,
takes the 'death of God'
for granted, decides to test his own mettle as a potential superman
'beyond good and evil,' and commits two murders. In ideological
externals, Raskolnikov is strikingly Nietzschean: for him men are
of two types--the masterful elite whose lives express a law unto them-
selves, and the stupid, 'massy' herd of slavish commoners. As a
superman, crime to Raskolnikov (he tells himself) does not exist, his
conscience should be clear over the killings. But Raskolnikov fails
this supreme test, as Dostoyevsky is convinced a'l se I f -professed
supermen must fail. The experiment of action 'beyond good and evil'
turns into a nightmare. Raskolnikov is crushed beneath the humanly
unbearable weight of estrangement from the order of Being: finally he
confesses his 'non-crime' and surrenders to the authorities. Similar-
ly, two characters from the masterful political novel The Possessed
follow the path of the mangod to their self-destruction: Stavrogin,
a proud but spiritually bankrupt nihilist who commits suicide after
permitting his wife's murder; and Kirillov, who 1 i l<e Nietzsche knows
that without God man must be his own divinity, but who unlike
Nietzsche refuses the arbitrariness of values willed in a meaningless
void, and ends by killing himself in protest against the encompassing
nihilistic universe and in the insane belief that following his
'conquest' of death all men will be gods.
DostoyevsKy is no self-righteous critic of the nihilistic
current he, like Nietzsche, saw enveloping Western culture. Every-
where he speaks not as an 'outsider' but with the authority of one
vyho has 'been the^e, ' who has himself run some distance with the
idea of the superman. Nowhere, however, does he speak with such
intimacy, power, and conviction as in The Brothers Karamazov
,
and
especially in the remarkable set piece, "The Grand Inquisitor."
Some brief commentary on this piece can perhaps best illustrate
Dos toyevsky ' s prophetic critique of superman ideology, and suggest
something of his own 'answer' to nihilism through attunement to
transcendent Being.
The central f'gure here is Ivan Karamazov, an enlightened
agnostic thinker and a deeply sensitive humanist. He has drawn, like
Nietzsche's lamp-bearing Madman ahead of most of his contemporaries,
the necessary conclusion from the Ideological temper of the time--
the old values are waning, God is dead, "everything is permitted."
It is this conclusion, elevated to a principle of action and combined
with Ivan's admirable humanistic sentiment, that proves his undoing.
The movement from Ideological humanism to ant I
-human i ty is
paradoxical, but, Dostoyevsky maintains, I rres I stabl e. Ivan is
overwhelmed by the tremendous amount of evil in the world resulting
from man's freedom In the knowledge of good and evil. In the chapter
entitled "Rebellion" just preceding the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,
he passionately challenges his devout brother Aloysha to explain
the greatest of all evils, the suffering of Innocent children. "No
innocent must suffer for another," he exclaims, "and such innocents,
too!"^^ Ivan is convinced that theodicy Is Impossible in the face
of a realistic assessment of the lacerated human condition. He
emerges as a tragic figure, as his inability to see sense In the
suffering of the sinless leads him to a metaphysical revolt against
the whole order of creation. "Can you understand all this absurd and
horrible business, my friend and brother, you meek and humble novice?
Can you understand why all this absurd and horrible business Is so
necessary and has been brought to pass? They tell me that without
it man could not even have existed on earth, for he would not have
known good and evil. But why must we know that confounded good and
evil when it costs so much?"^^ The knowledge of good and evil, the
suffering attached to it, represents the 'truth' of human existence
under God. It is this truth that Ivan will not, rationally cannot,
h7k
accept: "I want to forc^ive. I want to embrace. I don't want any
suffering. And if the sufferings of children go to make up the sum
of sufferings- which is necessary for the purchase of truth, then I
say beforehand that the entire truth is not worth sucfi a price. "^^
The perennial counterpoint to faith: If there is a God--a
supposedly all -good and omnipotent Being--how can He allow such evil
as exists in the world? Either God does not exist, or He is a God not
worth believing in. flen -the strong ones--are right to renounce
faith in this God, to seek to overturn the old order of existence, to
act in the nevv, prideful knowledge that "everything 's permitted."
The Legend of the 'Grand 1 nqu i s i tor ' --a "poem" Ivan has
made up and relates to Al oysha--fol 1 ows directly, the continuation of
Ivan's metaphysically rebellious reflections in a prophetically fan-
tastic mode. Against the backdrop of Nietzsche's anticipation of
a "new order of rank," it reads like an explicit and cruel parody on
Dostoyevsky ' s part of the envisioned community of supermen. Though
Nietzsche's specific motives (the desire for excellence, 'all that is
rare for the rare') are not Ivan's (the end of suffering, 'happiness'),
both seek in a new order of immanent existence a solution to the
crisis of values: the s imi 1 ar i t i es of result are trul/ amazing,
suggesting a genuinely universal content to the pathology of spiritual
disorder.
The setting for the Legend is sixteenth century Seville, "during
the most terrible time of the Inquisition, when fires were lighted
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every day throughout the land to the glory of God."^^ Suddenly
Christ appears amidst the crowds. For a few brief moments the scene
has a festival air, like that of the entrance into Jerusalem on Palm
Sunday; Christ makes a blind man see, raises a young girl from the
dead. But then the Cardinal, the Grand I nqu i s i tor--"an old man of
nearly ninety, tall and erect, with a shrivelled face and sunken
eyes"--makes his appearance. On seeing Christ "his eyes flash with
an ominous fire." The Grand Inquisitor orders his guards to seize
Christ, and He is seized.
There follows ona of the most breathtaking scenes in world
literature. The Grand Inquisitor is furious that Christ should return,
if even for a brief visit, to the world of men. "You have no right
to add to what you have already said in the days of old," he rates.
What was said once was bed enough, the Cardinal rails: the v-jhole of
Christ's original teaching is premised on an altogether erroneous
view of human nature. The Inquisitor's indictment is thorough,
cutting to the root of human being, the issue of spiritual personality.
Christ failed when he refused the Satanic "temptations" of "miracle,
mystery and authority"; when he insisted that man be free. For free-
dom is suffering and suffering is unhappiness. What men want, the
Grand Inquisitor knows, is not freedom but ' happi ness
'
--always some-
thing to eat, something to believe and worship beyond the slightest
doubt, someone to obey.
(H)othing has ever been more undendurabi e to man
and to human society than f reedom ! . . . You promised them
bread from heaven, but, I repeat aqain, can it compare
with earthly bread in the eyes of the weak, always
vicious and always ignoble race of man?... man seeks to
worship only what is incontestible, so i neon tes t i b 1 e ,
.
indeed, that all men at once agree to worship it all'
together...! tell you man has no more agonizing
anxiety than to find someone to whom he can hand over
with all speed the gift of f reedom.
. .You hungered for
a faith based on free will and not on miracles. You
hungered for freely given love and not for the servile
raptures of the slave before the might that has terrified
him once and for all. But here, too, your judgnient of
men was too high, for they are slaves... 55
By misunderstanding the pitiful nature of mankind, by insisting on the
life of freedom in the knowledge of good and evil, under a God to
whose order man must attune himself while yet he cannot see it, hear
it, taste it--by this error Christ undermined his own kingdom, and ab-
negated his right to interfere further in human affairs. "V/e have
corrected your v;ork," says the Grand Inquisitor, and portrays the
shift in the center of authority in the most striking way imaginable--
by condemning Christ to death for his attempt to meddle anew: "^or
if anyone has ever deserved our fire, it is you. Tomorrow I shall
56
burn you. D i x i !
"
The "we" who have corrected the work is ostensibly the Pope and
en
the Roman Church, ' but more than this it is the strong few, the
spiritually united "hundred thousand" who see through the facade of
freedom and the charade of good and evil; who as a result assume the
god-like respons i b i 1 i ty for totalitarian control according to the law
they are unto themselves. The "corrected work" is saturated with
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wIlHo-power. with Satanic libido dominandl
. An alliance with
Satan is in fact the root "secret" of the ruling caste. "We are not
with you but with him: that is our secret!" admits the Grand
Inquisitor. "(V/)e took from him Rome and the sword of Caesar and
proclaimed ourselves the rulers of the earth, the sole rulers...
Oh, this work is only beginning, but it has begun. We shall have to
wait long for its completion and the earth will have yet much to
suffer, but vje shall reach our goal and be Caesars and it is then
that we shall think about the universal happiness of men... how at
last to unite all in a common, harmonious, and I ncontes t i bl e anthill. "^^
Yet this 1 i b i do domi nand i
, like Nietzsche's will to power, is
for the 'good' of mankind, for it is premised on the fundamental
distinction between the strong and the weak, lav^-makers and law-obeyers,
masters and slaves. It is a humani tar ian wi 1 1 to power: his Grand
• • 59Inquisitor, Ivan says, "loves humanity obstinately"; out of love for
man do the rulers switch sides, from Christ to Satan, From trans-
cendence to radical immanence. "With us... all will be happy and will
no longer rise in rebellion nor exterminate one anothsr, as they do
60
everywhere under your freedom." In his too-little love for man,
Christ is made the author of all the world's pain: "In respecting him
so greatly, you acted as though you ceased to feel any compassion for
him, for you asked too much of him--you who have loved him more than
yourself! Had you respected him less, you would have asked less of
him, and that would have been more like love, for his burden would
have been ligher."^^ Thus the spiritual quest for transcendental
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attunement is t ransmorg r i f i ed into the craven need for "mystery" and
"miracle."
Once man's spiritual personality has been so denied, the
Grand Inquisitor's Satanic 'program' fol lows wi 1 ly-ni 1 ly
:
Do you know that ages will pass and mankind will
proclaim in its wisdom'and science that there is no
crime and, therefore, no sin, but that there are only
hungrv people... in the end they will lay their freedom
at our feet and say to us, 'V/e don't mind being your
slaves so long as you feed us!'^2
What does it matter if he does rebel against our
authority everywhere now and is proud of his rebellions?
It is the pride of a child and of a schoolboy. They
are little children rioting in class and driving out
their teacher. But an end will come to the transports
of the children, too. They will pay dearly for it.
They v/i 1 1 tear down the temples and drench the earth
with blood. But they will realize at last, the foolish
children, that altnough they are rebels, they are impotent
rebels who are unaole to keep up with their rebellion.
Man is in reality sensuous and gluttonous. The rulers will take the
people's ov;n bread from their mouths to give it back to them and be
loved for it. They will allow the people to sin and in return be
glorified. They will relieve the people of the great anxiety surround-
ing the makeing of decisions, for all decisions will be made for them.
Everything will be permitted or not permitted according to the measure
of the people's obedience. The people v/ill be as little children,
taught that the happiness of children "is the sweetest of all." "They
will marvel at us and they will regard us as gods because, having become
the! r masters , we consented to endure freedom and rule over them--so
dreadful will freedom become to them in the end''
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Such is Ivan's terrifying vision. He too is terrified. He
thirsts sincerely for man's well-being. His soul is ripped. He
wants faith but it will not come, his reason will not permit it.
God is dead. To the good: for faith in God, the struggle of attune-
ment to transcendental values, is senseless if all it breeds is suffer-
ing and evil. If rule by the supermen-- those who dwell '6,000 feet
beyond good and evil' and for whom "everything Is permi tted"-- i
s
necessary to deliver man from his anguish, then so be it! Let man
be enslaved by the strong. Only let him be happy.
But the burden of the superman proves too much for Ivan, as
it proved too much for Raskolnlkov. Half-brother Smerdyakov adopts
Ivan's principle, "all things are permitted," and murders the hated
father, Fyodor Karamazov, a crime for which brother Dmitri is accused
and tried. Smerdyakov subsequently hangs himself. Ivan, horrified
at the realization of his oV'Vn responsibility for the crime, confesses
In court, though by now he Is mad and no one believes his story. Yet
even in confession there can be no peace. Ivan has indulged In an
ideological closure to "virtue." He is trapped in a fatal cross-fire
of ideological commitment and existential guilt. Hence his nightmare
Devil's jeering taunt: "You're going to perform a great act of
virtue and you don't believe in v i rtue--that ' s what makes you so
angry, that's what worries you, that's why you're so v I nd I ct I ve . . . V/hat
then do you want to drag yourself off there for, if your sacrifice won't
be of any use? The fact Is you don't know yourself what you are going




Dostoyevsky offers us to ponder a deep political proposition,
viz., that the ineluctable progress of the metaphysical rebel is
toward tyranny disguised as love: the destruction of the human
personality posing as the promotion of humanitarian good-will. Of
course, Dostoyevsky himself is a 'humanitarian.' In a full sense.
He refuses to accept man as a half-man, man minus the spirit, as
merely 'existential,' man unf.ttuned to transcendental Being through
faith. With Nietzsche, he is painfully aware of the value crisis at-
tending the collapse of faith. Against Nietzsche, he rejects the notion
that sociei might be fruitfully, meaningfully organi;:ed according
to the commands of supermen. Such 'new' values would be as groundless
as the old. 'Strength' is an ultimately empty criterion, though
pernicious in the extreme. Dostoyevsky affirms instead the noetic
insight that the only ground for right action is the Ground itself.
If man has lost his orientation to Being, as he most certainly has, he
must regain it, reorient himself. Not through ideas, programs,
organi zat ion--these are unsatisfying substitutes for life lived in
the truth of Being, d i vert i ssements in Pascal's sense--but through
a reorganization of the 'society' of forces that constitutes the human
sensorium of transcendence, that is, through a right ordering of the
sou 1 .
Nihilism, Truth, and Platonic Conve r s i on
This prescription should be familiar enough to students of
political science, even if perhaps it is not. For it is substantially
a restatement, for Dostoyevsky in Christian form, of the fundamental
"anthropological"^'' principle of Plato, the founder of political
sc i ence
.
In raw form the anthropological principle states: if society
is sick, it is because the soul is deceased, has lost its footing in
the difficult ground of the Metaxy. This is the primary Platonic
interpretative pr i nc
i
pi e--when Socrates-Plato a-gues in The Republic
that society is the individual written in "large characters,"^ that
"in so far as the quality of justice is concernec', there will be no
69diffe rence between a just man and a just society"; when fie insists
that "Constitutions cannot come out of stocks and stones," that "they
must result from the preponderance of certain characters which draw
the rest of their community in their wake";*^*^ when in Books VIM and
IX of the Republic he analyzes, in addition to the "good and just"
temperament, "the inferior types: the competitive and ambitious
temperament ... and then the oligarchic, democratic, and despotic
7
1
characters..."; when he argues, in somewhat extreme application
of the principle, that entire ethnic types correlate with individual
72
character types.
For Plato, society is an order of the soul, and the soul a kind
of social order of constituent forces. The order of a particular
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society will always relfect the dominant type of the men of which
it is composed.
It is impossible to Imagine an Interpretative political science
without some version of the anthropological principle. Its power is
well evidenced by the fact that all theoretical analyses in the social
sciences proceed by way of investigating the 'theory of human nature'
at the base of every conceptual scheme;^-^ though the principle comes
down to contemporary practice more perhaps through the Aristotelian
medium of the Ethics and the Politics than direct from Plato. Aristotle
echos the Republ ic when he articulates, for example, "the principle
that what is true of the felicity of individuals is also true of that
of communities, and that therefore the state which is morally best is
the state which is happy and 'does well'"; and further that "the
fortitude of the state, and the justice and wisdom of a state, have
the same energy, and the same character, as the qualities which cause
individuals who have them to be called brave, just, and wlse."'''^
It will be recognized immediately that the anthropological
principle Is not solely interpretative. It Is at once essentially
or i t i ca
1
,
an instrument of social critique. The right order of society
depends upon the scientific analysis of the nature of man, and hence
the "highest good" for man. Plato, and Artlstotle following him in
this, do not simply offer their 'opinions,' but scientific truths
regarding human nature, the right ordering of the soul. Here lies
the depth connection between a Plato and a Dostoyevsky, the sense in
which they commonly close ranks against the spiritual disorders of
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their respective times. What has been lost in fifth-century B.C.
Athens and the nineteenth (a fortiori
, the twentieth) century A. D. /West
alikeis scientific insight into the real nature of man. This spiritual
myopia is the real root of nihilistic crises in every form. The order
of existence is inverted. Everything Is reduced to a matter of
'opinion,' 'ideology,' doxa- -exi stence without truth, existence in
untruth. Both Plato and Dostoyevsky in their appropriate! v different
ways take a stand against this untruthful existence, and assert that
genuine order is not something we 'make,' but rather something we
discover
,
and struggle, in the tension of Transcendence and Existence,
to attune ourselves to. Only by virtue of this struggle, man's
participation in Truth, is he capable of representing Truth in history.
For Plato the 'solution' to a nihilistic crisis is the
"phi losopher"--not Nietzsche's 'philosophic' superman, but the soul-
centered man oriented toward the transcendental Ground, and thereby
resistant to social decay. Eric Voegelin most ably explains this
critical conception of the Platonic philosopher:
The philosopher is compactly the man who resists the
sophist; the man who attempts to develop right order
in his soul through resistance to the diseased soul of the
sophist; the man v/ho evokes a paradigm of right social
order in the image of his well ordered soul, in
opposition to the disorder of society which reflects
the disorder of the sophist's soul; the man who develops
the conceptual instruments for the diagnosis of health
and disease in the soul; the man who develops the
criteria of. right order, relying on the divine measure
to which his soul is attuned; the man who, as a consequence,
becomes the philosopher in the narrower sense of the
thinker who advances propositions concerning right order
in the soul and society, claiming for them the objectivity
of epi Sterne
,
of science- a claim that is bitterly
disputed by the sophist whose soul is attuned to the
opinion of society. 75
This divine "attunement" of the philosopher is perhaps the
least understood aspect of Plato's thought. The general anthropological
principle gains its critical power from the discovery of a true or
right order of the human psyche, which can (though there is no
'necessity' involved) be expressed hi storical 1y--wi thin the limits
internal to the human cond i t i on-- i n the empirical order of the
political society in which the philosopher-discoverer finds himself.
But the philosopher does not 'know' the truth of right order in a
narrowly 'intellectual' way (as Plato is often represented as arguinng),
but rather through an ordering experience that occurs in the 5.oul as
the result of the loving ( erot i c) orientation lo/yard the Agathon (the
Good). In a context of nihilistic disorder, philosophic knowledge
so gained necessarily sets the philosopher in opposition to disordered
society and its existential agents; it is precisely this social
corruption the philosopher resists. Thus Plato describes ''the public
76
itself as the greatest of all sophists," because the sophistic,
disordered character predominates. In this context, Plato articulates
the critical distinction between the ph i 1 osopher and the ph i 1 odoxers ,
good and bad cros : the philosopher's
affection goes out to the objects of knowledge, whereas
the others set their affections on the objects of belief;
for it was they... who had a passion for the spectacle of
beautiful colours and sounds, but would not hear of
Beauty itself... So we may fairly call them lovers of
belief rather than of wisdom--not philosophical in
fact, but ph 1 1 odox I ca 1 . 77
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The philodoxer proffers only opinions, never truth-he is
suffering from an ^'ignorance of the soul.-^S Against the Protagorean
sophistic dictum, Plato holds forth in the Laws that God, not man.
is "the measure."
Now it is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the
'measure of all things,' much more truly than, as they
say, 'man.' So he who would be loved by such a being
must himself become such to the utmost of his might,
and so, by this argument, he that is temperate among us
IS loved by God, for he is like God, whereas he that is
not temperate is unWke God and at variance with him;
so also it is with the unjust and the same rule holds in
all el 56. 79
Like Nietzsche, Plato says that "there will be no need to dictate to
men of good breed:ng. They will soon find out for themselves what
8o
regulations are needed." But these men are not Nietzsche's supermen
indulging in self-glorification. They preserve "by the grace of
heaven" cultural institutions grounded in the Real. By virtue of this
grounding, they need not "spend their lives making a host of petty
O 1
regulations and amending them in the hope of reaching perfection."
So much follows logically from the premise that the goodness
of the polls is not rooted in institutions per se, but in the well-
ordered soul that animates the institutional pattern. But if it is not
strictly 'intellectual,' what then i s_ the nature of the experience by .
which the philosopner beholds the Agathon, the Good, the Form of Forms?
How does he achieve the 'knowledge' of right organization of the
soul ?
The answer is that the vision of the Agathon is a transcendental,
mystical experience. Most importantly, Plato does not provide, nor does
he intend to provide, an explication of the content of the Good.
Truly, he speaks symbolically of the Good as an "object" of knowledge,
as in Republic 50^-^05: "The highest object of knowledge is the
essential nature of the Good, for v;hich everything that is good and
right derives its value for us... So the order of our commonwealth
will be perfectly regulated only when it is watched over by a Guardian
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who does possess this knowledge." The Agathon represents, however,
the transcendent pole of the human Metaxy bounded by Transcendence and
Existence. Propositions are thus impossible. The point of the vision
of the Agathon is not to 'see' laid up in heaven a set of immortal rules
for immanent conduct. In Republ i c 587-588 the Agathon is compared
to the sun
,
which makes possible sight, but is itself neither sight nor
the object of sight.
This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge
their truth and to him who knows his pov/er of knowing,
is the Form or essential nature of Goodness. It is
the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while you may
think of it as an object of knowledge, you will do well
to regard it as something beyond truth and knowledge
and, as precious as these both are, of still higher
worth. And, just as in our analogy light and vision were
to be thought of as like the Sun, but not identical with
it, so here both knowledge and truth are to be regarded
as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good
is v/ronq. The Good must hold a yet higher place of
honour. "3
The Agathon is Be i ng-ou t-of -t i me , eternal and of inexpressible content:
Being itself, the Idea, God. The vision of the Agathon forms the soul
through the ordering force of the experience itself. It is this
ordering forces which Plato symbolizes as Justice ( P i ke ) --"Jus t i ce is
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produced in the soul, l^ke health in the body, by establishing the
elements concerned in their natural relations of control and subordina-
tion, whereas'injustice is like disease and means that this natural
or
order is inverted."
Conversion ( periagoge) to the right order of Being through
the experience of Dike is the central 'message' of the Re publ ic .
Hence the central significance of the Cave allegory, the 'turning' from
darkness toward the light of God's truth. "The soul of every man
does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it
with... just as one might have to turn the whole body round in order
that the eye should see light instead of darkness, so the entire
soul must be turned away from the changing world, until its eye can
bear to contemplate reality and that supreme splendour which we have
cal led the Good."^^
The purpose of ' educat ion ' i ncl udi ng the educative experience
of political life, the experience of citizenship and civic virtue--
is to aid this turning around. But against the sophists, who claim
that they can "teach" the Good itself--that is, can accomplish what
would be equivalent to inplanting the vision in the soul--Plato insists
that education can at best find "the readiest way" to the "conversion
of the soul." It cannot "put the power of sight into the soul's' eye"
itself. This power is already man's by virtue of the transcendental
constitution of the soul, his spiritual personality. It can neither
be given, nor taken away--either by humanitarian love, or contempt, or
some mingling of the two.
Compared to the unqualifiedly theocentric Plato, Aristotle
is considerably more 'naturalistic' Undeniably, Aristotle has
immanentized the idea. Yet the critical theocentric core remains
intact nonetheless, in the form of the spoudaios
,
the "good," or
mature man, and the noetic, contemplative life (bios theoretikos) he
leads. The spouda ios is the equivalent of the Platonic philosopher.
Like the philosopher he discerns the truth behind the veil of
opinions: "each state oF character has its own ideas of the noble
and the pleasnat, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by
seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm
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and measure of them." Like the philosopher the spoudaios manifests
the right ordering of the soul through the experience of contemplation:
"reason" ( nous ) , says Aristotle, is "tlie best thing in us." It causes
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us "to take thought of things noble and divine"; "it is not in so
far as he Is a man that he will live so, but in so far as something
90
divine Is present In him." Like the philosopher of the Republ I
c
,
the spoudaios Is the keystone of the paradigmatic polls articulated
in Books Vli and Vlll of the Pol I tics . The good society depends for
its existence on the predominance of mature men, men in whom the
excellences of human nature have been realized: with the "goodness
of the state," "we leave the realm of fortune, and we enter the
realm of human knowledge and purpose... A state is good in virtue of
the goodness of the citizens who share in Its government. In our state
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all the citizens have a share in the government and all must therefore
be good. As with Plato, so with Aristotle too is it the purpose
of education to aid in the development of mature men.^^
Aristotle argues further (here we may even say that he has made
an advance beyond the matter) that fraternity, or "political friend-
ship" ( phi 1 ia )
,
is rooted in the experience of the spoudaios
,
specifi-
cally the experience of self-love, "the good man's relation to him-
self"
--that is, to the virtuous, noetic self, the contemplative
faculty of the soul shared by all men of mature stature. The relation
of fraternity grounded in the oetic virtue of mature men forms the
basis of empirical political order, the substance of the common good.
Ross translates this substance as "unanimity." We "say that a city
is unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their
interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved
in common"; "such unanimity is found among good men: for they
are unanimous both in themselves and with one another, being, so to
say, of one mind... and they wish for what is just and what is advan-
95tageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavor as well."
Political justice derives from phi 1 ia- -f raterni ty and civic virtue--
which is turn derives from the like experience of the v;ell-formed soul.
The Contempor ary Situation
Neither Plato's nor Aristotle's paradigm of the good polls can
provide us a resolution to the great problems of our time. As Hegel
knew, far too much water has passed under the bridge of historical
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existence. Yet the natjre of man has not changed; and it seems to
me that the basic structure of their science is still sound. If a
return to the ordering principles of Platonic-Aristotelian political
science seems to us today impossible, it is not because of a too great
dissimilarity of fundamental situation. Not only are we, like these
two ancient philosopher-giants, faced with the rampant sophistry of
the intellect and the nihilism of the will that are the earmarks of
spiritual confusion. V/e are moreover perplexed by a similar crisis,
closely related to the nihilistic crisis generally conceived, regarding
the existential del i g i t imat ion of the prototypical political power
unit: !n the case of Plato and Aristotle, the polls city-state; in our
own case, the sovereign nation-state. Old symbols, sentiments and
beliefs, though they persist (in the case of the nation-state, often in
deadly, murderous form), have novj to be justified in the light of an
ever more apparent need to philosophically comprehend greater civili-
zational whol es-- i ncreas i ng 1 y , the whole of humanity."^ We must deter-
mine: What are the 'real needs' of men in our times? What is universa
and essential in the experience that has shaped our political conscious
ness, and what is merely contingent, destined to the 'dustbin' of histo
ry? What of meaning and value can be suggested as content of the
categories 'state' and 'citizen'? In face of these searching questions
a philosophical anthropology that comprehends the inner connections of
spiritual life and temporal power is all the more necessary. Without
it there can be no paradigm, no model, no 'ideal' of the good life. We
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are whistling in the wind. All the more necessary too, even more
critically so, is the appearance of individuals at once lovingly
(erotically, in the sense of the Platonic eros toward the Agathon)
open to transcendental experience of order, and with the leadership
capacity to stamp their well-formed character--thei r t ranscendenta 1
1
y
grounded 'ldea'-~on the existential institutional order of the polity,
whatever its territorial definition.
Professor Kateb has reason to despair and to anticipate the
'next state' of nihilism. Philosophical despair over man's fate is no
new phenomenon. Plato finally deserted the hope of the philosopher-king,
that the Ide? might be embodied politically, at least in a 'pure'
form (hence the progression from the Republ i c to the Laws, the
philosopher-king to the "Athenian stranger"). Aristotle lamented that
one could not drav/ from all the existing Hellenic poleis even one
97hundred men able to rule the paradigmatic polis: the tension betv^/ecn
the "good man" and the "good citizen" threatens to erupt into an open
breach
.
It is true that Dostoyevsky could look hopefully, even chauvin-
istically, to Russia as a Third Rome; just as the American V/alt Whitman
could at times embrace Manifest Destiny as the harbinger of a new
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spiritual world order. But the last one hundred years of 'progress'
have proved these hopes illusions. The global struggles of fascism,
nazism, messianic communism, and 'democratic' capitalism for world
domination in the present centrury indicate that Nietzsche, in this
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regard at least, was in fact the better prophet. Everywhere we hear
ideological protestations of humanitarian love and goodwill and the
desire for peace, while everywhere we see the fact of political
repression, domination and murder, the politics of international
'
competition and the 'balance of terror.' The ideal of respect for
persons falls before the fact of human degradation, the violation
of the spiritual personality. Lip-service to the spirit is undermined
by servile homage to the 'material'; friendship and hcmono'a by ex-
ploitation; love by sterile obscenity. "Things are in the saddle/And
ride mankind." Good and evil do not apply as categories tc the choice
of free-willing human beings, but are reified into nation-states, one
'system' versus another 'system.' When nihilism holds the upper hand,
Nietzsche's case seems to gain a persuasive cogency--"l i f e itself is
essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak..."
It is a hard time to have faith in a self-creating mankind.
Harder still is it to maintain metaphysical faith, to 'open'
oneself to transcendence, so completely has the theol og i ca c i v i 1 i s
of the nation-state displaced this faith. The power of the spirit
is indeed proved by the appearance of a Plato in the very midst of
sophistic decay. But by definition spiritual atrophy of 'society' is
for the many the dampening if not the destruction of the will to faith,
to aspire to the 'vision' of the Good that is the foundation of right
order. Consider the obstacles a struggle for faith must today face:
beyond the universal problem of evil (often coincident with the
struggle itself): the nearly universal acceptance of one or another
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of several reductionist interpretations of religious phenomena:
the general sociological claim that the sense of the holy is 'really'
the absolute claim of Society on the loyalty of the member, which it
has 'made' as a social being; the Feuerbachian interpretation that
'God' is simply a projection of alienated human powers of self-
perfection; the psychoanalytic claim that religion is "the universal
99obsessional neurosis of humanity," a mental defense against a
threatening nature which either transforms directly natural into
personal powers to be appeased, or conjures up--as in Judaic-
Christian rel
i
g ion--the image of the Father as all-powerful protective
figure; the more 'liberal' psychological argument that in so far as
man needs to encounter the "divine," the ''picture gallery" a.id the
"concert hall," that is, art in general, is as good a meeting place
as the church or the mediative pract i ce . ^ '^'^
All such interpretations purport to be 'scientific' And indeed
it is an aggressive modern science that has contributed most to the
contemporary closure to transcendental insight. Prepositional theology,
the bulwark of popular faith, has had to beat one afte" another retreat
before the advancing claims of de-divinizing scientific revelations, to
the obvious discredit of religious experience per se . Before the
bar of apparently incontrovertible scientific truth, faith appears as
the wishful phantasy of children too immature to ^ace the facts,
religion in general as "a losing cause, destined to be ousted from
more and more areas of man's knowledge until- at least it arrives at
a station precisely akin to astrology--a cul tural 'fifth wheel,' per-
^9^
sisling only as a survival from previous ages in which our empirical
knowledge was much less extens i ve . ^
^ The culture of unbelief has in
fact developed so far now that the sociology of religion has diffi-
culty defining its "rcferent
.
The so-called scientific perversion of order does not, however,
destroy the ideal of human order attuned to the order of Being. I
will not attempt just now to substantiate this claim any further thnn
I already have, inadcqucite as this effort is; but only suggest that
the whole history of human civilization, the struggle for values through
order under God, attests to it; that the disoriented nihilism of the
current age attests to it; that the persistence of a minority of
attuned individuals, distributed among all the various peoples of the
earth, attests to it.
Our problem now is a universal problem in periods of spiritual
crisis. It is the problem of establishing the closest possible ap-
proximation to a paradigm of right order which has yet to be given
precise definition. Henri Bergson has provided what is perhaps the
n)05t suitable symbolism for such a paradigm in our period with the
notion of the "open society." No Popperian liberal pluralism, the
Bergsonian open society expresses the recovery of tvro related critica-1
insights: that, first, the way to the good society lies necessarily
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in the "opening of the soul" to the transcendent origin of things
and man in Being, the fruit of this insight forming the stuff of
ethical substance; and, secondl/, that this society will find its
continual spiritual center in those mystic individuals who have achieved
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the most complete psychic metanoia and thereby the highest character
formation Unlike its historical predecessor, in Bergson's
thinking the "closed society" of static religiosity and its rigid
formulae, the open society discovers its ground In the experience
of the free spirit in tensional existence toward the ineffable world-
transcendent Deity. For the mystics, this is a direct experience;
for other men it is an indirect experience through religious symbolism
engendered by the mystic insight: "the crystal 1 i zation. . .of what
mysticism had poured, while hot, into the soul of man. Through
religion all men get a little of what a few privileged souls possessed
In full."^'^'' What all experience in common, however, exceptional and
unexceptional alike, is the experience of a Chr i st i an- 1 i ke universal
love (agage ) , a love embracing the whole of a humanity living in
1 08
common tension toward the divine Ground.
Between this most general of paradigms and its concrete
actualization in one or another particular form lies of course an
unspeakable distance. Some few important particulars, which we will
now attempt to explore briefly, are quite clear, however. These
particulars are three in number: in the present context an acceptable
paradigm of right political order will be, formally: (l) 'organic';
(2) democratic; (3) socialist.
The organic state. In the chapter on Hegel we examined in detail the
most profound modern theory of the 'organic state.' There is no need
here to recapitulate what has been said there. We need instead to
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clarify briefly the specifically metaphysical character of the
'organic' theory generally, as it is by virtue of this character
that it is deemed essential to any potential paradigm of right order.
The metaphysical mark becomes clear when we consider the sense
in which the organic polity is in fact 'organic '--that is, by
analogy only. The individual citizen is spoken of as a 'member' of
a corporate 'body.' This body, the state (and its interest, the
public interest) are said to be a higher 'individual' than the concrete
individual existent (and his particular interest); and so on. But
this is only to say, fii'st, that organic metaphors tell more truth
about the highest good and the right relationship of citizen and
state (in the final analysis, about the human condition as such) than
do so-called 'mechanical' metaphors which imacine the political
community to be little more than servant to and instrument of the
private satisfaction of independently situatea, and metaphysically
unconcerned, citizens. The latter are alreadv derailments from the
true nature of being, whereas the former become derailments only
when it is forgotten that they are indeed metaphors for reality,
and not reality itself.
1 09 .
The analogy is, moreover, asymmetric. ' Only in an asymmetri-
cally analogic way is the state organic for Plato and Aristotle..
Man is not 'by nature' a member of the state in the same sense as he
is by nature born unto a mother. This second sense of nature is
physical, the first is meta physical , implying a development of
capacities which only exist in potential in the physical being of man.
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Only in the state can a human being develop these latent capacities.
But the capacities themselves are not even 'natural' in the
strictly biologic sense, but rather in the sense that they are con-
nected with, or more precisely are part of
, a metaphysically apperceived
hierarchy of ends, of ' deve 1 opedness .
' It is to this hierarchy that the
individual in the paradigmatic state will attune himself to. This
attunement is not, needless to say at this point, a necessary develop-
ment in the same \;ay as the development of the child into the adult
is a necessary development. The Aristotelian spoudaios wi 1 1 undoubted-
ly be mature physically. But to be mature physically is not to be
a spouda ios The two 'natures' are related not by biologic fact, but
by the mediation of metaphysically attuned character.
On the basis of the foregoing brief analysis, we may say that
the metaphysical side of the organic analogy has in fact two distinct
dimensions, corresponding to our differentiation of human being into
the t ranscenden ta 1 /exi s tent i a 1 and agent i c/communa 1 dualities. In
the first place it links the individual agent, the citizen, to the
corporate body of the s':ate qua 'individual,' thus mediating the
agentic and communal poles of existential being. Secondly, it performs
this mediation in the context of an overarching hierarchy of developed
being that links Trancendence and Existence generally, and, specifi-
cally, the 'person' and the 'Individual.'
in this sense, and in this sense only, is the state a higher
'individual' than the particular citizen. Only in this sense is the
public interest more 'real' than particular private interests. For
only in this sense, on these grounds-at bottom metaphysical grounds-
does it make sense to say that the state is a bearer of meaning in
history, a meaningful cultural project in which the individual, by
virtue of his citizenship, 'participates.'
The specific institutional articulation of the polity will of
necessity depend upon the 'materials' at hand-existing institutions
and the general character state of the citizenry. The metaphysic of
the person as 'organically' related to the political community is,
however, the centrally important theoretical guide to this articulati on .
The democratic state
. A paradigmatic polity that is not to be
totally out of step with the temper of the times must of necessity be
'democratic' This is itself to say little, however. As T. S. Eliot
had already observed before WWII, "When a term has become so universally
sanctified as 'democracy' now is, I begin to wonder whether it means
anything. In meaning too many things. "^'^ Despite some current
knitting of brows over whether 'too much' democracy may not render a
country 'ungovernable,' the term itself enjoys a more hallowed
stature than ever. It is thus Imperative to distinguish, however
imperfectly, what is meant by democracy, to distinguish what is
essential and universal from what is incidental. We have organized
our remarks in this regard under three headings: (l) Liberalism;
(2) Participation and Public Space; (3) Leadership and Political
Educat I on
.
Liberalism. As is commonly asserted, the democratic state's
primary concern Is for 'freedom': Not the freedom of caprice , however;
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but rather the freedom to attain to, in the context of the various
limiting conditions of human being, the paradigm of right character.
The standard of freedom places a double limit on the exercise of
political power. First, it is axiomatic that no i nst i tut i ona 1 pattern
can in fact 'make' a person. Least of all can the state do so to
the neglect of all the intervening centers of social authority-
family, church, class association, voluntary organizations, etc.
The 'will to totality' displayed by certain metaphysical enthusiasts
is always a sure sign of a disordered psyche. Further, certain
tendencies of particular political institutions have often to be
specifically guarded against. We say 'particular-' institutions, but
the problem is a general one--i.e., the fact that unguided power
corrupts all but the very highest types--man i f est i ng in particular
ways. In a world of men v/ho exist under God but who are not themselves
gods, who too easily fall prey to the 1 i b i do domi nand i that is at best
a sleeping serpent in the soul of every man, unchecked political
power is a tempting tool for those who would defile the human per-
sona 1 i ty- -whether through pity, disgust or their combination is of
little issue. Institutional preventatives of unnecessarily concentrated
power, charters of individual 'rights,' and the ' i ke , are, therefore,
not incidental but essential to the paradigmatic political community.
It is essential and not incidental, further, that opposition and
dissent be tolerated.
Here, too, however, it should not be forgotten that the critical
issue is always what opposition and dissent stand for , what 'rights'
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Imply? Is the opposition itself affirmative of the personality,
does it show respect for persons? Or is it sheer 1 iberationi st
cant, abstract negativity, once more Hegel
" s 'fury of destruction'?
Dissent must always be measured and assessed in the light of the
polity's spiritual aims. 'Rights' will, in a paradigmatic community,
reflect these aims, provide a working concept of the concrete person:
the idea of the essential liberties (e.g., freedom of association)
and personal requirements (e.g., medical care, housing) necessary to
the development of right character. It is quite simply not true, as
some critics of bourgeois political culture have claimed, that rights
are inherently 'abstract' and atomi st i cal ly individualistic, and would
have no place in a re^! 'community.'
Again,, this conception is only possible on an organic meta-
physical premise: that the individual qua person in linked 'organically'
to a hierarchy of ends, purposes, and meaning transcending his particu-
lar individuality; and transcending as well social institutions in so
far as they are mere 'instruments' and 'service' agencies. The person
is coincident witfi these institutions only in so far as they participate
in this same hierarchy.
The 'liberalism' of the paradigmatic polity is bound to the
fundamental fact that socio-political institutions, while they are
grounded in transcendent symbolisms, are not themselves vertically
transcendent entities. For them to be used by men as if they directly
embodied the will of God (and this must include immanentized forms of
this will) is already a fall from Being, a sure sign that those
Institutions, and those men who direct them, should be resisted. Such
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men have committed the sin of 'pride.' Like Dostoyevsky
' s Grand
Inquisitor they may invoke the symbols of God's authority, but in
their own eyes they rule, or wish to rule, as mangods.
There may be further problems, however, even when the
strictly horizontal nature of institutional transcendence is accepted.
'Ideally,' in an ordered series of assoc i at i ona 1 forms, the 'higher'
development displaces tlie lower. Thus, to invoke Hegel's concepts,
life in civil society supercedes family life, and life in the state
(at least as mediated by corporate bodies) transcends all 'prior'
forms of social existence. The notion of a hierarchically ordered
associat ional series, however, by no means implies tliat the higher
forms may engage in arbitrary posturings of superiority vis-a-vis the
lower. Each sphere embodies a form of 'right'; all 'riglils' are
in an important measure reciprocally interdependent. Equally imporlont,
moreovtir, is the fact that clashes of right inevitably occur. If
ideally every dimension of order meshes tidily, ex i s tent i a 1
1
y l hey
do not. HcHicl knew Lliat the state would always include militant
devotees of the family who would prefer to see the whole state perish
before sending sons to die in battle; as there would always be those
worshippers of the balance sheet wlio gladly trade the public interest
for highcir profit; as well as tlie myriad assembly of authentic
Ant igones--romant ics
,
religionists, and recluses whose eyes are always
turned on something more 'inward' than either the baubles of ambition
offered by civil society's public [)rivacy, or the public spirituality
of the state. The aim of the state is to mediate in so far as it is
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possible these agentic resistances to integration, not to extirpate
or repress tiiem. It is a gross error to regard the state as a
"single spring" from which all right derives. Such a state might
achieve an impressive organization, but never a genuine order composed
of citizens with well-formed souls. The shaping of the soul requires
a range of 'lesser' freedoms, 'lesser' than the Freedom of the
state: freedom of individuel persons, freedom of associations and
'communities.' Liberals have been right to be concerned for
'pluralism,' if for not precisely the right reasons. To paraphrase
G. R. G. Mure, they have indeed held one end of the stick, though
the wrong end .
We must turn round the stick, too, regarding the liberal venera-
tion of democratic procedures. All procedures a'-e secondarv deriva-
tions from tfie spiritual substance of the pol't/. Employed by a
demonic will procedures can as easily be used to undermine democratic
life as to uphold it. Form is to be sure important, but only in
relation to the metaphysical substance. Considering, for example, the
central democratic procedure of voting, and the attendant principle
of majority rule, it is clearly the metaphysical presupposition of
common unity in historical existence that is most basic. Without it,
as Mure argues, the will of a majority has no legitimacy, but only
power: "Unless some real cofiimunity of will links all who vote, what
possible claim has the minority on the dissenting minority? If the
act of state is alleged to be the sovere i gn act of one or of a few,
of an absolute autocrat or of an oligarchy, there is again no claim to
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obedience-there is indeed no Lrue state-unless there is a real
community of will between rulers and ruled; i.e.. unless in being
ruled as opposed to being merely compelled a man is in some measure
rul ing himsel f ."^ ^ ^
Pa r t i c i pa t i on
_mjd^ubnc_s^ace Clearly, large-scale national
democratic states cannot be sustained without the i nf rastructural
support of citizen action within a multiplicity of 'lesser associations
As we have already argued, if properly qualified much of what partici-
pation'Sts maintain regarding the broadly 'educative' value of local
political involvement is true. A broad outlook of pluralistic
tolerance may be encouraged; political sensibilities are developed
and tempered; clti:!ens learn to 'care' for the welfare of the political
community, and sharpen the capacities for self-governance. Participa-
tion may simultaneously foster the spirit of independence and the
spirit of cooperation and responsibility in a context of face-to-face
community. In this sense it is a bulwark of phi 1 ia
,
political friend-
ship, 'fraternity.' Along the same lines, it can provide the necessary
public arena for the "revelation" of self, a kind of stage for utter-
ing great "words" and committing great "deeds," that Hannah Arendt
1 1 2
sees as the distinguishing mark of genuine politics.
Participation is all the more important to the value of the
citizenship role in our 'age of organization.' The person is dwarfed
by the mammoth structures that regulate so much of the social order.
For this reason such proponents of enhanced participation as Michael
Walzer are right to call for a democratic "hallowing out" of the
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state--by such measures as "a radical democratization of corporate
government," "the decentralization of governmental activity," and
"the creation of parties and movements that can operate at different
levels of government and claim a greater degree of individual commit-
ment at every level than our present parties can."^^^ Meaningful
citizenship in the present context implies a conscious effort at
multiplying and expanding 'public' spaces. The coincidence of self
and other, agent and community through responsible action in these
spaces is indeed the aim of political mediation at its best, without
which the active core of citizenship cannot be sustained.
But participation alone easily, almost necessarily, derails
into particularistic agency. Thus we have argued that the essential
counterpart to participation is the deliberative and ethical focal
point of the 'common' in the broadest sense. Participation must be
'raised up' to the level of the political community considered as a
whole, integrated into a genuine state led by genuine statemen— that is,
by men of 'universal,' soulful, substance.
Lea dership and political education . To say that the citizen
finds his completion in a political community and decision-making
structure only partly his 'own' is not to deny 'freedom' as the end
of the political. It is, to be sure, to draw limitations to political
freedom, to deny 'absolute' freedom as a v;orthy or even possible ideal.
But it is at once an affirmation of the citizen's autonomy qua
political actor. Political being is senseless, it has been the
argument of this whole essay, outside an awareness of the inherent
tensions of human existence. Autonomy coincides with an acceptance
of these tensions as constitutive of the human condition as such:
a conscious commitment to 'act out' these tensions: to accept ob-
ligations and limitations, indeed to impose them on oneself: to
plunge into life "up to the elbows," not to take refuge in the purity
of groundless, ultimately negative and destructive, abstractions:
to doubt, to take risks, to commit oneself, to dare to love one's
fellow citizens, and all mankind, and to willingly suffer the
consequences of that love: to care and to trust.
Most importantly, to trust one's leaders. Not blindly, certain-
ly not without solid evidence that tfiey know what 'being best' means
and can and do act v'irtuously in this knowledge, that they have well-
formed souls. ^^'^ But once their character has been proved in the
crucible of responsible political behavior, to trust them and to
learn from them, to submit to the rigors of pcKtical education and
the formation/self-formation of one's own character through this
education. Politics conceived as the establishment and sustenance
of meaning in history is impossible without this type of trust. The
notion of a ' peop 1 e ' i ndeed the notion of 'man' as otner than one
among the many species--has no sense without this kind of trust,
without belief in a common destiny, without faitii in the 'universal'
knowledge, intentions, and skill of the people's representatives.
It is impossible to sidestep the issue of right leadership.
Even in formal decision-making according to majority rule, what is
usually most important is not a majority per se (i.e., of eligible
voters), but a majority of concerne d citizens. it is a fact of
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political life in all its forms that (issues of power structure
and ideological manipulation aside) leadership falls to the most
' interested ,' who contribute the essential content to the
'consensus' that then rules. If this be a form of 'elitism,' then
it must be admitted that all politics, democratic politics included,
is inherently elitist. The main question is whether the elite is
with or without substance. In general, democracy must be separated
from hollow agitation about the quanity of philosophically unjustified
'freedom' and the degree of calculable 'equality' that there obtains
(this opplies a fortiori to socialist democracy). The first principle
of democracy--that is, the first principle of any form of legitimate
government-- i s that it requires spiritual training, intellectual
discipline, and a bountiful supply of not mere 'talk,' but of
ethically inspired, public interest oriented talk. A 'democracy'
without spiritual substance is a state without the a 1 1 - Important
"readiness to rational d I scuss ' on
,
'
^ and is already potentially a
mob. The Inviolable obligation of leadership In a democratic state
is the exercise of authority, both spiritual and political, to 'level
up,' within the limitations of the case, tlic mass of citizens to the
paradigm of well-formed character. Through example and through
persuasion (the Platonic pe I tho) , the leadership seeks as the aim of
its educative praxis "an ideal man, who respects others as he does
himself, inserting himself Into obligations which he holds to be
absolute, making them to coincide so closely with this absolute that
507
it is no longer possible to say whether it is duty which confers
the right or the right which imposes the duty."^^^ It is through
the mediation of the paradigm, and the persuasive leadership praxis
that realizes it to the greatest allowable extent within the
restrictions of existential circumstance, that the citizen individually,
and the citizen body as a whole, participates in the political repre-
sentation of Truth-in-history.
The social ist state
. The paradigmatic socialist state is a non-
mil lenial state. It is conceived as the necessary material ground
of democratic politics, not the end of politics per se. Socialism
is the transcendence of corporate capitalism, not the human condition.
As two proponents of the socialist 'idea' have recently insisted,
"There is no heaven on earth."^^'' The socialist state so conceived
would own, and manage, essential productive enterprises, thereby
displacing the highly irrational terms of relation betvyeen state and
economy that presently obtain, establishing public accountability where
'private' decision-making currently holds sway.
The prospect of a socialist state opens its own Pandora's box
of probl ems--most of them centering on the universal problem of
pragmatic pol i t i ca 1 power we have already touched on. A state that is
the legitimate directive and coordinative force of an industrialized
1 1
8
economy harbors enormous potential for abuse.
At the same time existential conditions make the socialist
form the only realistically imaginable form for a paradigmatic polity.
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The irrationalities of the corporate system are manifold and inherent;
Marx's analysis of the negative dynamics of capitalism can only
be considered confirmed by contemporary behavior. Bound by the
principle of (ever-expanding) production for private profit, corporate
capitalism is compelled to pursue policies which have proved to
undermine the health of the entire population, and especially that
of large numbers of industrial workers; irrationally consume scarce
resources; destroy the environment and ignore collective needs
generally; create unemployment; promote weapons growth and general
military expansionism, and, relatedly, neo-colonial i sm; foster the
deterioration of tfie family as a viable social unit £nd undermine
1 1 9community ties; promote urban- decay in its many manifestations.
Corporate capitalism forces the worker to seek dignity
--a
measure of autonomy and self-respect, and the recognition and respect
of others--through willing subordination to an authoritarian pro-
ductive organization grounded in exploitation. Corporate capitalism
Is divisive, setting members of the polity who might otherwise realize
mediating common interests against one another in a fierce scramble
1 20
for security, self-sufficiency, and satisfying \-Jork. Corporate
capitalism sustains a structure of Income stratification altogether
out of step with particular needs, and which breeds resentment,
disunity, a manipulative view tovyard I ntsrpersona ' relations, etc.
Politically these irrationalities are reflected in the current
crisis of the 'welfare state.' While highly constrained in its
policy choices under the prevailing terms of relation between political
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authority and the economy, the state is stripped of its horizontally
transcendent powers as it is nonetheless forced to hold the ring for
successful capitalist production. Viable pragmatic action is im-
possible within the limits of system- i mposed constraints: In order
to maintain economic 'health' the state must subsidize corporate
production in a variety of ways— through direct investment, tax
break incentives, the public financing of technical education, the
construction of such essential inf rastructural facilities as highways,
airports, etc. At the same time, in order to sustain its commitment
to a 'decent' standard of living for the citizenry as a whole (and
thereby its own legitimacy), the state must also act positively to
minimize the impact of corporate capitalism's so-called 'side-effects'
(unemployment, environment deterioration, etc.). In short, the
state is forced to enthusiastically promote the very activities of
a productive system the results of which it finds increasingly dif-
ficult to cope with in an even minimally effective way. Necessarily,
the dollar costs of this bizarre battle, in which the right hand
fights the left, fall most heavily, In the form of high, regressive
taxation, on the ordinary citizen, the primary victim. There is thus
the most extreme maldistribution of benefits and burdens: the corpora.-
tlons realize the oenefits; the citizenry as a whole, and especially
the working and under- classes, shoulders the burdens.
The state is the sole agent accountable to the electorate. It
is the state, therefore, that is blamed for the failures of the
productive system, failures which it cannot, however, remedy under the
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current terms of relation between itself and the economic order.
The result is a widespread disaffection and cynicism, an undermining
of the already tenuous and strained relations between agent and
community, citizen and state. Clearly, not until it is generally
recognised that the economic has a political 'soul'
--that is, not
until a process of planned production is genuinely 'politicized'
through democratic forms of public debate and accountability-can
we anticipate in the current context of pragmatic politics the
v/orkable mediation of the agentic and the communal. Socialism offers
at least the possibility of such mediation, a restoration of the
horizontally transcendent function of the political.
Socialism cannot itself contribute spiritual content, however.
Capitalism is nihilistic, violently so: it devalues values, undigni-
fies dignity, uproots roots, dehumanizes human beings. Socialism on
the other hand can rationally plan production; better mediate the
relation between private and public interests; provide meaningful
work as well as the psychologically secure leisure necessary for
'self-development' (and particularly the cultivation of the life of
reason, the philosophical life, by all who desire it); promote
policies which would sustain community life, and so contribute to the
Stabilization of values. But at this point v/e are yet talking about
form only. So long as we remain at this level, behind the socialist
Ideal of rationally organized life, fulfilling work, scl f-develooment
,
etc., is the specter of society qua well-kept kennel.
511
The current crisis of state and citizenship transcends exigen-
cies of strictly pragmatic existence. The pragmatic crisis has a
spiritual root. It is occasioned as much by the 'success' as the
failure of the productive system, bound up as it is with the
Enlightenment-spawned idea that something akin to millennial fulfill-
ment-self-made identity following the rejection of a world-trans-
cendent God, and an unruffled coincidence of private and public
happiness--could be attained through a culture of labor. But the
hope has misfired, the aspiration itself recognized as a gross mis-
calculation. We have entered the land of milk and hor.ey, and found
it a wasteland, a spiritual desert. As Charles Taylor has put it,
"the notion of a horizon to be attained by future production verges
on the absurd in contemporary America. Suddenly the horizon which
was essential to the sense of meaningful purpose has collapsed, which
would mean that like so many other enlightenment dreams, the free
productive, bargaining society can only sustain men as a goal, not as
a rea 1 i ty . "
The founding of a society on a vacuous spiritual ideal might
be read, in a contemplative moment perhaps, as a bad historical joke,
if so much were not at stake, if the results of its collapse were
not so pernicious, the aftermath so disturbing and fraught with danger
By what source is the vacuum now to be filled? V/ith what stuff will
we build the next 'horizon'? We are back again to Nietzsche's
original dilemma. Hegel believed that the historical pendul um woul
d
swing sufficiently far back to offset the gross worldliness of extreme
godless secularism. The Christian culture would sustain itself
in a secular context. But to understate the case drastically,
the Christian- culture is of doubtful health. Socialism sometimes
expresses itself as the self-conscious bearer of a secularized
"Christian eth i c . . . asp i r i ng toward cqua 1 i ta r i an i sm in a society of
people serving one another." But can these values, originating
in the Christian experience of a common humanity under God, be
sustained without a vertically transcendental reference? Nietzsche
thought not. I would like to believe otherwise, but am inclined to
agree. Strictly secular social i sm wi 1 1 argue to the contrary that
the 'spiritual' groundwork is intact--it is possible to build a
post-capitalist order on this foundation alone. Drawing on
Feuerbachian psychology, it can acknowledge its debt to so-called
transcendental experience whi'e denying the reality of the experience
itself: for religious values are alienated projections of man's own
species-being. It Is only natural in a process of h I stor I o-cu 1 tura
1
evolution that these values are immanent I zed
.
We have already been over this ground. It is disputed terri-
tory, where every point is moot. We have no new issues to open here.
Some will, alternatively, agree that 'transcendental' values
indeed cannot be effectively i mmanent i zed ; that, further, it may even
be true that really stable social order requires a transcendent
reference--a religion--of one sort or another. This, however, does
not make the values themselves true; religion does not for this
pragmatic reason necessarily point to anything real. In this case to
promote the so-called opening to transcendence is really only to
reassert Voltaire's somewhat cynical insight: If God did not
exist, we would have to invent him. But to live with an eye ever
toward an invented God, the argument continues, would be to live-
a life in untruth. (And certainly it would be.) Life in truth
can only be life lived without this false solace, the solace of
invented gods. However difficult, whatever instabilities are thereby
introduced into human order and values, man must simply accept, with
clear eye and bold heart, the fact that he |s_, contra Plato, the
sole 'measure' of his deeds, his world, his life. Man is a rational
being. By his reason, limited and fallible though it be, man must
make the most of his fallible and limited lot.
Once again the disputed ground. There is in all likelihood
no final agreement to be reached between he who affirms and he who
denies the reality of world-transcendent Being. There are perhaps
only questions to be posed one to the other, and positions to be
restated: on the one side the appeal--let him who has eyes see, and
ears hear; on the other the retor t--there is nothing to hear, nothing
to see; what the believer 'sees' and 'hears' is the invention of his
own belief, not evidence discovered by reason. That is all that may
be expected: an agreement to disagree.
Yet perhaps not, or not altogether. In closing I should like
to bring Plato into the argument once more, to consider an argument
of his that bears directly on the issue of this 'rational' impasse.
If it be granted any purchase, it is an argument of capital signifi-
cance. For it is Plato's claim that without God there is no
rationality in the full sense— hence no capacity for truly rational
discussion, and no genuine politics.
Reason and Faith
Our material is the two sophist dialogues, Protagoras and
Gorg I as
. Their themes, in so far as we are concerned here, are
complementary--the real relation of sophistic rhetoric to virtue,
the philosophic knowledge element of the latter, and the grounding
of this knowledge in a transcendental reference. In the course of
the dialogues, the sophist emerges as the practitioner of a nihilistic
pseudo- reason that resists acknowledgment of the triad virtue-know-
ledge-transcendence as the basis of genuine politics. The conclusion
is thus the same as that reached in the Repub lie ; and indeed the
Repub 1 i c is the culmination of the themes initiated in these dialogues.
Protagoras and Gorg i as
,
however, are especially keen on the irrational
nature of thought that refuses to follow through to its completion
in the erotic orientation to the Good. After briefly summarizing
the main movements of the dialogues, it Is this Irrationality we
wish to focus on.
The issue of the briefer Protagor as Is the teachability of
virtue. The question is of the most critical import. On it hinges
the future of the polity. For the polls certainly cannot persist
in healthy form if the youthful citizenry does not somehow develop
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the necessary civic virtues-justice, wisdom, piety, courage.
The sophist Protagoras insists that virtue can indeed be taught.
It is his profession to teach it; he grows wealthy doing precisely
that. Socrates is doubtful. The substance of the dialogue consists
in his 'conceding' that indeed virtue can be taught-but only
provided that the teacher has a sure grasp of the essential attributes
of virtue, that is, that he Is rooted in true knowledge and not mere
opinion as to the good. But it is exactly this knowledge that
Protagoras
,
the teacher for hire, does not have. He in truth sells
a product which passes, in a context of general Ignorance, for food
of the soul, but is in all likelihood its poison.
The more elaborate Gorgias proceeds from the premise that
virtue grounded in knowledge can be taught, to the condition of this
knowledge-- ' rational I ty' In the broadest and deepest sense. The
condition of rationality is that human activity be situated in the
widest possible perspect i ve-- 1 I f e which ends in death, and after
death 'judgement' of that activity according to the standard of
adjustment to the transcendental Good. For it Is only the Good, in so
far as it enters the soul of the erotic lover, that provides the
standard for right action, and so forms the substance of the polity.
This conclusion Is reached through a lengthy process of dialectic--
punctuated throughout by the irrational resistances of Socrates'
i nter 1 ocutors-- I n which the philosopher must overcome several separate
but related sophistic claims: a repetition by Gorgias of the
Protagorean position that virtue can be taught though there be no
sure knowledge of its nature; Polus the pupil's case that virtue
is pleasure and no more; and the enlightened politician Callicles'
threatening claim that human existence is to be interpreted solely
in terms of the stronger or weaker physis that prevails. (The case
of Callicles is especially significant in the context of this
chapter, since Nietzsche undoubtedly drew from it inspiration as
well as specific material for his own anti
-transcendental philosophy
of existence.) The climax of the dialogue (really, of both
dialogues) is reached in the concluding myth of the Judgement of the
Dead. The essence of the radical Socratic call for soirltual re-
'
generation is neither more nor less than the demand that we recognize
the 'standing in' of death in life as the soul-shaping experiential
basis for rational discussion of right life. One might say that there
exists always the pathos
,
an attribute of the human condition itself,
as the precondition for existential community. It is this elemental
spark of comity to which Socrates appeals in his interlocutors. But
without the erotic orientation to the transcendental grand finale of
mundane existence the precondition cannot be actualized. All v;e can
accomplish are rhetorical exhortations to live according to one or
another nihilistic, because ultimately ungrounded, scheme of 'values.'
The Socratic position Is revolutionary in the sense that it
subverts without qualification the legitimacy of the prevailing state
of inverted existence. As we saw In discussing the Republ Ic , the
real atuhority for the right order of the polity lies with those who
have 'seen' the Agathon, not with the barons of existential power.
Opposed are two absolutely different 'forms of life'
— the life of
'knowledge,' or virtue versus the life of 'ignorance,' or 'foolish-
ness.' The resistance of the sophists, in so far as they are repre-
sentatives of the inverted order, is thus quite 'rational' in the
sense of logical comprehens i b i 1 i ty . To follow through to logical
conclusion the Socratic arguments is to understand all the 'great
men' of the pol i ty--Per i c 1 es
.
Cimon, Them i s toe 1 es , Miltiades (see
discussion, Gorgias 515-519. pp. 576-80)--as its real corruptors, and
to recognize one's own soul in a state of disarray and in nesd of
radical reform. The resistance is in essence irrational, however,
because it necessarily means breaking off the arcument before it
reaches its logical culmination. The essence of irrationality is
thus claimed by Plato to lie in the unvji 1 1 i ngness to be drav;r, into
(to 'open oneself to') the realm of the transcendental, the refusal
to grant the reality of transcendental cognition. Rationality is
coincident with Justice, the right order of the soul; irrationality
with injustice, the soul's 'disease.'
The forms of resistance that appear in the Protagoras and
Gorgias are hardly foreign to the contemporary student of political
affairs. They range from the relatively harmless but effective tactic
of obscurantist pleonasm, to the thinly veiled tfireat of existential
murder. In between lies a gamut of myriad methods for derailing
discourse.
We meet the first instance of prolixity qua resistance tactic
in Protagoras' lengthy apologue (320-328, pp. 92-38). Protagoras
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scintillates. Discoursing eloquently on creation, the origins of
politics and the distribution of virtues and talents, embellishing
with myth, anecdote and commonsense wisdom, he purports to illus-
trate the teachability of virtue. At the apologue's conclusion,
Socrates is duly dazzled ("At length, when the truth dawned upon me,
that he had really finished," he reports, "not without difficulty I
began to collect myself.") However, "one very small difficulty"
remains (328-29, p. 99) --Protagoras has sl^irted, by talking around,
the issue of the nature of virtue. This is of course the heart of
the whole matter, and v/ith this "very small" difficulty, Socrates
begins the counte 'attack which proves (though not without further
interruptions of the argument's advance) that Protagoras is, as we
might say, 'talking through his hat' (albeit wittily and with an im-
pressive erudition), without true knowledge. The recurring question
is whether the virtues (justice, etc.) are many, or one. Are they
really just different names for the same thing, or all different parts
of one v/hole? Or are they different things altogether? The Socratic
dialectic, vyhich Protagoras is unable to rationally contravene, leads
inexorably to the conclusion that the virtues are one, united in
knowledge, and that knowledge is the greatest good and the greatest
"power" for man. Protagoras 'knows' none of this, nor vjants to know.
He prefers to talk i nsubs tan t i a 1 1 y to the delight of large audiences.
Protagoras' prolixity is not a 'personality' quirk. Whether
consciously or unconsciously, he knov^s he is ignorant. Ask him a
direct question, and he will give you an answer so long and with so
many digressions that it is hard to remember the original question.
Time and the. limited endurance of the participants will in this
case prevent rational discussion, though it will not prevent the-
speaker from acquiring the reputation that he is an eminently learned
man
.
Faced by the Socratic adversary who sees through the tactic,
hovvever, the speaker will rebel. Mot long after the early apologue,
Protagoras begins "getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be
setting himself in an attitude of war" (333-33'+, p. lOA). immediate-
ly there is another pleonastic outbreak. Socrates pretend5 a bad
memory, pleads for shorter answers that are to the point. Procagoras'
reply brings the resistant, anti -rational nature of the tactic into
the open, revealing the sophist's true interest to be not the truth,
but his reputation--"Socrates ," he replied, "many a battle of words
I have fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which
my adversary desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no
better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been no-
where" (335, p. 105). Protagoras only agrees to adhere to the rules,
the dialogue and rationality saved, when Socrates threatens a walkout.
In the Gorgias, sophist advertising speeches come quickly to
an end. Gorgias, while enthusiastically promoting the nobility and
value of his 'art' (rhetoric), declines responsibility for its bad use
by his students. But the declaimer Is shown to be pretense when the
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great sophist is embarrassed into silence by the vulgar behavior of
his pupi 1 Polus.
Just as Protagoras attempted to undermine discussion through
verbosity without substance, so had Gorgias, introducing digressive
examples of the power of rhetoric {US^-k^l
, pp. 51A-15). So now does
pupil Polus, insisting that his master's art is the "noblest," but fail-
ing to explain its nature. When Socrates brings him to account, he
is indignant over the attempt to repress his freedom of speech-- "What
!
do you mean that I may not use as many v/ords as I please?" (462, p. 520)
Agreeing at last to taper his remarks to rational requirements, how-
ever, Polus pulls some other tricks from his sophistic sleeve. In
his initial outburst he has already accused Socrates of boorishness
for forcing his mater Gorgias Into cont rad I ct I on--"Foi- will anyone
ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature
of justice? The truth Is, that there Is great want of manners In
bringing the argument to such a pass" (Abl
,
p. 519). The unspoken
presumption seems to be that 'gentlemen' of the teaching profession
will to their mutual advantage collude in keeping the secret that they
have In fact nothing of real value to teach.
Socrates is engaged in the most critical of theoretical tasks,
the illumination of the structure of values and right order, In essence
trying to answer the most basic question about man--"Who he is" {hkl)
.
Towards this end he attempts to build his arguments: the unity of the
"true will" of man and the good; the real power 1 essness of the
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apparently most powerful, i.e., the tyrants; the doing of injustice
as worse than suffering it, and the doing of injustice without the
redemption of- suffered punishment as the worst and most miserable
thing of all; thus the doubtful value of a rhetoric that commonly
results in the guilty being pardoned, etc. V/hen Polus cannot
rationally stem the rising tide of Socrates' argument, or alter its
direction, he tries to laugh it down as sel f -ev i dent 1 y ridiculous
(^73, p. 532); and after Socrates has forced him to admit that doing
evil is inconsistent with the true will of the evildoer, he parries with
a psychological slur--"As though you, Socrates, would not like to have
the power of doino what seemed good to you in the State, rather than
not; you would not be jealous when you saw anyone killing or despoiling
or imprisoning whom he pleased, oh, no!" (468, p. 527).
Polus is dogmatically closed to a scale of values superior to his
own nihilistic postion. He will not accept that Socrates himself
believes vyhat he says--"for you surely must think as I do," he insists
(^71, P- 530)- Yet Polus' dogmatic resistance is not itself dangerous,
even if it invites danger. For he is himself a powerless intellectual
who, when he fails to derail the argument, must take his lumps in
passive silence. This is not the case with Callicles, however.
Callicles is an activist, a politician. He has power. His resistance
is backed by the specter of violence aginst the challenger to the
prevailing order of things.
In the exchange with Callicles, the erotic issue, in fact de-
terminative throughout, comes into the foreground. Two variants of
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Eros are joined in battle for the soul of the polity. Socrates
loves philosophy, which culminates in the vision of the Agathon;
Callicles loves the "demus," the 'people' (^481-^82, p. Shi).
Socrates loves the truth, which is constant, Callicles the power
'
that comes, via the changeling rhetoric, from being of the ruling
opinion--"When the Athenian Demus denies anything you are saying
in the assembly, you go over to his op i n i on . .
.
you have not the power
to resist the words and ideas of your lover..." Callicles' case is
complex; we cannot go into it in detail. Suffice it to say that his
primary resistance tactic is one of psychological inversion, the first
and last principle of which is the fist: the threat, and when that
fails, the fact, of violence against the opposition. Socrates only
appears to be adopting a stance of superiority to the common view of
things, says Callicles; in fact, he is really a mob-oratoi— "For the
truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit
of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right,
which are not natural, but only conventional" (^182-^83), p. 5^3)-
Convention is the v/ay of the weak majority; nature the way of the few
strong. The strong are the best, the "excellent," those deserving to
rule and to have more than the rest. No real "man" believes as
Socrates argues that suffering injustice is better than doing it.
Since he considers Socreates "ingenious" and "sly," it seems that
Callicles believes he has discovered and is here letting out Socrates'
great secret--that he is' in the power game the same way everyone else
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is. He would gain power by paying lip-service to pious homilies,
gaining the people to his side in order to displace the current
rulers.
Socrates is able to demolish the case handily. Callicles
assumes a connection between strength and excellence which does
not hold. He 'really' means to argue for "superiority," which is
a matter of justice, not strength. Moreover, the rhetorician who
believes he is pov^erful in his ability to sway opinion is really no
more than a f 1 atterer--he panders to the corrupt tastes of h's
audience with no regard to their good: "a man may delight a whole
assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests" (501,
p. 563)- Callicles attempts to undercut Socrates' rational approach
to the Good by everyv/here pretending ignorance of his meaning, charging
Socrates with "quibbling," and even of "tyranny" (505, 0. 567). He
remains closed to the case Socrates is making--"! do not heed a word
of vyhat you are saying." But the progress of the argument cannot be
stopped, even though Socrates is finally forced to carry on the building
of a positive philosophy of existence alone:
And v;e are good, and all good things are good when
some virtue Is present in us or them? That, Callicles,
is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether
body or soul, Instrument or creature, when given to them
in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the
result of the order and truth and art which are imparted
to them. Am I not right? i maintain that I am. And Is
not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or
arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing^
good Is the proper order Inherent In each thing? Such is
my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her
own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And
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the soul which has order is orderly? Of course.
And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly.





The meaning of the right order of human existence is becoming
fixed through the rational expression of the Socratic eros. The
purpose of pol i t i cs--hence the aim. of all genuine statesmen-- i s to brine
order into the souls of the citizenry. The polity is good if life
within its institutions makes the citizens become better; the statesman
is good if under ii i s rule there is the same improvement. Authority
lies not with those that hold existential power, but those erotlcally
oriented toward tlie Acathon, who have undergone the soul-shaping ex-
perience of beholding it. Cailicles believes he yet holds the ultimate
pragmatic trump--"You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to
invert everything," he jeers: "do you not know that he who imitates
the tyrant v;ill, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him
and take his goods?" (511, p. 572). Here the outer limit of resistance
to rational discussion has been reached--the threat of murder and the
theft of the victim's property.
But of course CalMcles is v;rong. The dialogue nears its
climax now. For Cailicles can only believe the threat of death to
be effective against the philosopher because he resists the 'long'
perspective of time--that is, the time of a person's life which must
end in death, to be followed by the hereafter. The philosopher on the
other hand is ^'ully rational, he has situated life in the long perspec-
tive. He is ready to die. Threats do not move him: "may not he who
is truly a man cease to care about living a certain time?--he knows,
as women say, that no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not
fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way
he can best spend his appointed time" (512, p. 57^).
The logic of the warring variants of Eros is now fully worked
out. There Is initially the bond of common humanity that Is the
existential basis of rational communication. "0 Callicles." Socrates
hod declared at the outset of their discussion, ''if there were not some
community of feelings among mankind, hovyever varying In different
persons...! do not see how we could ever communicate our Impressions
to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I
have a common feeling. For we are lovers both..." (A8l
,
p. 5^2).
it is on the foundation of this commonality that Socrates attempts to
build the structure of his transcendental appeal. But the bridge
proves too weak--Cal 1 Icles will not expose his existential core; he
resists to the end--"! do not heed a word of vyhat you are saylng"--
and communication breaks down.
This, in sum, is Plato's claim regarding rational discussion.
Common human I ty-- the presence of F.ros in every persona 1 I ty-- I s not
enough. It is further necessary for a man to direct his Eros toward
the transcendental Good, and by this orientation to restrain his
"lusts." For the unrestrained man
is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is
incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of
communion is also incapable of friendship. And
526
philosophers tell us. ..that communion and friendship
and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together
heaven and earth and gods and men, and that the universe






From the Platonic perspective the essential prerequisite for
rational I ty--v;hlch, we must remember, is always the rationality of
man in history in search of values and meanlng--ls the existential
stance of faith. It is not specific doctrinal content, but faith
itself and the quest for the living truth-the zetema --that springs from
it, that is a 1 1 - important . The primordial reality of the cosmos, the
recognition of God's presence, Is at once the premise, essence, and
fulfillment of human reason. Anytlilng less is ignorance of what really
matters to man.
Concl us I on
V/e have done no more in this chapter than adumbrate the form of
the dilemma we face. V/hether politics and citizenship will attain
to the fullness of meaning that is potentially theirs depends on
whether or not a specific content can now be supplied. But we certain-
ly cannot supply It here. It is, therefore, time to b-come silent.
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indeed". The Theory and Pract ic e of Political Analysis (Homewood, ill.:
Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 5; quoted in Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology (New
York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 251.
^
"To the question: What can man achieve? we continue to reply: He
can achieve as much as his technics; yet v/e are obliged to admit that
these technics are unable to save man himself
,
and even that they are
apt to conclude the most sinister alliance with the enemy he bears
within him.
"I have said that man is at the mercy of his technics. This must be
understood to mean that he is increasingly incapable of controlling his
technics, or rather cont rolling his ovm control ". Marcel, Ph i losophy
of Existence
,




Kateb, "The Next Stage", p. ^7^- "In the case of abortion, the
meaning is patently clear. A potential human being is treated as so
much organic matter which can be removed from the body as if it were
a tumor".
^ Ibid., p. 475.
^ Ibid. Kateb is quick to qualify: "I do not mean to say that the
secrets of human nature are disclosed; only that some quite dramatic




Nietzsche. VJill to Power. Waller Koufmon and R. J. Holligdalc transUondon: Weidcnfield and Nicolson. I967). p. 9.
Kateb, "The 'Next Stane". p. i|80.
12
Joyrul__Wjs(loin, aphorism // (henceforth designated simply by the symbol
//) 343, in The Complete Works of Fricdric h Ni et/schc (henceforth referred
to as \^r^ksyrio volumes, ed. Oscar Levy In7w York: Russell and Russell
19G/(); vol. 10, p. 275.
Ibid.
,
//1 2^^, p. 168.
Leviatha n, Part I, chapter 6 (Oakeshott edition).
Ibid.
,
Part I I , ch. 26.
Phi losophy of Hi sto ry (New York: Dover Pul.)l i cat ions, 1936), pp. 9- 10.







The Commu n ist Manifesto, in Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Lngels Reader







Ibid., pp. 337, 338.
1 1 I All That is Solid Melts into Air': Marx, Modernism and Modern i-
,
DisserU (Winter, 1978), p. 59. Berman, in this scintillating
piece of arwi lysis, to which I .1111 indirectly indebted, is acutely aware of
the extreme tensions between this personality type and the ideal of com-
munity. "How can any lasting human bonds grow in such loose and shifting
soil?" he wonders (p. 62); "If bourgeois society is as volatile as Marx
thinks it is, how can people ever settle on any real selves?" (p. 65).
But despite these reservations, Berman tends toward the 'modernist' mood:
"The members of the bourgeoisie have alienated themselves from their own
creativity because they cannot be.ir to look into the moral, social, and
psychic abyss that their creativity opens up" (p. 61). Not so the prole-,
tariat: "Because the workers can come through the cifflictlon and fear
only by making contact with the self's deepest resources, they will be
prepared to fight for collective recognition of the self's beauty and
value. Their communism, when it comes, will appear as a kind of trans-
parent garment, at once keeping its wearers warm and setting off their
529
naked beauty, so that they can recognize themselves and each other
and all their radiance" (p. 65). Berman is more than a little uneasy
about the prospects of this communism ever coming about. Having denied
the possibility of transcendence, however, he believes it to be a long-
shot we have no choice but to gamble on.
23
Works, vol. 10, //260, p. 207.




vol . 12, p. 2.
Ibid., #108, p. 91.
27
Twi 1 igh t of the Idols, "The 'Improvers' of Mankind", in Works
,
vol. 16, p. hk.
28




vol. 5, p. 10.
Works
,
vol. 12, Ilk, pp. 8-9.
30
Twi 1 i ght , "Skirmishes in a War with the Age", Works , vol. lb, p. 63.
3
1
See, e.g.. Ibid., p. h3' "The concept of 'God' has been the greatest
objection to existence hitherto. We deny God, we deny responsibility
in God: Thus alone do v/e save the lA/orld". Cf. Ibid., o. 18: "The
'apparent' world Is the only world: the 'true' world is no more than
a false adjunct thereto"; and Ecco Homo
,
Preface, 1(2, Works , vol. 17,
p. 2: "The 'true world' and the 'apparent v/orld'--In plain Engllsh--
the fictitious vyorld and reality..."
W ill to P ower, II, //798, in Works , vol. 15, P. 236.
Use and Abuse of History , Vl! , In Works , vol . 5, p. 60.
Human-Al 1 -Too-Human
,
//25, Works , vol. 6, p. 'O.
Joyful Wisdom
,
#37^, in Works , vol. 10, pp. 3^*0-3^1.
//211, Works, vol. 12, p. 152.
Dawn, ffk53. Works , vol. 9, P- 325; Joyful Wisdom , vol. 10, p. 263-
In places Nietzsche embraces an apparently unqualified necessitarianism;
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e.g. Human-All -Too-Human
, #107, Works, vol. 6, p. 10?: "The completeirresponsibility of man for his actions and his nature is the bitterestdrop which he who understands must swallow if he was accustomed to see
the patent of nobility of his humanity in responsibility and duty. All
his valuations, distinctions, disinclinations, are thereby deprived of
value and become false... he may no longer either praise or blame, for
it is absurd to praise and blame nature and necessity". Cf. Twilight,
#8, vol. 16, p. A3: "The fact that no one shall any longer bFTi"sl^n s I b 1 e
. •
•





Beyond Good and Evi
1




vol. 16, p. 128. "Fitness" in parenthesis is substituted
for the Levy edition translation as "ef f imi nacy" , which is noted by the
translator to have in German a ''nobler ring" than the English ring.
"Fitness is Kaufman's translation.
ho
Use and Abuse cf History, IX, Works
,
vol. 5, p. 81. In Joyful Wisdom
,
#3, Works , vol. 10, p. 3B~ Nietzsche says that the ignoble person "does
not understand, for example, how a person out of love and knowledge can
stake his health and honour on the game. The taste of the higher nature
devotes itself to exceptional matters, to things which usually do not
affect people, and seem to have no sweetness; the higher nature has a
singular standard of value". In #283 (p. 219) he calls the "pioneers"
of the new age "cheerful", "patient", "simple", and "contemptuous" of
vanity; they are men of "magnanimity" and "acute judgment". In #85
(p. 89) we read: "What then makes a person 'noble'? Certainly not
that he makes sacrifices; even the frantic libertine makes sacrifices.
Certainly not that he generally follows his passions; there are con-
temptible passions"; and in #3^5 (p. 280) : "The great problems all
demand great love, and it is only the strong, well-rounded, secure
spirits, those who have a solid basis, that are qualified for them".




#260, vol. 12, p. 228: "In the foreground there is the
"feel i n'g of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, of the haplness
of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and
bestow: the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not--or scarcely--
out of pity, but rather from an impulse of super-abundance of power".
hi
Thus Spake Zarathus tra, Prologue, 3, V/orks , vol. 11, pp. 6-7.
J oyful Wisdom , #125, Works , vol. 10, p. 168: "God is dead! God
rema"ins dead! And we have killed Him! How shall we console ourselves,
the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest
that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our
knife, --who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we
531
cleanse ourselves? What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have todevise? Is not the magnitude of the deed too great for us? Shall we
not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There
never was a greater event, and on account of it, all who are born after
us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto".









vol. 12, p. 228.
bid., #ii3, pp. 57-58: "one must renounce the bad taste of wishing
to agree with many people. 'Good' is no longer good when one's neighbor
takes it into his mouth. And how could there be e 'common good ' 1 The
expression contradicts itself. That which can be common is always of
small value. In the end things must be as they are and have always
been: the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the pro-
found, the delicacies and thrills for the refined, and, in sum, every-
thing rare for the rare".
hi
Ibid., n57, p. 223
h8
"Soc i a 1 i sm--or the tyranny of the meanest and most bra i nl ess , --that
is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the mummers, brought to
its zenith, --is, as a matter of fact, tfie logical conclusion of 'modern
ideas' and their latent anarchy..." Will to Power
,
#125, Works , vol.
14, p. 102.
49
Not that Dostoyevsky knew Nietzsche's work; it is probable that he
never so much as heard Nietzsche's name. Nietzsche, on the other hand,
was familiar with some of Dos toyevsky ' s work. See Lavrin, N ietzsche ,
pp. 128-29.















57 The Legend is incredibly complex, ambiguous, and shot through with
religious symbolism, some explicit, some quite arcane. I am ignoring
all this here for the sake of simply presenting what I believe to be
Dostoyevsky 's main thrust. For a detailed and intricate analysis of
the full breadth of the Legend, see Ellis Sandoz, Pol ijtical Apocalypse
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 197D . On Dostoyevsky


















A more pleasant version of the same fantasy occurs in Ivan's Devil-
nightmare scene (Book 11, ch . 9, pp. 75^-55): "In my opinion, there's
no need to destroy anything. All that must be destroyed is the idea
of God in mankind. That's what we ought to start with!... Once humanity
to a man renounces God... the whole of the old outlook on life will
collapse by itself... and above all, the old morality, too, and a new
era will dawn. Men will unite to get everything life can give, but
only for joy and happiness in this world alone. Man w'll be exalted
with a spirit of divine, titanic pride, and the man-god will make his
appearance. Extending his conquest over nature infinitely every hour
by his will and science, man will every hour by this very fact feel
so lofty a joy that it will make up for all his old hopes for the joys
of heaven. Everyone will know that he is mortal, that there is no
resurrection, and he will accept death serenely and proudly like a
god. His pride will make him realize that it's no use protesting that
life lasts only for a fleeting moment, and he will love his brother
without expecting any rev/ard. Love will satisfy only a moment of
life, but the very consciousness of its momentary life will intensify
Its fire to the same extent as it is now dissipated in the hopes of
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eternal life beyond the grave".
The gnostic notion of the Satanic as the truly good and humanitarian
as against God's evil is here reaffirmed by the confessions of the
Devil himself: "I love people s incerely--Oh, I've been terribly
slandered!"; "my object is an honourable one"; "I'm perhaps the only
man in the universe who loves truth and sincerely desires good" (pp.
750, 759, 761). God's perversion is responsible for the evil actions
of the Devil: "My best feelings, gratitude, for instance, are formally
denied me simply because of my social pos i t ion . . . By some primordial de-
cree, which I could never make out, I was appointed 'to negate' while,
as a matter of fact, I'm genuinely kind-hearted and not at all good at
'negation' " (pp. 75^~55)
.
Ibid., pp. 769-70.
The term "anthropological principle" is Eric Voegelin's. See Order
and Hist ory, vol. 3 ( Plaro and A^ristotle ) (Baton Pxouge: Louisiana
Stace University Press"^ TsSTT, p. 86.
68
The Republ ic of Plato
,
trans. F. M. Cornford (Oxford: Clarendon
P ress, 19^1), 368, pT~kK.
Ibid., A35, p. 121
Ibid., 5A4, p. 261
69
70
This is the famous decline of forms. Regarding the grounding of
Plato's treatment in the anthropological principle, Voegelin explains:
"The psyche is a society of forces, and society is the differentiated
malnfold of psychic elements. The forms can follow each other intelli-
gibly in time because their sequence as a whole is a process vjithin a
soul, that is, the process of gradual corrosion in v^hich the elements
of the psyche are one after the other loosened from their 'just' po-
sition in the integrated, well-ordered soul, until the passions without




Republic, ^35-^36, pp. 128-29: "Surely... we must admit that the same
elements and characters that appear in Ihe state must exist in everyone
of us; where else could they come frcm? !t would be absurd to imagine
that among peoples without reputation of a high-spirited character, like
the Thracians and Scythians and northerners generally, the states have
not derived that character from their individual members; or that it is
otherwise with the love of knowledge, which would be ascribed chiefly
to our ov/n pari of the vyorld, or with the love of money, which one would




for example Stanley Benn's article, "The Nature of Political
V L
^'^^ iic^lopedi a of Philosophy
, ed . Paul Edwards (NewYork: The Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1967), Vol. 6, pp. 387-392,
74
IhePolitics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Clarehdon
Press, 1946), 1323b 30-37, pp. 281-82.
75






Ibid., 480, p. 184.
Ibid., 832, p. 72.
79 Th e Laws
,















507-508, pp. 214- 15.
84








On Aristotle's immanenti zation of the Idea, see Voegelin, Plato and
immanent metaphysics "end in a serious impasse both practically and
theoretical ly" (p. 362)
.
00
The Nicomachean Ethics ,' trans. David Ross (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969 edi tion) , 1 1 r3a 29-34, p. 59.
Ibid., 11773 11, 13, p. 263.
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90
Ibid., 1177b 27-28, p. 265.
Pol 'tics
.
1332a 33-35, p. 313.
See Politics
,
1333a Jff., pp. 316-17.
Ethics
,
1166a Iff., p. 227-28.
Ibid., 1167a 25f., p. 231.
95
Ibid., 1167b 5f., p. 232. The passage continues: "But bad men cannot
be unanimous, except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends,
since they aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in
labour and public service they fall short of their share; and each man
Vvfishing for advantage to nimself criticizes his neighbor and stands in
his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon
destroyed. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting
compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just".
96 The issue of the viability of the nation-state is unfortunately one
which we cannot take up here. The main lines or the proolem seem clear
enough, however. On the one hand the nation-state must, in the interests
of self-preservation itself, be rationally situated in the context of a
cosmopolitan world community. Thus it is easy enough tc make a case for
the anachronism of the nation-state as a viable political unit. But the
central problem of pragmatic political articulation remains. "Mankind",
though of spiritual substance, is an abstraction from the standpoint of
political existence. What exists concretely are ' peop 1 es ' -- Amer i cans
,
Japanese, Russians, etc. Articulation can only arise out of a defined
community, a people which already exists, bound by a common spiritual
outlook. This outlook is fundamental to institutional articulation.
The medieval period did without the 'state' precisely because the notion
of the 'Christian Commonv-yeal th ' found institutional expression in the
Church. But the idea of a universal spiritual articulation of mankind
is a moribund concept; and it seems to me that we are a long way away
from talking realistically about a context for meaningftl pol i t i cal
articulation 'beyond' the nation-state.
97 Politics 1286b, 8-21, and 1302a, 2,
^ For an insightful study of the striking thematic parallels between
Dostoyevsky and Whitman, see Perry D. Westbrook, The Greatness of Man
(New York: Thomas Yoscloff, 1961).
Freud, Complete Works , vol. 21, p. kk\ quoted in John H. Hick, Phi losophy




^ ^ ,See, for example, Anthony Storr's critique of Jung's downgrading
of art in his C.G. Jung (New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 9^-99.
101





Antonio Grumelli, "Secularization: Between Belief and Unbelief",
in Rocco Caporale and Antonio Grumelli, eds.. The Cul ture of Unbel ief
(Berkeley: Un i ver s i ty of Ca 1 i forn i a- P ress
, 1971), p. 8l. "Even granting
that there is not nor could there be a church of secularism or atheism,
we can rightly speak of secularization and atheism as pervasive cultural
attitudes clearly prevailing in various sectors of our society. Socio-
logically, this is an entirely new phenomenon and a far cry from the
object of study to which Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, or Pareto addressed
themselves to several decades ago" (ibid.).
1 03 See, for example, Erazim Kohak, "Religion and Socialism", Dissen t
(Spring, 1978), pp. 17^-185. Kohak estimates that a solid ]2% of the
populations of socialist nations is intensely religious. Discounting
the recent resurgence of 'fundamentalist' religion (which may well be
little more than a retreat from difficult sociological realities), roughly
the same figure probably holds for the 'free world' countries as well, the
U. S. included. Many find the persistence of such a religious core sur-
prising. But Kohak finds the surprise itself surprising: "Through
countless millennia of human history, religious faith has been human-
kind's most persistent and pervasive trait. Even in purely anthropological
terms, Vv'hat separates the human in the full sense of the word from the
naked ape, or even a lavishly dressed one, is the act of worship in v./hich
the subject bows before something that transcends and challenges the self-
enclosed preoccupation with needs and sat i sfact i on-- the encounter with the
Good, the Beautiful, the Holy" (p. 176). This is to be sure a far cry
from so much of the current narcissism parading under the banner of re-
ligiosity. See Christopher Lasch's critique of this pseudo- re 1 i g i on
,
"The Narcissist Society", The New York Review of Books , vol. 23, no. 15
(Sept. 30, 1976), pp. 5-13.
The Two Sources of Morality and Rel igion, trans. R. A. Audra and C._





Ibid., pp. 228, 265.
ibid., p. 227.
There are severe limitations to Bergson's conception. He unfortunately
does not adequately distinguish between immanent and transcendental life
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vol. 30. no. 2 (Summer. I963).
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npLorf^'
Mure "The Organic State", Philosop hy, vol. 2k, no. 90U9^9j for a helpful discussion of the asymmetric character of the organic
analogy. ^
T. S. Eliot. The idea of a Christian Society (New \ork: Harcourt
Brace and World, 19^0), pp. 11-12. '
'
1 1 1
Mure, "The Organic State", p. 212.
Arendt has made a great contribution to reviving the idea of the
'autonomy' of the political against much modern reduct i on i sm. However,
I find her overarching dichotomy of 'politics' and 'society', though
fruitful in many respects, highly artificial and misleading. Arendt
winds up 'reducing' politics in her own way--to 'great' worl d- immanent
act i on
.
Michael Walzer, "Politics in the Welfare State", in Irving Howe,
ed., Essential Works of Socialism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1970); and "Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America", Social
Researc h, vol. Al, no. h (Winter, 1974), p. 609.
1 Hi
I do not mean by this assertion that members of the governing class
must all be ph i 1 osophos-spouda i os . But they must be persons of sound
common sense whose psyches have in fact been decisively formed by the
socially constitutive symbolisms deriving from the transcendental en-
gendering experiences of the philosopher types. What is most important,
then, is not that philosophers rule, but that they exist in large enough
numbers and are of sufficient influence to shape the characters of the
state's leaders.
See Eric Voegelin, "On Readiness to Rational Discussion", in Albert




Michael H. Best and William E. Connolly, The Politicized Economy
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Co. , 1976) , p. 1 78.
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^A problem increasingly recognized by theorists of the left See
JhZr (ru u Ex istential Phenomeno lnnv and PoliticalTl^eory (Ch.cago: Henry Regnery.
^ SnTTWu^^li^^^^
Liberal, sm: Art
. c 1 es of Cone i 1 i at i on?" Dissent (Winter. 1977)
1 19 For lucid discussions of the inner structural dynamics of corporate
capita ,sm, see Best and Connolly, Th^lJ t i c i zed Economy ; and IraKatznelson and Mark Kesselman, The Po1itics~of Power T^Ynrk- Har-





I do not mean to imply that conflict will not always persist It
will. But conflict within a socialist society might well be expected tobe more rational'. There is a world of difference between, say, debate
over pol itical regulation of television programming, and conflict between
working class whites and unemployed black welfare clients.
121
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", Review
of Metaphysics (Fall, 1970, p: ^3.
122
Editorial, In These Times
, March 22-28, 1973, p. 16.
Both dialogues are translated in the Jovvett edition of The Dialogues
of Plato
,
vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1937). Page references in
the text refer to this edition.
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APPENDIX
REFLECTIONS ON THE INDIVIDUALIST DERAILMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Policy Pluralism and Welfare Statism
Pluralism and the common good
. "Policy pluralism" is the natural up-
shot of a political culture committed to non-directive constitutional
order. By this phrase I mean only the main thrust of American con-
stitutionalism restated, more or less what Theodore Lowi imports (in
part at least) by the phrase "interest group liberalism," i.e. that
"the role of government is one of ensuring access particularly to the
most effectively organized, and of rat* Tying the agreements and adjust-
ments worked out among the com[)eting leaders and their claims."^
The irremovable rock in the roadbed of individualist politics is
the immunity of personal, non-rational desire to communa 1 - rat I ona 1 con-
sideration and criticism. Deslre--in the political form of "interest"
--has usurped the privileges of the religious conscience; it is imper-
vious to persuasion from the standpoint of civic virtue. Consistently,
the freedom to pursue interest is exercised, and defended, with the fer-
vor of an unyielding article of faith. Not, to be sure, because it is
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true, but because it is mine , my purchase on existence itself. V/e
see that the deck is stacked against directive political authority from
the start: since interests of necessity belong to individuals (or in-
dividual "groups" ultimately reducible to the sum total of strictly
individual interests), political society has.no leg to stand on but the
aggregate totality of individual interests. This is the ultimate ground
5hl
immediately or ul timote1y--f rom the thrust/counterthrust of pre-politi-
cal interest. The "hidden hand" does not work that well. But the es-
sential point remains the same: the real "action" takes place in the
private space, where each i nd i v i dua 1 /g roup serves as its own principle
of authority.
Whatever appearances to the contrary, this is the point at which
the contemporary crisis of authority in fact first begins to fester,
long before it is ever recognized as such. Prior to the twentieth cen-
tury government could perhaps adhere more or less faithfully to its
strictly non-d i rect • ve function of management; negotiation and bargain-
ing couH serve as more or less exhaustive modes of deciding rivaling
interests (leave aside for the moment the outstanding fact that the in-
terests of the vast majority of citizens were left out of account; theo-
retically all was well)- But the twentieth century sounded the death-
knell of those days when government could in good faith pose as non-
directive arbiter of pre-pol i t i cal interests. It could yet pose as man-
ager, to be sure, but it becomes evident that is must now take a stand
on issues of national importance. Increasingly involved in supposedly
strictly "social" matters through increasing requirements that it pro-
vide services, regulate, etc., the new, "positive" state could no longer
honestly and without major consequence avoid tfie preeminently political
question, viz. what kind of order shall the nation have? What shall be
the nature and structure of the increasingly complex life we all share
in common?
But avoid the question the state did, and does. The "public inter-
est" becomes a hot, the hottest, of issues, whether fully recognized as
Ski
sense is the sam6. There can be no effective mediation because there
is no general good in any substantive sense. Thus present day plural-
ists affirm the purpose of Madisonian politics, to allow "independently
situated" political actors to achieve a sufficient number of objectives
to have a "stake" in the system and so to keep the game going. it is
the "game" itself that is important in and for itself; hence the near
obsessive concern of plural ists for procedure, the "rules of the game,"
the conditions of stability, etc., even to the point of rede'^Ining the
meaning of "democracy" to (approvingly) include extensive citizen apathy
(see below)
.
And if the public interest Is the first victim of the derailmen':,
"justice" is the second. The idea of distributing available "goods" ac-
cording to an objective principle of justice is supplanted by the bour-
geois-bargaining concept of "who gets what, when, hov;." One can surely
hope of "fair" bargaining, i.e. bargaining without bias. The state
should set up rules to keep conflict peaceable and within bounds, and
perhaps even to extend to all "equality of opportunity" to engage in the
conflict. But no more. The public interest and substantive justice are
ridden out of the political realm on the same rail. This is indeed tiie
radical core of liberalism, viz. the conception of a society functioning
"autonomously" with no essential reference to political autliority. The
important, meaningful work of life is carried on outside the political
realm. The management function of government is for this no less im-
portant, of course. The Hobb i s t-Ame r i can variant of liberalism decided-
ly does not anticipate a wholly self-adjusting order to resu U --e i ther
of the non-directive constitutional field, that no "higher" public in-
terest may be either held against, or perhaps more importantly, imparted
to particular interests. As ideological maxim, this is as true today as
at the founding of the Republic; as Truman writes in The Governmental
P^rocess^: "in developing a group interpretation (of politics), we do not
need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not
exist .
"
It is natural, then, that the emphasis of "theoretical pluralism,"
yet the prevailing paradigm of mainstream political science, should fall
so heavily on notions of "bargaining" and "tracing." Thus, e.g., Dahl
writes that in American politic.s "constant negotiations among different
centers of power are necessary in order to make decisions";^ or Riker,
on the President, the chief bargainer: "The political life of the pres-
ident is one of constant bargaining...";^ or again Truman: "The very es-
sence of the legislative process is the willingness to accept trading as
a means. "^ What is important to note is that these modern plural ists
do not simply recognize (as indeed any realistic theorist must) that
politics, as med i a tory/ i n tegra t i on i s t practice, involves negotiation,
compromise, etc.; but that they rather substi tut e trad;rg, bargaining,
etc. for a genuine mediation of particular interef.t and a philosophi-
cally grounded conception of the general good. Lipset is perhaps only
more explicit in his "value judgements" than other pluralist writers
when he proclaims "democracy," conceived as "the give-and-take of a free
society's internal struggles," to be "not only or even primarily a means
through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good
society; it is the good society itself in operation."^ The essential
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such or not. Th6 public expects that the state expand the scope of its
author! ty at the same time that it expands the scope of its activities
,
and to articulate a purpose, or range of purposes, to which the nation
can respond, and to the fulfillment of which the whole body politic can
marshal its disintegrative energies. This implies, of course, a style
of leadership that can articulate the public purpose, and a structure of
partisan organization that can mobilize energies in its behalf. But
to the political managers steeped in the ethos of the bargaining cul-
ture, the prevailing "public" philosophy, the issue proves too hot to
handle. They take, perhaps not surprisingly, the line of least resist-
ance: the issue is shunted aside, by way of parceling out to private
agencies (interes':s) the power to, effectively, forge pub lie pol I cy
.
Thus the structure of the Individualist derailment proves stronger, more
solidly entrenched In constitutional practice, than the exigencies of
twentieth century political existence. The state employs its authority
to shun authority, to adopt (by default) a unified policy of policy
pluralism. This Is the "solution" to the uncomfortable dilemma In which
the state finds itself: the category of public purpose can no longer be
left empty as in the Madlsonian formulation; yet that formulation per-
sists OS the dominant creed. Insisting that no public purpose Is possi--
ble beyond non-directive conflict maintenance. The hard road of reform-
ulating the public philosophy is the road not taken. The easy path is
the policy pluralism which, in Darryl Baskin's works, "allows the regu-
lated, coordinated, or otherwise serviced Interests to decide the questi
of purpose themselves."^ And which, we may add, eventually contributes
5^9
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to a full-blown crisis of authority when the scope and depth of failu
becomes too evident, and the communal pole of being wiM--can--no longer
be ignored.
The upshot of the pluralist structure for the quality of citizen-
ship, we might say, is this: that even were every citizen intensely in-
volved in the political process, the quality of citizenship would be
low; for it lacks the reference to the "transcendent" political author-
ity that ennobles and deepens the quality of public existenc?. But of
course this is not so, there is no mass participation, and vje would be
either blind, or at best telling only half the story, ir we did not
recognize that there is a structure, a power structure, that infuses the
constitutional pattern of policy pluralism. To modify E. E. Schatt-
schneider's cogent criticism somewhat: the problem with the pluralist
heavenly chorus is that is sings with a d i st i net i \'el y capi tal i st--speci
-
fically, and increasingly, corporate cap i ta 1 i s t--accent . This is of
course again but the "bourgeois bias" of modern politics: the chief
business of society, hence, of its loyal servant, the state, is business





throughout the improvements of "commerce" to be accomplished under the
proposed Constitution. Federalist no. 57, for example, identifies as
"the principal objects of federal legislation": "foreign trade," "trade
betvjeen the different States," the "judicious imposition" and "effectual
collection" of taxes, and the "uniform regulation" of a militia whose
9
main purpose is to guarantee a peaceable context for trade.
The fact of capitalist dominance of the political process is per-
haps. now, in no small degree due to the rising crescendo of socialist
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criticism, the outstandi[,g feature of policy formation in American
politics. This dominance most notably takes shape in the insidious
unofficial form of "cl ientel ism," i.e. the mutual dependence and support
of government administrative/regulative agency and its private constitu-
ency (the "client"), as well as in the form of direct lobbying. The
reason for this cozy arrangement is, or should be, obvious enough. Own-
ership/control of the means of production is a ready made pre- pol i t i ca 1
organization of power in the "game" of interest conflict; to the degree
that every society is "economic," economic interests are always the out-
standing Interests, end control of productive resources the most power-
ful of economic interests. In so far, further, as the power exercised
by even the most self-consciously authoritative state ;s ineluctably re-
lated to the organization of power in the "private" spPiere, it is quite
clear that democratic politics under contemporary conditions is incon-
ceivable without a socialist rearrangement of economic relations. But
we would grievously err in viewing the relation of non-governmental/
governmental power in a "substructura 1 /supers t ructu ral " manner. Power
in the private sphere does not of its nature automatically translate into
political power. For such a transformation to occur the government must
have already capitulated, it must have already renounced its capacity
and its responsibility to articulate a shared common purpose. In the
individual istical ly derailed political culture, power is in this sense
always "in the streets." The state comes to the starting gate without a
principle for organizing power in pursuit of public ends, without any
standard according to which the citizenry as a whole might be called upon
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to regulate and direct its "passions." Acceding to the constitutional
"philosophy" of policy pluralism, the state undermines its own ability
to educate the citizenry as to the proper ranking of interests, because
it agrees to the illegitimacy of any interest not "subjectively" defined
in the strict sense, that is, egotistically. Similarly it renounces its
own capacity to coerce to just ends, allowing the coercive power of domi-
nant interests free rein, and allowing further its own ideal self, the
power of the organized community, to become a v/eapon of particular inter-
ests in the war of all against all. Hence the state is from the first
involved in the crisis of authority long before it realizes as much;
the multiple contemporary crises of social disintegration only bring the
long existing truth into focal av/areness.
The an t i -pol i t i ca 1 impact of the vyelfare state . Welfare s tat ism, oc-
casioned by the twentieth centur/ eruption of America Into a full-fledged
mass society, presupposes a notion of universal recognition, and there-
fore of apparently substantial "equality-" It is now presumably not only
the pov/erful "interests" that have the state's ear, but whoever holds the
citizen status. Yet the "equality" afforded by the welfare state is too
well suited to the essentially ant i -pol i t i cal vision of Individualistic
mass society. It is, as Sheldon V/olin says, an equality without its
"sting," "a welcome requirement of administration. ° Welfare state
visibility is, practically, visibility vis-a-vis a set of uniform bureau-
cratic rules. It is of course much easier, as Hobbes knew, to govern
according to a set of uniform rules. Individual differences can be dis-
counted, and concrete individuals treated as simple members of an homo-
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genous mass. The price, however, Is fearsomely high:
.igaln, the trade-
off between substantive justice and "fairness" in the distribution of
minimal security. Even as it elevates all to equal status, the welfare
state undercuts appeals to "extraordinary" efforts of citizen virtue,
hence the very concept of "excellence" In service to the public Interest,
and reduces all to clients, recipients who take a number and wait their
turn; and the numbers are of course. In principle at least, Infinite.
Thus insofar as the positive state addresses the mass cf citizens,
the unpowerful non-participants, it does so as much on individualistic
premises as when It accomodates the powerful, participatory "interests."
Again, to be "free" is to be secure in one's private space and this alone,
to be protected against various sorts of Interference in that life, indeed
to a variable extent even to be provided, If need be, with tlie means to
secure one's private well-being. V/e need not be contemptuous of this
commitment to security or dishonor its contribution to human dignity to
recognize its severe shortcomings regarding the quality of citizenship.
Though fruitful insofar as it bespeaks a state obligation to guarantee a
measure of private happiness, the equation of freedom and security is a
relatively barren concept from the standpoint of the distinctively public
good. The state retains the limited posture of an instrument designed to
guarantee protection, maintain order, mitigate conflict. The citizen, for
his part, retains his status as hermetically occluded actor, or more
truthfully in the case of mass man, a non-actor. The "sharing" of these
citizens begins and ends in the uniformity of their singular relation-
ship to the manager-state: I am related to the state as you are, and you
are as he is Our "commonality" extends no further than this, the sin-
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gularly experienced perception of distance from "our" government, an
experience by nature subject to endless repetition, hence distinguished
by its quantitative rather than qualitative character.
The positive state therefore only reinforces the presumption of
citizen "self-sufficiency" and political passivity so long as the indivi-
dual citizen's security is tended to, so long as his "rights" remain in-
tact. Welfare is therefore essential to meeting the constitutional im-
perative of conflict maintenance, by vjay of its role in restricting ser-
ious conflict to the few with the pre-pol i t i cal organization and material




payoffs of Mao i son i an "ambition." It is in this sense a rela-
tively inexpensive "buying off" of a potentially discontented, because
unequal and underprivileged, underclass comprising the greater part of
the citizenry. The price of the stereotyped gocds distributed by the wel
fare state is passive obedience. Even v/here the v/elfare state is suc-
cessfully "invaded" by "out" groups vyho want "in" (or who want "more"),
usually witli considerable justice to their claims, rebellion quickly
metamorphos i zes into passive acc|U I escence : victory signifies only an
essentially [)rivate victory, a right to enter the roster of "pressure
groups," none of which participate in sliared community, but rather have
simply managed to successfully slice off their own piece of the pie;
and for the average welfare recipient it is a thin slice indeed.
Despite massive external changes on the face of the liberal state,
the essential visage remains unchanged. Not a line of the original
creed has been rewritten: every truly meaningful dimension of life is
private; only management/cjdmi n i st rat ion attains to a public significance.
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We have already bad a glimpse of one particularly serious consequence
of the derailment: the accountability of mutually dependent centers of
private and public power is lost to the mass of citizens. Now the un-
accountable bureaucratic organization of knowledge, expertise and con-
trol tends to place these centers of power not only outside the effective
control of the citizen body, but outside the orbit of comprehension as
well. The presumption of passivity is deepened: even should the citizen
be stirred to action, he finds the access points to the "system" severe-
ly restricted. Thus the seemingly inexorable trend accompanying the
transition from market to monopoly, or neo, capi tal i sm--towards in-
creased organisational centralization, incessant technological innovation,
increased occupational specialization, heightened interpersonal competi-
tion for decent work (this in tlie very teeth of the imperative for "coop-
eration") --proceeds unchecked, extending and reinforcing a constitution-
ally engineered isolation and aversion to the political. And thus even
as the conception of the state qua instrument is reaffirmed, the condi-
tions for violent tyranny are established. For the relatively few par-
ticipants in the pluralist routine, the issue of "control" need not
arise; over the objects of their concern, their private goods, they al-
ready exercise considerable control. For the multitude of welfare con-
sumers, however, the issue of control is very much alive; not surprising-
ly: the vulnerability of these "numbers" to bureaucratic manipulation
is notorious. From the conception of persons as passion driven members
of a mass that must be subjected to some form of external organization
follows the treatment of these persons as mere functional units
in the
scale economies of private and public planners.-
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Nor can we expect the Hobb i s t/ 1 i bera 1 state to go "beyond" welfare
as security provider-control agent; welfare is its most "positive" ex-
pression, the fulfillment of its basic premises. Its ultimate failure
is not that it is inherently incapable of extending the status of equal-
ity to all, but rather that despite its contribution to the visibility
of the individual, it results in another sort of invisibility, this one
perhaps more disabling than the first: that is to say, the entire spec-
trum of commun ion--the multiplicity of cultural projects which more ser-
ious and perspicacious political philosophies have considered the justi-
fication and purpose, at once "immanent" and "transcend-nt," of politics
and the state--becomes invisible to the blind eyes of i nd i v i dua 1 i s t i cal
-
ly derailed polity. Finally, then, even private good is threatened, in
so far at least as it involves such unstereotyped collective goods not
subject to distribution on an individualistic basis. This is of course
the point, as we have already seen, at which the dialectic of the author-
ity crisis really takes hold, where authority fails to mobilize virtue,
and the absence of virtue undermines authority: the result (l am
tempted to say necessary result) of a centuries old dream of a sys-
tem "so perfect no one will need to be good" (T. S. Elict), the dream
of the Madisonian machine.
Po 1 i t i c al Behavior: Violence, Corruption, and Political (M i s) Educa t i on
Violence. "Violence," Rap Brown once remarked, is "as American as apple
pie."^^ And so it seems. Born in violence in the 1770s, and having re-
newed its covenant by blood in the l860s, the Republic has throughout
556
its history been'prone to a high degree of "normal" violent turmoil:
from minor local rebellions and vigilante brutality, to racist terror,
industrial violence, urban riots, assassinations, etc. But if America
bears the mark of Cain, it has not necessarily been affixed by extra-
ordinary powers. Rather it follows, in part at least, from the nature
of the constitutional system, from, that is, the lack of a truly com-
mon space and the tradition of civility that it enjoins. For, we will
remember, "ambition" is su ppose d to counteract "ambition"; it is the
fuel for the interest driven managing mechanism. Everv individual by
nature, it is the presupposition of the cons t i tat i ona 1 order, resists
the transfer of his personal authority io the authority of others,
these others being either other persons or the communal authority, each
alike perforce incapable of employing power disinterestedly.
Of the course the process is meant to function smoothly, and above
all, peacefully. But despite its prescribed function of conflict main-
tenance, the state's inability to rule "neutrally' to the public good in
fact conduces to blur the critical distinction between acting "inside"
rather than "outside" the system, thus in fact, against "federalist
theory, encouraging the proliferation of "illegitimate" "onflict. As
Frank Coleman has put this point, the distinction between legal and il-
legal pursuit of private gain appears to political and would-be political
actors alike as simply that between "latent" and "manifest" violence.
Those who take the law back into their own hands are not act-
ing according to principles which differ from those groups
who are in possession of power and who would be prepared to
act illegally were the outcome of public policy threatening to
become substantially different. There is no true distinction
between the manifest violence of the Qut-groups who commit
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infractions of the law and the latent violence of the groups
possessing power.
I sm
In brief, the "operative realities" of the prevailing constitutional
create a vacuum of value relativism, which can only be filled by the
aggressive will to realize one's own particularity. The advantage or
disadvantage of this behavior to others, to one's fellow citizens, is
of no concern to the "independent" actor. Hence normal political prac-
tice becomes of necessity a species of nihilism. And nihilism is in-
herently violent.
A p'-oneness to violence, moreover, strikes me as intrinsic to any
political culture that accepts the identity of power and violence, as
American culture certainly does. The equation is unfortunately not the
mark of the conservative alone, but a sentiment shared across the poll--
tical spectrun,. C. Wright Mills, for example, writes in T he Power El I te :
"All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is
1 3
violence." This is a serious, a very dangerous, confusion. To be
sure. It proves a great conceptual aid In the demys t i f i cat I on of lying
ideologies that serve as masks for the truly monstrous violence committed
by the powerful against the powerless, the "In" groups and their poli-
tical lackeys against the exploited and abused "outs." But It too easi-
ly degenerates into an impoverished Ideology which affirms the worst and
most basic presumptions of i nd I v I dua 1 i s t I cal 1 y derailed polity, insist-
ing that all politics is and must be the struggle for domination among
competing pre-pol I t i ca 1 interests. With liberalism it denies the "trans-
cendent" category of the public Interest, and the notion of power as the
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means to realizing that interest. For the left this confusion perhaps
found its worst expressions in some of the 1960s' celebrations of vio-
lence, following Fanon, as "therapeutic," at once a grand political
gesture and an incomparable mode of self-expression, of "authenticity"
and 1 iberationist style. But this narcissistic, "personal" politics is
no invention of the left; its primary ground is in the political cul-
ture itself.
By this I do not mean to imply that violence is never justified.
To the contrary. Precisely because of the poverty of political com-
munity and civility, causes of justice, as well as unrequited demands
for private satisfaction, are virtually compelled towards violent mea-
sures. The "rules of the game" are notoriously stacked agaitist both the
majority Interest and issues of the greatest common concern; the most
legitimate claims are excluded, as it were a priori. Moreover, in re-
cent years past, the government itself has seemed bent on subverting the
constitutional order (as, for example, when Nixon invaded Cambodia, and
Indeed throughout the whole Southeast Asian disgrace). Where else, at
this point, to decide issues than in the streets? A fortiori, the fault
is with the an t i -communa 1 logic of the system itself, which instills from
the start a propensity to violence on the part of the aroused citizens,
whatever their motives, fair or foul. Especially when frustration, an-
ger, and moral indignation mix and are mobilized directly against the
government, a particularly acute dynamic of violence is liable to take
hold: the citizens, having exhausted normal channels, explode over a
long neglected issue, convinced that only militant action can achieve
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results. The government, on the defensive, for its part insists on ex-
ercising its Hobbist privilege (imperative!) of sustaining order through
police power. This of course only increases the culpability of the state
in the eyes of the dissident citizens, strengthening the conviction that
extreme measures are In order. The state responds with still greater
repress iveness .... Round and round we go.
And certainly the state j_s^ cul pabl e. It is, to be sure, the govern-
ment which perpetratas the greatest violence, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. For this very reason it understands the language of vio-
lence, and is, somewhat paradoxically, more likely to respond favorably
to violent as opposed to peaceable ou tburs ts--at least as long as these
outbursts make sense within the parameters of the constitutional system;
that is, so long as they are couched in the comprehensible lexicon of
"welfare," "interest," "bargaining," "negotiation," etc. When dissent
invokes another language, the language of a different order, the de-
railed state can only judge the dissenters mad, or enemies of order as
such, or simply look stupidly on their behavior In a state of unpretended
incomprehens ion.
Politic al lying and corruption
.
Corruption and lying, it can be argued,
are never far from the center of concrete practice In the political
realm. The mantle of strictly morality, after all, is thrown off at the
political threshold, left to the private province of women, children,
1^
and the naive faithful. But the constitutional tradition stemming
from The Federal ist , I believe, goes beyond the hard facts of Realpoli-
tik to actually encourage these nefarious political practices, and to
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allow them an unparalleled measure of tacit legitimacy. "Petty" cor-
ruption in particular seems intrinsic to the prevailing political or-
der, arising directly out of the bargaining culture. It is a climate
that presumes the predominance, the incorrigibility, of egoistic im-
pulse, a climate because of this presumption distinguished by the per-
vasiveness of interest-calculative transactional relations. Should we
then be surprised that influence peddling and arrangements of personal
expedience and self-aggrandizement on the part of public officials ap-
pears, in the eyes of these officials (and a reasonably cynical citizen-
ry), to be simply part of the "game" of normal politics? It is not, to
be sure, that corruption is considered on the up-and-up. It is rather
like unnecessary roughness in co.ntact sports: infractions are not sup-
posed to occur, one can be punished for violating the official rules,
but of course they do occur, and it is well recognized all round that the
payoff for a v/ell executed violation often far exceeds the risk. When
skilfully committed, sin has its virtuous aspect. The practiced crimi-
nal, indeed the dev-l himself, must be given his due. Only in politics,
players and referees are commonly indistinguishable; the warden is usual-
ly out to lunch; and the devil is given free rein to roam the earth.
V/hen the high criminality exposed by the Watergate revelations
flooded public awareness, the cynics who pronounced that "all politicians
do such things" were therefore right, it seems to me, to be cynical, even
if wrong in a more general way to believe that the operative rules
could
not be other than they are, to expect and demand no better
behavior of
the most highly placed officials. For there is in principle no
differ-
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ence in the venality that keeps lesser palms greased from school
boards to state legislatures, and that which erupted into the greatest
political scandal in national history. There was only a difference of
scale, the difference between "petty" corruption and "high crimes and
misdemeanors." I do not mean to berate this difference; the difference
in scale is surely an important difference; but only to suggest that the
various forms of public corruption have a common source in the two
hundred year old "tradition" of Madisonian political practice, a tradi-
tion, I dare say, not because of, but largely only in spite of which
high standards of public behavior can be sustained.
The logic of criminal "cover up" stems from the same source, if
from a somewhat different aspect of that source. Fo' whatever misdeeds
have been committed, "order" in the polity must be sustained, the func-
tion of "management" must not be allowed to lapse. The very same mis-
creants who v/ould readily go so far as to subvert the constitutional
order itself in their zeal to realize Its operative principles are sud-
denly transformed, in their own eyes at least, into the beleagured guard-
ians of the order itself, all that stands betv/een civilization and chaos,
a full-scale plummet into the state of nature. The V/atergate crisis had
therefore to be "managed" so as to prevent a further livening of politi-
cal debate on the crisis, and as importantly, on its causes and histori-
cal antecedents, its rootedness in the very structure of the polity, lest
this public interest have a disorderly impact.
The ethic of management by deliberate falsehood has become a stan-
dard trick of the trade, an i nd i spens i bl e administrative "skill." It
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perhaps reached its apotheosis in the presidential "management" of
the Vietnam War, througout which, as the Pentagon Papers finally re-
vealed, a policy of deception and propaganda was deliberately aimed
directly at the nation itself, not only at the citizenry, but at the
president's own legislative partners in management. Successive presi-
dents, in their zeal for "public relations," apparently took their cues
from the manipulative fraud of Madison Avenue. The now-standard method
for getting into office, the si.bst i tut 'on of the production and sale of
a marketable image for political education to genuine issues, is ex-
tended to conduct wi tnin office; the relationship of statesman to citi-
zen (betvyeen statesman and statesman!) is transformed wholly Into that
between the advertiser of a political commodity (a shoddy one at that)
and an undifferentiated mass of consumers. With the war, the president
could trust neither the Senate to participate In the conduct of the most
critical of "foreign affairs," nor the public to know the truth about
that conduct.
Similarly, the war itself can be viewed In pa''t as an effort in
management-- the management mentality extended to world scale. The
United States projected the image of omnipotent manager to the world and
to itself; and It was the I mage that had to be serviced and maintained
at all cost. Arendt makes this last point in her sssay "Lying in Poli-
tics."
The ultimate aim (of the war) was neither power- nor profit.
Nor was it even influence in the world in order to serve
particular, tangible interests for. the sake of which prestige,
an image of 'the greatest power in the world' was needed and
purposely used. The goal was now the image i tse 1 f . . . . For
this ultimate aim, all policies became short-term interchange-
able means, until finally, v/hen all signs pointed to defeat in
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the war of attrition, the goal was no longer one of avoidinghum.l.at.ng defeat but of finding ways and .eans to avo d ad"mittmg it and 'save face.'^S
Itself the issue of a derailment, the management model is thus given to
another particular derailment of its own. Because its function is to
manage reality, it will, where necessary, where, that is, reality gets
a little too unruly, substitute for concrete reality, the simple, veri-
fiable factual truth, its own image of reality, an illusion which it can
handle, and which assures its control. The praetorian guards of order
assure themselves: we have the power, we have the rationality, the means
of calculation and prediction, we can stabilize and destabilize at will.
The managers then, who might, as all politicians do (are perhaps forced
to do at times), lie and deceive successfully, lose sight of the very
distinction between ::ruth and falsity. What are in fact lies appear to
them as the truth; deception has given way to self-deception, a totally
disabling condition for both leader end led. At this point, when the
common has been reduced, or nearly reduced, to a tissue of lies, the
statesmen can neither judge nor learn; they certainly cannot teach the
people how to judge. One can only wonder at why the crisis of authority
is not deeper than it is, has not already had more devastating con-
sequences.
Pol itical al ienation
. The most severe effect of American constitution-
alism in the present context is the broad-scale exclusion of the great
majority of citizens from meaningful political Involvement. The exclu-
sion from involvement, or broadly speaking, "participation," is twofold:
F i rs t , exc 1 us i on from participation in the sense of playing the "game"
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of private satisfaction pursuit; or, more precisely, the vast majority
is encouraged (where necessary, forced) to accept the minimal security
provided by the welfare state as exhaustive of their fair share of satis-
faction, while the "big boys" go about translating their private inter-
ests into public policy. In short, the majority "are for much of the
time only spectators in the drama of political decision-making."^^
Secondly, and more importantly, there is exclusion from "participation"
in the sense of shared orientation towards collective, genuinely "pub-
lic" purposes responsibly articulated by political authority, and serving
as the focal point of political education and the mobilization of civic
energies. As we have seen, the two forms of exclusion are closely
re 1 ated
.
It is reflective of the depth of the long brewing crisis that is
now upon us thac citizen "apathy" is integral to the political order.
As is well known, gross non-participation extends to even the most
minimal activity of voting: roughly forty-five per cent of the American
electorate vote regularly; forty per cent never vote. And few voters,
it v;ould appear, genuinely care about the outcome of elections, or vote
with a sense of "political ef f i cacy • " ^ Such statistics are certainly,
as Dennis Thompson has remarked, "for citizenship theorists no cause for
pride." Neither should they be, however, any cause for surprise. In-
deed, widescale apathy is nothing is not indicative of the remarkable
"success" of the constitutional scheme. it has quite successfully helped
to produce citizens "more concerned with formal justice than with friend-
1
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ship, with interest than with brotherhood, with S.E.S. than with honor."
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That is to say, that despite all pretensions to the contrary, the de-
railed polity has performed the eminently "communal" function of poli-
tically educating the citizenry. While early as well as later plural-
ists embraced the illusion that they merely described the common lot of
mankind, ths constitutional ideology has in fact helped to create and
sustain a common, or rather pseudo-common, a political community that is,
because almost wholly bereft of virtue, divided against itself. "Other
political theories," Martin Diamond observes, "had ranked highly, as ob-
jects of government, the nurturing of a particular rel'gion, education,
military courage, c i v i c-sp i r i tedness
,
moderation, individual excellence
in the virtues, etc. On all of these The Federal i st is either silent,
or has in mind only pallid versions of the originals, or even seems to
20
speak with contempt." Generations of Americans have responded to the
negative, contemptuous genius of the Madisonian Legislator: either
through the active calculation of the economy of private gain, or the
knov/ledge that, in any case, they are "marginal to the area of really
important decisions," that "to become 'engaged' politically will no
21
doubt only lead to frustration...." All too sensible in either case
is the repression of the communal pole of being i r, favor of celebrating,
or at least settling for, the individualistic and the strictly agentic.
The identity of the citizen has no focus In the state, his being knows
no reference there. The civic spirit sputters before the collective
perception of the alien and incidental, if not openly hostile, charac-
ter of politics and government.
Nowhere does analytic, "theoretical" pluralism better affirm its
566
commitment to Madisonian polity than in eulogizing this death of civic
spirit. Voicing accolades for the value of system-sustaining apathy
was, at least through the post-World War II period until the mid-six-
ties, quite in vogue. E.g.: "we need some people who are active in a
certain respect, others in the middle, and still others passive Only
the doctrinaire would deprecate the moderate i nd i f ference
.
that facili-
22tates compromise" (Berelson); "There is political activity, but not
so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and
commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it
2^
Is held in check" (Almond and Verba) ;^ "The most we can expect is that
(the average citizen) will participate in the choice of decisionmakers
and that he will ask to be heard if an issue comes along which greatly
concerns him...." (Milbrath); the majority's apathy is "nobody's fault
25
in particular, and it is time we stopped seeking scapegoats" (Sartori).
As with the Founders, so with the theoretical plural ists is virtue and
political education displaced in favor of maintaining the political
mechanism: "stability" is yet the supreme value; only the historical con-
text has changed.
In their analyses of this context, theoretical p 1 ura 1 i s ts-- i n this
respect too like their Federalist forbears--have been quite "realistic."
The/ recognize all too well that citizens in mass democracies are dis-
organized and ignorant of political issues, but nonetheless volatile: in
their very ignorance and disorganization they are dangerously vulner-
able to demagogic manipulation, as such perpetually potential dynamite
to "democratic" political existence. With the intense ideological strug-
gles for domination that mark modern history serving as exper lent i al /con-
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ceptual control,' the plural Ists fear above all else the breakdown of the
"open society" and the emergence of totalitarian regimes expert at mani-
pulating the irrational cravings of the masses for "transcendent" poli-
tical community. In this respect, what has perhaps been too often over-
looked by tne critics of pluralism is its persuasive "common sensical"
purchase on certain outstanding quandaries of modern political society
as revealed in the lurid light of twentieth century experience. Their
own ideological functions aside, small wonder is it that plural ists have
considered the fundamental "democratic" problem to be -."hat of insuring
a controlled leadership that is at once securely insulated from the in-
fluence of the ignorant masses whose v^idescale participation could only
bring the house down, setting up the conditions fo r ext remi s t , and final-
ly terroristic, politics. The watchword of a generation of political
scientists has been Schumpeter's openly elitist conclusion: "The elector-
?6
al mass is incapable of action other than as a stampede."" Thus the
problem for "democratic" government, as Milbrath puts it, is that of
27
"maintaining a balance between responsiveness and the power to act"
free of decisive mass influence. In short, the problem of ruling wi th-
ou t the major i ty
.
But never less than here has common sense served as an adequate
interpretative key to history. The plural ists seem nowhere to consider
that the reality they depict might be not a necessary, but a deeply
pathological condition. On their view, the majority of citizens, not
the polity itself, is "sick." Nowhere do they speculate that the human
condition, limiting though it is, might yet offer more room for improve-
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ment than is immediately evident, that a state practice involving the
whole citizenry just might be poss i b 1 e wi thou t derailment into Hitler-
ian demogoguery, whereby the apparently ironclad ] og i c--"Extreme inter-
est goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanati-
cism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout
28
the community"
--does not hold. In their myopic thinking, the plural-
ists prove themselves imprisoned yet within the constitutional cage of
the individualistic bargaining culture, and the imperative of conflict
maintenance.
In their passion for presbyopic realism, the plural ists cannot ap-
preciate the inner connection between derailed individualism, an indivi-
dualism shorn of the idea of spiritual personality, and the very condi-
tions of mass society they deplore, and would guard the Republic against.
Hence the renunciation of the sc-called "classical" theory of democratic
citizenship which, it is insisted, rests upon obviously fallacious as-
sumptions regarding the ordinary citizen's absolute responsibility,
29
native rationality, and immediate will to the public interest. In its
place, pluralism promotes a model of system-maintenance in which the
citizenry is called upon only to perform the minimal function of select-
ing governmental leaders: "democracy" is defined as the competition among
elites for the privilege of managing the system. Again, Schumpeter has
provided the orthodox formulation: "the democratic method is that insti-
tutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which indivi-
duals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for
30
the people's vote." For this it is only necessary that "enough" peo-
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pie participate to sustain the consensus that keeps the peace. "It is
a fact that high participation is not required for successful democra-
cy"; "The comparative infrequency of political participation, its
relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weak-
ness of the ordinary man allow government elites to act. The inactivi-
ty of the ordinary man and his inability to influence decisions help
provide the power that governmental elites need if they are to make
dec i s i ons ."
The irony here is that the political authority thac would be pre-
served is by the very effort at preservation undermined. To a cne plu-
ral ists are concerned that the "vital fact of leadership" (Schumpeter)
not be "ignored." Yet they seem never to consider that leadership might
involve more than managing "political realities"; that officials might
be responsible for i nstruct i ng the citizenry, by word and example, on
the right practice of politics generally, and salient issues in particu-
lar. There are at least a couple of distinguishable, but related theo-
tetical issues involved here. First, it is clear that "activity" and
"participation" is conceivable to pluralists only on the Madisonian
model of self-assertion and vyill to realize particular interests which
are theniselves wholly dependent on the irrational "values" of diverse in-
dividuals; thus the certainty that heightened involvement could only
compel "fanatical" politics in face of an intolerable system overload.
Secondly, there is an assumed equation of respons i bi 1 i ty (of leaders)
with inf lexibi 1 i ty . The issue is always posed in terms of a dichotomous
either/or: either the people somehow decide beforehand on desirable poll-
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cies they then elect officials to carry out; or leaders, with "their
inherently greater sense of the realities of the situation within which
they must act,"^^ are elected to do in their wisdom what they must, to
be held accountable for their deeds taken as a whole only on next elec-
tion day. Phrased this way, in terms of a strict i nstrumental i sm en-
compassing both alternatives, the former is easily dismissed. For of





vague; issues is usually impossible,""^ expec i a 1 1 v when agreement relies
wholly on uneducated, particularistic opinion.
Against the "classical" prejudice, too many hands spoil the demo-
cratic broth. The question for citizenship, then, "is not so much
whether citizens are active but whether they have the opportunity to
exert control through activity when they wish to do sc-"^^ We need not
deny the importance to democratic polity of either control or the op-
portunity for extraordinary political engagement to refuse them as ac-
ceptible subst i tutes for political education and a sustained orientation
(of leaders and led alike) towards the genuinely common and public.
The very fact of substitution is only one step short of crisis.
Denied the support of shared political sensibility, the insulated lead-
ership is deprived of living contact with the citizenry. The best ef-
forts of pluralist political science cannot bridge the yawning gap, the
pernicious polarization, that develops betv/een the government and an
aggravated, increasingly dissatisfied, uninvolved, "alienated" citizenry,
the most striking expression of vjhich is the utter lack of institutional




which citizens can act a_s_ c i t i zens
.
that is. in common. The voluntary
associations, where they exist, are poor and improper mediators; the
relation to the common weal is shallow, contingent upon private sat
faction. Nor is the representative/party system able to fill the void.
In the first place, the modern representative system is founded squarely
on the individualistic premise. The principle of "one man, one vote" in
meeting the utilitarian imperative of leader selection wholly displaces
the transcendent sense of "representation" of a shared collective exist -
ence, of these men in this h i story--pol I t i cs in the true sense. It
takes more than one to make a common; the voting booth is in truth a
poor place to be a citizen. The parties themselves, so loose, fragmented
and decentralized that in Congress voting along party lines seems more
the exception than the rule, moreover do not even imagine their task as
genuinely mediatory, but as "aggregative" vis-a-vis p re-pol i t i ca 1 in-
terests. And even in this function they are failing fast, as forty year
old aggregate coalitions break apart; the number of "independent,"
maverick representatives in Congress increases each term; and presidents
are elected on vague, bodiless promises to restore "trust in government,"
boasting proudly that they owe nothing to no one, suggesting instead of
existential mediatorv forms a quas i -myst i ca 1 union with "the whole
people." The upshot of the new wave of "independence," of course, is
already predetermined by the constitutional frame, viz. the even greater
vulnerability of the system to thos pre-pol i t i ca 1 interests with the
greatest muse 1
e
. High sounding phrases and the best of intentions, so
long as they remain out of touch with an organization of popular pov/er,
inevitably crack on the hard rock of insular interest. And out of touch
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must they remain- so long as the mediatory forms do not exist to put the
"common man" in living political contact with the public focus (which of
course must first exist); that is, so long as the structure of constitu-
tional practice remains fundamentally intact.
An active, institutional mediation can alone give sense to the much
abused yet critical democratic concept of "consent," and bind the indivi-
dual citizen in his freedom to the political community. Political media-
tion is the self-conscious expression of what I call the "agent i c/com-
munal tension," which I believe I do not go too far in calling the very
essence of practical politics. Especially in this time of crisis is it
the meat of the matter, even if at the moment we seem restricted to a
meatless diet. V/ithout a radical reform of the public philosophy in the
direction of a mediatory organization of the citizenry, bounded on the
one side by the multiplicity of agentic social forms which indeed con-
stitute the vitality of the social order, and by a clearly articulated
communal, public interest on the other, there is no chance, i believe,
for a solution to the contemporary crisis of authority. Indeed, there
is every reason to anticipate either a rapid slide into a genuinely
Hobbist state of nature, the bellum omnes contra omnes ; or, should the
reactionary, policing strain of the American sovereign gain an unmiti-
gated upper hand, the unexpected realization of pluralist fears: a top-
down repressive organization of society of totalitarian, or near total-
itarian proportions. These alternatives are not, surely, mutually exclu-
sive. Before the drama comes to a close, they may indeed emerge as blood
kin in the last bitter scenes from the American marriage of pathologi-









Thus, as Wolln has observed, the liberal concept of man was not_ that
of a supremely rational agent. On the contrary, liberalism struck a
rather strict dichotomy between reason and desire, and declared the lat-
ter the prime mover of men. Morality itself was the product of desire,
human feelings uninfected by ideas. Reason had only to determine the
most efficient means to ends designated by passion. When liberalism
did begin to stress the moral /rat ional restraint of non-rationel drives,
it tore itself apart. The liberal psyche is thus dominated by a passion
it cannot (must not) fulfill: "capitalist society was defined in terms
of voluntary se 1 f -mu t i 1 at i on . " See Po l i tics and Vision (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown and Co., I960), pp. 322-333.
3 David Truman, The Governmental Proce ss (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951 ) , p. 51 . Cf . Schumpeter '5 remark in Capitalism, Socialism and
Democ racy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950): "There i s . .~7no such thing
as a uniquely determined common good that all people CDuld agree on or
be made to agree on hy force of rational argument." Schumpeter's com-
mon good, however, is something of a caricature; he calls it "the ob -
vi ous beacon light of policy, which is al ways simpl e to defi ne and
which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argu-
ment." (My emphasis).
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